Canada is working to increase its ship recycling capacity on the West Coast in order to accommodate an influx of end-of-life vessels in the near future. The Royal Canadian Navy is expected to retire several of its warships starting this fall. B.C. Ferries has also announced a major fleet renewal effort, which will see the company retire some of its older vessels. In July, B.C. Ferries said that it is looking to have its vessels recycled in British Columbia.

Owing to this rising demand, Gord Johns, the MP (member of parliament) for the Courtenay-Alberni area in British Columbia, is eyeing the deep-sea port of Alberni as a suitable location to establish a green ship recycling facility.

“The Alberni Valley is uniquely positioned to attract the infrastructure and business investment needed for ship recycling and dry dock facilities,” said Johns. “With federal nation-building investments on the horizon, increased defense spending, and growing demand for world-class vessel recycling, the timing could not be more critical.”

To spearhead the ship recycling operation in Port Alberni, politicians in central Vancouver Island have formed a leadership group to collect inputs from local people. Some of the targeted stakeholders include First Nations, Transport Canada, local businesses and unions as well as environmental organizations. In addition, the leadership group will look into the financing aspects of the project. The group met for the first time on Friday.

“We need a strong regulatory environment to keep this type of industry on our coast,” said Josie Osborne, member of legislative assembly for Mid Island-Pacific Rim.

 

As the Houthis escalate aggression against merchant shipping in the Red Sea, regional navies have renewed their efforts to build operational coordination. Last week, the IMO-led Djibouti Code of Conduct/Jeddah amendment (DCoC/JA) launched a new working group with the aim to streamline naval cooperation in the region. DCoC/JA includes 21 member states in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. While the region hosts several international naval task forces including EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), participation of the regional navies has been limited.

Currently, the existing regional naval cooperation framework is under the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), an intergovernmental body based in Mauritius and representing interests of five western Indian Ocean island countries. Under the IOC’s maritime security framework, there are two regional centers, which have helped coordinate regional responses to maritime threats in the Western Indian Ocean. The first one is the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center (RMIFC) based in Madagascar. The other one is the Regional Coordination of Operations Center (RCOC) in Seychelles.

With the new working group, DCOC/JA hopes to scale the operations of these centers. “Remember that the countries served by the IOC regional centers are also members of the DCoC/JA. Therefore, the new working group will expand the mandate and allow for bigger operations extending to southern Red Sea,” said Kiruja Micheni, DCoC/JA Project Manager.

In addition, Kiruja noted that the international navies operating in the region are unable to prosecute suspects engaging in illegal maritime activities. For this reason, the enhanced regional approach seeks to have a legal finish for maritime crimes. Besides, the efforts of the international navies can only go so far without synergies with the regional partners in the Western Indian Ocean. 

Following the successful launch of the working group, Kenya and South Africa offered to lead fundraising efforts at the IMO (International Maritime Organization). The working group is scheduled to start holding regional naval exercises in the next three years.

This regional initiative comes at a time when maritime threats in the Western Indian Ocean are rising. It is almost 700 days into the ongoing Red Sea crisis, and arms trafficking has been reported to be on the rise in waters in the Gulf of Aden. Early this year, security agencies confirmed strengthening of relations between Al-Shabaab militia group in Somalia and Houthis in Yemen. If left unchecked, this has potential to further destabilize merchant shipping in the region. So far, the U.S Africa Command (AFRICOM) has conducted dozens of airstrikes in Somalia, mainly targeting the hideouts of ISIS-Somalia fighters in the Puntland region.

 

As the Houthis escalate aggression against merchant shipping in the Red Sea, regional navies have renewed their efforts to build operational coordination. Last week, the IMO-led Djibouti Code of Conduct/Jeddah amendment (DCoC/JA) launched a new working group with the aim to streamline naval cooperation in the region. DCoC/JA includes 21 member states in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. While the region hosts several international naval task forces including EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), participation of the regional navies has been limited.

Currently, the existing regional naval cooperation framework is under the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), an intergovernmental body based in Mauritius and representing interests of five western Indian Ocean island countries. Under the IOC’s maritime security framework, there are two regional centers, which have helped coordinate regional responses to maritime threats in the Western Indian Ocean. The first one is the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center (RMIFC) based in Madagascar. The other one is the Regional Coordination of Operations Center (RCOC) in Seychelles.

