A new theory proposes that the universe’s fundamental forces and particle properties may arise from the geometry of hidden extra dimensions. These dimensions could twist and evolve over time, forming stable structures that generate mass and symmetry breaking on their own. The approach may even explain cosmic expansion and predict a new particle. It hints at a universe built entirely from geometry.

Consciousness evolved in stages, starting with basic survival responses like pain and alarm, then expanding into focused awareness and self-reflection. These layers help organisms avoid danger, learn from the environment, and coordinate socially. Surprisingly, birds show many of these same traits, from subjective perception to basic self-awareness. This suggests consciousness is far older and more widespread than once believed.

Around 1,000 years ago, a major climate shift reshaped rainfall across the South Pacific, making western islands like Samoa and Tonga drier while eastern islands such as Tahiti became increasingly wet. New evidence from plant waxes preserved in island sediments shows this change coincided with the final major wave of Polynesian expansion eastward. As freshwater became scarcer in the west and more abundant in the east, people may have been pushed to migrate, effectively “chasing the rain” across vast stretches of ocean.

Giant mosasaurs, once thought to be strictly ocean-dwelling predators, may have spent their final chapter prowling freshwater rivers alongside dinosaurs and crocodiles. A massive tooth found in North Dakota, analyzed using chemical isotope techniques, reveals that some mosasaurs adapted to river systems as seas gradually freshened near the end of the age of dinosaurs. These enormous reptiles, possibly as long as a bus, appear to have hunted near the surface, perhaps even feeding on drowned dinosaurs.

Researchers discovered a hidden molecular “switch” that herpes viruses rely on to invade cells. By combining AI, simulations, and lab experiments, they identified and altered a single amino acid that shut down viral entry. What once might have taken years was achieved far faster using computational tools. The findings open new possibilities for designing future antiviral treatments.

Hot Jupiters were once cosmic oddities, but unraveling how they moved so close to their stars has remained a stubborn mystery. Scientists have long debated whether these giants were violently flung inward or peacefully drifted through their birth disks. A new approach from researchers in Tokyo cracks open this puzzle by using the timescale of orbital circularization as a diagnostic.

Researchers in Sweden have unveiled a way to create high-performance electronic electrodes using nothing more than visible light and specially designed water-soluble monomers. This gentle, chemical-free approach lets conductive plastics form directly on surfaces ranging from glass to textiles to living skin, enabling surprisingly versatile electronic and medical applications.

Scientists have discovered that key compounds from cannabis—CBD and THC—show surprisingly strong effects against ovarian cancer cells. Used together, they slow cell growth, reduce colony formation, and may even block the cancer’s ability to spread. Even more promising, the treatment caused minimal harm to healthy cells and appears to work by restoring a disrupted signaling pathway that fuels tumor growth.

Back pain is wrapped in persistent myths, but many are far from the truth. From misconceptions about heavy lifting and bed rest to confusion over posture, exercise, and surgery, Dr. Meghan Murphy breaks down what really causes pain and what actually helps. Her insights reveal that everyday habits, movement, and smart prevention often make a bigger difference than people realize.

New research shows that your brain’s “true age” can shift dramatically depending on how you live, with optimism, restorative sleep, stress management, and strong social support acting like powerful anti-aging tools. Using advanced MRI-based brain-age estimates, scientists found that people with multiple healthy lifestyle factors had brains up to eight years younger than expected — even among those living with chronic pain.

Researchers tracking over 63,000 adults found that high-quality, minimally processed plant foods significantly reduce cardiovascular risk. But when those plant foods are ultra-processed, the advantage disappears—and can even backfire. Some ultra-processed plant diets increased risk by 40%. The study urges a shift toward whole, naturally nutrient-rich plant foods.

Natural killer cells act as the immune system’s rapid-response team, but the stress of anxiety and insomnia may be quietly thinning their ranks. A study of young women in Saudi Arabia found that both conditions were linked to significantly fewer NK cells—especially the circulating types responsible for destroying infected or abnormal cells. As anxiety severity increased, NK cell levels dropped even further, suggesting a stress-driven weakening of immune defenses.

SereNeuro Therapeutics revealed promising results for SN101, a first-in-class iPSC-derived therapy designed to treat chronic osteoarthritis pain while protecting joint tissue. Instead of blocking pain pathways, SN101 uses lab-grown nociceptors that act like sponges, soaking up inflammatory pain factors without sending pain signals. These cells also release regenerative molecules, offering disease-modifying potential that stands apart from traditional corticosteroids and single-target drugs like Nav1.8 inhibitors.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments and recommendations in response
to the November 6 Biofuels Land Use Change Public Forum. Growth Energy is the world’s
largest association of bioethanol producers, representing 97 producer plants, more than
130 associate members up and down the supply chain, and tens of thousands of biofuels
supporters across the country. Together, we are working to bring better and more
affordable choices at the fuel pump to consumers, improve air quality, and protect the
environment for future generations.
As our comments during the rulemaking for the 2024 Amendments to the LCFS
repeatedly noted, the long-outdated LUC value for bioethanol codified in the previous
and current LCFS regulations warrants reconsideration.
A Large Body of Credible Scientific Evidence Supports a Lower LUC Value for
Corn Bioethanol.
Since the inception of the LCFS, CARB has over-penalized crop-based biofuels due to
the agency’s misconceptions of the nature of their impact on land use change. Initially,
in 2009, corn starch bioethanol was assigned a 30 gCO2e/MJ penalty1
, a number our
industry argued was unsupported by credible evidence and lacking an empirical basis.
In the rulemaking process that produced this hyper-conservative figure, scientists
emphasized that there was “much uncertainty in measuring indirect emissions related
to” biofuels, creating unresolved difficulties on “whether and how to calculate” indirect
1 Even this value illustrates how LUC estimates decrease as models are refined. In the 2009 rulemaking process,
CARB’s estimate decreased from 35 gCO2e/MJ to 32 gCO2e/MJ and finally to 30 gCO2e/MJ as new model inputs
were incorporated into the model. See Initial Statement of Reasons, Proposed Regulation to Implement the Low
Carbon Fuel Standard (March 5, 2009), at IV-31
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2009/lcfs09/lcfsisor1.pdf
land use change.2 CARB then acknowledged 30 gCO2e/MJ overstated estimated LUC
and revised the figure downward to 19.8 in 2016, which, almost a decade later, remains
the codified value.
Over the last decade, the models and underlying data sets used to estimate land use
change have been greatly refined, resulting in a clear downward trend. For example, a
2021 review of the scientific literature derived a central best LUC estimate of 3.9
gCO2e/MJ for corn bioethanol.3 The U.S. Department of Energy, in conjunction with
multiple federal agencies, recently updated the model for federal tax credit purposes
under Section 45Z; that 2025 model incorporates a LUC estimate of 5.75 gCO2e/MJ for
corn bioethanol while relying on the same basic suite of models as CARB’s 2015
figure.
4
And a November 2025 analysis published by Dr. Stefan Unnasch and
economist Brian Healy of Lifecycle Associates evaluated a range of recent models with
“updated data and refined treatment of co-products, livestock, and soil carbon,” and
concluded that such refinements result in LUC estimates of “roughly 5 gCO2e/MJ.”
In addition, recent testimony from Dr. Tristan Brown during the rulemaking process for
New Mexico’s Clean Transportation Fuel Standard provides a number of examples of
updated data sets using more recent science than what is currently used by the LCFS
for crop-based biofuels.5 Since 2014, the LCFS uses a combination of GTAP-BIO and
AEZ-EF modeling for land use change. Even in 2014, the data used in AEZ-EF was
based on 8-year-old international GHG inventory methods and default values. In written
testimony to New Mexico’s Environmental Improvement Board, Dr. Brown notes there
have been “steady improvements made to both the GTAP-BIO model and the overall CI
score calculation methodology.” Additionally, given GREET’s status as the “primary
means of calculating lifecycle GHG emissions”, Argonne National Laboratory created
the Carbon Calculator for Land Use Change from Biofuels Production (CCLUB). CCLUB
is intended to “replace[s] the obsolete AEZ-EF model” and utilize the latest land use
change research and observable data. Examples of these observations include a
leveling-off, and in some cases, a decline in the acres harvested for corn bioethanol, all
while yield increased. When using the most up-to-date research (GTAP-BIO + CCLUB),
Dr. Brown concludes that corn bioethanol’s LUC value is 6.1 gCO2e/MJ.
2 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/BARCU/barcu-attach-old/lcfs09.archive/251-2009_liska_perrin_bbb.pdf
3 Scully, et. al. Carbon intensity of corn ethanol in the United States: state of the science, 16 Environ. Res. Lett. 4
(2021).
4 45ZCF-GREET Model (January 2025), https://www.energy.gov/eere/greet
5 https://www.env.nm.gov/opf/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2025/09/2025-09-02-EIB-25-23-Growth-Energys-NOIpj.pdf
Each of these four recent analyses are closely aligned around an estimated LUC range
of 3.9 – 6.1 gCO2e/MJ; far lower than the decade-plus old 19.8gCO2e/MJ currently
used in the LCFS.
Even these improved estimates likely overestimate LUC impacts. To elaborate, LUC
theory assumes that biofuels consumption in California can and will increase crop
commodity prices to a sufficient degree to drive farmers’ planting and land conversion
decisions across the globe. However, it is not possible in the real-world to isolate
impacts of California biofuels consumption from the multitude of other factors that may
more directly impact global crop commodities markets, including, for example, the
impact of agricultural, tariff, and land use policies implemented by other state and
foreign governments. This is particularly true in the context of corn bioethanol in
California, where CARB projects that bioethanol demand will decline as light-duty
electric vehicle penetration increases.6
Where bioethanol demand is declining, it simply
does not create any price signal that would drive increases in corn production.
Moreover, even if bioethanol demand were to remain steady or increase modestly,
analysis of existing trends demonstrates that over 600 million gallons of additional
bioethanol could be produced using the same corn acreage currently in production
today as a result of yield increases and other efficiency improvements.7
Indeed,
separate analyses by both Stillwater Associates and Ramboll have concluded (in the
context of the federal RFS program) that increased bioethanol demand in the U.S. has
very little to no impact on global corn prices.8
This is further affirmed by a growing body
of empirical evidence: for example, a 2022 International Energy Agency report
evaluated real-world data from 2005–2015 and found “no link” between increased U.S.
biofuel production and corn production or deforestation in Brazil.9
Instead, the report
casts doubt on any relationship between biofuel production and corn prices or livestock
production.
Despite the best available science converging around LUC estimates near 5 gCO2e/MJ
and the lack of empirical evidence to validate LUC theory, CARB concerningly relies on
6 CARB Standardized Regulatory Impact Assessment, 2024 LCFS Amendments (Dec. 19, 2023) at 18, Fig. 4.
7 Stillwater Associates, LLC, RFS Set II Proposal Analysis at 17, https://downloads.regulations.gov/EPA-HQ-OAR2024-0505-0646/attachment_3.pdf. See also
8
Id. at 9 (finding that “the actual effect on corn prices” from the most recent RFS program volume incentives “is
close to 0%.”); Ramboll and Net Gain Ecological Services, Review of Environmental Effects and Economic
Analysis of Corn Prices: EPA’s Proposed RFS Standards for 2023-2025 at 23-24, Figure 3-5, 3-6 (finding that “the
statistical dependency between corn prices and RFS volumes is either non-existent or very weak”).
9
IEA Bioenergy, Towards an improved assessment of indirect land-use change, Task 43 – Task 38 Report (October
2022).
repeatedly debunked studies from Searchinger et. al.10 and Lark et. al.11 for the Forum,
indicating an institutional unwillingness to consider more recent scientific evidence. In
contrast, we believe it is long past time for CARB to update the LUC values for cropbased biofuels in the LCFS consistent with the work of Dr. Brown, the U.S. DOE, and
other credible researchers.
Sustainability Requirements Render LUC Penalty Obsolete
In the most recent amendments to the LCFS, CARB implemented requirements for
crop-based biofuels purportedly to prove their sustainability, namely, to ensure that no
feedstocks for LCFS pathways came from land converted into cropland after 2008, and
verification processes to confirm sourcing.
12
In the most recently rulemaking, CARB’s Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA)
acknowledges potential direct and indirect land use change “is at least partially (and
potentially fully) accounted for by the LUC scores added to crop-derived pathways.”13
This acknowledgement renders the need for a sustainability certification moot and must
be accounted for in CARB’s current reconsideration of the LUC estimate appropriate to
apply to bioethanol.
This double penalty is particularly unbalanced where CARB denies bioethanol
producers the ability to utilize a wide range of on-farm practices to demonstrate GHG
reductions. It should be noted that many of those on-farm practices are recognized by
other California state agencies as tools to reduce the release of soil carbon.14
The
combination of an inflated LUC penalty untethered from the best available science with
10 See, e.g. Zilberman, D, Indirect land use change: much ado about (almost) nothing. GCB Bioenergy, 9(3), 485-
488. (2017) (“Searchinger et al. (2008) results may now be seen as fundamentally flawed not just because the ILUC
is uncertain and estimates vary considerably, but also because it fails to capture the basic features of agricultural
industries and land resources.”); see also https://growthenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Net-Gain-Rambollstudies.pdf
11See, e.g. Taheripour, et al., Comments on “Environmental Outcomes of the US Renewable Fuel Standard” (Mar.
21, 2022) (identifying “extreme” and “difficult to rationalize” inconsistencies in Lark et al. studies); Taheripour et
al., Response to comments from Lark et al. regarding Taheripour et al. March 2022 comments on Lark et al.
original PNAS paper (May 25, 2022) (reaffirming “major deficiencies, problematic assessments, and
misinterpretation” and determining that “the Lark et al. paper is more problematic than what we initially
evaluated”); Review of Recent PNAS Publication on GHG Impacts of Corn Ethanol, USDA (Dec. 14, 2022) (noting
“major methodological flaws” and observing that Lark’s findings “cannot be corroborated with USDA site level,
modeled, or national datasets.”).
12 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/atta1_finalcomparison_070125.pdf
13 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/barcu/regact/2024/lcfs2024/recirculated_draft_eia.pdf
14 https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/10/07/governor-newsom-launches-innovative-strategies-to-use-california-land-tofight-climate-change-conserve-biodiversity-and-boost-climate-resilience/
the failure to acknowledge scientifically-supported low-carbon agricultural practices
creates a significant distortion in bioethanol carbon intensity scores that unfairly harms
producers and California consumers.
Corn Acreage Unchanged Despite Increased Bioethanol Demand
Even as demand for bioethanol increased, the number of acres of corn planted and
harvested have remained largely unchanged. As we have referenced in multiple
previous comments during the most recent LCFS amendment rulemaking, the growth in
corn production in the United States has come from improvements in yield while the
number of acres used to produce corn are roughly the same number of acres used in
1900.
Since 1900, the top 25 years with the most increase in acreage relative to the nation’s
average of 77.745 million acres of corn production all occurred in or before 1933.15
15 https://afdc.energy.gov/files/u/data/data_source/10337/10337_corn_yield_acres.xlsx
Analysis of more recent trends again demonstrates that corn plantings have remained
stable while yield increased. The amount of land required to produce one billion gallons
of bioethanol has decreased from 3.1 million acres in 2007 to 1.9 million acres in
2024.16
Over this time, corn acres planted have remained constant, illustrating that both
the LUC penalty and the burdensome sustainability requirements are unnecessary for
corn starch bioethanol:
Conclusion and Recommendations
With the temporary approval of E15 via AB 30 and the subsequent rulemaking for
permanent approval, liquid fuels with higher bioethanol content have the potential to
significantly improve the carbon intensity of California’s transportation fuel mix. CARB
has a legal and policy imperative to expeditiously incorporate the best available science
16 Stillwater Associates, LLC, RFS Set II Proposal Analysis at 9, https://downloads.regulations.gov/EPA-HQ-OAR2024-0505-0646/attachment_3.pdf
on land use change estimates for bioethanol. As summarized above, the weight of the
credible scientific evidence requires a substantial downward shift in bioethanol’s LUC
value.
Growth Energy also encourages CARB to allow the use of climate-smart agricultural
practices, some of which include precision application of fertilizer, use of low CI fertilizer,
no or low-till farming practices, and the use of cover crops.17
We appreciate the opportunity to provide input on land use change. We urge CARB to
recognize the role biofuels have played and can continue to play in decarbonizing
California’s transportation fuel supply.
Sincerely,
Christopher P. Bliley
Senior Vice President of Regulatory Affairs
Growth Energy
17 https://growthenergy.org/policy-priority/climate-smart-agriculture/

