Growth Energy is the world’s largest association of biofuel producers, representing 97
biorefineries that annually produce 9.5 billion gallons of renewable fuel. Growth Energy’s
members produce more than 60% of all ethanol sold in the United States, most of which is used
to comply with the RFS. Growth Energy previously submitted comments on EPA’s proposed
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2026 and 2027, Partial Waiver of 2025
Cellulosic Biofuel Volume Requirement, and Other Changes (hereinafter “Set 2 proposal” or
“NPRM”).1
Here, Growth Energy respectfully submits these supplemental comments on the
EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: Standards for 2026 and 2027, Partial Waiver
of 2025 Cellulosic Biofuel Volume Requirement, and Other Changes; Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (hereinafter “supplemental proposal” or “Supplemental NPRM”).2
In the supplemental proposal, EPA proposes to increase the 2026 and 2027 national
Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”) standards so as to reallocate 100% or 50% of the RFS
obligations that are covered by the small-refinery exemptions (“SREs”) that EPA granted for
compliance years 2023-2025.3
EPA also solicits comment on reallocating other amounts,
including 0%.4
The SREs EPA granted for 2023-2024 freed 1.4 billion RINs from needing to be
retired for those years and made them available for compliance going forward.5
In the
supplemental proposal, EPA states that it projects granting SREs for 2025 covering about 780
million RINs.6
Thus, 100% reallocation would entail raising the 2026 and 2027 standards by
about 2.18 billion gallons in the aggregate.
I. Growth Energy appreciates and firmly supports EPA’s proposal to reallocate
100% of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations. The logic underlying the proposed reallocation is
that the RINs associated with the 2023-2025 SREs will be available for compliance in 2026-
2027, and thus they will reduce the binding force of the 2026-2027 RFS standards one for one
and allow obligated parties to use those RINs in lieu of the required volume of renewable fuel,
creating a renewable-fuel shortfall. That logic is sound and requires 100% reallocation. If the
RINs associated with the 2023-2025 SREs are not fully drawn down for compliance in 2026 and
2027, they will merely recreate the problems in future years: any rolled-over RINs associated
with those SREs will suppress the binding force of the 2028 RFS standards (one for one) and
accordingly allow obligated parties to create a renewable-fuel shortfall in 2028 to that extent.
This process will continue until all the SRE-associated RINs have inevitably been used in lieu of
renewable fuel, ultimately creating a 2.18-billion-gallon renewable-fuel shortfall equal to the
entire exempt renewable-fuel volume. Only 100% reallocation can avoid that outcome.
1
90 Fed. Reg. 25,784 (June 17, 2025).
2
90 Fed. Reg. 45,007 (Sept. 18, 2025).
3
Supplemental NPRM at 45,009:3.
4 Ibid.
5 Id. at 45,009:2.
6 Ibid.
2
II. Given the effects of the 2023-2025 SREs, EPA is required as a matter of law to
reallocate 100% of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations. That is required by EPA’s “core
mandate” under the CAA to set standards reasonably designed to “ensure” that the applicable
volumes are met. And that is required by EPA’s duty to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.
III. But even if reallocation were not mandatory, EPA would at least have discretion
to reallocate the exempt 2023-2025 obligations under both its “ensure” duty and its “Set” power.
IV. And insofar as EPA is exercising its discretion, it would be arbitrary and
capricious for EPA to reallocate less than 100% of those obligations. First, 100% reallocation
best serves Congress’ intent that the RFS program force the market to increase its renewable-fuel
use and best achieves the public benefits Congress sought to achieve by creating the RFS
program: increasing U.S. energy security and independence, decreasing greenhouse-gas
emissions, and promoting job growth and rural economic development. Full reallocation is also
most consistent with EPA’s analysis of the various statutory Set factors and with EPA’s
conclusion that those factors overall favor the proposed applicable volumes. Second,
reallocation—even 100%—would not harm non-exempt obligated parties because they can avoid
all net RIN costs, and if there were any portion of those costs that they could not avoid, that
portion would be far too small to justify non-reallocation. But at most, that unavoidable portion
cost could justify only the same proportion of non-reallocation. Third, no statutory Set factor is
affected adversely by reallocation. And fourth, it would be irrational for EPA to decline 100%
reallocation in order to preserve or increase the carryover-RIN bank for the future.
V. There is no reason to treat the exempt cellulosic-biofuel obligations differently.
The cellulosic-waiver standard plays no role when setting applicable volumes for 2023 or later
years. And anyway, reallocation is not inconsistent with accounting for the cellulosic-waiver
standard at this stage.