With the new working group, DCOC/JA hopes to scale the operations of these centers. “Remember that the countries served by the IOC regional centers are also members of the DCoC/JA. Therefore, the new working group will expand the mandate and allow for bigger operations extending to southern Red Sea,” said Kiruja Micheni, DCoC/JA Project Manager.

In addition, Kiruja noted that the international navies operating in the region are unable to prosecute suspects engaging in illegal maritime activities. For this reason, the enhanced regional approach seeks to have a legal finish for maritime crimes. Besides, the efforts of the international navies can only go so far without synergies with the regional partners in the Western Indian Ocean. 

Following the successful launch of the working group, Kenya and South Africa offered to lead fundraising efforts at the IMO (International Maritime Organization). The working group is scheduled to start holding regional naval exercises in the next three years.

This regional initiative comes at a time when maritime threats in the Western Indian Ocean are rising. It is almost 700 days into the ongoing Red Sea crisis, and arms trafficking has been reported to be on the rise in waters in the Gulf of Aden. Early this year, security agencies confirmed strengthening of relations between Al-Shabaab militia group in Somalia and Houthis in Yemen. If left unchecked, this has potential to further destabilize merchant shipping in the region. So far, the U.S Africa Command (AFRICOM) has conducted dozens of airstrikes in Somalia, mainly targeting the hideouts of ISIS-Somalia fighters in the Puntland region.

 

On Saturday, Microsoft confirmed that undersea cable cuts in the Red Sea may have increased delays for customers of its Azure cloud platform. Users with data passing through the Mideast - whether locally, in Asia or in Europe - temporarily experienced higher latency. 

In an update Sunday, the company said that the issues were resolved, and that its team was working to manage the effects of the situation by rerouting traffic through other channels. It cautioned that permanent repairs to the subsea links could be longer in coming. 

"Undersea fiber cuts can take time to repair, as such we will continuously monitor, rebalance, and optimize routing," the software giant said.

Internet traffic monitor NetBlocks reported that the disruption was located in the Red Sea, and the Pakistan Telecommunication Company narrowed the location to waters off the coast of Jeddah - roughly 400 nautical miles northwest of Houthi-controlled areas of western Yemen, the region of highest maritime security concern in the Red Sea. 

Accidental cable cuts happen routinely around the world, and private-sector commercial cable repair companies run a steady business dispatching cable ships to make repairs. The cuts attract more attention when they occur in areas of high geopolitical tension. Repeated cuts in the Taiwan Strait and the Baltic have resulted in vessel arrests and criminal charges for ship captains who are suspected of severing lines with their anchors - but proving intentional sabotage is difficult when the act of cutting a cable also occurs by accident, with frequency. 

The most recent cable damage incident in the Red Sea occurred in early 2024. Three cables were severed in February 2024, likely cut by the dragging anchor of the stricken bulker Rubymar. The ship drifted for weeks - abandoned and unassisted - after Houthi fighters hit it with an antiship missile.

90 percent of all international data traffic passes through subsea cables, and they are essential to the smooth functioning of commerce. That makes them a tempting target for saboteurs and spies: the cables are remote, difficult to monitor, and largely unprotected, especially in deep waters where they lie unburied on the bottom. Multiple nation-states are known to possess sophisticated capabilities for tampering with, cutting or destroying subsea cables - but in shallower waters, a dragged anchor is all that is needed.

 

[By Stacey Pizzino and Bryan G. Fry]

On September 2, 1945, the second world war ended when Japan officially surrendered. Today, on the 80th anniversary, the physical legacy of the conflict remains etched into land and sea.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Pacific. There, fierce battles left behind sunken warships, aircraft and unexploded bombs. These remnants are not only historical artifacts but toxic time capsules.

They leak fuel, heavy metals and other hazardous substances into fragile ecosystems, threatening biodiversity and, potentially, human health.

This problem is a reminder of the enduring environmental harms of conflict. Toxic remnants of war can damage ecosystems and communities long after the fighting stops.

