In recent days, the Taiwan Straits has been busy with allied warships.

Hobart Class destroyer HMAS Brisbane (DDG-41) and Halifax Class frigate HMCS Ville de Québec (FFH-332) transited the Straits on September 6.  A People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command spokesman objected to the transit in the normal manner, and said that the naval movements had been monitored.

While the transit was occurring, the Royal Navy carrier HMS Prince of Wales (R09), having completed a five-day port visit to Tokyo, sailed northwards along Japan’s eastern seaboard with HMS Dauntless (D33) and into the Sea of Japan, then southwards to commence a series of exercises with South Korean Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin Class destroyer ROKS Gang Gam-chan (DDH-979), minelayer ROKS Nampo (MLS-570) and Soyang Class fast combat support ship ROKS Soyang (AOE-51). 

As this activity was winding up in the Sea of Japan on September 8, two ships from Russia’s Pacific Fleet based in Vladivostok, the flagship Slava Class cruiser RFS Varyag (D001 and the Steregushchiy Class corvette RFS Gromkiy (F335) were heading in the opposite direction, leaving the area through the Soya Strait off northern Hokkaido, and then cruising through the Sea of Okhotsk into the northern Pacific.

The Australian and Canadian innocent passage was followed up by Arleigh Burke Class destroyer USS Higgins (DDG-76) and Type 23 frigate HMS Richmond (F239) also transiting the Taiwan Straits on September 12. There had been some speculation in the British press that Foreign Minister David Lammy, to avoid upsetting the Chinese, had vetoed the passage of HMS Richmond, to the consternation of the Ministry of Defence - but Lammy was replaced as foreign minister a week before the transit took place.

The carrier strike group led by HMS Prince of Wales is now on its long return journey to Portsmouth. On its outward deployment, the CSG passed through the Middle East region during a short-lived lull. On its return, the CSG is likely to have to contend with a more complex security situation. But the CSG commander can feel reassured that his command is operationally at peak efficiency, after continuous training at sea with allies since it left Portsmouth in April.

 

A brand new Russian fishing vessel broke down near the strategic southern entrance of the Oresund over the weekend, drifting in the sea lanes and attracting the attention of NATO member security forces.  

The crab vessel Mechanic Stepanov was built at Otradnoye Shipyard on the Neva River, and it received its RS class certification on September 4. No problems were identified in inspections and sea trials, and the vessel was cleared to depart for the long voyage to its home port in the Kuril Islands.  

The Stepanov got under way from St. Petersburg last Wednesday, but did not make it very far before running into trouble. The crab boat transited westbound through the Baltic and then suffered a blackout on Saturday night, reportedly due to a mechanical casualty. AIS data shows that the Stepanov was adrift in a busy shipping lane at the entrance to the Oresund for an extended period before going to anchor. 

Given heightened tensions between Russia and NATO - and previous incidents in the Baltic and the Danish Straits - a security response from NATO members was inevitable. Photos captured by observer Christian Panton show the Latvian Navy minesweeper LNVS Virsaitis (A53) responding to the scene, along with the Danish patrol boat Bopa (MHV 911). 

Swedish outlet Aftonbladet received an unconfirmed report that the crew of the fishing vessel requested a port of refuge in Sweden and were turned down, though this narrative was disputed by the authorities. After regaining power, Mechanic Stepanov transited north with a security escort and returned to its commercial voyage. 

 

The Philippines' western allies are lining up to voice opposition to China's plan to declare an "environmental zone" around Scarborough Shoal, a land feature in the Philippine EEZ that China has occupied since 2012. Manila views the declaration as a pretext, designed to extend Chinese sovereignty over Philippine territory, and a new excuse to allow the China Coast Guard to refuse access for Philippine artisanal fishermen. The news may be especially concerning for the Philippines given a reported buildup of up-armed Chinese patrol boats around Scarborough in recent weeks. 

On Sept. 10, China's State Council declared a new "National Nature Reserve" covering waters in and around Scarborough Shoal. While a compelling policy choice in its own right, China's ability to declare any special maritime zone in the area is in question. The Chinese mainland is more than 450 nautical miles away from Scarborough Shoal, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague rejected China's claim to waters within the Philippine EEZ nine years ago. Among many other findings, the court specifically ruled against China's attempts to close off access to Scarborough Shoal for Philippine fishermen. China has ignored the ruling and maintains that it has sovereign ownership over most of the South China Sea, citing the history of Chinese commerce in the area and a much-contested interpretation of UNCLOS' "straight baseline" clause. 

"The irony is clear: since 2016, evidence has shown large-scale harvesting of endangered species and reef destruction by Chinese fishermen," Philippine National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano said in a statement. "To now claim stewardship over an ecosystem that they themselves has damaged is both contradictory and misleading."

Beijing's "nature reserve" plans drew immediate opposition from the Philippine government. On Friday, Manila filed a diplomatic protest - the latest of many - to voice its objections to new infringements on Philippine sovereignty. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio joined the Philippines' objections, calling the Chinese declaration "another coercive attempt to advance sweeping territorial and maritime claims." The U.S. is a treaty ally of the Philippines, and has basing arrangements on Luzon and Palawan. 
 

 

[By Sam Goldsmith]

Autonomous submarines that Australia has launched into production are likely to relieve operational pressure on the country’s crewed submarines, undertake the most dangerous undersea missions, and present an enemy with greater risk of detection and attack.

While the government and builder Anduril are saying little about specific technology built into the submarines, called Ghost Sharks, some features are clearly probable or even certain, at least when the design is fully developed. Likely missions include communications and radar intelligence, detecting ships and other submarines, and laying mines.

The AUD$1.7 billion, five-year contract announced on September 10 would cover production of a first batch of dozens of Ghost Sharks, with entry into service early in 2026, the government said. The money would also pay for maintaining the submarines in service and for further development of the design.

‘This is the leading capability in the world in terms of a long-range autonomous underwater capability,’ Defence Minister Richard Marles told reporters. Specifications are undisclosed, but the all-electric Ghost Sharks are evidently less than 12 meters long, in at least one configuration, and displace less than 100 tonnes. The six crewed submarines of Australia’s Collins class are 78 meters long and displace 3,100 tonnes.

Launch of full-rate production follows a development program in which Anduril, working with the Royal Australian Navy and Defence agencies, built three prototypes ahead of schedule and within budget. ‘Ghost Shark will continue to evolve, as it must, with new payloads, new weapons, smarter autonomy and adapting to the emerging threats,’ said David Goodrich, chief executive of Anduril Asia-Pacific.

An obvious role for Ghost Sharks is the traditional submarine function of collecting communications and radar intelligence, in which a boat loiters in a place suitable for receiving signals and sticks an antenna above the water to do so. Submarines are valuable for this role because they can covertly carry their receivers close to a foreign transmitter to pick up weak signals or those made when the presence of a listener is unsuspected.

To the extent that Ghost Sharks can relieve the Collins boats of that mission, those crewed submarines, 22 to 29 years old, will be under less operational pressure. The Ghost Sharks, being numerous, should be able to simultaneously undertake such intelligence-collection in many more places than the crewed submarines can. Being so much smaller and not needing to expose a snorkel pipe for running diesel generators (which they don’t have), they should be able to loiter in places where the navy would dare not send a Collins.