3
DISCUSSION
I. TO THE EXTENT THE 2023-2025 SRE OBLIGATIONS ARE NOT REALLOCATED, THEY
WILL CONTINUE TO UNDERMINE FUTURE RFS STANDARDS AND WILL EVENTUALLY
CREATE AN EQUIVALENT RENEWABLE-FUEL SHORTFALL
EPA “project[s] that a total of 2.18 billion RINs will not need to be retired as a result of
SREs for 2023-2025.”7
As EPA notes correctly, the availability of those additional RINs will
reduce the binding force of the 2026-2027 RFS standards one for one, which in turn could result
in lower renewable-fuel usage in 2026-2027. The supplemental proposal, however, mistakenly
treats the possibility that this usage reduction will not be fully experienced in 2026-2027 as
possible justification for reallocating less than 100% of the exempted 2023-2025 obligations. To
the extent that the SRE-based RINs are not used to reduce renewable-fuel usage in 2026-2027,
they will continue to undermine the binding force of RFS standards in the future and will
eventually reduce renewable-fuel usage by the entire exempt volume, i.e., the projected 2.18
billion gallons. In other words, any SRE-based RINs not drawn down in 2026-2027 to achieve
compliance in lieu of renewable-fuel use will be rolled forward to 2028, where the process on
which EPA rests its reallocation proposal will repeat, suppressing the effective RFS standards
and depressing RIN prices until the SRE-based RIN-bank inflation has been fully drawn down
through an aggregate renewable-fuel shortfall of 2.18 billion gallons. This is the inevitable
product of the RFS program’s structure and basic economic principles—structure and principles
that EPA recognizes in the supplemental proposal (as it has recognized on prior occasions).
In the supplemental proposal, EPA correctly recognizes that the 2023-2025 SREs will
make additional carryover RINs available for compliance in 2025-2027. The RINs associated
with the 2023-2024 SREs “no longer need to be retired for compliance” with the now-closed
2023-2024 obligations, and therefore they can be carried over.8
Although the RINs made
available by 2023 SREs will have expired by the end of 2024 and therefore not be directly
available for compliance with the 2025-2027 standards, they will in effect be extended for
compliance with the 2025 standards through the “rolling” process that EPA describes in the
supplemental proposal and has described before: obligated parties will use all the carryover 2023
RINs for 2024 compliance and instead bank additional 2024 RINs for 2025.9
This rolling will
necessarily happen because otherwise obligated parties would allow their valuable RINs to
expire worthless—which no profit-maximizing economic entity would do. The only limit on this
rolling is that carryover RINs can be used to meet only 20% of the obligations, but that limit has
no practical force now because the 2023 SRE RINs are less than 20% of the 2024 obligations.10
Similarly, the RINs made available by the 2024 SREs will be carried over to 2025. Thus, the
2023-2024 SREs will inflate the RIN bank in 2025.
7
Supplemental NPRM at 45,009:2.
8
Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2.
9
Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2; 85 Fed. Reg. 7,016, 7,021 n.15 (Feb. 6, 2020); Renewable
Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 1236 (10th Cir. 2020).
10 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2; 85 Fed. Reg. 7,016, 7,021 n.15 (Feb. 6, 2020).
4
In 2025, the bank inflation from 2024 carryover RINs caused by the 2023-2024 SREs
could affect obligated parties’ actions in two ways. First, obligated parties “could choose to use
[those] carryover RINs to comply with their [2025] RVOs in lieu of acquiring renewable fuel
produced in [2025], thereby reducing the demand for renewable fuel production and use in [that]
year[].”11 In other words, those SREs could create a renewable-fuel shortfall relative to the 2025
applicable volumes and national percentage standards. This would draw down the RIN bank
because obligated parties would retire the 2024 carryover RINs but not replace them with 2025
RINs, i.e., would not roll the 2024 carryover RINs into 2025 carryover RINs for use in 2026.
Second, obligated parties could use the volume of renewable fuel required by the 2025 standards
and avoid creating a renewable-fuel shortfall in 2025. In contrast to the first scenario, this
second scenario would maintain the bank inflation from the 2023-2024 SREs because obligated
parties would retire the 2024 carryover RINs but roll them into new 2025 RINs, which they
would carry over to 2026. Obligated parties could also do a bit of both: partially draw down the
SRE-based bank inflation, creating some degree of renewable-fuel shortfall, and partially roll the
2024 RINs into 2025 RINs, which they would carry over into 2026. Again, the 20% limit on
using carryover RINs would have no force because it would exceed the total number of
carryover RINs. Moreover, for the same reasons, the 2025 SREs would make additional 2025
RINs available to be carried over into 2026.
So far, this description of the effects of the 2023-2025 SREs accords with the description
in the supplemental proposal. It also accords with prior EPA statements. For example, during
the Set 1 rulemaking, EPA noted: “SREs generally affect[] the demand for RINs in the calendar
year in which they were granted and the following years, rather than in the RFS compliance year
to which they applied.”12 EPA explained that “a small refinery that was granted an exemption
[might] continue[] to blend renewable fuel into its own gasoline and diesel due to the economic
attractiveness of doing so. In such cases, the total number of RINs generated may not have been
reduced by the SRE, but the carryover RIN bank may have increased.”13 Thus, for example,
“lower D6 RIN prices”—reflecting lower demand for conventional renewable fuel—“[a]fter
2018 … [we]re largely the result of: (1) Small refinery exemptions (SREs) granted
[retroactively] in 2018 [for the 2016 and 2017 compliance years], which reduced the total
number of D6 RINs needed for compliance with the RFS obligations …; and (2) The large
11 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:3.
12 Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program: RFS Annual Rules, Regulatory Impact Analysis at
7 (June 2022).
