US transit costs and how to tame them
I'm joined by Alon Levy of NYU's Transit Costs Project, whose work documents how expensive it is to build transit in the US relative to the rest of the world. We discuss how countries like Spain and Italy build cheaply by relying on in-house public expertise and standardized designs, while the Anglosphere is captured by a costly ideology of privatization. Levy explains how applying these lessons could make ambitious projects like high-speed rail in the Northeast not just possible but affordable.
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David Roberts
Hello everyone, this is Volts for July 30, 2025, "US transit costs and how to tame them." I'm your host, David Roberts. The US has a problem β and it's not just an economic problem, but a social, political, health, and climate problem. It's just this: it is extremely expensive to build public transit here. And it is simply impossible to have sustainable modern cities without public transit. Itβs not a moral question but a matter of geometry: it's the only way to fit all the people.
Anyone who has traveled to a European or Asian city knows that a better way is possible. There are plenty of countries and transit agencies in the world that build quickly, competently, and, relative to us, cheaply.
It is precisely this disparity between the US and the rest of the world that is the focus of the Transit Costs Project at New York University's Marron Institute. For several years, scholars there have compiled a comprehensive database of international transit construction costs. In 2022, the project issued an influential report summarizing what had been learned about why costs escalate and how to contain them.
That report was followed by a series of reports attempting to apply the lessons to model how projects in the US could be done faster and at reasonable cost. Most recently, there was a report on how to do high-speed rail in the US Northeast and a refreshed version of a report on how to enhance US rail service elsewhere without going full high-speed rail.
To discuss US transit woes and how to solve them, I am thrilled to have with me today the co-founder of the Transit Costs Project, author of the reports in question, and something of a fixation for transit nerds in recent years: Alon Levy. We are going to dig into how the US got into this mess and how to get it out.
Alon Levy, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.
Alon Levy
Thank you for having me on.
David Roberts
I've been looking forward to this for ages. You know, the more I've dug into urbanism stuff and transit stuff, the more your name keeps popping up. And then I saw the report on high-speed rail, so that seemed like all the excuse I need. But before we get into that, maybe let's just have a minute or two on your personal background. You were getting a PhD in math, as I understand it. How did you go from there to where you are now?
Alon Levy
I mean, I can talk about how you can use chaos theory to model bus delays, but this is something I only figured out many years later. So I went to Columbia for grad school, and I was socializing with various political bloggers in my first year of grad school. So I was trying to get from Morningside Heights, which is kind of tucked into the northwestern corner of the city on the 1 train, to events that were all over, disproportionately in places in Brooklyn and Queens, which are poorly connected with the 1. I constantly went by subway. I constantly had to think about the system, and a lot of it comes from having to think of it as a user.
The other thing is, also, this was 2006, 2007, and Ezra Klein had just released the Health of Nations. Now, at the time, it was just two-pagers on healthcare and how very basic things about healthcare worked in the US versus a bunch of peer countries.
David Roberts
Yeah, I remember that.
Alon Levy
Yeah, that was what introduced the efficiency argument for universal healthcare into American discourse. And the important thing is not that he did that. I mean, I knew the numbers about American costs already, and so he became a superstar on this. It's the notion that Americans actually are interested in this. This was well before the Chinese explosion in subway systems was still under construction at the time. So, at the time, New York was still one of the maybe top five, top ten subway systems in the world. But I was just curious how the others worked.
And somehow I got into looking at the construction costs and the biggest one in Tokyo. And then somehow I started falling down the rabbit hole of looking at construction costs while Second Avenue Subway was happening. And years later, I made that a career, essentially.
David Roberts
Yeah, the contrast between Tokyo and New York is bracing on this subject.
Alon Levy
Yeah. And the thing is, Tokyo does not build particularly cheaply. I only compared New York with Tokyo in maybe 2009, 2010, because I wanted to look at the biggest. But Tokyo actually has above-average construction costs and is not building very much.
David Roberts
Oh, really?
Alon Levy
Yeah, yeah. They have a lot of difficulties acquiring property. This is a very Japanese thing. And it's not how high costs, where high costs are elsewhere, but in Japan, the property law is atypically difficult. So, for example, the subway extensions have to go under streets because you need to buy the easements if you're going under buildings. These are expensive. It's also why Tokyo is so rail-oriented, because all of these things that raise the cost of property acquisition and make subways more expensive to build β I mean, a subway is a two-track line. The right of way is, with ancillary, with platform rocking, 15 or 18 meters.
Now imagine how much right of way you need for an urban freeway. And the result is that the Tokyo urban freeway network is underbuilt relative to its size. Because it's not that they don't have motorways β they have motorways, they have freeways. But if they don't have a lot of them, there may be two or three lanes in each direction and not four or five because it would be prohibitively expensive to acquire the property to build massive urban freeways. So in Japan's case, the property rights law in Japan that makes it more difficult to build infrastructure happens to make it even more difficult to build urban freeways, which is one of the reasons why the biggest Japanese cities are so rail-oriented.
David Roberts
So you got interested in these comparative questions and then started basically a project within the Marron Institute specifically to study these disparities β why they exist and what explains them, what are the factors involved. I'm sort of curious before we jump in. Just like you say Tokyo is a little above average construction costs. Who is, when you talk to people, sort of your golden standard, like, based on all this comparative work, who, what country is hitting the golden mean in your eyes, like, getting it right?
Alon Levy
So the one that's probably most recognized as building inexpensively is Spain. Spain has very low construction costs, but honestly, it's generally true of Southern Europe. So Portugal is identical to Spain on this. Italy probably very similar as well. Turkey is very cheap. And unfortunately, because Turkey is maybe, let's call it a 1.5th world country, not a first-world country, what we found is that people kind of ignore it. So when we talk about how Turkey works really efficiently, people assume it's just because the wages in Istanbul are much lower. But it really isn't. No, they really are very good at this.
Greece is good. The Nordic countries used to be amazing. They no longer are, but they're still fairly good. And Latin America runs the gamut. There are some places in Latin America that approach Spain in how efficient they are. For example, the Dominican Republic, the Santo Domingo Metro, is rather cheap to build. I don't know anything about it, except that I know that the idea of building it was inspired by New York, just because there's such a big Dominican community in New York that politicians go there to do a lot of fundraising. So there's that kind of soft power.
David Roberts
Is the US the worst or just close to the worst? Is it literally the worst?
Alon Levy
So New York is unambiguously the most expensive.
David Roberts
In the world?
Alon Levy
Yes, and it's not particularly close. Who is number two? There are a bunch of American cities, but also some non-US ones. Generally, when you think of the worst, you should be thinking of places that work in English. So that would be the US. Canada was, up until about 25 years ago, pretty normal and has gone nuts in the last 25 years. And at this point, Toronto has a very solid claim to being the second worst in the world. Hong Kong, really bad. Singapore, also pretty bad.
David Roberts
Hong Kong, interesting.
Alon Levy
Yeah, nobody believes me when I talk about how expensive, because people say, "Oh right, they have a government that could do whatever it wants so they don't have NIMBYs, their unions are completely defanged." All this is true. And yet Singapore and Hong Kong both build really expensively. I think Hong Kong is worse than Singapore, but I don't have enough data to be confident in that claim. And kind of through learning of bad ideas between British Thatcherites and Singapore and Hong Kong, they've kind of exported these bad ideas throughout the English-speaking world. This is what's going on with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, same issue.
The Gulf states obviously don't work in English. Technically, they're all Arab countries. But they're marinating in so much of this kind of international starchitecture, and they're maybe bringing in international consultants to buy some kind of prestige. And the result is that they too are really bad.
David Roberts
Well, let's get into it β so you've got this original report, sort of the original point of the project.
Alon Levy
Yeah, the 2023 one.
David Roberts
Yeah, yeah, just to lay out, sort of like "What are the big reasons?" So I want to kind of go through some of the big reasons why the US is so expensive and then talk about, you know, because you've got these two reports that I really found interesting. One is on how to build high-speed rail in the Northeast at a reasonable cost. And the other one is just how to sort of not build high-speed rail, but improve US rail, at least boost it up to medium speed. Faster than it is.
Alon Levy
Yeah. There are different claims for it. I mean, so Nolan Hicks, the author of the β let's call it Medium Speed Rail report, Momentum β uses different terminology. I like using the expression medium speed, but I am also aggressively not a marketer. And so the American terms for that is higher speed rail, which I really hate because higher connotes faster than high speed, which is the exact opposite.
David Roberts
Medium does not inspire anyone.
Alon Levy
I used to call it low-speed rail, but I mean, it's fine. I mean, not everything needs to be made of gold with diamonds in there.
David Roberts
So I want to go through some of the big reasons why US transit is so expensive and then sort of try to apply them to like this New York high-speed rail project. Sort of like, how do you solve this problem in practice? And the place to start, I feel like the main problem, if you had to identify one, is basically institutional failures. Governance issues, basically. And to me, one of the most intriguing things that you found, and I'd love to hear you talk about this a little bit, but basically, like when you find someone doing this well, you find them doing it in-house, in government. Government owns it, government experts are analyzing it, government departments are building it.