Anduril has said the Dive-XL autonomous-submarine design, which the Ghost Shark is based on, has a ‘multi-thousand mile range’, meaning at least 3,200 km. The voyage doesn’t have to start from a harbor: a Ghost Shark could be carried partway to its destination on a ship. On the other hand, it’s likely to cruise at only around 3 or 4 knots (6 or 7 km/h) to conserve battery energy.

Ghost Sharks will surely carry sonars for detecting sound from other vessels, quite likely including rope-like towed array sonars, which may have to be clipped on by divers as the sub leaves on missions. Ghost Sharks should be able to identify targets from sound signatures and decide whether they should rise to near the surface to make a radio report of what they’ve found. The information might then cue attacks by other forces, such as Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime aircraft.

Again, in performing these missions, Ghost Sharks can to some extent substitute for crewed submarines, and they can do the work in more and riskier places—especially since high danger of destruction of an uncrewed vessel may be acceptable. Maritime choke points, such as straits, are likely locations, but it’s conceivable that a line of Ghost Sharks might assemble off, say, the northwest coast of Australia and listen for enemy submarines in the open ocean.

Ghost Sharks must be much too slow to maneuver to make their own torpedo attacks.

They can surely lay mines, however, which is presumably the strike capability that Marles said the Ghost Shark would bring. Minelaying is another task that Ghost Sharks could do in more and riskier places than a Collins might enter, possibly even in ports.

Whether for minelaying or other tasks, Ghost Sharks could be dispatched before a war broke out, under instructions to lie on the sea bottom and await instructions, which might be sent by various means. Unlike crewed submarines, they couldn’t run out of food.

The dozens of Ghost Sharks in the initial batch, plus those that will follow, should enormously expand Australia’s ability to exploit the advantages of undersea warfare—to observe an enemy and disrupt its actions.

Sam Goldsmith is the director of consultancy Red Team Research.

This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here. 

 

Earlier this month, the U.S. Air Force and Royal Norwegian Air Force tried out the USAF's new antiship bomb against a maritime target in the Norwegian Sea, achieving the desired effect.

Quicksink is designed to follow a ship's movements while in mid-flight, with enough precision that it can drop into the water right alongside. When it sinks to a certain preset depth below the keel, it detonates, forcing the hull to hog upwards with the blast. The ship then falls back down, sags, and (in at least one prior test) breaks in two. In prior testing on a small merchant ship, complete sinking was achieved in under 20 seconds. This is the method of destruction delivered by heavyweight torpedoes, generally considered the gold standard of maritime lethality - but at a small fraction of a torpedo's cost. 

A Quicksink test in 2022 (Air Force Research Laboratory)

“A Navy submarine has the ability to launch and destroy a ship with a single torpedo at any time, but the Quicksink aims to develop a low-cost method of achieving torpedo-like kills from the air at a much higher rate and over a much larger area,” explained AFRL program manager Kirk Herzog in 2022.

This month, the U.S. Air Force conducted a new round of testing - this time, far from home. After a week of preparation for the bomb load, a U.S. Air Force B-2 bomber out of Whiteman AFB, Missouri flew all the way to the Norwegian Sea, where it met up with four F-35 fighters of the Royal Norwegian Air Force and one P-8A Poseidon maritime search aircraft. Escorted by the Norwegian fighters, the B-2 crew dropped more than one bomb on an unspecified maritime target, sinking it. 

Courtesy RNoAF

Courtesy USAF

“This test is a clear example of how we work with trusted allies to bring new capabilities into play faster and smarter,” said U.S. Air Force Col. Scott Gunn, 53rd Wing commander. “We’re not just preparing for tomorrow; we’re shaping it together.”

The test comes amidst rising tensions between Russia and NATO, including suspicions about the movements of Russia's fishing, research and tanker vessels. In the Baltic, Russia-linked tankers have been accused of attempted or actual damage of subsea cables. Across Northern Europe, defense planners are concerned at the amount of time that Russian research ships have spent near critical subsea infrastructure. And Russia's fishing fleet is universally suspected of spying on NATO interests, so much so that Norway has sharply restricted their access (and will even seize them if they stay too long). 

In the event of conflict, an inexpensive, proven weapon like Quicksink would be a cost-effective way to resolve these small-vessel threats if they posed a threat to strategic subsea pipelines - critical for delivering Norwegian gas to Europe. A new, 500-pound version of the bomb would be sized and priced appropriately for small vessel threats. Paired with a stealth delivery vehicle like the B-2, it would also be an efficient deterrent to bottle up the surface combatants of Russia's Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea, away from the likely conflict zone of the North Atlantic. 

 

As the UK plans to hand over Chagos Islands to Mauritius, India is eyeing to exert its influence on the archipelago. Last week, Mauritian Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam made a state visit to India, where together with Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed on several bilateral pacts spanning power sector, port development and maritime security. A major highlight of the discussion between the two leaders is India offering to assist Mauritius as it moves to assert its sovereignty over Chagos Islands.

Modi congratulated his Mauritian counterpart on the return of Chagos Islands, terming the measure as a historic milestone. “India has always supported decolonization and stood firmly with Mauritius in this journey,” added Modi.

However, the Chagos Islands takeover means Mauritius will have an expanded maritime zone to monitor. Currently, the size of Mauritius EEZ is estimated at 2.3 million square kilometers for a country with a modest coast guard, operating less than a dozen patrol vessels. Commenting on the new obligations for Mauritius, India’s Foreign secretary Vikram Misri said that India remains ready to provide the needed assistance.

“Mauritius has many more responsibilities now. It needs maritime resources, and in order to be able to fully develop and exploit those resources, it will need assistance. India is a preferred partner in providing that assistance. In addition, maritime security cooperation would help counter illegal fishing, arms and drug trafficking through support with equipment, platforms and trained personnel,” noted Misri.

Part of this support also includes surveillance of Chagos Marine Protected Area (MPA). The U.K government designated the MPA back in 2010, and it remains one of the world’s largest MPAs at a size of 640,000 square kilometers. Notably, Mauritian PM Ramgoolan requested Modi to provide an Indian ship for a planned mission to the Chagos Islands.

“We want to visit Chagos to put our flag there. The British offered us a vessel, but we said we preferred one from India because symbolically it would be better,” said Ramgoolan.  

Early this year, when Modi visited Mauritius, the two countries upgraded their ties to an enhanced strategic partnership. This has seen Mauritius become one of the largest recipients of Indian aid, with deals worth $680 million signed last week. Part of this funding will go into the upgrade of Mauritius’ Port Louis. With the re-routing of global merchant shipping via the Cape of Good Hope, Port Louis has strategic significance on the busy east-west shipping routes. Mauritius is also important to India’s ambition of projecting naval influence in the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, the British House of Commons last week voted in favor of a bill supporting handover of Chagos archipelago to Mauritius. A delegation from the UK’s Foreign Office is expected in Mauritius later this month to finalize the handover process. However, Chagos’s largest island, Diego Garcia, remains under the Anglo- American military lease for 99 years.

 

[From our correspondent at DSEI]

Shooting down Houthi drones in the Red Sea has been an expensive business.