13 Ibid.
5
number of carryover RINs available.”14 Independent economic analysis confirms this
reasoning.15
The supplemental proposal then tries to determine the specific year in which “the effect
of these [SRE-based] RINs is likely to be most acute.”16 EPA surmises the most acute effect will
likely be “in 2026 and 2027” because “only a few months remain in” 2025.17 EPA seems to
have in mind that the bank inflation caused by the 2023-2025 SREs is unlikely to cause an actual
renewable-fuel shortfall in 2025 because there is too little time remaining for obligated parties to
reduce their renewable-fuel use and rely on those RINs instead—in fact, by time EPA finalizes
its supplemental proposal, 2025 could be over. Instead, EPA expects that “the effect of these
RINs is likely to be most acute in 2026 and 2027.”18 EPA reaches this conclusion based on the
same programmatic and economic logic just described. EPA explains:
SREs granted for 2023-2025 will result in lower-than-anticipated RVOs for [2026
and 2027] and, all else being equal, will result in a higher number of carryover
RINs available for use in 2026 and future years. Increased numbers of carryover
RINs can negatively impact the demand for renewable fuel and the associated
RINs. This is because obligated parties can use carryover RINs years to meet
their compliance obligations in 2026 and 2027 in lieu of acquiring RINs generated
in these years. An increase in the availability of carryover RINs to meet obligated
14 Id. at 40. In the Set 1 rulemaking, EPA erred, however, in stating that “higher-than-projected
gasoline and diesel demand could offset the effect of SREs to some degree.” Id. at 7. That could
be true relative to the nominal applicable volumes but that is false with respect to the volumes
implied by the percentage standards. The point of a percentage standard is that the required
volume of renewable fuel varies in proportion to the volume of transportation fuel used. So, if
more transportation fuel was used than projected, the RFS correspondingly requires that
proportionally more renewable fuel also be used. Absent reallocation, SREs will necessarily
create a shortfall relative to the volumes required by the percentage standards, regardless of
whether transportation-fuel usage exceeds the projected volumess on which the standards were
initially based.
15 Edgeworth Economics, The Impact of EPA’s Policies Regarding RVOs and SREs at 2 (Aug.
30, 2019) [Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM, Ex. 7 at 7, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-
0646] (as EPA granted much greater amounts of SREs in 2018 and 2019, “D6 RIN prices fell
[to] the lowest level since 2013, and the RIN bank once again expanded as obligated parties
began to generate excess RINs” in light of the SREs); id. at 8 (those SREs “adversely affected
ethanol demand by reducing the incentive to sell E85” and “[t]he remaining impact likely was
absorbed by the RIN bank”).
16 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2.
17 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2.
18 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2.
6
parties’ compliance obligations in 2026 and 2027 could decrease the demand for
current-year RINs.19
EPA is probably correct that the 2023-2025 SREs’ effect is likely not to be felt in 2025
and is likely to be most acute in 2026 and 2027. And that prediction correctly prompts EPA to
propose reallocating the exempt 2023-2025 obligations through the 2026 and 2027 RFS
standards: “Thus, failure to mitigate the market impacts of the increased number of carryover
RINs due to the 2023-2025 SREs could result in a decrease in demand for renewable fuel
produced in 2026 and 2027. … The co-proposed SRE reallocation volumes for 2026 and 2027
are intended to prevent increased numbers of carryover RINs from decreasing demand for
renewable fuel below the proposed applicable volumes for 2026 and 2027 in the Set 2
proposal.”20
So far, so good. But then EPA recognizes the possibility that the RINs made available by
the 2023-2025 SREs in 2026-2027 will not cause an equivalent reduction in renewable-fuel use
in 2026-2027, and this is where the supplemental proposal goes wrong: it mistakenly treats that
possibility as a potential justification for reallocating less than 100% of the exempted
obligations. The supplemental proposal states: “Obligated parties holding few or no carryover
RINs may have an incentive to hold any carryover RINs attributable to 2023-2025 SREs as a
compliance flexibility for future years rather than using them towards their 2026 or 2027
compliance obligations. If obligated parties hold, rather than use, these carryover RINs, we
expect a much smaller impact, and potentially even no impact, on the RIN and renewable fuel
markets. We are therefore co-proposing SRE reallocation volumes for 2026 and 2027 equal to
50 percent of the 2023-2025 exempted RVOs”21 and soliciting comment on reallocating 75%,
25%, and 0% of the 2023-2025 exempted obligations.22
In suggesting less than 100% reallocation of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations, EPA
contradicts its own analysis of the effects of the 2023-2025 SREs and the ineluctable
programmatic and economic logic underlying that analysis. That logic dictates that the 2023-
2025 exempt obligations must be fully reallocated. As EPA acknowledges, RINs made available
by the 2023-2025 SREs—if not used in lieu of renewable fuel—can be “roll[ed] … forward to
the 2025 compliance year and beyond”23 and can be “available for use in 2026 and future
years.”24 The “beyond” is not necessarily confined to 2026 and 2027, as the plural “future
years” after 2026 implies. To the extent that the bank inflation caused by the 2023-2025 SREs
remains in 2028, those available RINs will repeat the effects first felt in 2026-2027. They will
reduce the volume of renewable fuel that must be used in 2028 (one for one). At that point,
obligated parties will face the same choice they will face in 2026 and 2027: whether to use those
19 Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:1:2; see also Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:3.
20 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:3; Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:1.
21 Supplemental NPRM at 45,011:1; see also Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:3-45,015:1.
22 Supplemental NPRM at 45,009:3.
23 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:2 (emphasis added).
24 Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:1 (emphasis added).