 

December 4, 2025
Matt Botill
Division Chief
Industrial Strategies Division
1001 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Via electronic submission
RE: Biofuels Land Use Change Public Forum
Mr. Botill:

The post Comments in Response to California Biofuels Land Use Change Public Forum appeared first on Growth Energy.

Dear Mr. President:
We write on behalf of organizations representing ethanol producers, oil refiners, fuel
marketers, travel plazas, truck stops, and convenience store retailers to express the need
for long-term policy certainty across the transportation fuel sector. Our diverse group of
industries often have unique policy priorities and market concerns, but we have always
shared a common goal to provide affordable, reliable liquid fuels for consumers. However,
our collective ability to continue to do so is being threatened by the ongoing uncertainty
regarding the sale of year-round E15 and the administration of Small Refinery Exemptions
(SREs) under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program.
E15 continues to play an expanding role in the fuel marketplace, but unpredictable shortterm waivers, seasonal and geographic restrictions, and regionally unique summer
gasoline specifications in the Midwest have created a shifting regulatory environment that
complicates planning and investment. Legislation allowing the year-round, nationwide
sale of E15 would improve fungibility and substantially reduce many of the complexities
that arise for our industries as we operate in a national marketplace.
In addition, we believe Congress must take legislative action to reform the Small Refinery
Exemption program. The current SRE structure has encouraged a system of winners and
losers that distorts the marketplace, creates instability, and ultimately, hurts consumers.
A more consistent and narrowly applied SRE structure would create a far more predictable
regulatory environment.
The absence of nationwide E15 and the administration of the SRE program present varying
challenges for our industries. They both impact investment and compliance planning,
blending decisions, and the stability of national fuel supply chains. Addressing these two
issues through clear legislation would provide a more coherent and durable policy
foundation, reduce volatility, and enhance confidence for all participants in the
transportation fuel sector.
For these reasons, we respectfully urge you to support legislation that brings lasting
certainty to these fuels issues and supports a stable, efficient marketplace.
Thank you for your consideration of these matters. Our organizations remain committed to
supporting constructive solutions as Congress evaluates next steps.
Sincerely,
American Petroleum Institute
Growth Energy
National Association of Convenience
Stores
NATSO, Representing America’s Travel
Centers and Truck Stops
Renewable Fuels Association
SIGMA: America’s Leading Fuel Marketers
CC:
The Honorable Mike Johnson
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Hakeem Jeffries
Minority Leader, U.S. House of
Representatives
The Honorable John Thune
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate
The Honorable Chuck Schumer
Minority Leader, U.S. Senate
The Honorable Doug Burgum
Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior
The Honorable Brooke Rollins
Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture
The Honorable Chris Wright
Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy
The Honorable Lee Zeldin
Secretary, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency

December 4, 2025
President Donald J. Trump
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Re: E15 Negotiations

The post Industry Letter to White House on E15 Negotiations appeared first on Growth Energy.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment as part of a Section 301 investigation into China’s
implementation of the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (“Phase One
Agreement”).
We appreciate the support and assistance of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
on this important issue as well as the agency’s continued engagement with foreign governments
to expand market access for U.S. ethanol. Growth Energy is the nation’s largest association of
ethanol producers, representing 97 U.S. plants that each year produce 9.5 billion gallons of lowcarbon, renewable fuel; 130 businesses associated with the production process; and tens of
thousands of ethanol supporters around the country. Growth Energy represents the leading
exporters in the ethanol industry, helping to support nearly 2 billion gallons of ethanol exports to
over 60 countries around the world.
In January 2020, China committed to substantial purchases under the Phase One Agreement,
including for agricultural commodities. These commitments have not been fulfilled. We
welcome USTR initiating this investigation.
The 2017 baseline for U.S. agricultural exports to China amounted to $19.6 billion1
. The Phase
One Agreement does not specify how the additional agricultural purchases would be
proportioned per commodity, although ethanol is specifically included in the “other” category.
China agreed to $32 billion in additional agricultural purchases over two years ($12.5 billion in
2020 and $19.5 billion in 2021) above the 2017 baseline and agreed to strive for a further $5
billion in additional imports per year of agricultural products. Thus, China’s minimal purchase
commitment of $32.1 billion in 2020 and $39.1 billion in 2021 not including the strived-for $5
billion.
However, the actual U.S. agricultural exports to China in 2020 ($26.4 billion) and in 2021 ($32.8
billion) were far below these commitments and the added annual $5 billion also never
materialized. Actual exports only amounted to 82 percent of minimal commitments in 2020 and
84 percent of minimal commitments in 2021.
1 Trade data compiled from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Global Agricultural Trade System.
The 2017 baseline for U.S. ethanol was 55 million gallons valued at $83 million. However, this
baseline is well below U.S. ethanol exports to China in 2016, which amounted to 198 million
gallons valued at $313 million. In 2020, U.S. ethanol exports were valued at $50.9 million (32
million gallons) and in 2021 were valued at $162.4 (100 million gallons). Since then, no
meaningful volumes have been exported, including in 2022 while other agricultural commodities
were still generally increasing in export value to China.
$0
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
$300,000
$350,000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
U.S. Ethanol Exports to China
(in thousands of dollars)
0.00
100,000,000.00
200,000,000.00
300,000,000.00
400,000,000.00
500,000,000.00
600,000,000.00
700,000,000.00
800,000,000.00
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
U.S. Ethanol Exports to China (liters)
China committed to a 64 percent increase over the 2017 baseline for 2020 and a 99 percent
increase over the 2017 baseline for 2021 in its agricultural purchase commitments under the
Phase One Agreement. No specific dollar or volumes were noted for ethanol purchases.
However, using these percentages, an estimate of ethanol purchases can be extrapolated had
China adhered to its commitments. Accordingly, ethanol purchases fell below what was expected
considering the overall percentage increase of commitments over the 2017 baseline.
In 2021, U.S. ethanol exports experienced a 95 percent increase over the 2017 ethanol baseline,
which is aligned with the agreement’s overall commitment percentage increase applied to
ethanol purchases. However, in 2020, U.S. ethanol exports of $50.9 million was 39 percent lower
than the 2017 ethanol baseline of $83.2 million. The actual amount of U.S. ethanol exports in
2020 was below the anticipated $136.3 million in ethanol purchases if considering the
agreement’s overall 2020 purchase commitment percentage increase of 64 percent over the 2017
baseline.
Under this approach, there was an $85 million purchase deficit of U.S. ethanol by China in 2020
and a $3.2 million purchase deficit in 2021, for a combined total of $88.6 million in nonmartialized purchases of U.S. ethanol by China.
A second way to consider if China fulfilled its purchase commitments related to U.S. ethanol is
comparing the overall share of U.S. ethanol to other agricultural purchases. In 2017, U.S. ethanol
accounted for 0.4 percent of U.S. agricultural exports to China. Of the additional $32 billion in
additional agricultural purchases China committed to, 0.4 percent would mean $135.5 million of
the additional purchase commitments would be of U.S. ethanol. Factoring in the 2017 ethanol
baseline and actual exports, this method shows an $88.6 million U.S. ethanol purchase deficit by
China under the Phase One Agreement.
Both assumptions show deficits higher than the value of U.S. ethanol exports to China in 2017.
The above assumptions also did not include the additional $5 billion in agricultural purchases
China agreed to strive for.
2017
Baseline
Additional
Purchase
Commitments
Total
Purchase
Commitment
Percentage
Increase Over
Baseline
(Commitment)
Actual
Exports
Percentage
Increase
Over
Baseline
(Actual)
Difference in
Commitment
vs. Actual
Agriculture (billions)
2020 $19.6 $12.5 $32.1 64% $26.4 35% -$5.7
2021 $19.6 $19.5 $39.1 99% $32.8 67% -$6.3
Total $32.0 $71.2 $59.2 -$12.0
Ethanol (millions)
2020 $83.2 $53.1 $136.3 64% $50.9 -39% -$85.4
2021 $83.2 $82.4 $165.6 99% $162.4 95% -$3.2
Total $135.5 $301.9 $213.3 -$88.6
Thank you for your consideration of these comments related to our concerns that China has not
followed through on its agricultural purchases under the Phase One Agreement, neither generally
nor on ethanol specifically. Growth Energy looks forward to working further with USTR to
resolve unfairness issues facing U.S. ethanol.
Sincerely,
Chris Bliley
Senior Vice President of Regulatory Affairs
Growth Energy

 

December 1, 2025
Ms. Jennifer Thornton
General Counsel
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
600 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20508
Docket ID: USTR-2025-0007
Dear Ms. Thornton:

The post Growth Energy Comments on 301 Investigation into China Phase One Agreement appeared first on Growth Energy.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments and recommendations in response
to the October 14 E15 Scoping Workshop. Growth Energy is the world’s largest
association of ethanol producers, representing 97 producer plants, more than 130
associate members up and down the supply chain, and tens of thousands of biofuels
supporters across the country. Together, we are working to bring better and more
affordable choices at the fuel pump to consumers, improve air quality, and protect the
environment for future generations.
Given our experience and expertise in the regulation of ethanol and our efforts to expand
the domestic market for higher blends, we have provided the following recommendations
for the state of California to consider so that consumers can benefit from E15 access as
soon as possible.
E15 Should Be Considered and Regulated as California RFG (CaRFG)
In every market E15 is available, it is treated and regulated as gasoline fuel. It is also
offered alongside E10 gasoline. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) should align
with its sister agency the California Department of Food and Agriculture’s (CDFA) Division
of Measurement Standards1 and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)2
in
1 https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/dms/programs/Petroleum/docs/e15_faq.pdf
2 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-I/subchapter-U/part-1090/subpart-A/section-1090.80
2
characterizing E15 as gasoline rather than a flex fuel or alternative fuel. In particular,
Growth Energy supports CARB’s codification of the practical approach to implementing
AB 30 that it took in initial guidance at the October 14 Scoping Workshop on E15 Use in
California (Workshop). Specifically, CARB requires the petroleum, CARBOB portion of
E15 to meet normal California reformulated gasoline regulations, allows blending with
10.5% and 15% ethanol, and requires the finished E15 to meet normal CaRFG standards,
except for oxygen content.3 We appreciate CARB’s reiteration of this in the AB 30
Frequently Asked Questions document released on November 10.4 Formalizing this
interim approach through codification of CaRFG specifications for E15 is both efficient
and consistent with other jurisdictions’ and other California agencies’ treatment of the fuel.
Were CARB to regulate E15 as an alternative fuel, it would create more uncertainty and
raise more questions regarding the dispensing of E15. For instance, without significantly
and unnecessarily overhauling a number of fuel regulations, the only fuel retail stations in
California that would be capable of dispensing E15 without costly equipment upgrades
may be stations already offering E85. The expense to upgrade equipment to dispense
E15 as an alternative fuel would be prohibitive to widespread adoption in the California
market. Therefore, for ease of adoption and in line with the federal definition of E15 as a
gasoline, we strongly encourage CARB to regulate E15 as a CaRFG fuel.
Growth Energy disagrees with comments made during the Workshop suggesting that
were E15 regulated as CaRFG, the fuel specification for CaRFG would have to change
such that E15 would be mandated and E10 would no longer be eligible for sale in the
state. This is incorrect as a regulatory matter and a mischaracterization of precedent in
other states. CARB retains discretion to promulgate fuel specifications for CaRFG under
both E10 and E15 formulations. Moreover, a multitude of markets requiring low-RVP and
RFG fuels offer E15 alongside E10.5 Currently, there are 556 retail locations in 11 RFG
jurisdictions offering E15 alongside E10. Not dissimilar to California today, states with
RFG markets are able to maintain fuel specifications for E10 and E15 simultaneously by
incorporating ASTM standards by reference, such as D4814 (Standard Specification for
Automotive Spark-Ignition Engine Fuel)
6 and D4806 (Standard Specification for
Denatured Fuel Ethanol)
7
, with some including supplemental tabulated values that govern
3 Oct. 14 Workshop Slides at 14.
4 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/ab-30-frequently-asked-questions
5https://www.getbiofuel.com
6 https://store.astm.org/d4814-25.html
7 https://store.astm.org/d4806-25.html
3
fuel properties and components. One recent successful example is Arizona, which
incorporated E15 into its cleaner burning gasoline regulations.8
In sum, continuation of
CARB’s interim policy that treats E15 as a gasoline product is the best path forward for
regulatory efficiency and to ensure market certainty for fuel suppliers and retailers.
Addressing Retail Equipment Compatibility
Currently, CARB, the State Water Resources Control Board (WRCB), the Office of the
State Fire Marshal (OSFM), and other associated agencies require retail fuel storage and
dispensing equipment to be certified by Underwriter’s Laboratory (UL) or a similar
nationally recognized laboratory for approval to dispense fuel in the state. During the
federal approval process for E15, the Obama administration’s EPA allowed for a
manufacturer’s statement of compatibility or a manufacturer’s warranty statement for E15
in lieu of UL testing and certification for Underground Storage Tank (UST) systems.
9
Manufacturers have long provided statements of compatibility for tanks of various design
and materials of construction, with many rated up to E100.
10 This has proven safe and
effective in all 34 states in which E15 is sold. Also, a recent advisory provided by the
WRCB to Unified Program Agencies and UST Owners and Operators provided guidance
that allows the use of manufacturer’s statements as a method to demonstrate
compatibility of numerous components within the UST system.11
Retail fuel dispensing equipment also has a robust history of compatibility with E15. More
than 90 percent of dispensers in-use nationwide are from companies with equipment
warrantied for E15 or higher: All Wayne dispensers in service today carry a warranty for
and are compatible with E15. Meanwhile, all Gilbarco dispensers installed since 2008
have the same warranty. Additionally, hanging hardware (hoses, nozzles, breakaways,
etc.) is also often compatible with E15. This is evidenced by manufacturer’s warranty
statements indicating compatibility, including numerous from the CARB Phase II
Enhanced Vapor Recovery program. This enhanced compatibility is largely due to
materials of construction for this equipment having been developed in accordance with
aggressive test fuels and often certified using fuels with safety margins extending up to
8 https://apps.azsos.gov/public_services/register/2023/5/contents.pdf
9 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-I/subchapter-I/part-280/subpart-C/section-280.32
10 https://afdc.energy.gov/files/u/publication/ethanol_handbook.pdf
11 https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/ust/docs/2025/ust-e15-letter.pdf
4
(or beyond) 15 volume percent ethanol. Aggressive test fuels contain increased aromatic
and ethanol content with higher inclusion rates of contaminants such as water, peroxides,
or acids, according to SAE J1681.
12 An example of a test fuel containing higher safety
margins of ethanol content is ASTM Reference Fuel H, used in UL330 for hose and hose
assemblies.
13
Overall, these characteristics have allowed authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs) to
approve equipment using a manufacturer’s statement in addition to, or in lieu of, existing
certifications. This method of approval is also supported by equivalency language
provided in NFPA30/30A.14,15 Alternatively, in states such as Iowa, the State Fire Marshal
used enforcement discretion, based on information provided by UL regarding its testing
parameters16, to accept all UL87 listed equipment compatible with E10 as also compatible
with E15. This determination is noted on page 5 of the Class 2 Waiver for the Iowa E15
Access Standard17, and provided by the authority granted in Iowa Code Section
455G.31.
18 To date, Iowa has reported no adverse effects from this regulatory decision
on compatibility.
The thorough nature of design requirements for California fuel dispensing hardware,
combined with policy such as requiring the permanent closure of single-walled
underground storage tanks, places the state in a position to leverage relatively modern
fueling infrastructure and minimize cost and schedule for fuel retailers to effectively offer
E15.
We urge CARB, OSFM, and other involved agencies to continue the acceptance of
manufacturer’s statements of compatibility, or manufacturer’s warranties, for approval to
store and dispense E15 in California, bringing the state in line with federal guidance and
the regulatory and approval practices of the 34 states currently offering E15.
12 https://www.sae.org/standards/j1681_202305-gasoline-alcohol-diesel-fuel-surrogates-materials-testing
13 https://www.shopulstandards.com/ProductDetail.aspx?UniqueKey=38520
14 https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/nfpa-30-standard-development/30
15 https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/nfpa-30a-standard-development/30a
16 https://www.cspdailynews.com/fuels/ul-announces-new-e15-dispensing-directive
17 https://iowaagriculture.gov/sites/default/files/weights/E15_Class2_Waiver_Information.pdf
18 https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/455G.31.pdf
5
Phase II Enhanced Vapor Recovery
With California’s unique requirements on enhanced vapor recovery (EVR) and the
inability previously to offer E15, there are currently no EVR systems approved for E15 in
the state. Given the lower volatility of E15 compared to E10, current E10-approved EVR
systems will easily suffice. As described in the Tier I Report of the E15 MME, previous
literature review and testing of RVP characteristics for both E10 and E15 have
demonstrated that the two fuels are indistinguishable.19 The Tier II Report of the E15 MME
also found that differences in evaporative emissions of E10 and E15 are statistically
insignificant.20
Vapor Balance Phase II EVR systems represent a vast majority of the market and should
be approved under the same standards as vacuum-assisted systems due to the
similarities of E10 and E15 and the proven history of compatibility of E10 listed equipment
to store, handle, and dispense E15.
CARB’s AB 30 FAQ referenced the need to certify EVR systems for use with E15. Given
the “statistically insignificant” differences in evaporative emissions, we recommend CARB
re-issue Executive Orders VR-20321 and VR-20422, and others as necessary, to ensure
that maximum ethanol concentrations of 15 volume percent are allowed for all Phase II
Vapor Recovery systems. This will help accelerate E15 adoption in the state without the
need for retailers to wait while testing is conducted on EVR equipment for a fuel with
evaporative emissions that are statistically indistinguishable from its approved fuel of E10.
CARB’s Concerns Over Misfuelling Are Unfounded, Mitigated by EPA Regulations
During the Workshop, CARB requested feedback on misfuelling incidents and whether
California should consider “any additional restrictions beyond” what is required by the
EPA to prevent misfuelling. As we noted in 2022 comments to the EPA on the Renewable
Fuel Standard, “even EPA has acknowledged that misfuelling fears are speculative and
likely unfounded.”23 Indeed, EPA cited “no evidence that misfuelling commonly occurs or
19 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/E15_Tier_I_Report_June_2020.pdf
20 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/E15_MME_Tier_II_Report_July_2023.pdf
21 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/vr203AD_lgl_c.pdf
22 https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/vr204ad_lgl.pdf
23 https://growthenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Growth-Energy-RVO-Comment_Exhibits.pdf
6
is otherwise a legitimate concern.” In fact, over the course of a ten-year period, data
shows there have been no incidents attributing the use of E15 to engine damage or
“inferior performance.”24
EPA currently requires fuel retailers offering E15 to follow a rigorous blueprint that
includes plans on how to mitigate and prevent misfuelling and a compliance survey plan,
while fuel and fuel additive manufacturers are required to register their product with the
EPA under 40 CFR Part 79.25
We appreciate CARB and their partner agency CDFA’s release of documentation showing
that only the federal label prescribed in 40 CFR 1090.1510 is required.26 We believe the
combination of the required Misfuelling Mitigation Plan and the required federal label
provide sufficient and robust protections for consumers and retailers. Any additional
labels, warnings, or guidance beyond those requirements are unwarranted and would
unnecessarily confuse California drivers and dissuade them from using an acceptable
and compatible fuel.
E15 Adoption Rates, Potential Cost Impacts Largely Depend on Regulatory
Decisions
Among the questions raised during the Workshop is the value to California consumers
and the costs to retailers for infrastructure improvements. The cost to retailers and its
impact on E15 adoption rates will ultimately be determined by the decisions made and
actions taken by CARB, OSFM, and other regulatory agencies involved.
We have seen significant growth in the number of fuel retail locations in states that have
embraced E15, treating it as a gasoline rather than alternative fuel. In 2019, there were
just over 2,000 fuel retail locations in the country offering E15. That number has since
grown to more than 4,500 locations in just six years.
24 https://www.americasfuel.com/engine-performance
25 https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/e15-fuel-registration#mmp
26 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-I/subchapter-U/part-1090/subpart-P/subject-groupECFR5fdfb67ce1d6cec/section-1090.1510
7
As we have detailed above, there are simple and uncontroversial equipment compatibility
determinations that CARB and OSFM can make for dispensing equipment and Phase II
EVR systems that leverages existing infrastructure and streamlines equipment
compliance, unlocking savings for consumers while providing necessary and appropriate
environmental protections. Taking the wrong approach on how E15 is regulated,
equipment compatibility decisions, and methods of dispensing will effectively lock E15 out
of wide swaths of California’s fuel market.
1. Requiring new dispensers could easily escalate typical E15 conversion costs by
more than four times, while requiring new tanks could escalate conversion costs
by well over fifteen times.27 Utilizing manufacturer’s statements as proof of
compatibility, ensuring that E15 may be dispensed from shared infrastructure with
E10, and regulating E15 as a gasoline product, have been a proven way to keep
conversion costs very low while maintaining safe operation and robust fuel quality.
2. Failing to amend Executive Orders VR-203 and VR-204 or taking other expeditious
action to clear vapor recovery-related barriers will cause a lengthy delay in E15’s
entry into California’s fuel market with no animating environmental cause of
concern. As mentioned above, testing during the multimedia evaluation of E15
27 https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/02/f59/USDRIVE_FWG_PotentialImpactsIncreasedEthanolBlendLevel.pdf
8
yielded no statistically significant differences in evaporative emissions between
E10 and E15. In fact, as ethanol content of a fuel increases, its evaporative
emissions decrease.28 As a result, E15 is more than suitable for Phase II EVR
systems currently approved for E10, a slightly more volatile gasoline.
3. Of the 34 states in which E15 is being offered, regulating agencies have accepted
manufacturer’s statements of compatibility in lieu of a UL certification or
certification from a nationally recognized laboratory. As mentioned above, more
than 90 percent of dispensers in use nationwide are from companies with
equipment warrantied for E15 or higher. We urge CARB, OSFM, and other involved
agencies to accept the manufacturer’s statements of compatibility or
manufacturer’s warranties for approval to dispense E15 in California in lieu of UL
listing, bringing it in line with federal guidance and the regulatory and approval
practices of the 34 states currently offering E15.
28 https://growthenergy.org/policy-priority/e15-and-higher-ethanol-blends/
9
Conclusion
California has the opportunity to utilize E15 with a greater environmental and climate
benefits than any other state currently allowing its sale. Given California’s status as a
mandatory RFG state, E15 can be sold year-round without annual summer RVP waivers
or other EPA regulatory action. With the passage and signing into law of AB 30, California
has the opportunity to provide energy cost savings at the pump with a lower carbon fuel
in as little as a few weeks, provided the correct regulatory decisions are made. We
encourage CARB to align its regulatory approach with the other states currently offering
E15, providing certainty, clarity, and uniformity in the market without any negative
environmental or economic impacts.
Sincerely,
Christopher P. Bliley
Senior Vice President of Regulatory Affairs
Growth Energy

 

November 17, 2025
Matt Botill
Division Chief
Industrial Strategies Division
1001 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Via electronic submission
RE: E15 Scoping Workshop Public Comments
Mr. Botill:

The post Growth Energy Public Comments on California E15 Scoping Workshop appeared first on Growth Energy.