Royal Navy Type 45 guided missile destroyer HMS Diamond (D34) was deployed in zone in the Red Sea for several months in early 2024, and on one night in January shot down seven drones aimed at merchant vessels, using its Sea Viper missiles. On its last night in the danger area, it shot down a Houthi ballistic missile. US Navy vessels, and other allies participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian, accounted for many more drones and missiles.

Whilst some drones were brought down by relatively inexpensively machine and chain gun fire from Phalanx and similar such systems, most takedowns were performed using missiles. A single Sea Viper missile probably costs more than $1m. The total cost of missiles fired by HMS Diamond during its Red Sea deployment has been estimated to be $25m, whereas the cost per unit of the Houthi drones shot down is probably in the region of $50,000.

The imbalance in the cost of attacking with drones, as opposed to defending against drones, makes the contest more than just a test of rival technologies. It also becomes a matter of attrition and economics, with defenders using systems designed for far more sophisticated targets running down stocks that are necessarily limited because of the cost of procurement.

The disparity has been clearly demonstrated once again by the recent air incursion into Poland on September 10 by at least 17 Russian drones. At least 15 were Gerbera decoy drones, unsophisticated dummies designed to draw fire, making the Russian effort either a test run or a political stunt. But this did not prevent an expensive array of air-to-air missiles being expended by NATO jets to bring them down. Economically, the contest was won by the Russians. In open war, a similar such attack would reduce NATO stocks of air defense missiles before the Russians deployed the real drones with explosive payloads.

Hence one of the most interesting stands at the biennial Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) exhibition held in London this week was that of Frankenburg Technologies. This Estonian firm has developed a short-range, speed-of-sound anti-drone missile for a unit cost of about $65,000. The company describe the missile as the smallest guided missile in the world. The Frankenburg Mk 1 can be fired from ships, but also from aircraft, drones, from fixed ground sites and armored vehicles. The low cost of the system effectively means that it could be deployed on many more platforms than is currently the case in naval applications, where the target demands a more sophisticated and integrated defensive approach. Frankenburg Technologies contends that the simplicity of its design will enable hundreds of missiles to be manufactured every week. The system appears to undergoing field trials in Ukraine.

Commander Dan Hallett, a director of the firm and a former Royal Navy officer, told TME "I’ve seen how fast maritime threats evolve. Today, Russian drones strike Ukrainian ports and Houthi drones target Red Sea shipping — proof that drones are now weapons of strategic disruption at sea. Frankenburg Technologies pairs frontline experience with advanced counter-drone missile systems for crewed and uncrewed vessels, giving navies, ports, and energy operators the tools to detect and defeat these threats before they endanger lives and maritime trade.”

It remains to be seen if prolonged Western procurement processes can transition from peacetime to more agile contracting in the face of an intensified and accelerating threat. Faced with the realities of a national struggle for survival, the Ukrainian government has an imperative to make that transition. But whether other governments still in peacetime mode can follow that lead remains to be seen.

 

[By Angela van der Berg]

The International Court of Justice’s landmark advisory opinion on climate change has come in handy for South African communities that are trying to stop global oil company Shell from drilling for oil and gas off the coast.

The opinion, handed down by the world’s highest court in July 2025, sets out what all governments are legally required to do to tackle climate change. It confirmed that:

• All states have a duty to prevent activities within their jurisdiction from causing significant climate harm.
• States must phase out fossil fuels to keep global temperatures below 1.5°C above pre-industrial times. This includes regulating private companies, such as fossil fuel corporations, to drive their pollution levels down.
• Human rights to life, health, food, water and a healthy environment are directly affected by climate change. Therefore, states must protect these rights.
• Cumulative effects matter. One mining or drilling project may seem small but governments must consider its contribution to global emissions and climate harm.
• Governments are also legally obliged to adapt towns, cities and rural areas so that they can withstand climate disasters, especially for those most at risk.

The advisory opinion is already being used in South Africa by a community and environmental law organization, Natural Justice, and a sustainable development advocacy group, The Green Connection, in their appeal against a government decision to allow Shell to drill up to five exploration and appraisal wells off the coast of the Northern Cape province.

Their appeal says the South African government has not considered how Shell’s oil exploration will contribute to climate change.

I am an environmental law specialist who researches how international and domestic law can be used to advance climate justice in South Africa and across Africa. In my view, the advisory opinion could shift the balance in courtrooms across Africa in favor of environmental justice and human rights groups. It confirms that governments must align fossil fuel decisions with their duty to prevent harm. This gives communities a stronger legal basis to argue that fossil fuel expansion undermines both their rights and their country’s climate obligations.

South Africa is already experiencing worsening floods, droughts and storms. Every bit of warming increases these risks.

The country’s 2024 Climate Change Act sets out a pathway to cut emissions and build resilience. Yet fossil fuel projects are still being approved by the government.

What the Shell appeal is all about

In June 2025, South Africa’s Department of Mineral Resources granted Shell an environmental authorization to drill for oil and gas in the ocean on the country’s west coast. This area is ecologically sensitive, supporting whales, fish stocks and small-scale fishing communities.

Natural Justice and The Green Connection argue in their appeal that the authorization is unlawful and defective. They give the following reasons.

The environmental impact assessment assumed an oil spill could be stopped far more quickly than is realistic, and downplayed the risks of ultra-deepwater drilling, where equipment failure or a blowout on the scale of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster is possible. These risks threaten marine ecosystems and small-scale fishers’ livelihoods.

Some of Shell’s safety and emergency response plans were not included in the assessment. This meant the public and decision-makers could not evaluate whether Shell is able to manage a major disaster. Their absence doesn’t mean Shell has no plans at all, but it does mean the decision was taken without a transparent review of those plans.

No baseline studies (basic surveys of the marine life and ecosystems in the exact area) were done before approval. Without this information, the risks from spills, and pollution to whales, fish and corals, were likely underestimated.

The appeal also says that there was no consideration about how future production might affect South Africa’s ability to meet its Paris Agreement commitments, and that drilling for oil and gas is outdated as these are not renewable energies.

Any oil spills could pollute beyond South African borders, potentially reaching neighboring Namibian waters. However, the environmental impact assessment ignored effects on Namibian fisheries, tourism and coastal communities.

Finally, the approval failed to comply with the Integrated Coastal Management Act, which says the South African government must protect sensitive ecosystems for the long-term benefit of communities and future generations.

How the International Court of Justice opinion has been used in the appeal

The advisory opinion is not legally binding. However, the obligations it has confirmed, in international climate and customary law, are. It is the most authoritative interpretation yet of what governments must do to prevent further climate change.

Under South Africa’s constitution, courts must take international law into account when interpreting rights.

This gives organizations like Natural Justice and The Green Connection (and others across Africa) a powerful new tool. They can:

• challenge new fossil fuel projects in court by arguing they breach international obligations to prevent climate harm
• hold governments accountable for weak climate policies or failure to meet Paris targets
• strengthen community voices, showing that demands for clean energy and protection of livelihoods are backed by international law.
• build regional solidarity, with African groups drawing on the same opinion to resist fossil fuel expansion and demand climate justice.

A turning point

Across Africa, where 45 countries are exploring for oil, gas or coal, the court’s opinion raises the stakes by suggesting that continued fossil fuel expansion could breach international obligations.