7
RINs in lieu of using renewable fuel—i.e., whether to create a present renewable-fuel shortfall—
or whether to roll them into 2029. To the extent that obligated parties roll them into 2029, the
effects will continue and the choice will repeat in 2029, and so on, every year, until eventually
every RIN originally made available by the 2023-2025 SREs has been used in lieu of renewablefuel usage. And this eventual renewable-fuel shortfall equal to the SRE volume is inevitable
given the logic of the RFS program and obligated parties’ economic interests. In short, the entire
volume of SREs—2.18 billion, according to supplemental proposal’s estimate—will necessarily
create an equivalent renewable-fuel shortfall of 2.18 billion gallons over the course of the RFS
program unless fully reallocated.
Consequently, as explained below in Parts II and III, EPA must reallocate 100% of the
2023-2025 exempt obligations.
II. BOTH EPA’S DUTY TO SET RFS STANDARDS THAT “ENSURE” THE REQUIRED
VOLUMES WILL BE MET AND ITS DUTY TO ENGAGE IN REASONED DECISIONMAKING
REQUIRE EPA TO REALLOCATE THE SRES FULLY
EPA is legally required to reallocate 100% of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations. This
legal duty comes from two independent sources.
First, as EPA and the D.C. Circuit have recognized, EPA’s “core mandate[ is] to ensure
the Act’s annual renewable fuel volumes are met.”25 This means that EPA “must set percentage
standards that … are reasonably designed … to meet the target volumes for th[e] upcoming
year.”26 This mandate continues throughout the life of the RFS program, even after 2022. The
statutory provisions articulating the “ensure” duty are not time-limited; on the contrary, one
expressly states that EPA’s regulations must comply with the “ensure” duty “[r]egardless of the
date of promulgation.”27 Moreover, it would make no sense for EPA’s “core mandate” to
evaporate while the program continues. EPA itself has recognized that its “ensure” duty
continues for the duration of the RFS program. EPA invoked this overarching “ensure” duty in
the 2020 rulemaking as authority for modifying the percentage formula to account for projected
retroactive SREs for all future years, not just for 2020 or 2020-2022.28 EPA’s 2022 Rule did
likewise in reaffirming that modification.29 Indeed, the 2022 rule expressly stated that the
25 Wynnewood Refining Co., LLC v. EPA, 77 F.4th 767, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2023); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(o)(2)(A)(i), (iii)(I) & (3)(B)(i); 85 Fed. Reg. at 7,050:3, 7,051:2.
26 Br. for Respondents at 27, 29, Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA, No. 20-1107, ECF
#2112942 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25, 2025).
27 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
28 85 Fed. Reg. at 7,050:3 & nn.158-159.
29 87 Fed. Reg. 39,600, 39,632:2-39,633:1 & nn.185-186 (July 1, 2022).
8
revised percentage formula “would in fact better ‘ensure’ that the volumes are met” if EPA
“grant[s] SREs for some future compliance year,” i.e., after 2022.30
In the supplemental proposal, EPA correctly recognizes that insofar as carryover RINs
made available by the 2023-2025 SREs are rolled into 2026 and 2027, they will diminish the
binding force of the standards EPA sets for those years one for one because obligated parties
could use those RINs in lieu of the corresponding volume of renewable fuel. In other words, if
EPA sets the total applicable volume for 2026 to 24.02 billion gallons and there are 2.18 billion
carryover RINs available from the 2023-2025 SREs, the percentage standard EPA establishes
will actually require obligated parties to use 24.02 minus 2.18 billion gallons of renewable fuel,
i.e., 21.84 billion gallons. If obligated parties use more than 21.84 billion gallons of renewable
fuel in 2026, that will be a voluntary choice they make, not an act mandated by the 2026 RFS
standards. In short, as long as there are RINs for compliance in 2026 or 2027 made available by
the 2023-2025 SREs, the standards EPA establishes for 2026-2027 will not be reasonably
designed to meet the required applicable volumes EPA sets for 2026-2027 unless the associated
exempt obligations are fully reallocated. To fulfill its “ensure” duty, EPA must reallocate all the
exempt 2023-2025 obligations.
In fact, EPA previously recognized this logic in modifying the percentage formula to
account for retroactive SREs, and the D.C. Circuit upheld that analysis. In that rulemaking, EPA
correctly explained that “should [it] grant [exemptions] without accounting for them in the
percentage formula, those exemptions would effectively reduce the volumes of renewable fuel
required by the RFS program, potentially impacting renewable fuel use in the U.S.”31 Raising
the standards to reallocate retroactively exempt obligations, EPA declared, has “the effect of
ensuring that the required volumes of renewable fuel are met when small refineries are granted
exemptions from their [RFS] obligations after the issuance of the final rule.”32 The D.C. Circuit
affirmed EPA’s position, concluding that EPA’s statutory duty “to ‘ensure’ that the applicable
volumes ‘are met’” supplies EPA with “the authority to adjust the percentage standards to
account for small refinery exemptions.”33 The Court added that reallocating retroactive SREs
30 87 Fed. Reg. at 39,633:1. The “ensure” duty expressed in § 7545(o)(3)(B)(i) is not time
limited. The phrase “calendar years 2005 through 2021” only specifies when the establishment
of percentage standards is no longer governed by the deadline specified in the preceding phrase:
“Not later than November 30 of each of.” § 7545(o)(3)(B)(i). For post-2022 calendar years, the
CAA establishes a different deadline: “no later than 14 months” before the year begins.