Growth Energy is the world’s largest association of biofuel producers, representing 97
biorefineries that annually produce 9.5 billion gallons of renewable fuel. Growth Energy’s
members produce more than 60% of all ethanol sold in the United States, most of which is used
to comply with the RFS. Growth Energy previously submitted comments on EPA’s proposed
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2026 and 2027, Partial Waiver of 2025
Cellulosic Biofuel Volume Requirement, and Other Changes (hereinafter “Set 2 proposal” or
“NPRM”).1
Here, Growth Energy respectfully submits these supplemental comments on the
EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2026 and 2027, Partial Waiver
of 2025 Cellulosic Biofuel Volume Requirement, and Other Changes; Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (hereinafter “supplemental proposal” or “Supplemental NPRM”).2

In the supplemental proposal, EPA proposes to increase the 2026 and 2027 national
Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”) standards so as to reallocate 100% or 50% of the RFS
obligations that are covered by the small-refinery exemptions (“SREs”) that EPA granted for
compliance years 2023-2025.3
EPA also solicits comment on reallocating other amounts,
including 0%.4
The SREs EPA granted for 2023-2024 freed 1.4 billion RINs from needing to be
retired for those years and made them available for compliance going forward.5
In the
supplemental proposal, EPA states that it projects granting SREs for 2025 covering about 780
million RINs.6
Thus, 100% reallocation would entail raising the 2026 and 2027 standards by
about 2.18 billion gallons in the aggregate.
I. Growth Energy appreciates and firmly supports EPA’s proposal to reallocate
100% of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations. The logic underlying the proposed reallocation is
that the RINs associated with the 2023-2025 SREs will be available for compliance in 2026-
2027, and thus they will reduce the binding force of the 2026-2027 RFS standards one for one
and allow obligated parties to use those RINs in lieu of the required volume of renewable fuel,
creating a renewable-fuel shortfall. That logic is sound and requires 100% reallocation. If the
RINs associated with the 2023-2025 SREs are not fully drawn down for compliance in 2026 and
2027, they will merely recreate the problems in future years: any rolled-over RINs associated
with those SREs will suppress the binding force of the 2028 RFS standards (one for one) and
accordingly allow obligated parties to create a renewable-fuel shortfall in 2028 to that extent.
This process will continue until all the SRE-associated RINs have inevitably been used in lieu of
renewable fuel, ultimately creating a 2.18-billion-gallon renewable-fuel shortfall equal to the
entire exempt renewable-fuel volume. Only 100% reallocation can avoid that outcome.
1
90 Fed. Reg. 25,784 (June 17, 2025).
2
90 Fed. Reg. 45,007 (Sept. 18, 2025).
3
Supplemental NPRM at 45,009:3.
4 Ibid.
5 Id. at 45,009:2.
6 Ibid.
2
II. Given the effects of the 2023-2025 SREs, EPA is required as a matter of law to
reallocate 100% of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations. That is required by EPA’s “core
mandate” under the CAA to set standards reasonably designed to “ensure” that the applicable
volumes are met. And that is required by EPA’s duty to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.
III. But even if reallocation were not mandatory, EPA would at least have discretion
to reallocate the exempt 2023-2025 obligations under both its “ensure” duty and its “Set” power.
IV. And insofar as EPA is exercising its discretion, it would be arbitrary and
capricious for EPA to reallocate less than 100% of those obligations. First, 100% reallocation
best serves Congress’ intent that the RFS program force the market to increase its renewable-fuel
use and best achieves the public benefits Congress sought to achieve by creating the RFS
program: increasing U.S. energy security and independence, decreasing greenhouse-gas
emissions, and promoting job growth and rural economic development. Full reallocation is also
most consistent with EPA’s analysis of the various statutory Set factors and with EPA’s
conclusion that those factors overall favor the proposed applicable volumes. Second,
reallocation—even 100%—would not harm non-exempt obligated parties because they can avoid
all net RIN costs, and if there were any portion of those costs that they could not avoid, that
portion would be far too small to justify non-reallocation. But at most, that unavoidable portion
cost could justify only the same proportion of non-reallocation. Third, no statutory Set factor is
affected adversely by reallocation. And fourth, it would be irrational for EPA to decline 100%
reallocation in order to preserve or increase the carryover-RIN bank for the future.
V. There is no reason to treat the exempt cellulosic-biofuel obligations differently.
The cellulosic-waiver standard plays no role when setting applicable volumes for 2023 or later
years. And anyway, reallocation is not inconsistent with accounting for the cellulosic-waiver
standard at this stage.
3
DISCUSSION
I. TO THE EXTENT THE 2023-2025 SRE OBLIGATIONS ARE NOT REALLOCATED, THEY
WILL CONTINUE TO UNDERMINE FUTURE RFS STANDARDS AND WILL EVENTUALLY
CREATE AN EQUIVALENT RENEWABLE-FUEL SHORTFALL
EPA “project[s] that a total of 2.18 billion RINs will not need to be retired as a result of
SREs for 2023-2025.”7
As EPA notes correctly, the availability of those additional RINs will
reduce the binding force of the 2026-2027 RFS standards one for one, which in turn could result
in lower renewable-fuel usage in 2026-2027. The supplemental proposal, however, mistakenly
treats the possibility that this usage reduction will not be fully experienced in 2026-2027 as
possible justification for reallocating less than 100% of the exempted 2023-2025 obligations. To
the extent that the SRE-based RINs are not used to reduce renewable-fuel usage in 2026-2027,
they will continue to undermine the binding force of RFS standards in the future and will
eventually reduce renewable-fuel usage by the entire exempt volume, i.e., the projected 2.18
billion gallons. In other words, any SRE-based RINs not drawn down in 2026-2027 to achieve
compliance in lieu of renewable-fuel use will be rolled forward to 2028, where the process on
which EPA rests its reallocation proposal will repeat, suppressing the effective RFS standards
and depressing RIN prices until the SRE-based RIN-bank inflation has been fully drawn down
through an aggregate renewable-fuel shortfall of 2.18 billion gallons. This is the inevitable
product of the RFS program’s structure and basic economic principles—structure and principles
that EPA recognizes in the supplemental proposal (as it has recognized on prior occasions).
In the supplemental proposal, EPA correctly recognizes that the 2023-2025 SREs will
make additional carryover RINs available for compliance in 2025-2027. The RINs associated
with the 2023-2024 SREs “no longer need to be retired for compliance” with the now-closed
2023-2024 obligations, and therefore they can be carried over.8
Although the RINs made
available by 2023 SREs will have expired by the end of 2024 and therefore not be directly
available for compliance with the 2025-2027 standards, they will in effect be extended for
compliance with the 2025 standards through the “rolling” process that EPA describes in the
supplemental proposal and has described before: obligated parties will use all the carryover 2023
RINs for 2024 compliance and instead bank additional 2024 RINs for 2025.9
This rolling will
necessarily happen because otherwise obligated parties would allow their valuable RINs to
expire worthless—which no profit-maximizing economic entity would do. The only limit on this
rolling is that carryover RINs can be used to meet only 20% of the obligations, but that limit has
no practical force now because the 2023 SRE RINs are less than 20% of the 2024 obligations.10
Similarly, the RINs made available by the 2024 SREs will be carried over to 2025. Thus, the
2023-2024 SREs will inflate the RIN bank in 2025.
7
Supplemental NPRM at 45,009:2.
8
Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2.
9
Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2; 85 Fed. Reg. 7,016, 7,021 n.15 (Feb. 6, 2020); Renewable
Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 1236 (10th Cir. 2020).
10 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2; 85 Fed. Reg. 7,016, 7,021 n.15 (Feb. 6, 2020).
4
In 2025, the bank inflation from 2024 carryover RINs caused by the 2023-2024 SREs
could affect obligated parties’ actions in two ways. First, obligated parties “could choose to use
[those] carryover RINs to comply with their [2025] RVOs in lieu of acquiring renewable fuel
produced in [2025], thereby reducing the demand for renewable fuel production and use in [that]
year[].”11 In other words, those SREs could create a renewable-fuel shortfall relative to the 2025
applicable volumes and national percentage standards. This would draw down the RIN bank
because obligated parties would retire the 2024 carryover RINs but not replace them with 2025
RINs, i.e., would not roll the 2024 carryover RINs into 2025 carryover RINs for use in 2026.
Second, obligated parties could use the volume of renewable fuel required by the 2025 standards
and avoid creating a renewable-fuel shortfall in 2025. In contrast to the first scenario, this
second scenario would maintain the bank inflation from the 2023-2024 SREs because obligated
parties would retire the 2024 carryover RINs but roll them into new 2025 RINs, which they
would carry over to 2026. Obligated parties could also do a bit of both: partially draw down the
SRE-based bank inflation, creating some degree of renewable-fuel shortfall, and partially roll the
2024 RINs into 2025 RINs, which they would carry over into 2026. Again, the 20% limit on
using carryover RINs would have no force because it would exceed the total number of
carryover RINs. Moreover, for the same reasons, the 2025 SREs would make additional 2025
RINs available to be carried over into 2026.
So far, this description of the effects of the 2023-2025 SREs accords with the description
in the supplemental proposal. It also accords with prior EPA statements. For example, during
the Set 1 rulemaking, EPA noted: “SREs generally affect[] the demand for RINs in the calendar
year in which they were granted and the following years, rather than in the RFS compliance year
to which they applied.”12 EPA explained that “a small refinery that was granted an exemption
[might] continue[] to blend renewable fuel into its own gasoline and diesel due to the economic
attractiveness of doing so. In such cases, the total number of RINs generated may not have been
reduced by the SRE, but the carryover RIN bank may have increased.”13 Thus, for example,
“lower D6 RIN prices”—reflecting lower demand for conventional renewable fuel—“[a]fter
2018 … [we]re largely the result of: (1) Small refinery exemptions (SREs) granted
[retroactively] in 2018 [for the 2016 and 2017 compliance years], which reduced the total
number of D6 RINs needed for compliance with the RFS obligations …; and (2) The large
11 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:3.
12 Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: RFS Annual Rules, Regulatory Impact Analysis at
7 (June 2022).
13 Ibid.
5
number of carryover RINs available.”14 Independent economic analysis confirms this
reasoning.15
The supplemental proposal then tries to determine the specific year in which “the effect
of these [SRE-based] RINs is likely to be most acute.”16 EPA surmises the most acute effect will
likely be “in 2026 and 2027” because “only a few months remain in” 2025.17 EPA seems to
have in mind that the bank inflation caused by the 2023-2025 SREs is unlikely to cause an actual
renewable-fuel shortfall in 2025 because there is too little time remaining for obligated parties to
reduce their renewable-fuel use and rely on those RINs instead—in fact, by time EPA finalizes
its supplemental proposal, 2025 could be over. Instead, EPA expects that “the effect of these
RINs is likely to be most acute in 2026 and 2027.”18 EPA reaches this conclusion based on the
same programmatic and economic logic just described. EPA explains:
SREs granted for 2023-2025 will result in lower-than-anticipated RVOs for [2026
and 2027] and, all else being equal, will result in a higher number of carryover
RINs available for use in 2026 and future years. Increased numbers of carryover
RINs can negatively impact the demand for renewable fuel and the associated
RINs. This is because obligated parties can use carryover RINs years to meet
their compliance obligations in 2026 and 2027 in lieu of acquiring RINs generated
in these years. An increase in the availability of carryover RINs to meet obligated
14 Id. at 40. In the Set 1 rulemaking, EPA erred, however, in stating that “higher-than-projected
gasoline and diesel demand could offset the effect of SREs to some degree.” Id. at 7. That could
be true relative to the nominal applicable volumes but that is false with respect to the volumes
implied by the percentage standards. The point of a percentage standard is that the required
volume of renewable fuel varies in proportion to the volume of transportation fuel used. So, if
more transportation fuel was used than projected, the RFS correspondingly requires that
proportionally more renewable fuel also be used. Absent reallocation, SREs will necessarily
create a shortfall relative to the volumes required by the percentage standards, regardless of
whether transportation-fuel usage exceeds the projected volumess on which the standards were
initially based.
15 Edgeworth Economics, The Impact of EPA’s Policies Regarding RVOs and SREs at 2 (Aug.
30, 2019) [Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM, Ex. 7 at 7, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-
0646] (as EPA granted much greater amounts of SREs in 2018 and 2019, “D6 RIN prices fell
[to] the lowest level since 2013, and the RIN bank once again expanded as obligated parties
began to generate excess RINs” in light of the SREs); id. at 8 (those SREs “adversely affected
ethanol demand by reducing the incentive to sell E85” and “[t]he remaining impact likely was
absorbed by the RIN bank”).
16 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2.
17 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2.
18 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2.
6
parties’ compliance obligations in 2026 and 2027 could decrease the demand for
current-year RINs.19
EPA is probably correct that the 2023-2025 SREs’ effect is likely not to be felt in 2025
and is likely to be most acute in 2026 and 2027. And that prediction correctly prompts EPA to
propose reallocating the exempt 2023-2025 obligations through the 2026 and 2027 RFS
standards: “Thus, failure to mitigate the market impacts of the increased number of carryover
RINs due to the 2023-2025 SREs could result in a decrease in demand for renewable fuel
produced in 2026 and 2027. … The co-proposed SRE reallocation volumes for 2026 and 2027
are intended to prevent increased numbers of carryover RINs from decreasing demand for
renewable fuel below the proposed applicable volumes for 2026 and 2027 in the Set 2
proposal.”20
So far, so good. But then EPA recognizes the possibility that the RINs made available by
the 2023-2025 SREs in 2026-2027 will not cause an equivalent reduction in renewable-fuel use
in 2026-2027, and this is where the supplemental proposal goes wrong: it mistakenly treats that
possibility as a potential justification for reallocating less than 100% of the exempted
obligations. The supplemental proposal states: “Obligated parties holding few or no carryover
RINs may have an incentive to hold any carryover RINs attributable to 2023-2025 SREs as a
compliance flexibility for future years rather than using them towards their 2026 or 2027
compliance obligations. If obligated parties hold, rather than use, these carryover RINs, we
expect a much smaller impact, and potentially even no impact, on the RIN and renewable fuel
markets. We are therefore co-proposing SRE reallocation volumes for 2026 and 2027 equal to