The Shell appeal is a test for whether South African courts will accept that fossil fuel expansion in the era of the climate crisis is inconsistent with the constitution and international law.

Win or lose, the case marks a shift. For the first time, African activists are wielding the United Nations’ highest court as part of their legal strategy. As climate impacts intensify, that strategy may prove decisive in shaping Africa’s energy future.

Angela van der Berg is Director of the Global Environmental Law Centre and Associate Professor, Department of Public Law & Jurisprudence at University of the Western Cape.

This article appears courtesy of The Conversation and may be found in its original form here. 

 

As part of the ongoing economic reforms, Libya has reported progress on the development of Sirte Port and its connecting infrastructure. During the peak of hostilities between forces of west and east Libya in 2016, Sirte was one of the fiercest battlegrounds. With tensions between the two Libyan governments tapering down, development initiatives appear to be resuming.

Recently, the two governments closed ranks in a move to allow Turkey to proceed with exploration of oil and gas off Libya’s Mediterranean waters. Ports development is another area that has gained national consensus in Libya, viewed as an importunity to revitalize trade relations for the country.

Sirte Port in central Libya is seen as one of the most strategic infrastructure initiatives. The port has potential to rekindle Libya’s trade with its landlocked neighbors including Chad, Mali and Niger. Sirte port resumed commercial operations in February after nearly 14 years of closure due to war in the region. The arrival of the general cargo ship Sea Horizon marked the reopening of the port. The vessel carrying construction materials and equipment for projects in Sirte Free Zone, arrived from Alexandria port in Egypt.

Last month, Sirte Free Zone Authority (SFZA) announced notable progress in the construction of the “SSS” highway project. The $2 billion road project is expected to link Sirte port with key southern cities including Sabha and Sokna. The project is part of Libya’s Vision 2030 aimed at enhancing transportation between northern and southern Libya. In addition, it is envisioned that it will form a road corridor to the country’s landlocked neighbors. Notably, the project involves companies from Egypt and the UAE, signaling regional backing.

The SSS project involves plans to install smart port system in Sirte, reportedly with Huawei’s support. There has also been significant progress in construction of specialized terminals. Early this month, Sirte port announced completion of its first dedicated bitumen unloading platform, which will support in the reconstruction efforts.

Further, the port is celebrating increased commercial activity with docking of more vessels. Last week, the Turkish general cargo vessel Lutuf docked at the port. The vessel arrived from Turkey’s port of Gemlik and was carrying about 1,000 tons of goods.

 

[By Jason Lancaster]

Guadalcanal, the Coral Sea, Tarawa, New Guinea, and Iron Bottom Sound highlight the strategic location of the South Pacific during the Second World War. Today, U.S. and allied preeminence in this vital region is under threat. The People’s Republic of China (PRC,) through a sophisticated blend of economic inducements, political influence, and maritime coercion, is executing a campaign to erode U.S. and allied presence and reshape the Indo-Pacific order. Such activities mirror the tactics of insurgency, where control is gained not just through force, but by blurring legal boundaries, exploiting economic vulnerability, and using civilian fronts to advance strategic ends.

The PRC’s maritime insurgency is not limited to the South China Sea. It is a global phenomenon. This maritime insurgency is not fought with gunfire but with corruption, development loans and aid, and the PRC’s deep-water fishing fleet. More than 17,000 vessels fishing throughout the world routinely engage in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), often acting as a civilian vanguard for PRC state objectives. The situation is particularly acute in the South Pacific, where Chinese fishing fleets exploit the limited enforcement capacity of Pacific Island Countries (PICs), deplete sovereign marine resources, and undermine local economies, eroding governance, and sovereignty in the process. 

The South Pacific is by no means a strategic backwater. It lies astride the sea lines of communication connecting U.S. treaty allies in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia.  It is home to key U.S. territories such as Guam and American Samoa. It includes the Compact of Free Association (COFA) states Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. At its heart are the fourteen Pacific Island Countries. possess rich marine resources, and command strategic real estate that could either anchor regional stability or serve as launchpads for malign influence.

Historically, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand have been the region’s primary security and development partners. However, since 2018, the PRC has dramatically expanded its presence building dual-use infrastructure, embedding security arrangements, and offering opaque development assistance. Despite sustained Western aid to these nations, Beijing’s influence has surged. The construction of Chinese-funded ports and runways in the Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Long range missiles stationed in the Kiribati or the Solomons could threaten Hawaii, Australia, and the continental U.S., compromising freedom of navigation, eroding regional deterrence, and challenging the U.S. ability to defend treaty partners Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

IUUF is a major threat to PIC economies. Fishing is a major contributor to many PIC economies and IUUF challenges the ability of states to create revenue, further condemning them to a future of dependency on international development aid. The United States can enhance its hard power in the Indo-Pacific by utilizing soft power to counter IUUF and provide humanitarian assistance, thereby denying PRC regional influence.

Countering IUUF

The United States does not need to develop a new engagement strategy with South Pacific nations from whole cloth. The Pacific Island Forum produces its own strategic documents. Composed of 18 members and associate member states, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) serves as a unifying voice for the small states of the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand are full members while U.S. territories Guam and American Samoa are associate members. The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security articulate shared South Pacific security concerns and development goals. The United States and its allies are already adopting PIF strategic documents for engagement with Pacific Island Countries to achieve mutual successes. 

Countering IUUF and other forms of transnational crime is a top PIF priority, second only to climate change and rising sea levels. While the United States pays signatory nations US$60 million a year over ten years for the privilege of fishing within PIC Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, the PRC flagrantly disregards the sovereignty of Pacific Island states while plundering their maritime bounty. Pacific Island nations do not have the capacity to police their expansive EEZs against massive fishing fleets without assistance. 

Pacific Fusion Center

The PIF’s 2018 Boe Declaration recommended various security proposals to defend PIF interests. One was the development of a Pacific Fusion Center to support the collation, sharing, and analysis of intelligence. The Pacific Island Forum stood up a Pacific Fusion Center in Vanuatu in 2021. The fusion center “enhances information sharing, cooperation, analysis and assessment, and expands situational awareness and capacity across the Pacific.” The fusion center provides an opportunity to expand multinational cooperation in the region and expand defense and security force capacity. To successfully counter transnational crime, the U.S. should support and increase the capacity of the Pacific Fusion Center with the mid-term goal of turning it into a maritime headquarters, increase the capacity to enforce PIC EEZs and laws, and increase regional maritime domain awareness fed into the Pacific Fusion Center.

Through US associate PIF members Guam and American Samoa, the U.S should offer USCG support for the center to immediately increase its effectiveness. With a mid-term goal of creating a PIC-led multilateral maritime headquarters like the Combined Maritime Forces headquarters in Bahrain, this multinational maritime headquarters would be rotationally led by PICs with Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. support, and would have tactical control of forces regionally assigned to countering transnational crime.

The Pacific Fusion Center will not be effective without forces at sea enabling maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA supports two vital interests: enabling US, Australian, New Zealand, and local PIC forces to intercept and eliminate IUUF, and monitoring the PLAN in the region. IUUF fleets are vast. This was illustrated off South America, in February 2025, when the Argentine Navy tracked over 380 PRC flagged fishing vessels near the Argentine economic exclusion zone, requiring Argentina to send two warships and two aircraft—a sizable portion of its deployable blue water forces—to monitor these fishing vessels. The United States can support MDA through multiple asset types to identify potential threats within the maritime domain, supporting both the Pacific Fusion Center and a PIF response at sea.