§ 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii). Nor does the phrase “calendar years 2005 through 2021” time limit EPA’s
duty to issue percentage standards (as opposed to applicable volumes) for 2023 and later years.
The RFS could not function without percentage standards, as EPA acknowledged when it
decided to continue using them after 2022, 88. Fed. Reg. at 44,519:2-3—a decision expressly
based on EPA’s recognition that its continuing “ensure” duty continues after 2022, id. at
44519:2.
31 85 Fed. Reg. at 7,050:3.
32 Ibid.
33 Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 101 F.4th 871, 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
9
“helps prevent undercompliance by ensuring that the leeway afforded to small refineries does not
lead to percentage standards that undershoot the target renewable fuel requirements.”34
Second, EPA is separately “required to engage in reasoned decisionmaking,” not
arbitrary or capricious decisionmaking.35 That means that in setting RFS standards, EPA must
“consider [all] important aspect[s] of the problem” and “examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.”36 If EPA sets RFS standards without accounting for carryover RINs still
available because of the 2023-2025 SREs, it will knowingly set standards that will not require
the volume of usage that they purport to require, i.e., it will knowingly set ineffectual standards
by blinding itself to obvious circumstances regarding how those standards will operate. That
would not reflect reasoned decisionmaking.
As explained above, the programmatic logic underlying these twin legal duties does not
end in 2026, or even 2027. Rather, it continues to all subsequent years as long as the RIN bank
remains inflated to any degree because of the 2023-2025 SREs. For example, if 1 billion of the
2.18 billion RINs estimated to be available in 2026 because of the 2023-2025 SREs are drawn
down for compliance in 2026 in lieu of using additional renewable fuel, then the remaining 1.18
billion RINs that are rolled forward into 2027 will reduce the effective requirement of the 2027
standards by an equivalent 1.18 billion gallons. If 500 million of those 1.18 billion RINs are
then drawn down for compliance in 2027 in lieu of using additional renewable fuel, then the
remaining 680 million RINs will be rolled forward into 2028 and will reduce the effective
requirement of the 2028 standards by an equivalent 680 million gallons. This process will
continue until all the SRE-based RINs are drawn down in lieu of renewable fuel use. Each year,
EPA would set the standards in violation of its duties to “ensure” that the standards will require
the specified volume of renewable fuel and in violation of its duty to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking. The only way to avoid those violations is to reallocate 100% of the exempt the
2023-2025 obligations.
III. EPA’S “ENSURE” DUTY AND THE “SET” PROVISION AT LEAST GIVE EPA DISCRETION
TO REALLOCATE THE SRES
Even if EPA were not statutorily required to reallocate 100% of the exempt 2023-2025
obligations, EPA would at least have statutory discretion to do so. Here again, there are two
sources of such authority.
First, EPA’s “ensure” “mandate” (described above) at a minimum gives EPA permission
to reallocate the SRE obligations. As the D.C. Circuit has held, EPA finds “authority to account
34 Ibid.
35 Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A); 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A).
36 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
10
for the small refinery exemptions in the statutory language directing EPA to promulgate
regulations to ‘ensure’ that the applicable volumes ‘are met.’”37
Second, as the supplemental proposal explains, the CAA’s “Set” provision also
authorizes EPA to reallocate exempt obligations when establishing annual standards. That
provision requires EPA to set volume requirements “based on a review of the implementation of
the program during [prior] calendar years … and an analysis of” an array of statutorily specified
factors.38 The supplemental proposal correctly recognizes that this framework allows EPA to
reallocate the exempt 2023-2025 obligations in setting the 2026-2027 volume requirements.
As described above, the history of the RFS program shows that, if not reallocated, SREs
ultimately suppress renewable-fuel usage—either immediately in the year for which they are
granted or later by inflating the RIN bank, which then displaces renewable-fuel usage in
subsequent years. EPA can and should heed this lesson in exercising its power under the Set
provision, and EPA rightly acknowledges that in the supplemental proposal: “under our directive
to review the implementation of the program, … the SREs granted for 2023-2025 … have a
direct impact on the RFS obligations … for all [non-exempt] obligated parties in aggregate
(which can now retire a greater number of carryover RINs and fewer current year RINs to satisfy
their combined RFS obligations for 2024 and 2025). … [B]ecause obligated parties can now use
the carryover RINs that otherwise would have been retired for compliance but for the 2023-2025
exemptions, SREs granted in one year can have an impact on the market for RINs and renewable
fuel in future years.”39
The supplemental proposal also accounts for the various statutory factors EPA must
consider in setting volume requirements after 2022. In its initial Set 2 proposal, EPA
determined, based on its consideration of the various statutory factors, that the market could
produce, distribute, and use the proposed volumes of renewable fuel, and that the other factors
were generally enhanced by or consistent with achieving such volumes.40 Because full
reallocation of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations would preserve the intended binding force of
the proposed volume requirements, and thus the intended level of renewable-fuel demand, full
reallocation is supported by and consistent with EPA’s analysis of the statutory factors. EPA
rightly acknowledges this in the supplemental proposal: “the statutory factors that the EPA must
consider when establishing the applicable volumes for years after 2022 are impacted by the
production and use of renewable fuel and are not impacted by the use of carryover RINs.”41
The supplemental proposal states that the CAA “gives EPA considerable discretion to
weigh and balance the various factors required by statute.”42 It is true that EPA has significant
37 Sinclair Wyoming, 101 F.4th at 891-892.
38 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii).