Like it's so funny in the US, you know, there's this mythology that government is inevitably inefficient, but you've found basically the opposite on transit costs. So just talk a little bit about that.
Alon Levy
Sure. And I will point out, by the way, that this myth of inefficient government and efficient private sector consultancies, this is exactly the set of institutions that have been adopted in, let's call it the English-speaking world minus the US β the US have slightly different institutional failures. It's specifically people who are β and previewing to something slightly because we're starting to do a London case. And the origin of all this is becoming a lot clearer because I only saw kind of what they were looking at this, how they were looking at this in the Nordic countries, which are β they are influenced by English-speaking ideologies.
When I was researching this, as I said, the Nordic countries used to build as cheaply as Spain. They no longer do, but they still build at below-average costs. And I've been reading what they're doing with procurement, and they essentially take it for granted that better privatization equals better projects. So what they were doing is they were looking at different countries, and all of the countries that they were looking at were in northern Europe. They don't deign to learn from southern Europeans or Eastern Europeans, let alone non-Europeans in Scandinavia. And so they were comparing various Nordic countries with the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland.
And they were just taking it for granted that there was more involvement of private consultants in early project decision making in the UK and the Netherlands as, "Oh, this is more advanced." And in Germany and Switzerland they don't do any of that, so that's less advanced. It was not taken as a point that one needs to argue. It was taken as something that's obvious, like economic growth is good is not something that people feel the need to justify. Or unless you're specifically writing for Thatcherite publications, you will say lower inequality is good. And you will not need to justify that.
And it's the same. They were treating more privatization of project delivery as obviously good. And they weren't even noticing how in the 1970s, the construction costs for the London Underground and the construction costs for the U-Bahn in, let's say, Berlin or Frankfurt or Munich were the same. And by the 2000s, which is when that report that I'm referencing right now is written, British costs were about twice the German costs. And looking at London right now, it might at this point be three or four x.
David Roberts
Well, I mean, I don't want to get off into sociology here, but what you're describing here is very bizarre to me. Like I say, economic growth is good, and I don't have to argue for it, but if I did have to argue for it, I'd have a ton of evidence. Whereas if I did want to argue that privatization works better and produces lower-cost projects, there's almost no evidence for that. Like, almost all the evidence is the opposite. Like you have this myth that has a total iron grip on national leaders across the world that is based on almost nothing as far as I can tell.
Am I exaggerating?
Alon Levy
Only slightly, because there is some evidence that privatization improves certain things. And from there they assume privatization improves everything, even things that aren't actually privatized. What I mean by not actually privatized: if it's something where you can have a lot of private competition and very loose government involvement, for example, let's say private airlines versus a state-owned national airline, then that is something that privatization is better at. But project delivery always involves the state. And one of the issues is: what is the problem you're trying to solve with privatization? So if the problem is that government doesn't work, then the issue is that privatization itself is a government program.
Now you may be able β no, I'm serious β so often the positive examples that are cited in Washington Consensus for privatization, these are examples of the government handcuffing itself. Something like saying, "We are currently in a reform mode, but we know that we will not be able to deal with lobbyists who will want special protections for their own industries. So we're going to, in the next few years, disempower ourselves because this is our window to disempower the lobbyists." And you see this a lot with, for example, tariffs.
This is why the Washington Consensus is so pro free trade, because β and you see this right now with the Trump tariffs β tariffs are so discretionary that they tell industries, "Don't buy better plants, don't invest in productivity, buy politicians, make sure to lobby to be one of the winner industries." So, for example, a government program that disempowers a future president from wielding this kind of weaponized tariff system, maybe returning it to Congress, or at the very least not giving the president this kind of absolute discretion. That would be a way of disempowering the government, saying, "Okay, right now we're in a reform window and we can disempower ourselves in the future so that we do not succumb to lobbyists."
None of that is the case where you're privatizing project delivery for infrastructure. That is the difference.
David Roberts
Why is that different? What is it about project delivery that escapes the magic of privatization?
Alon Levy
It's always public. The decision, "Do you build a subway? is public." You can be extremely privatized, which is, for example, what's going on in Canada. Again, they like doing a lot of privatization of project delivery, or in Gulf States, the UK, and so on. But the decision, "Do we build a subway in the city under these streets?" that is a public sector decision. The funds are always provided public sector. There may be some kind of private financing model, which is often just a way of having off-book debt at very high interest rates. So in Italy, the project delivery is overall not at all privatized.
But some of the extensions that they were building in the Great Recession, they chose to have some kind of public-private partnership, some P3 for financing, in order to keep the debt off books. And in the debt crisis, and then you look at the contracts, and I think it was in Milan, for how much they were paying the concessionaire and how it was structured β payments per rider. And so the bottom line of this was that based on the expected ridership, it boiled down to the state borrowing off books at 8%. Now, Italy was never Greece; Italy was never at a point where 8% was better than just having a slight deficit for this.
Nobody would ever question a deficit for long-term infrastructure. The troika are not morons. The troika understand where most debt comes from, and it is not from infrastructure investments. If you're saying, "this is for infrastructure," people understand in the same way that, for example, if there's a war or a crisis that might lead to war, like right now with Ukraine, people are very understanding, or they're saying, "Okay, we need to increase military spending off of debt," because it's understood that this is not politicians trying to buy votes or anything. This is about a war that none of the European politicians started.
David Roberts
Isn't it also the case, like if you're building a private, you know, private airline or whatever, you really only have to please your customers. But when you're building public projects, there are certain service obligations you have to the public that would not make sense in a free market context.
Alon Levy
Correct. So you could always find corner cases where you could maybe even make a profit on, for example, a subway line. But they exist, they are rare. My standard example is in San Francisco. This could be done under Geary Boulevard just because the bus ridership there on a parallel street is very high. A subway there would just be extremely justified, and I hope that the city is capable of building that. But it's so justified that with good enough cost control, the private sector could make a profit on it. But it's not going to be a very large profit.
Every person there with money can probably make a better profit investing in tech.
David Roberts
But also, insofar as the public has to spend more to meet these service obligations β you know what I mean β more than a private developer would have to pay in some cases. It seems like in those other cases where there's value to be had, the public should get that to offset the former. Do you know what I mean? Like, why should we decide that any time there's profit available we should assign some private entity to skim that off? Like, why not?
Alon Levy
Yeah, exactly. It's a huge problem with, I don't know what to call it, maybe hybrid systems where there may be bus shuttles that can make a profit in core markets. You live in Seattle, right?
David Roberts
Yeah, yeah.
Alon Levy
So I don't know Seattle buses well enough. I don't know how well you know Vancouver, but Vancouver has a bunch of core buses where you look at the operating cost per rider and it is, I'm not sure if it is still less than a Canadian dollar per ride, but 10 years ago it was less than a dollar and already then the fare was two-something. So there are situations where you have maybe a jitney, these street-hailing jitneys that just go on the busiest routes and essentially skim off all of their profits. Tel Aviv has a lot of that.
Or inner New Jersey, the suburbs, the densest New York City suburbs in New Jersey have that. And in Jersey they've kind of bullied New Jersey Transit off of these routes. For example, they do things like they block bus stops or they make sure to always, instead of arrive exactly in the middle between two regular buses for maximum frequency, they arrive just ahead of the bus.
David Roberts
That's so annoying.
Alon Levy
Yeah. So, yeah, these are things that, when it's possible, you do need to regulate that so that they don't skim off the profits and weaken the network effects that you're getting out of all of this.
David Roberts
So one of the pieces of the governance critique is this is farming stuff out to private consultants and stuff to no obvious savings. The other sort of big governance critique is just fragmentation. And I think this is particularly bad in the US, which is just in any given setting you've got city authorities, county, state, municipal, federal, and no one is clear exactly who's in charge. And no one's clear exactly where the buck stops.
Alon Levy
Yeah, exactly. And it's not just American, it's also in the US and UK. The UK is much less fractionalized. But the kind of the mentality in both cases is that agencies aren't really empowered, unless, in the US it has to be a political appointee who tells them do it. In the UK it's either a very senior civil servant, one who's a generalist and didn't come from the department, or the minister. So often it has to be a ministerial approval, which is just a crapshoot whether you get a good minister for something.
David Roberts
Yes.
Alon Levy
And even that can only build very big projects, and it's harder to do small ones unless you empower the civil servants.
David Roberts
So I'm guessing the people who do this well and cheaply empower the civil servants who have their hands on these systems to make decisions about which small lines β you know what I mean? They're not waiting on political permission.
Alon Levy
I mean, to an extent. So the decision to build a subway extension in Stockholm or in Milan is political. Now there are mechanisms that inform the politicians. So the advice of various organizations. There's going to be a benefit-cost analysis, which is not done in the United States. It is in the United Kingdom. So I think the US should be doing benefit-cost analyses, but it's not going to solve the problem, it's just going to lead to better project selection. But if it's a megaproject, then the politicians have to make decisions.