Improving Capacity

Most PICs have little capability to enforce their own EEZs. Australia’s mitigation for the PIC’s lack of resources is the Pacific Maritime Security Program. This security assistance program provides Guardian-Class patrol boats, an equivalent of the USCG’s fast response cutter (FRC), along with crew training and maintenance for every PIC. The program has provided a total of 22 patrol boats over 30-year program. This effort has been a mixed success, as the region is full of marked and unmarked reefs and multiple ships have met with accidents. In December 2024 the new Fijian patrol boat RFNS Timo was damaged while docking. Timo is a replacement vessel for RFNS Puamau, which hit a reef and sank in June 2024. Timo completed her first patrol in April 2025. Despite this program many of these countries still do not have the capacity to patrol the entirety of their EEZs. The geography is a demanding one—the EEZ of Kiribati is roughly the size of the continental United States. The RAN and RNZN also have capacity issues. The RAN and RNZN serve dual functions, conducting both war at sea and law enforcement missions. The RNZN’s new force design will reduce the availability of RNZN vessels to conduct regional constabulary duties.

The US Coast Guard (USCG) faces budgetary and ship number restrictions, but they are the regions preferred US service for cooperation. With local agreements, the USCG can help increase regional capacity. USCG District Oceania, formerly District 14’s area of responsibility is the Pacific with ships based in Honolulu and Guam. The USCG has two national security cutters, one medium endurance cutter, three Fast Response Cutters (FRCs), and three buoy tenders stationed in Honolulu, as well as three FRCs and a buoy tender based in Guam. The U.S. Navy supports USCG missions as able. These efforts are primarily focused on the U.S. and COFA state EEZs. USCG ships are responsible for patrolling thousands of miles of both U.S. and COFA EEZs. The distances involved are vast: it is 850 miles from Guam to Palau and over 5,000 miles from Honolulu to American Samoa. In addition to fisheries protection, these cutters are also responsible for counter-narcotics, smuggling, other law enforcement requirements, and search and rescue.

The United States must increase its regional naval presence to reassure citizens, partners, and potential partners. Utilizing USCG assets reassures regional allies and partners while minimizing the threat of escalation with the PRC, reducing fears and potential misgivings of U.S. intent. The United States should increase USCG District Oceania’s assets by relocating four Fast Response Cutters currently homeported in Bahrain to the South Pacific. The increased presence of Littoral Combat Ships in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility would mitigate the reallocation of the four FRCs. 

Eradicating IUUF

Increased and improved provision of command and control and MDA and increased capacity to intercept IUUF fishermen is required for the eradication of IUUF. Officials at the New Zealand embassy stated that there were not sufficient naval forces in the region to enforce EEZs across the multitude of countries. Legal action offers an essential tool to deter further incursions despite limited forces at sea.

PICs should be provided legal, domestic, and security assistance to prosecute transnational crime. Most PRC fishing captains work for state owned enterprises tied to important CCP bosses. Linking senior CCP party members to illegal behavior that costs PIC citizens jobs, money, and resources for the future could be a method to end IUUF as well as deter future PRC illegal activities. Convictions in absentia after fair public trials are a method to deter PRC activity and highlight PRC malign influence. 

Healthcare and Pacific Partnership

Medical support is one of the most frequently requested forms of aid from PICs. The U.S. Navy’s Pacific Partnership is hugely popular in the region and provides life-changing care. The popularity of the mission should drive the U.S. and allies to increase the frequency of visits with increased allied support. USNS Mercy does not participate every year, but there has been an attempt at her participation every two years.

The Department of Defense should discuss RAN, RNZN, and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force support for increasing the number of Pacific Partnership missions. Although none of these navies have a dedicated hospital ship like USNS Mercy, each nation has a ship suitable for these missions and the capacity to send a single vessel for a 3–4-month humanitarian deployment to the South Pacific. A planned rotation of USN, RAN, USN, RNZN, USN, JMSDF provides a six-year cycle that enables maintenance, training, and other operational requirements to be scheduled. The U.S. off-years would still see U.S. mission support with a ship as well as medical personnel. U.S. years would have USNS Mercy support.

The Navy should hub a medical expeditionary ship (T-EMS) in Yap, Federated States of Micronesia to support smaller scale but persistent humanitarian medical support in the region. These vessels contain one or two operating rooms and are extremely suitable for this mission because of their shallow draft and hospital level facilities and ability to embark helicopters. The T-EMS’s sister ships, the fast expeditionary transports (T-EPFs) have been frequently used for Pacific Partnership stations, demonstrating the utility of this class for use in the South Pacific.

Conclusion

The South Pacific region holds immense strategic value for the United States and its allies. Located at the heart of key U.S. alliances and territories, the region has drawn increasing attention from the PRC, whose maritime gray zone insurgent activities threaten to undermine regional security, economic stability, and political alignment.

The PRC’s deepening engagement with PICs, particularly through dual-use infrastructure, strategic partnerships, and coercive economic practices has shifted the balance of influence away from traditional allies like the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The potential for Chinese military assets in Kiribati or the Solomon Islands should be viewed as a severe threat to U.S. territories and Indo-Pacific allies. Coupled with increased PLAN presence and aggressive operations, this trend signals a challenge to U.S. freedom of movement and regional dominance.

To effectively counter this encroachment, the U.S. must commit to a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy that integrates regional security support, humanitarian assistance, and institutional cooperation. Expanding the Pacific Fusion Center will strengthen intelligence sharing and regional coordination and MDA. Increased USCG presence would deter illegal activities like unregulated fishing and support local law enforcement capabilities. These efforts should be pursued in partnership with Australia, New Zealand, and other like-minded nations to promote regional ownership and reduce perceptions of neocolonial influence.

Combating transnational crime, particularly illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing requires not only physical presence but also legal and political resolve. Holding senior PRC officials accountable through international legal mechanisms can deter further violations and reinforce the rule of law. In parallel, bolstering regional healthcare through expanded Pacific Partnership missions and sustained medical presence such as stationing a T-EMS in Micronesia will address urgent humanitarian needs and enhance U.S. soft power. Ultimately, securing the South Pacific is not solely about countering PRC influence. It involves empowering Pacific Island Countries, reaffirming the United States’ commitment to its allies, and ensuring that the region remains free, open, and resilient.

Commander Jason Lancaster is a Surface Warfare Officer. He has served at sea in amphibious ships , destroyers, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5, and is the Operations Officer for the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Deployment Training Center. He holds Masters’ degrees from the National War College and the University of Tulsa and completed his undergraduate work at Mary Washington College.

This article appears courtesy of CIMSEC and may be found in its original form here. 

 

A U.S Coast Guard cutter built in 1927 that has been part of the USS Silversides Submarine Museum exhibits in Muskegon, Michigan, for years, has been towed away and will be scrapped. The decision came following what the museum said was significant deterioration that made efforts towards continuous preservation unfeasible.