50 percent of the 2023-2025 exempted RVOs”21 and soliciting comment on reallocating 75%,
25%, and 0% of the 2023-2025 exempted obligations.22
In suggesting less than 100% reallocation of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations, EPA
contradicts its own analysis of the effects of the 2023-2025 SREs and the ineluctable
programmatic and economic logic underlying that analysis. That logic dictates that the 2023-
2025 exempt obligations must be fully reallocated. As EPA acknowledges, RINs made available
by the 2023-2025 SREs—if not used in lieu of renewable fuel—can be “roll[ed] … forward to
the 2025 compliance year and beyond”23 and can be “available for use in 2026 and future
years.”24 The “beyond” is not necessarily confined to 2026 and 2027, as the plural “future
years” after 2026 implies. To the extent that the bank inflation caused by the 2023-2025 SREs
remains in 2028, those available RINs will repeat the effects first felt in 2026-2027. They will
reduce the volume of renewable fuel that must be used in 2028 (one for one). At that point,
obligated parties will face the same choice they will face in 2026 and 2027: whether to use those
19 Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:1:2; see also Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:3.
20 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:3; Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:1.
21 Supplemental NPRM at 45,011:1; see also Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:3-45,015:1.
22 Supplemental NPRM at 45,009:3.
23 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2 (emphasis added).
24 Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:1 (emphasis added).
7
RINs in lieu of using renewable fuel—i.e., whether to create a present renewable-fuel shortfall—
or whether to roll them into 2029. To the extent that obligated parties roll them into 2029, the
effects will continue and the choice will repeat in 2029, and so on, every year, until eventually
every RIN originally made available by the 2023-2025 SREs has been used in lieu of renewablefuel usage. And this eventual renewable-fuel shortfall equal to the SRE volume is inevitable
given the logic of the RFS program and obligated parties’ economic interests. In short, the entire
volume of SREs—2.18 billion, according to supplemental proposal’s estimate—will necessarily
create an equivalent renewable-fuel shortfall of 2.18 billion gallons over the course of the RFS
program unless fully reallocated.
Consequently, as explained below in Parts II and III, EPA must reallocate 100% of the
2023-2025 exempt obligations.
II. BOTH EPA’S DUTY TO SET RFS STANDARDS THAT “ENSURE” THE REQUIRED
VOLUMES WILL BE MET AND ITS DUTY TO ENGAGE IN REASONED DECISIONMAKING
REQUIRE EPA TO REALLOCATE THE SRES FULLY
EPA is legally required to reallocate 100% of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations. This
legal duty comes from two independent sources.
First, as EPA and the D.C. Circuit have recognized, EPA’s “core mandate[ is] to ensure
the Act’s annual renewable fuel volumes are met.”25 This means that EPA “must set percentage
standards that … are reasonably designed … to meet the target volumes for th[e] upcoming
year.”26 This mandate continues throughout the life of the RFS program, even after 2022. The
statutory provisions articulating the “ensure” duty are not time-limited; on the contrary, one
expressly states that EPA’s regulations must comply with the “ensure” duty “[r]egardless of the
date of promulgation.”27 Moreover, it would make no sense for EPA’s “core mandate” to
evaporate while the program continues. EPA itself has recognized that its “ensure” duty
continues for the duration of the RFS program. EPA invoked this overarching “ensure” duty in
the 2020 rulemaking as authority for modifying the percentage formula to account for projected
retroactive SREs for all future years, not just for 2020 or 2020-2022.28 EPA’s 2022 Rule did
likewise in reaffirming that modification.29 Indeed, the 2022 rule expressly stated that the
25 Wynnewood Refining Co., LLC v. EPA, 77 F.4th 767, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2023); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(o)(2)(A)(i), (iii)(I) & (3)(B)(i); 85 Fed. Reg. at 7,050:3, 7,051:2.
26 Br. for Respondents at 27, 29, Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA, No. 20-1107, ECF
#2112942 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25, 2025).
27 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
28 85 Fed. Reg. at 7,050:3 & nn.158-159.
29 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600, 39,632:2-39,633:1 & nn.185-186 (July 1, 2022).
8
revised percentage formula “would in fact better ‘ensure’ that the volumes are met” if EPA
“grant[s] SREs for some future compliance year,” i.e., after 2022.30
In the supplemental proposal, EPA correctly recognizes that insofar as carryover RINs
made available by the 2023-2025 SREs are rolled into 2026 and 2027, they will diminish the
binding force of the standards EPA sets for those years one for one because obligated parties
could use those RINs in lieu of the corresponding volume of renewable fuel. In other words, if
EPA sets the total applicable volume for 2026 to 24.02 billion gallons and there are 2.18 billion
carryover RINs available from the 2023-2025 SREs, the percentage standard EPA establishes
will actually require obligated parties to use 24.02 minus 2.18 billion gallons of renewable fuel,
i.e., 21.84 billion gallons. If obligated parties use more than 21.84 billion gallons of renewable
fuel in 2026, that will be a voluntary choice they make, not an act mandated by the 2026 RFS
standards. In short, as long as there are RINs for compliance in 2026 or 2027 made available by
the 2023-2025 SREs, the standards EPA establishes for 2026-2027 will not be reasonably
designed to meet the required applicable volumes EPA sets for 2026-2027 unless the associated
exempt obligations are fully reallocated. To fulfill its “ensure” duty, EPA must reallocate all the
exempt 2023-2025 obligations.
In fact, EPA previously recognized this logic in modifying the percentage formula to
account for retroactive SREs, and the D.C. Circuit upheld that analysis. In that rulemaking, EPA
correctly explained that “should [it] grant [exemptions] without accounting for them in the
percentage formula, those exemptions would effectively reduce the volumes of renewable fuel
required by the RFS program, potentially impacting renewable fuel use in the U.S.”31 Raising
the standards to reallocate retroactively exempt obligations, EPA declared, has “the effect of
ensuring that the required volumes of renewable fuel are met when small refineries are granted
exemptions from their [RFS] obligations after the issuance of the final rule.”32 The D.C. Circuit
affirmed EPA’s position, concluding that EPA’s statutory duty “to ‘ensure’ that the applicable
volumes ‘are met’” supplies EPA with “the authority to adjust the percentage standards to
account for small refinery exemptions.”33 The Court added that reallocating retroactive SREs
30 87 Fed. Reg. at 39,633:1. The “ensure” duty expressed in § 7545(o)(3)(B)(i) is not time
limited. The phrase “calendar years 2005 through 2021” only specifies when the establishment
of percentage standards is no longer governed by the deadline specified in the preceding phrase:
“Not later than November 30 of each of.” § 7545(o)(3)(B)(i). For post-2022 calendar years, the
CAA establishes a different deadline: “no later than 14 months” before the year begins.
§ 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii). Nor does the phrase “calendar years 2005 through 2021” time limit EPA’s
duty to issue percentage standards (as opposed to applicable volumes) for 2023 and later years.
The RFS could not function without percentage standards, as EPA acknowledged when it
decided to continue using them after 2022, 88. Fed. Reg. at 44,519:2-3—a decision expressly
based on EPA’s recognition that its continuing “ensure” duty continues after 2022, id. at
44519:2.
31 85 Fed. Reg. at 7,050:3.
32 Ibid.
33 Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 101 F.4th 871, 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
9
“helps prevent undercompliance by ensuring that the leeway afforded to small refineries does not
lead to percentage standards that undershoot the target renewable fuel requirements.”34
Second, EPA is separately “required to engage in reasoned decisionmaking,” not
arbitrary or capricious decisionmaking.35 That means that in setting RFS standards, EPA must
“consider [all] important aspect[s] of the problem” and “examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.”36 If EPA sets RFS standards without accounting for carryover RINs still
available because of the 2023-2025 SREs, it will knowingly set standards that will not require
the volume of usage that they purport to require, i.e., it will knowingly set ineffectual standards
by blinding itself to obvious circumstances regarding how those standards will operate. That
would not reflect reasoned decisionmaking.
As explained above, the programmatic logic underlying these twin legal duties does not
end in 2026, or even 2027. Rather, it continues to all subsequent years as long as the RIN bank
remains inflated to any degree because of the 2023-2025 SREs. For example, if 1 billion of the
2.18 billion RINs estimated to be available in 2026 because of the 2023-2025 SREs are drawn
down for compliance in 2026 in lieu of using additional renewable fuel, then the remaining 1.18
billion RINs that are rolled forward into 2027 will reduce the effective requirement of the 2027
standards by an equivalent 1.18 billion gallons. If 500 million of those 1.18 billion RINs are
then drawn down for compliance in 2027 in lieu of using additional renewable fuel, then the
remaining 680 million RINs will be rolled forward into 2028 and will reduce the effective
requirement of the 2028 standards by an equivalent 680 million gallons. This process will
continue until all the SRE-based RINs are drawn down in lieu of renewable fuel use. Each year,
EPA would set the standards in violation of its duties to “ensure” that the standards will require
the specified volume of renewable fuel and in violation of its duty to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking. The only way to avoid those violations is to reallocate 100% of the exempt the
2023-2025 obligations.
III. EPA’S “ENSURE” DUTY AND THE “SET” PROVISION AT LEAST GIVE EPA DISCRETION
TO REALLOCATE THE SRES
Even if EPA were not statutorily required to reallocate 100% of the exempt 2023-2025
obligations, EPA would at least have statutory discretion to do so. Here again, there are two
sources of such authority.
First, EPA’s “ensure” “mandate” (described above) at a minimum gives EPA permission
to reallocate the SRE obligations. As the D.C. Circuit has held, EPA finds “authority to account
34 Ibid.
35 Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A); 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A).
36 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
10
for the small refinery exemptions in the statutory language directing EPA to promulgate
regulations to ‘ensure’ that the applicable volumes ‘are met.’”37
Second, as the supplemental proposal explains, the CAA’s “Set” provision also
authorizes EPA to reallocate exempt obligations when establishing annual standards. That
provision requires EPA to set volume requirements “based on a review of the implementation of
the program during [prior] calendar years … and an analysis of” an array of statutorily specified
factors.38 The supplemental proposal correctly recognizes that this framework allows EPA to
reallocate the exempt 2023-2025 obligations in setting the 2026-2027 volume requirements.
As described above, the history of the RFS program shows that, if not reallocated, SREs
ultimately suppress renewable-fuel usage—either immediately in the year for which they are
granted or later by inflating the RIN bank, which then displaces renewable-fuel usage in
subsequent years. EPA can and should heed this lesson in exercising its power under the Set
provision, and EPA rightly acknowledges that in the supplemental proposal: “under our directive
to review the implementation of the program, … the SREs granted for 2023-2025 … have a
direct impact on the RFS obligations … for all [non-exempt] obligated parties in aggregate
(which can now retire a greater number of carryover RINs and fewer current year RINs to satisfy
their combined RFS obligations for 2024 and 2025). … [B]ecause obligated parties can now use
the carryover RINs that otherwise would have been retired for compliance but for the 2023-2025
exemptions, SREs granted in one year can have an impact on the market for RINs and renewable
fuel in future years.”39
The supplemental proposal also accounts for the various statutory factors EPA must
consider in setting volume requirements after 2022. In its initial Set 2 proposal, EPA
determined, based on its consideration of the various statutory factors, that the market could
produce, distribute, and use the proposed volumes of renewable fuel, and that the other factors
were generally enhanced by or consistent with achieving such volumes.40 Because full
reallocation of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations would preserve the intended binding force of
the proposed volume requirements, and thus the intended level of renewable-fuel demand, full
reallocation is supported by and consistent with EPA’s analysis of the statutory factors. EPA
rightly acknowledges this in the supplemental proposal: “the statutory factors that the EPA must
consider when establishing the applicable volumes for years after 2022 are impacted by the
production and use of renewable fuel and are not impacted by the use of carryover RINs.”41
The supplemental proposal states that the CAA “gives EPA considerable discretion to
weigh and balance the various factors required by statute.”42 It is true that EPA has significant
37 Sinclair Wyoming, 101 F.4th at 891-892.
38 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii).
39 Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:2.
40 See NPRM at 25,812:1-25,834:3.
41 Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:2-3.
42 Supplemental NPRM at 45,011:2.
11
discretion in exercising its power under the Set provision, and that discretion is sufficiently broad
to include the proposed reallocation. However, as Growth Energy explained in its initial
comment on the Set 2 proposal, that discretion is not unlimited: specifically, EPA must set the
volume requirements at the maximum volume of renewable-fuel use that can be achieved in
response to the RFS’s incentives, unless achieving that volume would likely trigger the
conditions for a general waiver based on severe economic or environmental harm.43 This
constraint supports the supplemental proposal because reallocation helps ensure that the required
volumes are not effectively reduced when they are readily achievable (as the initial Set 2
proposal shows they are).
IV. IF EPA HAS DISCRETION REGARDING WHETHER TO REALLOCATE THE 2023-2025
SRES, IT WOULD BE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS NOT TO EXERCISE THAT
DISCRETION TO REALLOCATE THE EXEMPT OBLIGATIONS FULLY
As explained above, EPA is statutorily required to fully reallocate the exempt 2023-2025
obligations, but at a minimum, EPA has discretion to do so. Under the circumstances, any
reallocation that is less than 100% would be arbitrary and capricious.
A. Full Reallocation Would Best Serve All the Statutory Objectives That EPA
Found Would Be Served by Achieving the Proposed Volumes
Congress created the RFS program “to force the market” to “replace” fossil fuel with
“greater and greater volumes of renewable fuel each year.”44 Congress adopted this “marketforcing policy” to “move the United States toward greater energy independence and security,”
“to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,” and to promote “job creation … [and] rural economic
development.”45
In its initial Set 2 proposal, EPA determined that the proposed applicable volumes would
further the achievement of these congressional objectives. First, EPA assessed that its proposed
volumes would force the market to increase its renewable-fuel usage above the amount that the