And often these projects are good enough that they're, let's call them bipartisan. So, for example, Crossrail and High Speed 2 in the UK were bipartisan. Labour, the Conservatives both supported them in the early 2010s. And the expansion of the subway in Stockholm was called Nya Tunnelbanan, New Subway. That was something that was decided in the mid-2000s. The center-left coalition was obviously for it. The center-right coalition was a little bit skeptical, but they approved it because the benefits were very clearly very good.
David Roberts
So this is the main thing I wanted to talk to you about because at once the governance problem seems to me the biggest and most obvious. There are others obviously, but these are the core to me β the US obsession with consultants and privatization is the original sin. And a lot of the other problems you list are sort of downstream of that.
Alon Levy
I will say "Yes, but..." So the obsession with consultants is unambiguously the biggest problem in English-speaking countries that are not the United States. In the United States it is a problem, but it is not the only problem. The US in general just has very little empowerment of public sector engineers, for example, to the point that when they are empowered, they're empowered to say no. And then it's on the politicals to say, "No. I know you said no, we're going to do this anyway." And that's where you get fractionalized situations where in Bellevue, Washington, the fire department refused to certify a light rail station that did comply with the state fire mandate because they wanted overcompliance.
So it's this kind of thing, and it can be done even when it's not β the fire department could be a municipality trying to extort betterment.
David Roberts
Everybody's empowered to say no. Almost no one is empowered to say yes. And almost everyone is empowered to say no.
Alon Levy
No, a lot of people are empowered to say yes, just as these people are the governor. Or if it's a big enough city like New York, it can sometimes be the mayor. And this requires taking responsibility. These are not people who take responsibility for anything.
David Roberts
Yes, right, right.
Alon Levy
And, but yeah, no, it's this kind of constant scourging of the civil service that civil service needs to have some kind of maybe political commissars or some kind of DOGE overseers. And nothing good ever comes out of it because at the end of the day someone's going to need to make all these decisions. And when they try to use the consultants as a maybe more politically pliant second civil service, the results are awful. Not because the consultants are bad at their jobs, they're not. The consultants are just mismanaged. They are told things like "study everything." So, okay, so that means that they're going to study even rather stupid alternatives because they're told to study everything, and it's easier to do extra work than not to do the extra work or to push back against the client.
And it's everything else involved with that, it's things like a project delivery that maximizes conflict.
David Roberts
Wait, wait, hang on, before we get past the governance things, because I want to talk about this in reference to your proposal for β
Alon Levy
For high-speed rail.
David Roberts
Yeah, high-speed rail in the Northeast. Because, you know, insofar as you've identified these problems, you're trying to show how they could be solved in proposing these projects. And this is why I want to dwell on this governance problem, because it seems to me both the most difficult and the most difficult to solve. So sort of your proposal is to centralize decision-making about Northeast rail. And just to be clear, like the Northeast high-speed rail in the way you're describing it involves, I don't know, like, I didn't count, but like 10 states. There's a lot of states involved and thus there will be a lot of agencies involved, a lot of actors involved.
And you are proposing to basically create an agency that will coordinate construction and scheduling and et cetera. But I just, like, stumble on that because I wonder, like, it makes sense from a 30,000-foot point of view. It makes sense from a total, like if you want to do the total project as cheaply as possible, it makes all the sense in the world. But if I'm one of those agencies, if I'm one of those states, I jealously guard my power. I'm often more interested in my power over a little corner of the thing than I am in the total cost of the larger project. Do you know what I mean? So, like, yes, political economy-wise, how do you pry control out of the hands of these agencies? I mean, how is that supposed to happen?
Alon Levy
So there was this spiel I just gave you about empowering the civil servants, and that is more for urban transit. And for the Northeast Corridor, there're kind of two opposing forces pulling on this. The first force is that mainline rail in the United States has awful systems. And when I say systems, I mean mainline rail is managed really poorly. There are all these things that all of the insiders know that are just wrong. In Toronto, they tried to modernize their commuter rail just now, and they're doing quarter measures essentially because the old-timers at GO Transit/Metrolinx just don't think of commuter rail as a form of public transit.
They think of it as something very weird that can only be understood by people in North American railroading. And the result is that the Berlin S-Bahn, the commuter rail in Berlin, has approximately the same ridership as every American commuter rail system combined. The idea in the United States that people can learn anything from German commuter rail is anathema, at least within these agencies, including Amtrak.
David Roberts
Yeah, I should just say, like one of the problems you identify is the US's complete refusal to learn anything from the great examples that surround it in the world.
Alon Levy
Exactly. This is especially bad in railroading just because it's kind of its own thing. And they're convinced that the US is the best freight rail system in the world β Russia and China are better, but democratic Europe west of Ukraine genuinely does not have very good freight except for a handful of landlocked or very mining-oriented countries. So Switzerland, Austria are good. Sweden and Finland, and the Americans refuse to learn from these as well. And no, a lot of it is refusal to learn. So often what I found when selling this report is that the insiders of the agencies keep telling me that certain things are impossible that happen thousands of times a day on this side of the pond.
David Roberts
I mean, that is US politics in a nutshell right there: being told that things are impossible that other countries do routinely.
Alon Levy
Yeah, but it's often much more extreme than that. It's not like it's impossible to have universal healthcare. I think it's understood in the United States that there's universal healthcare in basically every other first-world democracy. And the question is how to get there. But this is not, "Oh, they have this, but it's hard to get there." It's things like, "Oh, we can't use these kinds of switches on these kinds of tracks," or "We can't run these kinds of timetables," or "We can't coordinate bus and commuter rail timetables." And the answer to basically all of these things is "Yes, it's possible."
So that's kind of a negative factor. As I mentioned, there are two kind of veiling forces there. This is the negative one. The positive one, when you were asking about the state and agency turf issues β that they prefer to own a small fief to being part of something bigger and more successful. The positive thing is that the commuter trains in the United States are so poorly run, so poorly used, that there is a lot of surplus that can be produced just by running them better to the point that it even betters the service within the state for the kind of riders that they care about, which in this case is nine-to-fivers, people who kind of like Don Draper or Pete Campbell in the seasons of Mad Men when they are shown taking the trains that are today Metro-North (at the time were not yet called Metro-North) from the suburbs to Grand Central.
And Pete Campbell takes the same train every day and sits at the same time, seats, and gets to know the same four people. So just very traditional, that commuter rail mentality that thinks it's still the 1950s and 60s, that people still travel like that. That's the only service that they care about. And the problem is the service they provide is so terrible that you can get into a situation where Greenwich, Connecticut, for example, could get faster service to Grand Central on an all-local train than it gets today on an express train because the timetables are so fragile, the way they're being written, the way they're not being coordinated with infrastructure at all, the way that each train is its own thing, that they need to add something like 25% or 30% to the timetable of every train and professionals add 7%.
Seriously, there are a bunch of things that can be done that are either free or inexpensive that will make local trains faster than non-stops on Metro-North today. And so there is surplus even for the riders who are currently the most privileged. And I don't mean the most privileged in the sense of being rich, although they are, but in the sense that they are considered the core service for the commuter rail.
David Roberts
So your promise to states here is that by participating in this larger project, you will also get local commuter rail improvements by coordinating things at a higher level.
Alon Levy
Exactly.
David Roberts
Things will work more smoothly even in your local corner.
Alon Levy
Exactly. For example, in both Maryland and Massachusetts, they run diesel trains under the catenary on the Northeast Corridor. And in Massachusetts, what's going on is they're aware that they should probably electrify, but they have never run electric trains on the MBTA. And this is really important because maybe you think of electric trains as less polluting than diesel trains, and they are. But electric trains have a very long slew of benefits over diesels and no drawbacks whatsoever, except that you need to pay two strings of wires. And this is a line that is already fully wired. So electric trains are cheaper than diesel trains to buy and maintain.
They're just not used to them. So they don't know how to spec them out correctly. And they come up with these compromises because, again, they're institutionally not very familiar with how to run good service. And yeah, there are outsiders like TransitMatters in Massachusetts who are screaming at them about this, but again, they're not used to it.
David Roberts
Well, I'll just say that I'm a little skeptical that even the promise of local benefits is going to move bureaucrats.
Alon Levy
I will say that it is moving them in Massachusetts and in Pennsylvania. The issue in Massachusetts and Rhode Island is not the quality of the tracks. The tracks are largely already built to high-speed rail standards. The extra work that needs to be done to them ranges from none whatsoever to extremely cheap. And the main issue is that there's heavy traction with commuter rail north of Providence. These are slow diesel trains. They do Boston to Providence in well over an hour.