39 Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:2.
40 See NPRM at 25,812:1-25,834:3.
41 Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:2-3.
42 Supplemental NPRM at 45,011:2.
11
discretion in exercising its power under the Set provision, and that discretion is sufficiently broad
to include the proposed reallocation. However, as Growth Energy explained in its initial
comment on the Set 2 proposal, that discretion is not unlimited: specifically, EPA must set the
volume requirements at the maximum volume of renewable-fuel use that can be achieved in
response to the RFS’s incentives, unless achieving that volume would likely trigger the
conditions for a general waiver based on severe economic or environmental harm.43 This
constraint supports the supplemental proposal because reallocation helps ensure that the required
volumes are not effectively reduced when they are readily achievable (as the initial Set 2
proposal shows they are).
IV. IF EPA HAS DISCRETION REGARDING WHETHER TO REALLOCATE THE 2023-2025
SRES, IT WOULD BE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS NOT TO EXERCISE THAT
DISCRETION TO REALLOCATE THE EXEMPT OBLIGATIONS FULLY
As explained above, EPA is statutorily required to fully reallocate the exempt 2023-2025
obligations, but at a minimum, EPA has discretion to do so. Under the circumstances, any
reallocation that is less than 100% would be arbitrary and capricious.
A. Full Reallocation Would Best Serve All the Statutory Objectives That EPA
Found Would Be Served by Achieving the Proposed Volumes
Congress created the RFS program “to force the market” to “replace” fossil fuel with
“greater and greater volumes of renewable fuel each year.”44 Congress adopted this “marketforcing policy” to “move the United States toward greater energy independence and security,”
“to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,” and to promote “job creation … [and] rural economic
development.”45
In its initial Set 2 proposal, EPA determined that the proposed applicable volumes would
further the achievement of these congressional objectives. First, EPA assessed that its proposed
volumes would force the market to increase its renewable-fuel usage above the amount that the
market would use without the RFS program.46 Specifically, EPA proposed to require about
6.514 billion gallons of renewable fuel above the “No RFS” level in 2026 and about 6.900 billion
gallons of renewable fuel above the “No RFS” level in 2027.47 Second, EPA’s analysis found
that “the proposed volume standards” would yield “benefits” in terms of “jobs, rural economic
43 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 6-11, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
44 Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691, 696-697, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
45 Americans for Clean Energy, 864 F.3d at 696-697, 705; 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(ii)(I)-(II)
& (VI); see also, e.g., NPRM at 25,829:3.
46 Growth Energy, however, maintains that EPA’s proposed implied conventional volumes are at
least 1 billion gallons too low. See Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 11-17, EPAHQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
47 Compare NPRM at 25,811 Table III.D.1-1 (estimated No RFS use of 17.506 bil gal and
17.560 bil gal) with id. at 25,829 Table V.F-1 & Table V.F-2 (proposed RFS use of 24.02 bil gal
and 24.46); see also id. at 25,785:3, 25,788:3.
12
development, energy security …, and … climate” through reduction in greenhouse-gas
emissions—the very benefits that Congress intended the RFS to achieve by forcing the market to
increasingly replace petroleum with renewable fuel.48 Further, EPA considered the costs of
achieving the proposed volumes, consistent with the statutory Set factors, and found in its initial
Set 2 proposal that “the proposed volumes are appropriate under EPA’s statutory authority as an
outcome of balancing all relevant factors.”49
Again, 100% reallocation of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations would simply preserve
this analysis and thus preserve these positive overall consequences consistent with Congress’
objectives and the statutory factors. As EPA notes, full reallocation will “not … increase the
production and use of renewable fuel beyond the volumes previously proposed for 2026 and
2027”; rather, full reallocation will simply require that the RIN bank inflation resulting from the
2023-2025 SREs be drawn down, and “the statutory factors that the EPA must consider when
establishing the applicable volumes for years after 2022 … are not impacted by the use of
carryover RINs.”50 On the other hand, less than full reallocation would diminish or eliminate the
statutory benefits: as discussed above, less than full reallocation would reduce renewable-fuel
usage, which in turn would diminish the reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions, diminish the
enhancement of U.S. energy security and independence, and diminish job growth and rural
economic development.
In sum, full reallocation best accounts for the statutory factors and best serves the central
objectives that Congress sought to achieve through the RFS program.
B. Reallocation Would Not Harm Non-Exempt Obligated Parties
Although reallocation would increase the obligations for non-exempt obligated parties,
those increased obligations would not impose additional net financial cost on non-obligated
parties. As Growth Energy explained in its initial comment, obligated parties incur no net
compliance cost under the RFS program, or at most a de minimis net cost.51 EPA recognizes this
is in the supplemental proposal: “We do … expect that, on average at the national level,
obligated parties would pass on the costs of purchasing additional RINs to consumers.”52
Indeed, objections that small refineries have raised to their ability to fully recoup their RIN costs
are not only incorrect but also would generally not apply to non-exempt obligated parties
anyway.