market would use without the RFS program.46 Specifically, EPA proposed to require about
6.514 billion gallons of renewable fuel above the “No RFS” level in 2026 and about 6.900 billion
gallons of renewable fuel above the “No RFS” level in 2027.47 Second, EPA’s analysis found
that “the proposed volume standards” would yield “benefits” in terms of “jobs, rural economic
43 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 6-11, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
44 Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691, 696-697, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
45 Americans for Clean Energy, 864 F.3d at 696-697, 705; 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii)(I)-(II)
& (VI); see also, e.g., NPRM at 25,829:3.
46 Growth Energy, however, maintains that EPA’s proposed implied conventional volumes are at
least 1 billion gallons too low. See Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 11-17, EPAHQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
47 Compare NPRM at 25,811 Table III.D.1-1 (estimated No RFS use of 17.506 bil gal and
17.560 bil gal) with id. at 25,829 Table V.F-1 & Table V.F-2 (proposed RFS use of 24.02 bil gal
and 24.46); see also id. at 25,785:3, 25,788:3.
12
development, energy security …, and … climate” through reduction in greenhouse-gas
emissions—the very benefits that Congress intended the RFS to achieve by forcing the market to
increasingly replace petroleum with renewable fuel.48 Further, EPA considered the costs of
achieving the proposed volumes, consistent with the statutory Set factors, and found in its initial
Set 2 proposal that “the proposed volumes are appropriate under EPA’s statutory authority as an
outcome of balancing all relevant factors.”49
Again, 100% reallocation of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations would simply preserve
this analysis and thus preserve these positive overall consequences consistent with Congress’
objectives and the statutory factors. As EPA notes, full reallocation will “not … increase the
production and use of renewable fuel beyond the volumes previously proposed for 2026 and
2027”; rather, full reallocation will simply require that the RIN bank inflation resulting from the
2023-2025 SREs be drawn down, and “the statutory factors that the EPA must consider when
establishing the applicable volumes for years after 2022 … are not impacted by the use of
carryover RINs.”50 On the other hand, less than full reallocation would diminish or eliminate the
statutory benefits: as discussed above, less than full reallocation would reduce renewable-fuel
usage, which in turn would diminish the reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions, diminish the
enhancement of U.S. energy security and independence, and diminish job growth and rural
economic development.
In sum, full reallocation best accounts for the statutory factors and best serves the central
objectives that Congress sought to achieve through the RFS program.
B. Reallocation Would Not Harm Non-Exempt Obligated Parties
Although reallocation would increase the obligations for non-exempt obligated parties,
those increased obligations would not impose additional net financial cost on non-obligated
parties. As Growth Energy explained in its initial comment, obligated parties incur no net
compliance cost under the RFS program, or at most a de minimis net cost.51 EPA recognizes this
is in the supplemental proposal: “We do … expect that, on average at the national level,
obligated parties would pass on the costs of purchasing additional RINs to consumers.”52
Indeed, objections that small refineries have raised to their ability to fully recoup their RIN costs
are not only incorrect but also would generally not apply to non-exempt obligated parties
anyway.
Even a de minimis cost cannot justify anything less than 100% reallocation, given that
any such lesser reallocation would reduce renewable-fuel use and the associated congressionally
desired benefits. But at most, if obligated parties would absorb some portion of the net
compliance cost of the reallocated obligations, that would warrant non-reallocation only to that
48 NPRM at 25,829:3; see id. at 25,830:1-25,831:1.
49 NPRM at 25,788:2.
50 Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:2; see also id. at 45,015:1.
51 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 25-36, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
52 Supplemental NPRM at 45,015:1.
13
proportional extent. For example, if obligated parties would have to bear 0.5% of the net RIN
costs from complying with the reallocated obligations, then EPA could decline to reallocate only
0.5% of those obligations. A disproportionately large non-reallocation would be economically
irrational, unfair to renewable-fuel producers, and detrimental to the achievement of the
congressionally desired objectives of the RFS program.
To summarize the key points regarding compliance costs from Growth Energy’s initial
comment:
 Extensive empirical study has found that obligated parties pass at least 98% of their
marginal RIN costs down the supply chain. The principal study finding less than
100% pass-through suffered from methodological flaws that understated the passthrough, but even if its finding were sound, that would mean that obligated parties
absorb, at most, only a miniscule portion of the RIN cost.53
 All obligated parties can fully avoid net RIN costs through readily available RIN
contracts. As with virtually any other financial instrument or commodity, actors in
financial markets make contracts available for RINs to manage price fluctuations over
time. Through such contracts, obligated parties can match their incremental RIN
purchases and associated price risk to their incremental fuel sales, and thereby
achieve consistent, reliable, and complete RIN-cost pass-through.54
 Even if obligated parties achieve only incomplete pass-through of their RIN costs,
that does not necessarily mean they incur a net cost. RIN prices can rise or fall, and
so incomplete pass-through of RIN costs can result in either a net cost or a net gain to
the obligated party. And the history of the RIN market shows that RIN prices
regularly rise and fall to a roughly equal extent, meaning that the gains will generally
offset the costs overall. In any event, there is no a priori reason to conclude that the
costs will exceed the gains overall, and EPA could conclude that the reallocation will
inflict a net cost on obligated parties only if EPA finds that obligated parties’
unpassed-through RIN costs will exceed their unpassed-through RIN gains, but there
is no empirical evidence of that.55
 There is no reason an obligated party would lack sufficient working capital to fully
pass through its RIN costs. Obligated parties never need to “pre-purchase”—i.e., lay
out capital for—RINs before selling the corresponding fuel, and thus they will always
have the capital from the sale of their fuel available to finance the corresponding RIN
acquisition. In fact, obligated parties can use strategies for acquiring RINs that are
accretive to their working capital.56
53 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 27-28, 32, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
54 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 28-31, 32-34, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
55 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 27, 33-34, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
56 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 34, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
14
 Small merchant refineries have argued that they cannot achieve full pass-through of
their RIN costs because of certain features unique to their small size or the small size
of the local markets in which they operate. Those arguments are refuted by both the
empirical evidence and economic theory. But in any event, those arguments
generally would not apply to non-exempt obligated parties, which are typically
integrated, are typically larger, and typically operate in larger markets.57
C. No Statutory Set Factors Weigh Against the Proposed Reallocation
In the supplemental proposal, EPA identifies only one statutory factor that might be
affected adversely by reallocating the exempt 2023-2025 obligations: retail fuel prices for
consumers (precisely because of RIN-cost pass-through). EPA explains: “We do … expect that,
on average at the national level, obligated parties would pass on the costs of purchasing
additional RINs to consumers, and that this action could increase the cost of transportation fuel
to consumers.”58 But as EPA correctly recognizes, this effect does not alter EPA’s initially
proposed analysis of the “cost to consumers” statutory factor or the broader Set factor analysis.
Again, even 100% reallocation would merely preserve the binding force of the previously
proposed volumes. In the Set 2 proposal, EPA already assessed the cost of those volumes to
consumers and found it to be outweighed by the benefits Congress sought to achieve. The
supplemental proposal’s cost analysis confirms that even 100% reallocation would not increase
the cost to consumers above what EPA had already accounted for.59
Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit has held, “in enacting the Renewable Fuel Standards
Program, Congress made a policy choice to accept higher fuel prices in order to reap the benefits
of greater energy independence and … reduced greenhouse gas emissions.”60 “If it were
otherwise, the RFS Program would be largely superfluous; the market would independently
incentivize the production and consumption of renewable fuels.”61 So, as a matter of law, the
very small cost to consumers associated with achieving the full proposed volumes (with
reallocation or not) cannot outweigh the statutory benefits associated with those volumes.
D. Any Desire to Maintain or Grow the RIN Bank as a Safety Valve Cannot
Justify Any Non-Reallocation
Asserting that “[c]arryover RINs provide obligated parties compliance flexibility for
substantial uncertainties in the transportation fuel marketplace,” EPA states in the supplemental
proposal: “Because of the limited number of carryover RINs available [apart from the 2023-2025
SREs], it may not be necessary or appropriate to propose SRE reallocation volumes for 2026 and
57 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 34-36, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
58 Supplemental NPRM at 45,015:1.
59 Supplemental NPRM at 45,015:2-3.
60 Sinclair Wyoming, 101 F.4th at 889.
61 Sinclair Wyoming, 101 F.4th at 889.
15
2027 equal to the full magnitude of the 2023-2025 exemptions to maintain the intended
renewable fuel use in 2026 and 2027.”62 This notion is wrong and should be rejected.
First, even 100% reallocation of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations would not affect nonexempt obligated parties’ ability to comply with their 2026-2027 RFS obligations or draw down
any carryover RINs that would be available irrespective of the 2023-2025 SREs. To meet the
additional obligations resulting from the reallocation, obligated parties would, by definition, need
to draw down only the RINs made available by the 2023-2025 SREs.63 And EPA already
determined that the initially “proposed volumes [for 2026 and 2027] could be met with
renewable fuel produced and used in 2026 and 2027,” without the use of carryover RINs.64
Second, if EPA is suggesting that less than 100% reallocation might be warranted to
enable obligated parties to increase the RIN bank for after 2027, then EPA’s suggestion is
mistaken. For one thing, as explained above, that tactic would simply transfer the problems that
100% reallocation would resolve to a future year: again, the RIN bank inflation from the 2023-
2025 SREs would reduce the efficacy of a future year’s standards and would eventually lead to a
renewable-fuel shortfall in a future year.65 That would subvert Congress’s market-forcing policy
and Congress’ intent to use that policy to achieve important public benefits. For another thing,
as Growth Energy previously showed, EPA completely misunderstands the proper role of
carryover RINs, and intentionally setting RFS standards to preserve or increase the number of
carryover RINs contradicts Congress’ purpose and the CAA’s text.66
In any event, it would be arbitrary and capricious for EPA to implement less than 100%
reallocation in order to increase the RIN bank without a concrete analysis of what size the RIN
bank should be. But EPA has not presented any such analysis. Indeed, EPA has never analyzed
whether any particular RIN-bank size—5 billion? 20 billion?—was necessary for the wellfunctioning of the RFS program.
V. EPA SHOULD NOT TREAT CELLULOSIC BIOFUEL DIFFERENTLY FOR PURPOSES OF
REALLOCATING EXEMPT OBLIGATIONS
In the supplemental proposal, EPA asks whether it “should include all, some, or none of
[the exempt 2023-2025 cellulosic biofuel] volumes in the SRE reallocation volumes.”67 EPA
must and should include all of those volumes.
62 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:3-45,011:1.
63 See Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:2 (“We project that the portion of the RFS obligations
represented by the SRE reallocation volumes would be met with carryover RINs attributable to
the 2023-2025 exempted RVOs.”).
64 Supplemental NPRM at 45,009:3.
65 Supra Pt. I.
66 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 40-42, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
67 Supplemental NPRM at 45,011:3.
16
EPA wonders whether it may account for the carryover cellulosic RINs made available
by the 2023-2025 SREs given that the “projected volume available”—a phrase used in the
CAA’s cellulosic-waiver provision—excludes carryover RINs.68 This question is inapt for two
separate reasons.
First, the cellulosic-waiver standard plays no role in setting the cellulosic biofuel volumes
for years after 2022. As Growth Energy explained in its comment on the initial Set 2 proposal,
EPA misunderstands the CAA’s directives regarding how to set the cellulosic biofuel volumes
for those years. EPA must set those volume requirements without regard to whether a cellulosic
waiver will be triggered, i.e., EPA must set the volume requirement to the maximum achievable
level of cellulosic biofuel production in response to RFS incentives (just as it must do for the
other categories of renewable fuel); EPA may exercise the cellulosic waiver later, on the eve of
the compliance year, if it turns out that the market was unable to achieve the specified level of
production.69
Second, even under EPA’s mistaken interpretation of the cellulosic-waiver standard, that
standard is not implicated by the reallocation of the exempt 2023-2025 cellulosic biofuel
volumes. The reallocation would increase the percentage standards to draw down cellulosic
RINs made available by the 2023-2025 SREs, but that is not because those carryover RINs
would be included in the projection of cellulosic-biofuel production. Rather, EPA’s approach
would first determine the projected production and provisionally establish the volume
requirements at that level, but then independently adjust the standards to preserve the efficacy of
the production-based volume requirements that EPA otherwise determines are appropriate.
These conclusions are unaffected if EPA determines that the achievable cellulosic
volumes are actually higher than it initially proposed.70 In that case, EPA must still set the
cellulosic volume requirements to that level and then adjust the standards to account for the
reallocation of the 2023-2025 cellulosic volumes.
But if EPA were to exclude the exempt 2023-2025 cellulosic obligations from the
reallocation, it should not correspondingly reduce the total volume requirement because, as
Growth Energy has shown, there is ample additional conventional ethanol to backfill the
cellulosic shortfall beyond the volume on which EPA based its proposed total volume
requirements.71
68 Supplemental NPRM at 45,011:3; see 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(D)(i).
69 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 10-11, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
70 Supplemental NPRM at 45,011:3.
71 See supra n.46.