It's an hour 10, maybe. The intercities do that in 35, 36 minutes. And if they wanted, they could do it in 25 if they made fewer stops and if they used better equipment. And so they need to timetable them together. They need to have the fast trains overtake the slow trains. And the best way to do that is to speed up the slow trains. So this is where the thing that improves intercity service is literally just speeding up the commuter trains.
David Roberts
So it's making local service better that serves making the larger system work better.
Alon Levy
Exactly. And again, this is a Massachusetts thing. And a Maryland thing. In Maryland, I will say it's Amtrak's fault for how it was scoring MARC (Maryland Transit Administration) over on electricity. Not entirely, but it is predominantly Amtrak's fault. In Massachusetts, Amtrak was trying to be accommodating. The MBTA just doesn't care. And it's not exactly a turf issue. The MBTA is interested in a lot of other aspects of modernization that are within its history or within what it's used to. So the other thing you need to do is to not just electrify the trains, but also raise all the platforms so that you could get on the train without climbing steps.
David Roberts
If you have this unified control and procurement. One of the things you talk about is how terrible procurement is currently. And basically, long story short, US transit agencies end up with very expensive, not particularly well-performing equipment. And part of what you're talking about doing to get around that is allowing this centralized authority to open up bidding on equipment internationally to allow all these international firms who do this much more often and much better to come sell their equipment in the US, which, again, like makes all the sense in the world to me in terms of getting better equipment and better service and a better system, but is also extremely counter to the political tenor of the times.
Alon Levy
No, you don't need to. So for better equipment on commuter rail, you don't need to centralize, you just need the agencies to know how to write an RFP. And the problem is they kind of don't. So they maybe hire a consultant. So I saw SEPTA (Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority) write an RFP for new train sets. That was how many hundreds of pages? Maybe 500. Amtrak wrote one that's a thousand pages. Just to put it in perspective, a Spanish RFP for the same thing is 70. So they just overspecify. They try to define what a train is instead of trusting that the vendors know what a train is and just say, "We need the following things. This is the service we're trying to run. These are the dimensions of the train." β so that they manufacture them to the right specs.
And then that makes it much easier forβI won't say the international vendors, but international in this context means European. The American regulations were realigned in 2018 within European regulations effectively and maybe also Korean. But Japanese and Chinese regulations are very different. So Japanese vendors that want to do business in this situation have to essentially Europeanize, like Hitachi essentially bought European plants and European patents and is effectively a European train vendor. The same way that the Ford Focus β yeah, it's called Ford, but it's a European car made in the United States.
David Roberts
So just better procurement, more professional and effective.
Alon Levy
More willingness to β if you're not getting federal funding, you're not subject to Buy America, just buy foreign. If you're getting federal funding and you're under Buy America, you can still handle it because these vendors do have American plants. But be very standard. And by standard I mean standard European, non-standard American with your RFPs and make use of these modernized regulations, which the commuter agencies have not so far because they're just very conservative. They're used to β they believe what works for their grandparents works for them. And the thing is, fewer people today, and I don't mean today, 2025, because of cars.
Fewer people in 2019 entered the business district of Manhattan between 8 to 9 in the morning than did in 1960. Way more people entered the business district on the 24-hour scale, but all the gains were off-peak.
David Roberts
It's just not a 9-to-5 commuting world anymore.
Alon Levy
It's just like, yeah, the 9 to 5 commuting world was in a multi-generational decline. The New York City subway was busier at rush hour. The trade for a more crowded rush hour in the 1970s where the system was collapsing and ridership was not much more than a billion a year than it was in the 2010s, where the ridership hit 1.5, 1.6 billion a year. The gains in subway ridership in the 90s and 2000s were entirely off-peak. And the subway to an extent recognizes that. With the commuter rail system in the United States, it doesn't.
It's just very traditional. And this is where a lot of the problems come from. Again, not all of them. There are others. There are construction costs. There are issues with just raw construction costs building bypasses. The result is that kind of the good way to modernize your infrastructure is to understand that sometimes you need to build a tunnel here or there, or to build a bypass here or there, or to grade-separate a junction in an urban area here or there, and then timetable in conjunction with that. And when you're too mortified of building anything, you will not coordinate.
You will assume that these are prohibitively expensive, and maybe you will build them later for capacity, but you will not really think of them as timetable enhancers.
David Roberts
Well, if you have an entity that has the whole system in its view, then you can understand those trade-offs better. You can understand where spending money here might save more money elsewhere in the system. If you have a larger view, you're better at making those trade-offs. I guess the second big sort of family of problems going beyond governance is just overdoing it. Overbuilding, overdesigning, overgilding, too much bespoke, you know, one-off projects, too much gold-plating, et cetera, et cetera. And part of how you're trying to sort of counter that with the Northeast rail project is just making maximum use of existing infrastructure, doing the minimal amount of tunneling that you have to do, ordering standardized trains, standardized designs, standardized designs of stations.
Talk a little bit about all that. Why is it in the US context that we are so prone to β we can't build the basic block and tackle basic transit systems, but when we do turn our attention to actually trying to build something, we wildly overbuild it? Why is that?
Alon Levy
There isn't a lot of willingness to iterate on things. Everything needs to be new and shiny. This is especially true for megaprojects, because megaprojects are by definition mega, by which I mean they are uniquely big for what you're doing. Building an extension of the Metro with two stations in Paris is not a megaproject; in New York, it is. In Paris, building an extension with 50 stations, yeah, that's a megaproject. But the result is that politicians want signature stations. There's demand for that, often bottom-up, where a community says, "We want something special, we want placemaking."
And it is possible to say no. But governors and so on, or agencies or mayors, choose not to say no. Or the way they divvy up the project. Maybe they try to do each station run by autonomous subcontractors. And maybe the subcontractors don't pick the same elevator design. Or in Second Avenue Subway they got different vendors to do the escalators at different stations. And again, it's all these things because all the things that they're trying to not look like the Washington Metro, where every station kind of looks the same and it's brutalist. And everyone thinks that that is very cost effective, and it absolutely isn't.
What actually is cost effective is β the art is free by the standards of the cost of building a station cavern. I mean, making it look good is essentially free. The problem is, again, it's things like the design of the electrical and mechanical rooms or the escalators and elevators. I mean, you could decorate the same cake in so many different interesting ways with all these, you know, the cake decoration YouTubers that I'm talking about?
David Roberts
So you could just make a simple standard station and spruce it up to look nice relatively cheaply.
Alon Levy
Yeah, exactly. Stockholm does this very well. In Stockholm, it's easier because they have very hard rock which forms natural arches. So that by itself is kind of artistic. And then you put statues in the stations. And I don't want to judge, but the cost of procuring paintings and sculptures for stations is a rounding error in a rounding error in budget. And then, so yeah, people sometimes demand special things and then agencies don't say no. Or sometimes it's other kinds of creep, like parking creep at commuter rail stations or especially big overpasses instead of doing simpler underpasses.
I was talking about this years ago with MBTA people about the cost of, as I said, high platforms at the commuter rail stations, which at the time, they were not expensive projects. They were maybe 20, 25 million each. They could have gone a little bit under 20 if they'd had standardized designs. But they didn't. And the reason they didn't was that the governor wanted β Governor Baker β wanted to do everything with the private sector, so they couldn't come up with their own standardized designs, and they had to wait for a consultant to come up with standardized designs for the stations of South Coast Rail.
And they were hoping to piggyback. Often it's just people don't think of it as important and nobody tells them that it is. And so anyway, 20 million or so, 25 million, and maybe you up that for inflation it's 30. And you look at New Jersey Transit, and New Jersey Transit, when it takes an existing station with low platforms and puts high platforms there so peopleβso, for example, so wheelchair users can get on and ADA doors.
David Roberts
Wait, can we pause on this? Because this is a theme that comes up over and over again, and so I'd love to talk about it a little bit. When you're talking about commuter rail stations, you say they should standardize around high-level stations. What is a high-level station, and why is it superior?
Alon Levy
Okay, so the important thing is that the height of the platform and the height of the floor of the train are identical to within β
David Roberts
Ah, right. So you just walk on.
Alon Levy
So you just walk on or roll on or roll your luggage on, or roll your walker on or roll your stroller on. And even if everyone there is able-bodied, it will generally halve your boarding time, and with other things that you can do in addition to this, it can even be a factor of four difference.
David Roberts
And this is as opposed to, like, having to step up?
Alon Levy
Yes, exactly.
David Roberts
It's that simple?
Alon Levy
Yes. And this is especially important in an American context. The reason is that the European context is they've kind of picked compromise heights that when you do have steps and on intercity trains here, unfortunately you always have steps. It's maybe one step up or two. In the United States it's at least three. Because the way it works, the eastern US, the big urban stations all have high platforms. The platform height is 4 ft. This is also the standard high-speed rail boarding height in China and Japan. And nearly all high-speed rail ridership is in China and Japan, and the European high-speed rail, as I said, the platforms are kind of middle height, but the floors are essentially the same height as they're still about four feet.
David Roberts
It's such a simple thing. And it's wild how central it is to these reform plans and how big of a plan.