Even a de minimis cost cannot justify anything less than 100% reallocation, given that
any such lesser reallocation would reduce renewable-fuel use and the associated congressionally
desired benefits. But at most, if obligated parties would absorb some portion of the net
compliance cost of the reallocated obligations, that would warrant non-reallocation only to that
48 NPRM at 25,829:3; see id. at 25,830:1-25,831:1.
49 NPRM at 25,788:2.
50 Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:2; see also id. at 45,015:1.
51 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 25-36, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
52 Supplemental NPRM at 45,015:1.
13
proportional extent. For example, if obligated parties would have to bear 0.5% of the net RIN
costs from complying with the reallocated obligations, then EPA could decline to reallocate only
0.5% of those obligations. A disproportionately large non-reallocation would be economically
irrational, unfair to renewable-fuel producers, and detrimental to the achievement of the
congressionally desired objectives of the RFS program.
To summarize the key points regarding compliance costs from Growth Energy’s initial
comment:
Extensive empirical study has found that obligated parties pass at least 98% of their
marginal RIN costs down the supply chain. The principal study finding less than
100% pass-through suffered from methodological flaws that understated the passthrough, but even if its finding were sound, that would mean that obligated parties
absorb, at most, only a miniscule portion of the RIN cost.53
All obligated parties can fully avoid net RIN costs through readily available RIN
contracts. As with virtually any other financial instrument or commodity, actors in
financial markets make contracts available for RINs to manage price fluctuations over
time. Through such contracts, obligated parties can match their incremental RIN
purchases and associated price risk to their incremental fuel sales, and thereby
achieve consistent, reliable, and complete RIN-cost pass-through.54
Even if obligated parties achieve only incomplete pass-through of their RIN costs,
that does not necessarily mean they incur a net cost. RIN prices can rise or fall, and
so incomplete pass-through of RIN costs can result in either a net cost or a net gain to
the obligated party. And the history of the RIN market shows that RIN prices
regularly rise and fall to a roughly equal extent, meaning that the gains will generally
offset the costs overall. In any event, there is no a priori reason to conclude that the
costs will exceed the gains overall, and EPA could conclude that the reallocation will
inflict a net cost on obligated parties only if EPA finds that obligated parties’
unpassed-through RIN costs will exceed their unpassed-through RIN gains, but there
is no empirical evidence of that.55
There is no reason an obligated party would lack sufficient working capital to fully
pass through its RIN costs. Obligated parties never need to “pre-purchase”—i.e., lay
out capital for—RINs before selling the corresponding fuel, and thus they will always
have the capital from the sale of their fuel available to finance the corresponding RIN
acquisition. In fact, obligated parties can use strategies for acquiring RINs that are
accretive to their working capital.56
53 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 27-28, 32, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
54 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 28-31, 32-34, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
55 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 27, 33-34, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
56 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 34, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
14
Small merchant refineries have argued that they cannot achieve full pass-through of
their RIN costs because of certain features unique to their small size or the small size
of the local markets in which they operate. Those arguments are refuted by both the
empirical evidence and economic theory. But in any event, those arguments
generally would not apply to non-exempt obligated parties, which are typically
integrated, are typically larger, and typically operate in larger markets.57
C. No Statutory Set Factors Weigh Against the Proposed Reallocation
In the supplemental proposal, EPA identifies only one statutory factor that might be
affected adversely by reallocating the exempt 2023-2025 obligations: retail fuel prices for
consumers (precisely because of RIN-cost pass-through). EPA explains: “We do … expect that,
on average at the national level, obligated parties would pass on the costs of purchasing
additional RINs to consumers, and that this action could increase the cost of transportation fuel
to consumers.”58 But as EPA correctly recognizes, this effect does not alter EPA’s initially
proposed analysis of the “cost to consumers” statutory factor or the broader Set factor analysis.
Again, even 100% reallocation would merely preserve the binding force of the previously
proposed volumes. In the Set 2 proposal, EPA already assessed the cost of those volumes to
consumers and found it to be outweighed by the benefits Congress sought to achieve. The
supplemental proposal’s cost analysis confirms that even 100% reallocation would not increase
the cost to consumers above what EPA had already accounted for.59
Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit has held, “in enacting the Renewable Fuel Standards
Program, Congress made a policy choice to accept higher fuel prices in order to reap the benefits
of greater energy independence and … reduced greenhouse gas emissions.”60 “If it were
otherwise, the RFS Program would be largely superfluous; the market would independently
incentivize the production and consumption of renewable fuels.”61 So, as a matter of law, the
very small cost to consumers associated with achieving the full proposed volumes (with
reallocation or not) cannot outweigh the statutory benefits associated with those volumes.
D. Any Desire to Maintain or Grow the RIN Bank as a Safety Valve Cannot
Justify Any Non-Reallocation
Asserting that “[c]arryover RINs provide obligated parties compliance flexibility for
substantial uncertainties in the transportation fuel marketplace,” EPA states in the supplemental
proposal: “Because of the limited number of carryover RINs available [apart from the 2023-2025
SREs], it may not be necessary or appropriate to propose SRE reallocation volumes for 2026 and
57 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 34-36, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
58 Supplemental NPRM at 45,015:1.
59 Supplemental NPRM at 45,015:2-3.
60 Sinclair Wyoming, 101 F.4th at 889.
61 Sinclair Wyoming, 101 F.4th at 889.
15
2027 equal to the full magnitude of the 2023-2025 exemptions to maintain the intended
renewable fuel use in 2026 and 2027.”62 This notion is wrong and should be rejected.