The museum announced on September 10 that after thoughtful deliberation, it had made the difficult decision to deaccession the cutter McLane from its permanent collections. The cutter has been part of exhibits for over three decades, having been moored at Muskegon harbor since 1993.

The 38-meter (125-foot) Active-class patrol cutter was commissioned in 1927 and served the USGC with distinction through multiple eras of the agency’s history. She was named after Louis McLane, who was appointed U.S. Secretary of State in 1833. Part of McLane’s active duty was patrolling the waters of the Territory of Alaska, including the Bering Strait, during World War II.

Decommissioned in 1968, McLane was donated to the USS Silversides Submarine Museum in 1993, where she has been offering visitors a glimpse into life aboard a patrol vessel. However, the vessel’s deteriorating condition had progressed, the museum says, to the point of being inaccessible for public touring. Maintenance concerns have seen the vessel closed to the public since spring of this year. The museum has now decided that it has further made her continued presence in the harbor untenable. 

The museum highlighted that while it has made efforts to explore alternative preservation options, the vessel’s conditions have meant that continued stewardship was no longer sustainable. It believes that with the cold season approaching, the combination of time, weather, and structural decline made timely action necessary to ensure the safety of the vessel and the surrounding environment.

Unable to continue preserving the vessel, the cutter was sold for scrap. King Towing undertook the task of towing the cutter from the harbor, while Pitsch Companies will handle the dismantling.

 

USS Silversides, a WWII vintage submarine (USS Silversides Submarine Museum)

 

To honor McLane’s legacy, all historical artifacts and interpretive materials housed aboard the vessel were removed to ensure their continued educational and historical value. These artifacts will now be part of the broader collection at the museum and shared with partner organizations.

“The McLane had been a symbol of service and strength for decades,” said Veronica Campbell, USS Silversides Submarine Museum, Executive Director. “Though it was difficult to say goodbye, we were incredibly grateful to our community partners who helped us navigate this transition with dignity and respect.”

Following the departure of McLane, the museum that originally opened as the Great Lakes Naval Memorial and Museum now intends to put its main focus on its main exhibit, the USS Silversides submarine. Part of the efforts will involve fundraising to support the restoration of Silversides.

Commissioned in December 1941, shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the submarine embarked on her first war patrol in April of the following year, and went on to complete 14 war patrols in the Pacific during WWII.

She was decommissioned in 1946 and became a stationary training ship in Chicago until 1969. After retiring from service, she spent time in Chicago as a museum ship, moving to Navy Pier in 1979. In 1987, Silversides was towed across Lake Michigan to become part of the Great Lakes Naval and Memorial Museum.
 

Criminal syndicates stealing vehicles in the U.S. and shipping them to countries in West Africa are becoming daring, reports U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Its officers were recently surprised when they found a stolen bulldozer being smuggled out of the Port of Baltimore was destined for Ghana.

Officers stationed at CBP’s Area Port of Baltimore are among the busiest when it comes to intercepting stolen vehicles, the bureau reports. Often, they are being smuggled out of the U.S., hidden in containers. The stolen vehicles are mostly SUVs, sedans, vans, and pickup trucks. Last year, the Baltimore Field Office ranked second nationally in terms of stolen vehicle recoveries.

On September 3, however, they encountered something that was a bit unusual. The officers were inspecting an export shipment and discovered a 2015 Caterpillar D8T bulldozer valued at about $237,000. It was in the process of being shipped to Ghana, a West African nation that CBP reports is a popular destination for stolen vehicles.

While conducting a routine export examination on the dozer, officers discovered that the vehicle identification number (VIN) matched a stolen vehicle report from Carroll County, Maryland. They contacted the Carroll County Sheriff’s Office and confirmed that the theft report remained active, resulting in the seizure of the dozer.

CBP says that the seizure of the bulldozer is an indication that criminal syndicates involved in exporting stolen vehicles from the U.S. are becoming daring. West Africa, specifically Nigeria and Ghana, they report are lucrative markets for the stolen vehicles. Last year, about 60 percent, or 151 of the 250 stolen vehicles that officers in the Baltimore Field Office recovered, were destined for West African nations. The 250 recovered stolen vehicles were collectively valued at $9.6 million

Nigeria was the top destination with officers recovering 70 vehicles destined for the country, representing 28 percent of all vehicle recoveries. A total of 28 vehicles were earmarked for shipping to Ghana.

CBP reports that during each of the previous five years, over 90 percent of recovered stolen vehicles were destined to West African nations.

“Customs and Border Protection officers continue to combat transnational criminal organizations by interrupting the international trade in stolen vehicles at our seaports,” said Jason Kropiewnicki, CBP’s Acting Area Port Director in Baltimore. “We will continue to secure our nation’s borders, recover stolen vehicle exports, and work with our federal, state, and local law enforcement partners to hold these criminal organizations accountable.”

Despite efforts to fight the crime, CBP highlights that national volumes of stolen vehicle export recoveries remain on the rise. In 2024, the agency recovered 1,445 stolen vehicles, about 10 percent more than in 2023, and 81 percent higher than in 2021.
 

 

The Norwegian government announced today, September 12, that after months of trying to get a Russian-owned fishing vessel to leave its port, it has resorted to seizing the vessel. The government reports it will take into consideration outstanding claims from the Port of Batsfjord, but it wants the vessel out of the port immediately.

The saga of the 39-meter (128-foot) long fishing boat Azurit began when it docked in the Port of Batsfjord, a remote fishing village on Norway’s north coast along the Barents Sea. The vessel is registered in Russia with a home port of St. Petersburg and ownership reported to a company called Oceanprom. The vessel received some repairs from a local company, but appears to have failed to pay its bills and was detained with a crew remaining aboard.

Norway changed its regulations limiting access for Russian vessels to its ports starting in 2022 and again in 2024. Access was limited to just three ports: Kirkenes, Batsfjord, and Tromsø, and some Russian companies were entirely denied fishing permits. Further, Russian vessels can only stay in Norwegian ports for five days. The government later asserted that financial claims were not a reason for vessels to remain in port beyond the time limit.

"This vessel must be removed from Båtsfjord harbour. After considering and trying various solutions, it was now absolutely necessary to make a decision on the state takeover of the vessel. The Norwegian Coastal Administration can thus implement all necessary measures to remove it," said Minister of Fisheries and the Oceans Marianne Sivertsen Naess.

Saying that the prolonged stay in Batsfjord harbor was “considered to pose a risk of national security interests being threatened,” Norway expelled the vessel on December 6 telling it that it must depart within five days. At the time, the captain told Norwegian broadcaster NRK that they were confused because they had a detention order and an eviction notice.

The ship simply never left. The Ministry reported that it considered and tried various solutions, including possibly towing the vessel. The police took steps to secure and control the vessel, but it still never left.

Media reports indicate it now owes as much as $200,000 to the port and various local businesses. The vessel is also reported to be in poor condition. NRK reports the state will cover the berthing fees.

Norway’s Secretary of State Kristoffer André Hansen said that he expects the vessel will likely be towed to a local shipyard and dismantled.
 

HMM continues to take steps designed to execute on its strategy of diversification of its shipping operations. While the company continues its role as a leading container carrier, it is also following a strategy to expand its dry bulk operations as a means of stabilizing its financial results.