Alon Levy
Yeah, exactly.
David Roberts
And the effect it has. If you have a station that isn't level, how big of a project is it to make it level? Or is this just something you have to build new stations to do?
Alon Levy
You need to build a high-level platform. And as I said, the MBTA β I'm not sure about now, but it used to be able β and by used to, I mean five years ago β used to be able to do it for, in today's money, 25, 30 million. New Jersey Transit is still doing it for about 30 million, and SEPTA is doing it for less. But SEPTA's platforms are shorter, and if you pro-rate, it ends up being about the same or maybe a bit cheaper. 20 maybe.
David Roberts
So wait, that's to redesign an existing station or to build a new one?
Alon Levy
Redesign existing station.
David Roberts
Got it.
Alon Levy
Now building a new station β and this is what the thing with the sort of thing before about overdesign. I was talking to MBTA planners, I don't remember how many years ago, maybe five or six. And they told me that the work involved in building high platforms is fundamentally the same as building an infill station. If the infill station is more expensive, it's because you're doing other things. For example, maybe you insist on also putting a parking garage there or some kind of overpass over the tracks. And the result is that β and New Jersey Transit, I started saying, has this program to convert low-level platforms to high-level platforms.
And again, it's, forgetting, it's about 30 million per station. But whenever it builds an infill station, it's not 30 million, it's not 30 million and change, it's 250 because they're β
David Roberts
Jesus!
Alon Levy
There's no reason for it to cost 250. They're just loading it with parking garages and overpasses, and especially big overpasses, and maybe an entry hall that nobody needs, and just a lot of overdesign because they're supposed to be signatures or something, as opposed to "This is a commuter rail station. Your budget for it is 30 million. Go."
David Roberts
Right. Well, there's so β I mean, commuter stations are so rare here. It's like we want to make everyone special. Maybe if we just had more of them, we would be more accustomed to just seeing a normal one.
Alon Levy
In central Jersey, they're used to commuter rail stations. They just think constantly in terms of parking. So they keep building parking and they call it building trains as part of β it's not the biggest problem, but it is for commuter rail in Jersey one of the bigger ones.
David Roberts
Same in Seattle. I mean, another one of the problems, sort of the broad-scale problems you identify in the US cost-wise is just sort of, I guess what you would call weak political discipline or civic discipline. Like no one can say no to anyone.
Alon Levy
They can. They absolutely can say no. They just choose not to.
David Roberts
Wait, no one says no to anyone.
Alon Levy
It's like saying that the Supreme Court can't strike down something that Trump does. Yes, it can. They choose not to because six justices agree with him.
David Roberts
I mean, you can just say you should let the technocrats lead this and be in charge. They know what to do. But like all the political force is pushing the other way. Do you know what I mean? Like, I just don't know how you, how do you getβ
Alon Levy
There's, I mean, I will say that there's way more prestige on civil service in continental Europe, southern Europe especially. I think there's just a lot of engineer prestige there, especially public sector engineer. And the US can do better. The US needs to let go of the idea that the civil servants are all petty tyrants and instead treat them as professionals.
David Roberts
We're heading in the other direction, I'm afraid. Like we're having a very populist moment.
Alon Levy
Yeah. So that means things like β and again, commuter rail is somewhat different, just because the internal way mainline rail works in the United States genuinely needs to de-Americanize and Europeanize or Sinicize or Russify or β
David Roberts
I don't think Russify is going to sell very well.
Alon Levy
For freight, you will be surprised. Or Japan. Japan is β I'm not sure what the verb is. But elsewhere you want to, for example, not have these six-month or one-year hiring pipelines. You want an interview and then the person gets hired within two weeks to one month. It's kind of interesting that everyone talks about privatization as in shoving the civil servants aside and putting private consultants in their stead, as opposed to, let's call it private sectorization, where you're just treating the civil servants like Google treats the programmers.
Which means you hire them in a process that doesn't take years. You pay them well in cash, not pensions.
David Roberts
And you can fire them if they don't β
Alon Levy
And you can fire them if they don't perform well. Correct. And you can fire them not necessarily at will, but over months and not decades. And the sad thing is you can actually fire civil servants in the United States very quickly if they piss off a politician. You just can't lay them off or you can't have the manager fire them. It has to be political intervention from above. And it means things like moving pay from pensions to cash. Ambitious people don't choose a job based on a promise of a pension in 25 years β I'm sorry.
David Roberts
Yeah, yeah. I mean, it's funny you're saying like hire good people and value them and pay them well. Which in the private sector is like, "duh." It's so weird that we don't think of the public sector in this way.
Alon Levy
And invest in them. Because one of the things that I have been hearing is that in the United States, agencies will not pay for any professional development conference or any kind of conferences outside the US or maybe Canada. The only way an American transit planner can go for a conference in Europe is β is if it's called Donut Vacation. I don't know if you've seen that term. What it means is you take some days off on both sides of the conference. You get days off, you're out to go on vacation, you pay the flight tickets because it's your own vacation.
And for the three days or however long the conference is, the agency will cover the conference tickets. But I'm not even sure if they cover the hotel. They certainly will not cover the flights. And here's the thing. The cost for an American to attend Innotrans, Innotrans being the big rail conference, it's in Berlin every two years, is on the order of about 1 to 1.5k β flight, hotel in Berlin for a couple of nights.
David Roberts
And again, we do not pay our civil servants particularly well. So they're not like, you know, positioned well to take business trips like this that they can pay on their own dime.
Alon Levy
Exactly. And if you're really unlucky with flight prices and hotel prices, and if you have expensive taste for restaurants, you might scratch 2K. Might. And here's the thing. These are people who are paid at this point, six figures. The entry-level salary for, let's say, a transit planning engineer is very high five figures these days. So someone who is, let's say, 28, that's not entry level, that is six years out of college, probably high five, maybe very low six. I doubt it's going to be very low. So it's probably 80, 90 with public sector union benefits.
So this is someone whose existence costs the state of, let's say, New York or Massachusetts, probably $160,000 a year. $170,000. And they will not pay the extra $1,500 to send this person to a conference outside North America. It's just a lot of it is that petty. It's not even that they don't spend enough on the civil servants. I mean, they could use a raise, but mostly they could use β again, I believe the private sector norm in the US is every dollar that you earn in salary, you earn about 30 cents in benefits. And in the public sector unions, it's more like 80 or 90.
So it's maybe even more than 2x if you count overheads. But obviously the private sector also has overheads. So a lot of it is just people being very petty and not investing in this kind of basic expertise. Instead, they go for superstars. And you see this with Andy Byford.
David Roberts
Andy Byford is who?
Alon Levy
So Andy Byford is a transit manager who has managed the transit agencies in Toronto, New York, and London, and was subsequently hired by Amtrak to be VP of High-Speed Rail Development.
David Roberts
Yeah, I think I remember all this now.
Alon Levy
Yeah. In New York, so when he was head of New York City Transit, people called him Train Daddy because they saw in him finally a competent professional civil servant hired from within the industry rather than from within the good old boy network. And here's the thing, in the UK, nobody called him Train Daddy when he ran Transport for London. No, he was just a good civil servant who ran the agency, and there were many like him.
David Roberts
Imagine just thinking that you should just expect good from civil servants and not celebrate every individual instance of it.
Alon Levy
Yeah, exactly. And so it's kind of being misused in the United States right now, unfortunately, because what they should be using him for is as a pipeline because he supervised a lot of very good people who were not at the top, but reported directly to the top in Toronto and in London. I don't know how good his continental European connections are. He is said to speak French and German, but I haven't seen connections to Paris or to anywhere in Germany from him β but who knows. And essentially use him to hire people who are like him. Instead, they put him in charge of high-speed rail, which is a very flashy project but is not within his past experience.
And I'm sure, I mean people are very hopeful that he was going to do good things. They put him on Penn Station improvements, and the main improvement you need to do to Penn Station is to shut down Penn Expansion and shut down reconstruction. These are two projects that are probably 25 billion between them, and they're worth more or less zero. So we didn't really go into it in the construction cost report in 2023. But there are two separate problems. We only tackle the problem of "The projects that are built are too expensive." There's a separate problem which is "Are you building the right project?"
As I said, there's an American problem and there's a rest of the English-speaking world problem. The rest of the English-speaking world largely does not have that problem. London is building lines in largely the correct order. The problem is it's too expensive. New York, I should add, same thing on the subway. The subway is building the right things. Second Avenue Subway, phases one and two, once people realized they could build the Interborough Express or IBX, that's the line that connects middle neighborhoods β so not very inner, but also not core-oriented outer neighborhoods β of Brooklyn and Queens directly with each other.
That's a very good project. And from time to time mayors or governors test the waters with some other project that they're considering. And the things that they talk about are always good priorities. So Governor Hochul was testing the waters and unfortunately nothing has come of it of a 125th Street subway extension of Second Avenue Subway. Really good idea. Mayor de Blasio was saying something about the subway extension under Utica Avenue, also really good idea. So in New York, the priorities are right on the subway. The construction costs are just so high they can't build any of them.