The post Growth Energy Comments on EPA 2026-27 RVOs and Reallocation Proposal appeared first on Growth Energy.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on significant foreign trade barriers for the 2026
National Trade Estimate report.
We appreciate the support and assistance of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on these
important and often longstanding issues as well as the agency’s continued engagement with
foreign governments to expand market access for U.S. ethanol. Growth Energy is the nation’s
largest association of ethanol producers, representing 97 U.S. plants that each year produce 9.5
billion gallons of low-carbon, renewable fuel; 129 businesses associated with the production
process; and tens of thousands of ethanol supporters around the country. Growth Energy
represents the leading exporters in the ethanol industry, helping to support nearly two billion
gallons of ethanol exports to over 60 countries around the world.
Expanding market access for U.S. ethanol is very different than other agricultural commodities
and requires different levels of support that accompany changing a country’s energy supply
chains and fuel specifications. These positive, mutually beneficial exchanges with countries have
already led to significant policy advancements, including with Japan and the United Kingdom.
We request a continuation of those supportive efforts in collaboration with industry both
bilaterally, regionally, and as a part of U.S. government engagement in international bodies (such
as the G7, G20, International Maritime Organization, and International Civil Aviation
Organization). USTR’s continued assistance will help to expand U.S. ethanol’s significant 2024
trade surplus of 1.79 billion gallons, or $3.97 billion.
Brazil
In 2024, the U.S. had a $150 million ethanol trade deficit with Brazil—in 2023 that deficit was
$212 million. This was in stark contrast with a $197 million U.S. ethanol trade surplus with
Brazil in 2018. This recent ethanol trade deficit with Brazil tracks with Brazil’s movement away
from reciprocal, tariff-free ethanol trade between our two countries. Furthermore, Brazil was
once the top export market for U.S. ethanol, valued at $736 million in 2017, but has fallen
significantly. While Brazil may have inched back to the 13th largest export market in 2024 ($54
million), it was the 41st largest market in 2023 ($140,000).
The Brazilian market has been the epitome of unfairness for U.S. ethanol. While we have
continued to push Brazil to remove its unfair tariff and to address other issues limiting U.S.
ethanol exports, they have been unwilling to do so. A reciprocal tariff on Brazil would help to
address grossly inequitable tariffs/trade, unfairness in U.S. ethanol’s lack of eligibility under
Brazil’s low carbon fuel policy, and Brazilian efforts to supersede U.S. leadership in biofuels and
as a supplier of choice.
We applaud USTR’s initiation of a Section 301 investigation into Brazil’s unfair trade action and
hope our earlier provided comments and testimony on this will help guide USTR in the next
steps of its investigation.
U.S. Tariffs Compared to Brazil
The U.S. levies 1.9 percent and 2.5 percent tariffs for denatured and undenatured non-beverage
ethanol, respectively. Today, Brazil’s applied tariff for imports of ethanol from non-Mercosur
countries is 18 percent, but this was not always the case.
Prior to 2012, Brazil lobbied the United States to remove its “other duty or charge” on ethanol
imports, with Brazilian industry calling for “free and fair trade” between the two largest ethanol
producing and consuming counties. Brazil sought to improve its access to the U.S. ethanol
market given the expanding volumetric requirements under the U.S. Renewable Fuels Standard
(RFS). However, as U.S. ethanol exports to Brazil expanded into 2017, Brazil went backward on
the desire for free and fair trade by establishing a tariff rate quote (TRQ). When the original TRQ
was expiring in 2019, Brazil increased the TRQ but added quarterly allocations. These
allocations limited exports given the seasonal nature of ethanol production in Brazil. Once that
TRQ expired in December 2020, U.S. ethanol exports to Brazil were assessed a 20 percent tariff.
The tariff fluctuated until it settled at the current 18 percent tariff in February 2023.
Brazil’s Low Carbon Fuel Policy (RenovaBio)
Brazil only recently decided to certify one U.S. ethanol producer under RenovaBio, the country’s
low carbon fuel policy. However, because of the issues surrounding the structure of RenovaBio’s
compliance verification, only a very small portion of that biorefinery’s production is deemed
eligible to participate. Brazil is seeking to apply this same methodology for all U.S. ethanol
producers, despite this extremely limited eligible. By comparison, RenovaBio certifies most, if
not all, of the output of Brazilian ethanol producers, allowing them to benefit from the program.
This further disadvantages U.S. ethanol while Brazil continues to peddle a misleading narrative
that falsely suggests any American producer can fairly participate in the program or that it allows
sustainably produced ethanol to be eligible.
RenovaBio also disadvantages U.S. corn ethanol by assigning it an unnecessarily punitive carbon
intensity score for the using default values. Given RenovaBio was established to meet the needs
of Brazil’s sugarcane growers and it was structured around that supply chain, Brazil’s producers
do not receive a similarly punitive default score as they do not need to rely on default values.
RenovaBio is a lucrative program for Brazilian biofuel producers and is modeled on the U.S.
RFS and California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS). In the U.S., Brazilian producers are
able to participate in both the RFS and the LCFS and can reap the financial benefits of those
programs. Brazilian sugarcane ethanol is eligible to create advanced Renewable Identification
Numbers (RINs) under the RFS as well as carbon credits under California’s LCFS. Conversely,
U.S. ethanol cannot participate in RenovaBio and is not eligible to generate similarly lucrative
carbon credits (known as CBios) under RenovaBio. In 2023 (the last full year of data available
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Foreign Agricultural Service), Brazilian
fuel distributors met 81 percent of RenovaBio’s reduction targets by retiring 33.1 million CBios.
CBio trading results in an estimated average price of $16.61 per CBio, resulting in a total of
$548 million in lost opportunity for U.S. ethanol producers under RenovaBio. Over time, the
amount of CBios are projected to increase incrementally, ultimately reaching nearly 96 million
CBios annually by 2031. Brazil hopes the CBios will reach values like California’s LCFS.
Third-Party Markets
Brazilian ethanol exports entering the United States via the Gulf are typically destined to be
processed into ethyl tert-butyl ether (ETBE) for export, including to Japan. While U.S. ethanol
can be used to meet up to 100 percent Japan’s on-road demand for ethanol and ETBE, it is
estimated that 40 percent of U.S. ETBE exports to Japan, or 85 million gallons (with an
estimated value of $153 million) are produced from Brazilian ethanol. A reciprocal tariff or
Section 301 remedies on Brazilian ethanol could result in higher costs for ETBE produced from
Brazilian ethanol and not U.S. ethanol. Improved economics of U.S. ethanol vis-à-vis Brazilian
could allow for a greater proportion of ETBE exported to Japan to come from U.S. ethanol.
Brazil continues to seek preferential recognition for its multi-cropped corn as being more
sustainable and a better alternative to U.S. corn. Not only do we disagree with this assessment
but as Brazil continues to push this false narrative, we have become increasingly concerned that
Brazil is affecting our potential to compete in certain markets, like Japan, that put a premium on
lifecycle emissions reductions. Assistance by the U.S. government would be welcome to reset
the discussion on sustainable corn production in the United States.
Canada
Canada has been our largest and most reliable export market, setting record volumes of 675
million gallons in 2024, valued at $1.5 billion. This represents approximately 35 percent of all
U.S. ethanol exports. Increases in provincial blending mandates have helped U.S. ethanol exports
grow to meet these higher mandates and represent continued growth potential. However, we are
concerned with “domestic content” requirements that have been announced at the provincial
level and proposed federally.
On August 8, Ontario’s Ministry of Environment, Conservation, and Parks adopted a domestic
content requirement for its gasoline, which was effective immediately. Ontario currently requires
a renewable content requirement of 11 percent in its gasoline (i.e., E11), which is set to increase
to E13 in 2028 and E15 in 2030. Of that renewable gasoline requirement, 27 percent of that will
need to have been produced in Canada for the remainder of 2025. For 2026 and 2027, that
percentage will increase to 64 percent; for 2028 and 2029 it will decrease to 54 percent and then
further decrease to 47 percent in 2030. The release notes that this requirement is aimed at being
time-limited and temporary in nature. However, no additional details were provided other than
that the ministry will continue to monitor factors impacting its producers. Ontario accounts for
approximately 37 percent of Canada’s gasoline sales.
In February 2025, British Colombia’s (BC’s) Minister of Energy and Climate Solutions issued
Ministerial Order No. M41. This order notes that effective January 1, 2026, the minimum five
percent renewable fuel requirement for gasoline must be met with eligible renewable fuels (i.e.,
ethanol) produced in Canada. BC’s low carbon fuel policy provides economic incentives for
ethanol producers who have made significant financial investments to lower their carbon
intensity level. This market, estimated to be 64 million gallons and valued at $115 million, will
be unfairly closed to U.S. ethanol, and could result in the loss of financial investments by U.S.
ethanol facilities who updated facilities to better perform in BC’s low carbon fuel policy.
Given the size and importance of the Canadian market for U.S. ethanol, and the inclusion of
ethanol on the second proposed list of commodities targeted by Canada for tariff retaliation, we
ask that any trade dispute be resolved as soon as possible so U.S. ethanol can enter Canada tarifffree and without provincial origin restrictions. Additionally, we are concerned about the
economic situation for inputs that are necessary for the U.S. ethanol production process, such as
yeasts. Some yeasts are produced in Canada and imported into the United States. An import tariff
on these products could undermine the price competitiveness of ethanol in the United States,
affecting U.S. consumers.
We are concerned that continued efforts to limit imports and utilization of U.S. ethanol could
result in market loss for U.S. ethanol and a loss of investments geared toward complying with
provincial low carbon fuel policies. Changes to Canada’s Clean Fuel Regulation may compound
these issues by making it more difficult for U.S. ethanol to comply and participate.
China
In January 2020, China committed to substantial purchases under the Phase One trade
agreement, including for agricultural commodities with a reference to ethanol. These
commitments have not been fulfilled. While ethanol is just one of many agricultural commodities
under the Phase One agreement, China agreed to $32 billion in additional purchases and agreed
to strive for a further $5 billion in additional imports per year of agricultural products. In 2017,
which serves as the baseline to determine purchases, U.S. ethanol exports to China were valued
at $83 million. In 2020, U.S. ethanol exports were valued at $51 million and $162 million. Since
then, no meaningful volumes have been exported. While tariffs are levied, endorsement by the
government is necessary for purchases and seems to be the main reason for the lack of U.S.
ethanol exports.
Colombia
On February 24, 2024, Colombia returned to its E10 mandate after almost three years of
instituting lower and fluctuating blend levels that caused U.S. ethanol exports to Colombia to
plummet. With this new market certainty, Colombia returned as the fifth-largest export market
for U.S. ethanol in 2024, valued at $377 million. Despite its return as a significant ethanol export
market, U.S. ethanol continues to face unfair trade practices despite the free trade agreement
between the United States and Colombia. Since May 2020, Colombia has levied a countervailing
duty (CVD) of $0.06646 per kilogram (or $0.20 per gallon) on imports of U.S. ethanol. During
the March 2023 expiry review, Colombia determined it would extend its CVD for an additional
five years at the same rate, but with an option to review after three years.
The process for the expiry review occurred during these blend rate fluctuations, which Colombia
noted were due to limited domestic supply and high import prices. However, the CVD results in
higher import prices of U.S. ethanol and its removal would have negated the need for continued
blend fluctuations by stabilizing both prices and imported supply. Additionally, while Colombia
did experience a drop in their domestic production, the country’s geographical limitations mean
that imports and domestic ethanol supply different regions, meaning a nationwide fluctuation
was not necessary to address domestic supply concerns, since they only affected a fraction of
Colombian jurisdictions. While this is no longer an issue given the return to E10 blending, it is
illustrative of the protectionist mentality on ethanol that is governing Colombia’s decisions on
the CVD.
Colombia continues to seek alternative options to its pricing formula for its domestically
produced ethanol, as well as additional means to restrict ethanol. Both proposals have the
potential to reduce U.S. ethanol exports and create policy uncertainty for Colombia’s ethanol
program. Colombia initiated a public comment period on October 1, 2025, for revisions to
pricing1 and a comment period on July 22, 2025, for potential restrictions on imports depending
on Colombian production.
2 USTR’s continued engagement to ensure fair and equal treatment in
this market is critical to continue strong U.S. ethanol exports to Colombia.
European Union (EU)
The EU imposes an import duty on U.S. ethanol of 19.2 EUR/hl and 10.2 EUR/hl (for
undenatured and denatured, respectively). In 2024, the EU was the fourth-largest export market
for U.S. ethanol with exports amounting to nearly 197 million gallons valued at $428 million.
Removing the EU’s import duty could help expand U.S. ethanol exports to the bloc, generally,
and make U.S. ethanol competitive with Brazil in the EU.
Currently, Brazilian ethanol is assessed the same import duty as the United States. However, that
could change if the pending EU/Mercosur trade agreement is approved following the December
2024 final negotiations. The agreement would phase in a TRQ that would give Brazilian ethanol
access to the EU market at a significantly reduced rate compared to U.S. ethanol, culminating
with up to almost 218 million gallons being assessed a 6.4 EUR/hl for undenatured ethanol and a
rate of 3.4 EUR/hl for denatured. Of that amount, up to almost 151 million gallons for specific
chemical uses can enter without any duty assessed. This will further hurt U.S. ethanol exports to
the EU as Brazil will be given a significant economic advantage.
The EU also uses “crop caps” that significantly restrict the amount of U.S. corn ethanol that can
contribute to the EU’s on-road emissions reductions targets under its 2024 revisions to its
Renewable Energy Directive (RED). Revisions to RED were a part of the EU’s “Fit for 55”
package of proposals to implement the European Green Deal, which aims to reduce emissions by
at least 55 percent by 2030 and reach climate neutrality by 2050.
The “Fit for 55” package also included new policies that set emissions reductions standards for
aviation and marine fuels, called ReFuelEU Aviation and ReFuelEU Marine. Unlike for on-road
applications, crop-based biofuels (such as U.S. corn ethanol) are prohibited from meeting the
1 https://www.minenergia.gov.co/es/servicio-al-ciudadano/foros/establecer-metodologia-para-calculo-del-valoringreso-productor-alcohol-carburante-etanol/ 2 https://www.minenergia.gov.co/es/servicio-al-ciudadano/foros/establecer-un-mecanismo-para-medir-el-deficit-enla-oferta-nacional-de-alcohol-carburante-para-garantizar-el-abastecimiento-interno/
emissions reductions targets for both aviation and marine end uses. Both the U.S. and European
biofuels industries sought to rectify this injustice through the European courts, but these suits
were dismissed on February 25, 2025.
The European Union bioenergy policies and regulations support inaccurate and outdated
viewpoints that agriculture-based biofuels threaten global food security and cannot be
sustainably produced. As a result, U.S. ethanol is severely restricted.
India
India has become a significant global producer of ethanol, largely to meet their E20 blend goal
by 2025. India has also become a significant export market for U.S. ethanol. In 2024, India was
the third-largest export market for U.S. ethanol, amounting to nearly 187 million gallons valued
at $441 million. Despite the strength of this market, India prohibits the importation of ethanol for
fuel uses, so all U.S. ethanol exports to India were for industrial purposes. This restriction is
based solely on India’s protectionist policy to support their domestic industry. As India seeks to
establish itself as a global leader in biofuels, restricting access to their market sets a dangerous
precedent to other countries seeking to establish a biofuels program. We have recognized India’s
interest to grow their biofuels industry and how doing so can be economically precarious. We
supported past efforts to work around the full opening of the market. However, India has
repeatedly denied these motives and reinforced their interest to only put up barriers to entry and
unfairly close off competition.
Even if India can meet its ambitious E20 goal by relying only on domestic production, this
restriction undermines market access for U.S. ethanol for fuel purposes and underpins an
unfairtrade environment and practice by hindering fair competition.
Indonesia
Ethanol imports are assessed a 30-percent tariff rate by Indonesia, which is economically
uncompetitive for the market compared to other octane enhancers (which can face zero or fivepercent tariffs). To avoid this tariff, Indonesia is importing gasoline pre-blended with ethanol
that can enter the country duty-free and often comes from Singapore. While imports of preblended gasoline seem to be growing, it is difficult to measure. Indonesia is poised to begin
significant ethanol blending, with five-percent blending scheduled to start in 2025 for nonsubsidized gasoline, and 10-percent blending starting in 2029. Despite being a leading user of
biodiesel, ethanol blending has lagged due to limited domestic feedstocks. While there may be
some effort to prioritize domestic production, this shouldn’t be considered a barrier at this time,
given the potential flexibility for imports. If Indonesia implemented a nationwide E10 mandate,
removed the tariff, and removed other barriers to utilizing imported ethanol, it could result in a
potential export market of over 900 million gallons.
Japan
USTR has been a good partner for the U.S. ethanol industry when it comes to encouraging Japan
to expand their use of U.S. ethanol for both on-road and other applications. Because of this
engagement, U.S. ethanol had been able to meet 100 percent of Japan’s on-road ethanol demand,
which is primarily met through ETBE (a fuel additive produced with ethanol). While Japan
recently proposed increasing the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions value of gasoline, this
increase will also correspond with increasing the emissions reduction target from 55 percent to
60 percent. This increased threshold would lower the maximum market share for U.S. ethanol
from 100 percent to approximately 90 percent. As part of the comment period for this change,
the U.S. ethanol industry requested Japan revise the score for U.S. ethanol so we could once
again access 10 percent of the market with an updated score. Additionally, Japan will be seeking
to set the GHG emissions profile for new feedstocks, such as Brazilian corn as well as cassava
and sugarcane from Thailand. While we appreciate the interest by Japan to expand feedstock
options as they seek to implement an E10 goal by 2030, we are concerned that U.S. ethanol may
not be a prioritized feedstock.
We appreciate the continued phase-down of U.S. ethanol’s tariff under the United States-Japan
Trade Agreement (USJTA) that entered into force on January 1, 2020. However, we understand
this is only for one specific tariff line,
3 which leaves both U.S. fuel ethanol as well as industrial
ethanol facing additional tariff lines. The tariff removal for non-beverage ethanol would not just
further position U.S. ethanol positively as Japan seeks to implement direct E10 blending but
could also improve the economic competitiveness of U.S. ethanol in the Japanese market
compared to other countries that supply ethanol to Japan.
4
We applaud the reference of ethanol as part of the $8 billion in purchases Japan committed to as
part of the September 4, 2025, executive order. We appreciate USTR and the U.S. government’s
continued efforts to include ethanol as part of the bilateral United States-Japan discussions,
including earlier statements and commitments stemming from leader meetings, such as Japan
doubling its ethanol demand for both on-road and for aviation. We encourage USTR to continue
the pressure and engagement with Japan on the positive role U.S. ethanol can play and to help
facilitate its mutually beneficial use in Japan.
In 2024, U.S. ethanol exports to Japan (again, primarily as ETBE) are estimated to be at least
129 million gallons, which would place it as the fifth-largest ethanol market. As Japan’s effective
blend rate with ETBE is less than 2 percent, moving to E10 direct blending would result in
significant ethanol export growth.
Mexico
Mexico has been a top, reliable export market for U.S. ethanol for both industrial and beverage
purposes. In 2024, U.S. ethanol exports to Mexico hit a record 84 million gallons, valued at over
$270 million. U.S. ethanol enjoys tariff-free access to Mexico. Given restrictions on blending
levels, Mexico currently does not blend ethanol into its gasoline despite some pilot projects for
higher-level blends, but the country is currently exploring new ways to develop their domestic
ethanol industry as well as to initiate fuel ethanol blending in the country. While Mexico is
seeking to develop domestic production, moving to allow E10 nationwide could result in a $1.9
billion ethanol market that could be met with U.S. imports.
Nigeria
3 2207.10.199
4 Specific codes where tariff removal for U.S. ethanol could be beneficial include: 2207.20.100, 2207.20.200,
2207.10.121, 2207.10.122, 2270.10.123, 2207.10.191
Despite having an E10 policy on the books since 2007, Nigeria does not currently blend fuel
ethanol. The U.S. ethanol industry has been working with Nigeria to start implementing a pilot
program to use fuel ethanol. These efforts have focused on developing fuel ethanol standards,
handling capacity, and integrating supply chains. While these efforts are progressing,
successfully moving from the pilot phase will require a reduction of the 20 percent import tariff
Nigeria levies on non-beverage ethanol. Removing this tariff, or at a minimum providing parity
between ethanol and other fuel additives, will help to make larger-scale ethanol blending
economically viable for U.S. ethanol exports, as well as to help support a domestic ethanol and
fuel industry. Improved economics for ethanol could assist in lowering prices paid by Nigerian
consumers following the May 2023 removal of its fuel subsidy on petroleum imports. Nigeria
has been a steady export market for U.S. ethanol for industrial purposes, valued at nearly $44
million in 2024. If Nigeria implemented a nationwide E10 mandate, it would generate 320
million gallons of ethanol demand, largely met with imports, with an estimated value of $576
million.
United Kingdom (UK)
We applaud the recent TRQ the Administration obtained for nearly 370 million gallons of U.S.
ethanol to enter the UK duty free, avoiding the £0.16/liter tariff on undenatured ethanol and a
£0.085/liter tariff on denatured ethanol. This volume is approximately 150 percent of the ethanol
volume exported in 2024.
Like the EU, the UK also limits the use of corn ethanol to meet its on-road emissions reduction
goals (i.e. a crop cap) and prohibits the use of food-based feedstocks to meet their emissions
reduction goals under their new aviation emissions policy. The UK is also putting together policy
recommendations for the maritime sector, which we ask USTR to engage on to avoid limitations
on U.S. corn ethanol.
Removal of crop caps and crop prohibitions would help ensure growing export markets for U.S.
ethanol in what has become a significant market for U.S. ethanol since the UK initiated its E10
mandate in 2023. In 2024, the UK was the second largest export market for U.S. ethanol, with
243 million gallons valued at $535 million.
Vietnam
Vietnam has undergone several reductions in the tariff it levies on imports of U.S. ethanol over
the past few years including a tariffs reduction from 10 percent to five percent in March of this
year. This reduction followed a similar action in July 2023 when Vietnam lowered its tariff to 10
percent for both denatured and undenatured ethanol. Despite this reduction, the tariff continues
to position U.S. ethanol at an economic disadvantage particularly compared to tariffs imposed on
gasoline and other fuel additives, which are levied at either zero or three percent. A tariff
removal for U.S. ethanol would also assist competitiveness for U.S. ethanol compared with
ethanol from other origins, where they may have duty-free access to the Vietnam market.
With such a significant discrepancy between other fuel additives, it is even more difficult to
expand the use of ethanol blending in other grades of gasoline at higher blend rates. U.S. ethanol
exports to Vietnam in 2024 were valued at $15.7 million, but decreasing the tariff and increasing
blend rates to all grades of gasoline could result in significant export growth to Vietnam with
improved economic competitiveness.
We are encouraged to see E10 pilot efforts in Vietnam in anticipation of the announced E10
nationwide offering starting in 2026. Continued engagement by USTR on the benefits of ethanol
blending would help support E10 implementation. Nationwide E10 in Vietnam could result in
240 million gallons of export potential, which has an estimated value of $432 million. While this
would not negate the overall U.S. trade deficit of $123.5 billion with Vietnam, increasing ethanol
exports can play a role in reducing it.
International Bodies
Ethanol as a feedstock to produce sustainable aviation and maritime fuels is receiving increased
attention from other countries who are looking to meet their emissions reduction targets as
agreed to under the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Carbon Offsetting and
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). Updated values from this year placed U.S. corn ethanol for alcohol-to-jet as
a “CORSIA Eligible Fuel”. Despite recent updates to the emissions profile of U.S. corn ethanol
under ICAO CORSIA, additional adjustments are needed to more scientifically and accurately
portray U.S. ethanol—specifically changes such as the removal of quantitative scoring for
indirect land use change, more accurate references to U.S. agricultural land use, and the
incorporation of practices undertaken by farmers that reduce carbon emissions, such as no-till
farming.
Without these changes, U.S. ethanol is inaccurately scored in such a way that could place it
outside the eligible emissions value countries, such as Japan, may seek to implement.
Conversely, there seems to be significant interest in ICAO to support Brazil in their efforts to
unscientifically get an improved score for their “second crop” corn, which would undermine
market demand for U.S. corn. While we appreciate the increased engagement by the U.S.
government on CORSIA, we urge you to incorporate the U.S. biofuels industry within the United
States expert nominations to ICAO. Otherwise, decisions and negotiations in ICAO are taking
place that could unduly harm U.S. ethanol without giving the industry any means to weigh in on
or ultimately shape the resulting policies.
Like ICAO for aviation, we are also eager to engage within the sustainable marine fuel sector,
particularly as IMO is adopting their own greenhouse gas emissions policies. A strong U.S.
government effort is needed to ensure that U.S. corn ethanol is accurately placed and well
positioned to be used as a feedstock for marine fuel for those countries participating in the IMO’s
Net Zero Framework, or any other subsequent IMO frameworks encouraging greater use of
lower emission fuels. We similarly ask for your support for strong U.S. industry representation
and engagement in future discussions at the IMO. Unlike aviation, we believe that ethanol could
be utilized within the maritime sector as a “drop-in” fuel to existing vessels that are already
configured to run on methanol. However, without a workable pathway for U.S. ethanol under the
IMO, countries would not have an incentive to utilize U.S. ethanol.
Thank you for your consideration of these comments. Growth Energy looks forward to working
further with USTR to resolve unfairness issues facing U.S. ethanol.
Sincerely,
Chris Bliley
Senior Vice President of Regulatory Affairs
Growth Energy