First, even 100% reallocation of the exempt 2023-2025 obligations would not affect nonexempt obligated parties’ ability to comply with their 2026-2027 RFS obligations or draw down
any carryover RINs that would be available irrespective of the 2023-2025 SREs. To meet the
additional obligations resulting from the reallocation, obligated parties would, by definition, need
to draw down only the RINs made available by the 2023-2025 SREs.63 And EPA already
determined that the initially “proposed volumes [for 2026 and 2027] could be met with
renewable fuel produced and used in 2026 and 2027,” without the use of carryover RINs.64
Second, if EPA is suggesting that less than 100% reallocation might be warranted to
enable obligated parties to increase the RIN bank for after 2027, then EPA’s suggestion is
mistaken. For one thing, as explained above, that tactic would simply transfer the problems that
100% reallocation would resolve to a future year: again, the RIN bank inflation from the 2023-
2025 SREs would reduce the efficacy of a future year’s standards and would eventually lead to a
renewable-fuel shortfall in a future year.65 That would subvert Congress’s market-forcing policy
and Congress’ intent to use that policy to achieve important public benefits. For another thing,
as Growth Energy previously showed, EPA completely misunderstands the proper role of
carryover RINs, and intentionally setting RFS standards to preserve or increase the number of
carryover RINs contradicts Congress’ purpose and the CAA’s text.66
In any event, it would be arbitrary and capricious for EPA to implement less than 100%
reallocation in order to increase the RIN bank without a concrete analysis of what size the RIN
bank should be. But EPA has not presented any such analysis. Indeed, EPA has never analyzed
whether any particular RIN-bank size—5 billion? 20 billion?—was necessary for the wellfunctioning of the RFS program.
V. EPA SHOULD NOT TREAT CELLULOSIC BIOFUEL DIFFERENTLY FOR PURPOSES OF
REALLOCATING EXEMPT OBLIGATIONS
In the supplemental proposal, EPA asks whether it “should include all, some, or none of
[the exempt 2023-2025 cellulosic biofuel] volumes in the SRE reallocation volumes.”67 EPA
must and should include all of those volumes.
62 Supplemental NPRM at 45,010:3-45,011:1.
63 See Supplemental NPRM at 45,014:2 (“We project that the portion of the RFS obligations
represented by the SRE reallocation volumes would be met with carryover RINs attributable to
the 2023-2025 exempted RVOs.”).
64 Supplemental NPRM at 45,009:3.
65 Supra Pt. I.
66 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 40-42, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
67 Supplemental NPRM at 45,011:3.
16
EPA wonders whether it may account for the carryover cellulosic RINs made available
by the 2023-2025 SREs given that the “projected volume available”—a phrase used in the
CAA’s cellulosic-waiver provision—excludes carryover RINs.68 This question is inapt for two
separate reasons.
First, the cellulosic-waiver standard plays no role in setting the cellulosic biofuel volumes
for years after 2022. As Growth Energy explained in its comment on the initial Set 2 proposal,
EPA misunderstands the CAA’s directives regarding how to set the cellulosic biofuel volumes
for those years. EPA must set those volume requirements without regard to whether a cellulosic
waiver will be triggered, i.e., EPA must set the volume requirement to the maximum achievable
level of cellulosic biofuel production in response to RFS incentives (just as it must do for the
other categories of renewable fuel); EPA may exercise the cellulosic waiver later, on the eve of
the compliance year, if it turns out that the market was unable to achieve the specified level of
production.69
Second, even under EPA’s mistaken interpretation of the cellulosic-waiver standard, that
standard is not implicated by the reallocation of the exempt 2023-2025 cellulosic biofuel
volumes. The reallocation would increase the percentage standards to draw down cellulosic
RINs made available by the 2023-2025 SREs, but that is not because those carryover RINs
would be included in the projection of cellulosic-biofuel production. Rather, EPA’s approach
would first determine the projected production and provisionally establish the volume
requirements at that level, but then independently adjust the standards to preserve the efficacy of
the production-based volume requirements that EPA otherwise determines are appropriate.
These conclusions are unaffected if EPA determines that the achievable cellulosic
volumes are actually higher than it initially proposed.70 In that case, EPA must still set the
cellulosic volume requirements to that level and then adjust the standards to account for the
reallocation of the 2023-2025 cellulosic volumes.
But if EPA were to exclude the exempt 2023-2025 cellulosic obligations from the
reallocation, it should not correspondingly reduce the total volume requirement because, as
Growth Energy has shown, there is ample additional conventional ethanol to backfill the
cellulosic shortfall beyond the volume on which EPA based its proposed total volume
requirements.71
68 Supplemental NPRM at 45,011:3; see 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(D)(i).
69 Growth Energy Comment on Set 2 NPRM at 10-11, EPA-HQ-OAR-2024-0505-0646.
70 Supplemental NPRM at 45,011:3.
71 See supra n.46.
The post Growth Energy Comments on EPA 2026-27 RVOs and Reallocation Proposal appeared first on Growth Energy.