But in much of the rest of America, the priorities are also very bad. Like in Los Angeles, on the subway they're constantly building the wrong projects. And as with what we're seeing in privatization, the problem in Los Angeles is right-wing anti-government ideology tried to make it harder to waste money and instead made sure money would be wasted, because they need a supermajority of 2/3 to raise any taxes.
And if you're San Francisco, you could do it and it's fine. In San Francisco you say, "We're progressive, we like trains." You can't say it in LA. LA is not that liberal. In LA you say, "We're progressive, we like taxes for trains," you get 60%, you need 2/3. So instead you need to make deals with apolitical actors. Let's call them swing voters. But don't think of them as swing voters as people who are really in favor of tax cuts, but also really in favor of abortion rights. Think of them as neighborhood-scale leaders who don't care about anything except being seen as having brought home the bacon.
They are never going to take the train. They just want a train to each subregion, no matter how stupid. So to get their approval they need to β of course they think they need to β come up with a worse network design while underinvesting in core capacity areas where they actually are going to get ridership on the train. But that might be the second line in a neighborhood.
David Roberts
This gets back to the lack of civic discipline too. And also I wanted to bring up this last β one of the last sort of major things you identify in the 2023 report for high costs is just in the US the legal and regulatory environment in general is just β there's review upon review, environmental review, this review, that review, there's community input and then there are NIMBYs at every stage. And then at every stage there's also this constant risk of litigation, which I think is just a uniquely bad problem in the US, and all of this sort of just like a lot of the other problems we're discussing I think are also affected by this.
Just everybody's acting very defensively, everybody's worried they're going to get sued. Everybody's kind of doing things for the wrong reasons. Everybody's doing things defensively because of this larger environment. And I don't know what you do about that.
Alon Levy
You actually follow the law. It's the same thing that we're signing in the High-Speed Rail report where doing things in the, let's call it, standard European way with the understanding that France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands are not the same country and have different legal and political systems is entirely legal in the United States.
David Roberts
Yeah, I wanted to pull that out because I saw this sentence and I flagged it in my mind. It says in your high-speed rail project, we "...dialogue with European vendors and employ European technical standards, which are generally legal in America." That's like β they are?
Alon Levy
Yes. The FRA made changes throughout the 2010s. They worked because the political appointees under Obama didn't even know that they were happening. And then under Trump, the first time they were delayed by 18 months because technically it counted as a new regulation. And then it took them time to explain to the politicals, "No, no, no, yes, technically it's a new regulation, but it's a regulation that all of the industry favors because it has negative cost to the industry. If you want, you can think of it as a deregulation. It's just written as if it's a new regulation."
And so yeah, they made it legal. It's just that the agencies aren't making use of it because they're not used to it. And a lot of it is also true with things involving construction costs where it's completely legal to do project delivery in a more flexible way. Where, for example, instead of buying the lowest bidder, you hire a small team of in-house engineers β we're talking single-digit number of people β who will review every proposal for technical merit and give it a score. And then you do it by a weighted average of the technical score and the cost.
David Roberts
Oh, interesting.
Alon Levy
It's legal. It's done in California, except they don't trust their technical scoring enough, so they end up hiring the lowest bidder for the most part. But that weighting exists in California. The American contracting law permits that. It's called lowest responsible bid. You are not obligated to pick the lowest bid. It's just that everyone thinks you're obligated to pick the lowest bid, and that's what they're used to.
David Roberts
Interesting.
Alon Levy
You're allowed to be flexible about liability, which means you're allowed to itemize the costs. So the issue with liability here is that the good way to do it β it's something that Italy kind of discovered in the 1990s when they put half of parliament under indictment over corruption that also involved infrastructure. So they passed a lot of very toothy anti-corruption laws. It's kind of like American racism, right? Because the US in the 1950s is an apartheid state. So in the 60s the US passes civil rights laws and by the, for example, 80s, 90s, I don't think the US is any more racist than the average Western European country, which I mean, still insanely racist, but not something that the French or the British, for example, or the Dutch can point to and say, "At least we didn't do that."
So it's kind of the same with Italy and corruption at this point. The level of political corruption in Italy isn't any worse than in any other Western European country.
David Roberts
Oh, interesting.
Alon Levy
But nobody recognizes that. So in the same way that if you tell French people that "No, there actually is less job discrimination in the US than in France," they won't believe you. So the result is that one of the things that they do in Italy is contracts are not allowed to be fixed price. They're required to be itemized so that people can see what the state is paying for or the region or the city is paying for. And the thing is in the US to figure out what things should cost, agencies itemize, by which it means they hire independent cost estimators and everything is under NDAs so that the bidders don't see that. It's completely legal for them to disclose all of this to the vendors.
It is completely legal for a state to require β and think what, for example, a state like New York needs to do to require that agencies disclose itemization to the bidders and that they base project change orders on these items. This is really important because the itemization means that you don't need to fight over change orders because everything is priced in. And in the 2023 report, we find references to this cutting costs on power plants, actually both renewable and non-renewable in India, for example, or road repair in Massachusetts. It cuts the cost by 15 to 20% just by being better at itemization.
David Roberts
Wow. A lot of these seem so simple.
Alon Levy
Itemization is really boring. Okay. I mean, trains may be exciting or the noses on the Shinkansen. That's exciting. Itemization of public procurement is almost the most boring thing in this ever. 15, 20% cost reduction. It's these kinds of procurement improvements where you need to kind of unlearn everything that either Thatcherite and third-way people trying to reconcile that with still not having all the poor people die of hunger, but still privatize the government. They kind of unlearn how they think good governance works because these things cause costs to mushroom again. 1970s UK, Germany, Italy, roughly the same costs of subway construction. 2020s Germany has risen by maybe 25 or 30% since then.
In real terms, Italy has fallen by maybe 25 or 30% just because there is less corruption now, and then the UK is up by a factor of maybe three since then. It's really bad. And you want to adopt this kind of system of procurement that is β I mean, I won't say more flexible, but people in the United States think design-build is more flexible, which it really isn't. It just hides the inflexibility behind private sector NDAs.
David Roberts
One of the big reforms you talk about is going from design-build to what's called design-bid-build. Can you just briefly explain what that means?
Alon Levy
Sure. The traditional system is design-bid-build. Quite a lot of awful projects were built like this, like Second Avenue Subway phase one. It means you hire someone to design the project, maybe design a subway station, then you own the design, and then you bid it out to someone else who will build it. As opposed to design-build, which is β
David Roberts
Whoever designs it just goes on to build it.
Alon Levy
Yeah, usually it's called design-build. In New York, for some reason they call that progressive design-build. But design-build is said within the English-speaking world to be more flexible. And magically, whenever a city or a country adopts that, their costs explode.
David Roberts
Like, why would you think that would work better? I guess I don't understand. Like, why would you want toβ
Alon Levy
Because if you're bad at governing, design-bid-build doesn't work well because, for example, you're dealing with liability. So who has the liability? The designer or the builder? And the correct answer in all cases is the public sector. But if you're trying to privatize risk, then who you privatize risk to is a question. And often what happens, and for example, it in Norway β in Norway, some of the systems they came up with while privatizing risk was if the builder is allowed to make changes to the design. But if the builder makes changes to the design, the builder is liable.
If the builder makes no changes to the design, the designer is liable. The result is the builder will never make changes to the design. The designer knows that and will design defensively. So this leads to overbuilding. Because, for example, if you're building anywhere where you might have water problems, you may need to grout in order to waterproof the tunnel. Here's the thing: unless you're building in an area with maybe a very high water table, you don't know in advance that you need to grout. And the result is that ideally, you want to delay that decision till the last possible moment.
Grouting is not hard. It costs extra money. But you don't need to redesign everything if you need to grout. What this means is you design for the possibility of grouting, but you don't design the grouting. And if once you start doing the actual digging, you discover that you're going to get water intrusion, then you grout. So you only grout where you absolutely have to. But that requires the flexibility for the builder to vary from the design. This is a really important principle of all these places I told you that are very low cost β the Southern European places or Turkey.
David Roberts
You just give the builder some discretion to adjust things as they do.
Alon Levy
The New York law on this is rather rigid. And instead of doing the right reforms, they did the wrong reforms, which are in design-build. And often this also means taking the liability into the public sector instead of privatizing the liability. So design-build allows you to short-circuit all of that by privatizing the liability and not having to worry about any of this. The problem is the conflict between the designer and the builder will still be there, just hidden behind the general contractor or whoever, or the design-builder. There might even be a psychological issue that the designer won't want to make changes.