 

October 30, 2025
Mr. Edward Marcus
Chair of the Trade Policy Staff Committee
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
600 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20508
Docket ID: USTR-2025-17782
Dear Mr. Marcus:

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Thank you for taking a proactive approach on E15 implementation in the wake of the state
budget providing funding for the rulemaking and the signing of AB 30 into law.
As we have mentioned in numerous verbal and written comments, ethanol has been the leading
source of carbon reductions historically in the state’s LCFS with just E10 and E85. E15 will
continue that trend.
E15 is currently sold in 34 states at nearly 4,500 sites and has powered more than 160 billion
miles driven nationwide.
With the right approach, California can become the leading market in E15, which is why getting
this right—for consumers, retailers, and the environment—is critical. We believe part of that
approach is providing written guidance, giving fuel retailers and the entire supply chain
confidence that they can offer E15 without concern over ambiguous regulation.
We are glad to see the clarification that CARBOB can be blended with up to 15% ethanol. That
is important for retailers to have that certainty and clarity.
We would encourage CARB to work with the other agencies involved to ensure timely
implementation of AB 30 and to operate under the intent of the law: allow the sale of E15 in the
state and simultaneously address regulatory questions on methods of sale, equipment
approvals, and labeling.
We encourage CARB to follow a regulatory path that mirrors E10 and California Reformulated
Gasoline, as E15 is a viable option for nearly all passenger vehicles on the road today as
opposed to alternative fuels.
Additionally, E15 is defined by the U.S. EPA in 40 CFR § 1090.80 as “gasoline that contains
more than 10 and no more than 15 volume percent ethanol.”
Due to the high rate of equipment and vehicle compatibility with E15 –in addition to California
regulations such as the permanent closure of single walled underground storage tanks— a vast
majority of retail infrastructure is able to store, handle and dispense E15 safely.
Can you clarify the scope and content of the survey CARB is conducting to determine whether
E10 certified vapor recovery systems can be certified for E15? E.g. – Are you requesting
information from equipment manufacturers? Or are you conducting additional tests? Are you
able to
Misfuelling Mitigation Plans are important and required by the EPA. Along with the label required
by 40, CFR, § 1090.1510, MMPs have other minor labeling requirements when E15 is being
dispensed from the same hose and nozzle as other gasoline products. Issues and questions
regarding misfuelling are already addressed thoroughly by federal requirements. A national
survey is deployed through RFGSA that actively assesses clarity for the consumer and
adherence to federal labeling requirements.

Growth Energy’s Comments (AS PREPARED)
CARB E15 Implementation Workshop
Dallas Gerber – Director of State Government Affairs
Reid Wagner – Technical Director of Market Development

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