The company announced the signing of a new long-term contract of affreightment (COA) with Brazil’s Vale, one of the world’s largest mining companies. Valued at approximately $310 million, the contract is for ten years, starting in the second quarter of 2026, for the transport of iron ore using five bulk carriers. It follows a similar 10-year contract completed in May with Vale valued at more than $450 million.

“Through portfolio diversification, we aim to achieve balanced growth across various markets and secure new opportunities for long-term growth,” HMM reported while announcing the new contract. It is the strategic partnership with Vale is expected to provide stable cargo volumes and consistent revenue over the next decade.

The company highlights it has been active in the dry bulk and construction material sectors since 1977 and today operates general cargo vessels in various sizes from 30,000 DWT Handy to 60,000 DWT Supramax worldwide, including in the Americas, the Middle East, and Europe. Its current fleet list shows a total of 20 dry bulk carriers: 7 Capesize, 2 Panamax, 4 Supramax, and 7 Handy.

HMM highlights that it plans to expand its bulk fleet to 110 vessels (12.56 million DWT) by 2030, as part of its strategy to diversify beyond container shipping and pursue new growth opportunities.

As part of this strategy, the company recently took delivery of the eco-friendly Ocean Ariel, a 42,000 dwt bulker built by Japan’s Tsuneishi Shipbuilding. The shipbuilder highlights that it is a versatile design primarily for the three major bulk cargoes of iron ore, grain, and coal, but it can also carry lumber, hot coils, and sulfur, allowing for greater trade flexibility. It uses a semi-box-type hold that is also suitable for transporting steel products.

HMM, according to reports, is also pursuing secondhand dry bulk tonnage after it failed in its bid to acquire the bulk operations of South Korea’s SK Shipping.

The company in 2022 launched its new long-term strategy, reporting it would invest $10 billion to grow its operations. Its objective is to nearly double its container capacity to 1.2 million TEU while accelerating growth in the bulker segments. It has also ordered four new multi-purpose vessels and ordered car carriers that will operate under a long-term charter to Hyundai-Glovis. The company is also seeking growth in logistics, with reports that it is planning investments in terminals around the world.

 

The legal battle over Maryland’s planned offshore wind project is heating up as the United States followed through on its earlier statement and filed to vacate the Construction and Operation permit granted in late 2024 to US Wind. Anticipating the move after earlier statements of intent by the Department of Justice, the offshore wind developer has already filed claims with the courts to block the moves by the Trump administration.

Maryland’s WBOC News broke the story, reporting that the Department of Justice filed on Friday afternoon, September 12, as expected to vacate the permits granted by the Biden administration. The government had declared its intent at the end of August in another court filing. The U.S. is party to a lawsuit filed by government officials in Ocean City, Maryland, seeking to block the project, the first of two US Wind was to develop on its offshore lease.

Maryland Wind was the tenth commercial-scale offshore wind project approved by the Biden administration. It calls for up to 114 wind turbines that would bring power ashore in Maryland and Delaware. The plan calls for 1,700 MW of offshore wind power generation capacity. US Wind, which is owned by funds managed by Apollo Global Management, an American investment firm, and Renexia, a subsidiary of Toto Holding, had received all of its permits from the federal government as well as both Maryland and Delaware.

Today’s court filing, WBOC reports, cites “substantial concerns” about the review and approval process for the project. It specifically points to what it says is a lack of mitigation efforts to prevent impact on Maryland’s fishing industries. Ocean City, which is a popular tourist destination, has also opposed the project, saying it would hurt its business and reduce the number of visitors.

US Wind moved at the beginning of September in anticipation of the Trump administration’s actions after DOJ declared its intent to challenge the permits. The company filed a cross claim in Maryland court, saying that the effort was politically motivated. They asserted that the president, his appointees, members of Congress, and the opponents had been unfairly pressuring the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management to cancel the licenses. The company, in its filing, asserted that the federal defendants failed to explain their action and the reversal of earlier government policies that supported the development.

Earlier this week, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum declared the U.S. offshore wind industry dead. According to a report by Bloomberg, Burgum said the U.S. was reviewing five projects, and he also cited the withdrawal of tax credits and other subsidies. The U.S. has also recently ordered a stop work on the installation of Revolution Wind, being developed by Ørsted. It also declared its intent to challenge the permits for Massachusetts’ SouthCoast Wind being developed by Ocean Wind North America, a joint venture between EDP Renewables and Engie, and New England Wind, which is being developed by Avangrid, a subsidiary of Spain’s Iberdrola.

In addition to the case filed by US Wind in Maryland, Ørsted also filed suit to force the stop work ordered to be lifted on its project, which is already 80 percent installed. A coalition of US states also filed a suit challenging the federal review of the wind energy sector ordered by Donald Trump.
 

Nearly a week after the Dutch cargo ship Thamesborg grounded in a remote part of the Canadian Arctic during a trip on the Northwest Passage, a salvage master and naval architect were due to reach the vessel. They are working on a plan for the ship, which is reportedly stable but has taken on water in multiple ballast tanks.

The operator Royal Wagenborg, said the salvage team would reach the vessel by the end of the week. In addition, the Canadian Coast Guard vessel CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier is being used to transport personnel and equipment to the remote site.

The Canadian Coast Guard reported that an underwater survey was completed on September 8 using ROVs two days after the vessel went aground. The 21,359 dwt vessel was sailing from China to Baie-Comeau, Quebec, and is carrying a load of carbon blocks used for manufacturing in heavy industry. The ship went aground in the Franklin Strait in Nunavut.

A crew of 15 people is aboard the vessel along with a Canadian ice pilot. There were no injuries, but they are stranded in a remote part of Canada, away from any large settlements. The survey of the hull confirmed the damage to the ballast tanks, but the fuel tanks do not appear to be damaged, and there was no flooding in the cargo holds. A second Canadian Coast Guard vessel, CCGS Jean Goodwill, has remained on scene.

The Canadian Coast Guard reports the vessel's owner and the salvage master have organized additional equipment and personnel. Currently, the damage is being analyzed to develop the salvage plan.

The Thamesborg, built in 2013, is 564 feet (174 meters) in length. The ship, which is registered in the Netherlands, was inspected in Canada in March 2024 and 2025 with no issues reported. It has an ice class. 

Media reports from Canada highlight that only 18 percent of Canada’s Arctic waters have been mapped with modern technology. Much of the Northwest Passage, they note, lacks modern charts.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada revealed in an announcement yesterday that this is the second grounding of the season in the same general eastern area of the Northwest Passage. It reported that an investigation team is on its way to St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, to interview the crew of another cargo ship, the Rosaire A. Desgagnés (12,776 dwt). The vessel, which is registered in Canada, went aground on August 23 in Pelly Bay, Nunavut. The location is to the south of where the Thamesborg is stranded, and unlike the current situation, the vessel was refloated with the tide. It was conducting a supply mission to the region and was inspected for damage after it was refloated. It is expected to reach St. John’s over the weekend.
 

The UK expanded its list of sanctions targeting Russia’s oil and gas industry as well as suppliers of electronics and other military components. The latest round of sanctions came as the UK’s new Foreign Secretary made her visit to Kyiv.