And here's the thing. The design-build contract means that it's a bigger contract, so you're getting fewer companies that can bid on it. The decisions on who to hire will be made at a higher level, by which I mean by political appointees, which is why political appointees love that. Politicians love that. They are really bad at making these decisions. As far as possible, you want to shrink the contract sizing. This is something very important in, let's call them, upper-middle-income, 1.5 world countries. In Chile, it's something they do, they break the contracts into small pieces. And Turkey is capable of doing that as well because these are countries that have not a lot of consolidation in the construction market.
So if the contract sizing is $50 million, then you're getting a lot of local bidders. This is not as available to richer countries. The Nordic countries have had difficulties with this. Or Italy has so few local contractors that when two of the top four merged, I think the state β I don't know if the state intended to or actually did it β the state bought a stake in the combined company. Or in the EU. They can do it through this kind of Europeanization where you can just hire people from the rest of Europe more easily. But often you do need to maybe go to somewhat bigger contracts.
We're talking 150 to 100, 300 million. And the problem is in the United States, they've gone nuts on this. There are $1 billion contract sizes for Second Avenue Subway phase two, and you're just not getting enough competition. So yeah, if there's less competition, and maybe you're not good at hiring the best people because you don't technically score β I mean, all these 20% extras for various ways you score procurement, they add up.
David Roberts
Yeah. Let me ask you about the trains themselves. I should have asked about this earlier, but in the Momentum report, which is talking about how to just sort of improve rail service, generally not going full high-speed, but just going medium speed, one of the things you emphasize, sort of like that report, is in two halves. The first half is about station design, which we talked a little bit about, just making them high-level, optimizing boarding and alighting, etc. The second half is about the train sets themselves, the trains. And the main thing in that part of the report is just get rid of diesel.
Replace with what you call electrical multiple unit trains, EMUs. So, explain why diesel is so problematic, what these EMUs are, and why they work better?
Alon Levy
I mean, you rode an EMU to work today if you took the light rail. Every subway in the world. Every light rail system and every subway system in the world is on EMUs. EMUs really mean two things. The first is the trains are powered by electricity, and electricity, in this case, does not mean batteries. I mean, you are allowed to buy battery trains. You shouldn't, but these exist. But people don't call them EMU, but BEMU β B for battery.
David Roberts
Oh, so you're talking about catenary. These are, for purposes of this report, you're talking mostly about catenary.
Alon Levy
Yeah, I mean, occasionally third rail for legacy purposes. But one of the things that Nolan was pointing out in Momentum is that third rail costs so much extra that even on lines that are currently third rail, he wanted extensions to be done with catenary.
David Roberts
Oh, interesting. And catenary β
Alon Levy
It just means overhead wires with a pantograph that collects the current from the wire.
David Roberts
Right. There's a little arm from the train attached to the wire. I'm sure everybody has seen these. And that's the cheapest way to electrify. So what are the multiple electrical β multiple unit β what are the units in question?
Alon Levy
It means that you don't have a separate locomotive. So when you take an Amtrak train on the Northeast Corridor, it's electric. But this means that instead of a diesel locomotive towing unpowered cars, you have an electric locomotive towing unpowered cars. This was how electrification was invented for mainline trains in 1890. It is also inefficient and, at this point in passenger service, completely obsolete. The way it is done is multiple units, which means either all of the cars or some of the cars in the train set will have motors. If it's a high-floor, high-platform train, it means the motor will be underneath the easiest β you can have low-floor trains, and then it's more complex where you're putting the motors. But it means that the cars are both motored and carrying passengers. Again, doesn't have to be every β the American way is usually that every car is motorized, or the Shinkansen way. But often maybe only half the cars will be motorized and the others will house some equipment for the adjacent car's motorization, but there will be trailers.
David Roberts
I'm guessing this is more efficient use of the electricity just because you're spreading out the β
Alon Levy
It's more efficient in a lot of ways. For example, the acceleration rate at high speed is just a matter of power, but at low speed, it's a matter of overcoming rolling friction. And the quantity that you care about is what proportion of the train's weight is supported on driven axles. So if you have one locomotive and a lot of cars, then only a small fraction of the train's mass will be on driven axles. So the acceleration at low speeds will be very low. And, separately, electricity also gives you more power, so you accelerate much better than a diesel.
And an electric locomotive is kind of a half measure. Literally, an electric locomotive and a diesel multiple unit or diesel DMU each provide about half the acceleration rate advantage of an EMU over a diesel locomotive. And of course I'm talking about acceleration. This is the most important on lines where you have a lot of acceleration cycles. So that would be local lines, a lot of stops.
So this would be not just subways because you need the electricity for ventilation, but also on elevated trains. This is how EMUs were invented. And it's also kind of a recent invention. The subway, for example, in New York was EMUs from day one. And it was just that, literally just the first metro electrification in the world was on the Northern Main Line, and it was with locomotives. But very rapidly they also transitioned to EMUs for this reason. So these are cheaper to procure, cheaper to maintain. Again, the only reason not 100% of the world is on EMUs is that you need to put up the catenary.
And that costs money. And this is especially important to do on busy lines because the catenary and the substitutes cost the same regardless, largely, of how busy the line is.
David Roberts
But won't you save that back on maintenance and fuel costs pretty quickly?
Alon Levy
Yes, their return on investment is high. I mean, I can tell you what I computed, but I'm worried it was too optimistic about this. But a German study on this found that roughly the breakeven point in terms of traffic, because again, the cost of wire is fixed and the benefits depend on how much service you're running. Because we're talking maintenance costs, just the trains are faster, so passengers get better service, things like that. They're more reliable as well. The breakeven point is if you are running two-car trains every half hour at rush hour. So if you have a four-car train every hour, that's about your breakeven point. And, for example, commuter lines in Boston, they run seven- or eight-car trains several times an hour. So we're talking massive, massive benefit-cost.
David Roberts
So this is just mustering the political will to make investments.
Alon Levy
To make investments at scales that they already are making just in things that they are more used to. So there would be things like high platforms. As I said, the northeastern commuter agencies are much more familiar with that. But with electrification, the US is atypically unelectrified. The only electrification project this century has been Caltrain. And Caltrain was so extremely poorly run, we're talking factor of seven cost premium over comparable electrification projects. And it's scaring everyone else. They are only bankrupting themselves to Caltrain, maybe possibly to Toronto, which is a good claim for being the second most mismanaged electrification project in the world.
They're never going to benchmark themselves to the ongoing Danish electrification project, or German or Italian.
David Roberts
So I'm guessing that in developed countries, electrifying all your trains is just β there's no one who's not doing that. Everyone's doing that on some timetable.
Alon Levy
They're doing it slowly because Europe specifically has a lot of legacy lines that are never going to get a lot of traffic. Just maybe it's not a line that connects a city to somewhere else. Maybe it's connecting to suburbs without passing through the city, and some of them are left with batteries increasingly. I mean, I honestly think that a lot of these need to be wired as well. But Europe is majority electrified, but only a small majority are electrified. And again, it should be a larger majority. But I at some level understand why it's not 100%. India is 100% electrified.
China is getting there soon because these are maybe newer rail networks that never were in this situation where maybe in 1902 they built a line between what were at the time significant towns, and there were no cars. And at this point, these towns don't have as much independent economic existence. And there are cars. So that's not where people want to travel.
David Roberts
But one of the things you say in the high-speed rail report is there are lots of these existing tracks that could accommodate high-speed service. Like they're physically capable if you just string the wire. It's possible to upgrade existing lines to be fast and electric. You don't have to build all new.
Alon Levy
Yeah, if the trains are β but it depends on the specific line. So, for example, you can do it to an extent between New York and Albany, but forget about it between Albany and Buffalo because the tracks are too curvy. Whereas the Northeast Corridor only has one really curvy part of it, which is Connecticut. But in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, it is rather fast. In New Jersey, Pennsylvania, same.
David Roberts
So does your proposal just slow down briefly in Connecticut, like β
Alon Levy
Yes, unfortunately.
David Roberts
That's the way to deal with curvy tracks. You just have to slow down.
Alon Levy
New Haven to the Rhode Island state line. I keep saying that they need to build a bypass, just build new high-speed tracks north of I-95 because that is the least dense part of the Northeast. But that's also a point where I-95 only has four and not six lanes because it's the least densely populated part. So they can do it while keeping the takings to a reasonable level. It's not no takings or anything, but they don't need tunnels. The takings are moderate. A lot of them are not residential because it's things like a small business by the side of the highway, a small business at the exit or the junction of I-95.
And these are people who care about their businesses. But they will go for a couple million dollars and open a new business, you know, 100 yards away. That's not a big deal. And that bypass, I think, should cost about $5 billion or so. And that's based on European costs. But it's not the easiest thing to build. Chicago to Cleveland or Chicago to Detroit is the easiest thing to build. But it is on the easy side to build, and it saves half an hour.
David Roberts
Just to hit this theme one more time. Like, if you have a central authority that's got its eyes on the whole system, then you can make these calculations. Like, is $5 billion at this spot going to produce more value for the whole system than the cost?
Alon Levy
And one of the things I am trying to tell people in Connecticut is they need to support that. There are not a lot of neighbors in there, but there are some. And the state needs to support that it gives better intercity service to points north from New Haven, for example. And I will say west of New Haven, it's different. The population is much higher. If you try to build the bypass, the cost, you wish it were only 5, maybe 50 if you want to be sufficiently fast. So instead I'm talking about, yeah, the trains would slow down somewhat.
They can still run a lot faster than Amtrak and Metro-North do today. Just the design standards today are not very good. And Metro-North slows down the trains due to using 1950s standards for how trains that were kind of garbage even then could run on a curve. So a lot of it is this kind of coordination. The Metro-North β so Connecticut, west of New Haven, is a rare place where it's literally a state exploiting Amtrak and not the reverse. And here's the thing, you do it right β as I said, I mean, Greenwich would be able to get local trains that are faster than today's expresses.
Today, most trains up to New York to New Haven on Metro-North do it in about two hours. They could do it β the commuter trains, I mean, they'd make all the stops. New Haven to Stamford could probably do it in an hour if they do things. There are substantial benefits to the state. A lot of it is just the traditional railroaders have kind of gotten into a habit of if it is not part of the tradition handed down continuously from the 1950s or even before then, they don't believe it. Which, again, it's a different issue from construction costs for project delivery.
But maybe if there's a common theme of refusing to learn from other parts of the world, especially ones that speak English with an accent.
David Roberts
Maybe this is outside your remit, but have you or anyone else done a sort of study of if your vision of high-speed rail in the Northeast Corridor was implemented, what sort of knock-on economic growth effects would be? I mean, is it safe to assume they're large? Like I'm just assuming they're large?
Alon Levy
I can try to give you first-order estimates, but there are people who do this for a living who can come up with something that's much better than something that is only true to within a factor of two to three in each direction. No, but you're right. I mean, high-speed rail always produces these economic benefits that are simultaneously very large and very small. And what I mean by very small is it's difficult to see them in the GDP of, let's say, Japan or France or China. That said, the construction costs are also not that visible to GDP.
This is not β I mean, the US military is, I believe, $850 billion a year. Now, I'm talking about somethingβ
David Roberts
Yes, we have the money.
Alon Levy
No, no, not necessarily have the money. Just, I mean, that is called a big priority. Our Social Security β I'm trying to remember what the Social Security outlays are. And the problem is I last looked at them 15 years ago in the United States. I've gotten older since, but I believe we're talking well north of a trillion dollars a year at this point. So obviously big changes for that would be visible in federal budgets and GDP and things like that. And high-speed rail β I'm talking about something that should cost $17 billion to do between Boston and Washington.
If you want to do a US-wide network, like you've seen the map by Alfred Twu or these various maps that have high-speed lines that go from north of Boston all the way to Texas, to Florida, to Texas, through to the Great Plains. That is probably something that is doable in $400, $500 billion, not per year, but one time. And if it takes 20 years to build, it's extremely aggressive and it's still maybe 1/15th or something of the military spending or 1/30th or less of that of Social Security. So it's something that would generate benefits.
It can be visible and will be large compared with the upfront cost of the system. It's just that the United States is, what, it's a $25 trillion economy every per year, one time. Things that are measured in the tens of billions are invisible at that scale. So it's not like I can say, "Oh, this will raise American economic growth." It will not. It's too small. But it will be visible inβ
David Roberts
You could say it would raise regional economic growth. I think you could safely sayβ
Alon Levy
No, I mean, the Northeast is like one sixth of America. I mean, if it's not visible to America, it's probably not visible to the Northeast. But it will have positive benefits. It's just the measurement would be things like companies have better ties across the Northeast or academia will have better ties to the Northeast. I told you, I went to Columbia for math. And at the time we had a joint seminar β Columbia, CUNY, NYU β because they were tied together by the subway. And in Cambridge, Massachusetts, likewise, Harvard and MIT don't do joint seminars, but people from each go to seminars at the other.
It's fine, it's normal. And if the commuter trains were better in the Boston area, it would also include things like Brown, Brandeis, Tufts, things like that. And if the intercity trains were better, it would be much easier for people to, to do this northeast-wide for things like Penn and the New York system, things like that. Or Hopkins and Penn or Hopkins and the D.C. unis. And Paris, by the way β
David Roberts
It's difficult to put a number on that kind of thing. But I just think like connectivity produces emergent benefits. That's a matter of faith.
Alon Levy
Yeah, exactly. It's not just a matter of faith. I mean, I'm talking β so if we're talking about math academia, you have exact examples of how it's happening in Germany, where German math academia is excellent. Not in the sense that there's a Harvard in Germany β there isn't β but it's just research institutes that are very well connected. Or in France, it's just all centralized in and around Paris. And yeah, people go to seminars between Paris and the suburbs bound by commuter train systems that all the Parisians hate but are actually very good. The Parisians hate them because they're not the metro.
So maybe the trains don't come as often as the metro, and often there's also sometimes an element of racism. The suburbs, not the ones with these universities, but the ones at the other end, are legendarily poor and non-white. So there is that kind of prejudice. But the trains are, objectively speaking, very good, and people in the Paris region constantly use them. And Paris has truly excellent academia. Again, I know this in math better than in other things. Paris is possibly the most important mathematical center in the world outside of Boston.
David Roberts
Interesting.
Alon Levy
They do excellent research there. And I hate a lot of, by the way, I hate a lot of what they do. They're justβthe way they talk at seminars is β and I don't mean it because they have an accent. I mean they just β I will say they prefer the American style of how to give a math talk than the French style. But objectively speaking, very good mathematics is done in this way. And I imagine this is no different if we're trying to talk about, I know, biotech tying New York and Boston and also Central Jersey. These are probably the most important centers of biotech in the US. I mean, Moderna is in Cambridge.
A lot of the firms are headquartered in New York and a lot of the research is done in Central Jersey. So yeah, to be things that make it much easier to get rid of these places so that instead of having to pay very high fares on a train that still takes four hours, you pay more reasonable fares on a train that doesn't.
David Roberts
Yeah, that's inevitably going to make a difference.
Alon Levy
Yeah.
David Roberts
Okay. Well, we are way over time now. This is all super fascinating to me. I mean, one of the things that really becomes clear when you dig into this is that these types of plans are not the type of things that can be done at a high level of abstraction. Like, there's a lot of detailed, rich knowledge about the actual details of actual stations and routes and cities. It's all very fine-grained. I've been sort of like keeping a high-level perspective on it in this discussion. But people who are interested in the region should dive into the report because it gets very granular.
But just sort of thematically to wrap up, I think the themes of your work here, if I could pull them out, are if we want better transit in the US we need to bulk up civil service, take it seriously, pay it well, train it well, support what it does, trust its recommendations and plans, and to have a little bit more political and civic discipline to just allow transit planners to do things in a standardized way that's not necessarily flashy or it's not going to show up in some Architectural Digest, but just standardized stations, standardized trains. You know, I've sort of left like on the one hand all of that makes immense sense to me and the high-speed rail plan sort of shows what that would look like in practice. But on the other hand, just like it's so counter to so many very deep forces in US politics, you know what I mean?
It's pushing against some very fundamental forces of US politics. So, like, how serious are you about seeing some of this actually happen? Or do you just think of this as kind of a thought experiment?
Alon Levy
Yeah. So just to add one last thing to your summary, it's also important for the builders to be curious because you can't just stick to the US β not on, you can stick to the US on things that the US is generally good at. We're talking software, finance, biotech, things like that. You can't do it in places where you're already behind. I don't know, I'm reading a lot of things and I always feel a little askance that none of them really tries to engage with poor democracy, anti-backsliding, anti-authoritarian movements in other places. We're talking things like β
David Roberts
I know this has all happened before. It's like we're walking through a script that's played out a dozen times, and we refuse to read the other β
Alon Levy
Yeah. So it is kind of important that the civil service be, as you said, empowered, trained well, developed better. But it's also really important to keep them curious rather than think that it's still 1960s America. It is not.
David Roberts
Yeah. And so somehow that will involve shielding them a little bit from the perpetual threat of lawsuits and reviews and NIMBYs, and just to everybody, every entity having a chance to come along and impede them, like, somehow we need to insulate that a little bit.
Alon Levy
I don't want to sound like Nancy Reagan, but sometimes you can just say no to them.
David Roberts
All right, well, we'll leave it there. I mean, there's so much more in all of this, but this has been super fascinating. Alon, I really appreciate it. Appreciate your work, and thanks for walking us through it.
Alon Levy
Yeah, thanks for sure.
David Roberts
Thank you for listening to Volts. It takes a village to make this podcast work. Shout out, especially, to my super producer, Kyle McDonald, who makes me and my guests sound smart every week. And it is all supported entirely by listeners like you. So, if you value conversations like this, please consider joining our community of paid subscribers at volts.wtf. Or, leaving a nice review, or telling a friend about Volts. Or all three. Thanks so much, and I'll see you next time.