With the new action, the UK again claims the position as the country with the most sanctioned tankers. The long list includes vessels that have previously been listed by the United States, as well as targeting Russian majors, including Sovcomflot, Rosneft, and Gazprom. Among the ships are the Vasily Dinkov (72,700 dwt), which was introduced in 2008 by Sovcomflot as the first of three new Arctic enhanced ice-class tankers, designed to transport oil from the Varandey oil field within the Arctic Circle. There are also multiple vessels linked to Gazprom, including a gas tanker, Gazpromneft Zuid East (6,897), which was previously listed by the United States.

The UK highlighted that it continues to lead the charge against the shadow fleet. It said the goal is to reduce sources of revenue. 

The UK is now approaching 500 listed tankers, having already listed 423 tankers, a dramatic increase from just over 100 tankers sanctioned at the start of 2025. The EU, by comparison, currently has sanctions on 444 tankers, while the U.S. lags at just over 200 tankers from the Russian shadow fleet.

“International action to increase economic pressure on Russia and to cut off critical cash flows which he desperately needs to pay for this illegal war is vital,” said Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper. “These sanctions form the next stage in the UK’s leading efforts to ramp up economic pressure alongside our security support and our work alongside the Coalition of the Willing for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.”

She noted that Russia, in the last two weeks, has again moved to obstruct the US-led peace efforts by launching the largest air attack of the war against Ukraine. They noted that over 800 missiles and drones were fired in a single night and over 6,500 in July. Attacks, they said, are a level ten times that of a year ago.

In addition to the tankers, the UK added 30 entities and individuals that it says are propping up Russia’s war machine. They said the companies were being targeted for supplying key equipment such as electronics, chemicals, and explosives used to manufacture missiles and other weapons systems.

In addition to listing companies in Russia, the UK also targeted others supplying the effort. This included companies based in China and Turkey. They were also linked to electronics widely used in Russian weaponry, including drones and missiles.

 
 

[By: Inmarsat Maritime]

The 2025 edition of the Future of Maritime Safety Report from Inmarsat Maritime, a Viasat (NASDAQ: VSAT) company, reveals that distress calls at sea remain high, underlining the vital role of human factors in safe shipping.

According to the report, the number of Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) distress calls registered on the Inmarsat Maritime network increased from 788 in 2023 to 801 in 2024, broadly in line with the 2018-2023 annual average of around 800 calls.

The report points to a turbulent year for international shipping, with geopolitical instability, conflict, severe weather events, piracy, and cyber-attacks all adding pressure on operators and crews. Alongside these risks, seafarers are facing welfare challenges linked to the pace and volume of new technologies. While digitalisation and decarbonisation are essential for the industry’s future, the rapid implementation of new systems and reporting requirements has created an information ‘overload challenge’ for seafarers, highlighting the need for new technologies to support, rather than strain, crew welfare.

The Future of Maritime Safety Report 2025 calls for the industry to acknowledge the fundamental role seafarer welfare plays in minimising the number of preventable incidents at sea. It recommends a ‘human factors’ approach to data that streamlines information, reduces duplication, and eliminates contradictory outputs.

Peter Broadhurst, Senior Vice President, Safety and Regulatory, Inmarsat Maritime, said: “Accurate data holds immense potential to transform shipping safety – from predictive maintenance to casualty and near-miss reporting and human-factor analysis. But data must empower crews, not overwhelm them. We need smarter systems to capture, evaluate, and utilise data more effectively without placing an extra burden on already overworked seafarers.”

Peter Broadhurst also emphasised the need for greater collaboration: “By sharing anonymised safety data, the industry can create a trusted ecosystem that strengthens standardisation and regulations, improves operations, and safeguards seafarer welfare. Together, we can create one of the most powerful maritime safety initiatives to navigate us through the pressures and changes impacting international shipping in the years to come.”

Inmarsat invites maritime professionals, policymakers, and stakeholders to explore the findings of the Future of Maritime Safety Report 2025 report and to support collective action in safeguarding life at sea.

Download the full report here.

[By: Lloyd's Register]

Lloyd’s Register (LR) has granted Approval in Principle (AiP) to Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI) for its new Floating Offshore Wind Turbine (FOWT) design, SnapWind Float.  

Announced this week at Gastech 2025 in Milan, SnapWind Float has been developed to deliver floating wind solutions that can unlock deeper water sites and higher-capacity renewable energy sites worldwide. 

In addition, the SnapWind Float design is optimised for the development of floating offshore wind farms in regions where skilled workforce, heavy lifting equipment and sufficient workspace are limited. 

SHI’s engineering team completed the concept and basic design, while LR carried out a comprehensive review, in accordance with its rules and international standards, to verify the feasibility and safety of the design and clears the way for its progression towards commercial deployment. 

Sean van der Post, LR’s Global Offshore Business Director, said: “As the offshore wind industry seeks new solutions to unlock deeper waters and higher capacity sites, the SnapWind Float demonstrates significant progress toward establishing floating wind as a commercially sustainable solution at scale.” 

Hae-Ki Jang, Chief Technology Officer at Samsung Heavy Industries, said: “The SnapWind Float is designed to meet the challenges of offshore wind developers who require efficient and commercially viable solutions. Receiving AiP from Lloyd’s Register is an important milestone that validates our technology and supports the next stage of offshore wind development worldwide.” 

[By: DNV]

At Gastech 2025, DNV awarded an Approval in Principle (AiP) to HD Hyundai Heavy Industries (HD HHI) for the design of next-generation LNG carriers (LNGC) and Very Large Ethane Carriers (VLEC) with forward accommodation and Wind-Assisted Propulsion Systems (WAPS). 

The innovative designs, featuring 174K LNGCs and 100K VLECs (Ethane/LPG carriers), are the first from HD HHI to combine a forward accommodation layout with the integration of tiltable rotor sails. The LNGC design will be equipped with four tiltable rotor sails from Norsepower, while the VLEC design will incorporate two. Those two designs have been assessed for principle compliance with DNV’s WAPS notation, DNV Rules Pt.6 Ch.2 Sec.12.

By utilizing the forward accommodation concept, the vessels are designed to minimize some of the challenges related to onboard WAPS installations, for example COLREG compliance and reduced visibility, while maximizing the efficiency benefits of wind-assisted propulsion, through enhanced fuel efficiency and emissions reductions.

Hong-Ryeul Ryu, CTO & Executive Vice President at HHI, stated: “These vessels’ concepts are expected to become a Future Platform capable of flexibly responding to the stringent environmental regulations.”

Vidar Dolonen, Regional Manager, Korea & Japan at DNV Maritime, said: “WAPS have been going from strength to strength over the past few years. And with the current advances in technology, materials, and production capacity in the segment we expect this to accelerate. But with each advancement on the system side space, there is the further possibility of tailoring the vessel design of these installations to individual ship types and sizes. This is why we are very pleased to award this AiP to HD HHI for their LNGC and VLEC designs. Combining forward accommodation with rotor sail technology in the gas carrier space demonstrates these possibilities for enhancing energy efficiency and emissions reduction. This milestone highlights the strong collaboration we are building with HHI to support shipping’s transition towards a more sustainable future.”

An Approval in Principle (AiP) is an independent evaluation of a concept based on a predefined framework of requirements. It confirms the feasibility of the design and ensures there are no significant technical obstacles hindering its implementation.