The USS Astoria steams by USS Yorktown after the carrier was hit by three Japanese bombs in the Battle of Midway on June 4, 1942 (US Navy)

The Pacific as a dumping ground

World War II in the Pacific involved four years of conflict between Japan and Allied forces. The war began in the region in December 1941 when Japan attacked a United States naval base at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii.

The Pacific conflict included the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway and the Guadalcanal campaign in the Solomon Islands.

Pacific islands became staging grounds for battles. Weapons were stockpiled and hazardous material discarded. Ships and aircraft were sunk. When the war ended, much of this material was simply left behind.

Among the remains are an estimated 3,800 wrecks still lying on the Pacific Ocean floor.

An environmental hazard

As remnants of war degrade, they often leach toxic pollutants into nearby waters and soils. These can build up in marine life, enter the food chain and pose serious risks to both biodiversity.

At Palau, a WWII Japanese ship sank in Koror Harbour and became known as the Helmet Wreck. It contains Japanese depth charges leaking acid into surrounding waters.

Researchers have shown the long-term environmental impacts in the Baltic Sea of unexploded WWII ordnance – bombs, shells and grenades that failed to detonate. An estimated 3000kg of dissolved ammunition chemicals have been found.

Coral reefs and mangroves, which are vital for coastal protection, are especially vulnerable to both chemical exposure and physical damage.

For example, researchers examined the effects off Puerto Rico of unexploded ordnance. They found nearby sea animals contained potentially toxic compounds leaking from the ordnance, which meant the substances had entered the food web.

Remnants of war, such as this unexploded ordnance on a beach in the Solomon Islands, can pollute the surrounding area. Chris Teasdale, Author provided (no reuse)

Human communities on high alert

Unexploded ordnance continues to endanger communities. Just last year, for example, more than 200 bombs were found buried beneath a school in the Solomon Islands.

In places such as Palau, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, these dangers are unearthed regularly. They can be found by farmers working their land, children playing or fisherman working.

Buried bombs, sunken ships and downed aircraft often contain fuel and heavy metals. This includes lead and cadmium which can interfere with the body’s hormone system and cause serious health issues.

Research into the human health impacts of war remains is limited – especially in the Pacific. But existing studies suggest exposure is linked to serious consequences.

For example, parental exposure to wartime contaminants has been linked to birth defects in Gaza and Vietnam.

And a study of Britsh Army ammunition technicians released earlier this year found significantly higher rates of bladder cancer than the general population. This suggests occupational exposure to explosive compounds may pose long-term health risks.

Climate change is increasing the risk

As Earth’s climate warms, extreme weather events are worsening and seas are rising. This is exacerbating the dangers posed by wartime remnants.

For example Cyclone Pam, in March 2015, exposed unexploded WWII ordnance in Kiribati and Tuvalu. Further investigations revealed remnants including high explosive projectiles, mortars and 5,300 rounds of ammunition.

In 2020, a visiting fisherman found an unexploded bomb near Lord Howe Island. Then-Environment Minister Sussan Ley suggested the device may have been shifted by a cyclone or ocean currents.

Similarly, floods and landslides can move these hazards over significant distances, increasing uncertainty around their locations and complicating clearance efforts.

Rising sea levels are threatening to breach one of the Pacific’s most toxic legacies – the Runit Dome in the Marshall Islands. This concrete structure was built in the late 1970s to contain radioactive waste from US nuclear testing decades earlier.

Research shows extreme storms could increase radioactive sediments in the area to up to 84 times higher than normal. There are also concerns cracks in the dome’s surface could lead to contamination of surrounding waters.

In this 1978 photo from Runit Island, military personnel in protective clothing watch as concrete and soil is used to cover up a crater left by the US after it conducted nuclear tests decades earlier. Department of Defense/US Army

Reflecting on war’s toxic legacy

Despite the risks to people and health in the Pacific, remediation has been slow. The 80th anniversary of WWII offers an opportunity to reflect on the toxic legacy of war – and to act.

The scale of the problem demands coordinated, well-funded action. The work should not just remove dangerous materials, but restore damaged ecosystems and monitor long-term health impacts.

Some support has been offered. It includes Operation Render Safe, a program to remove war remnants led by the Australian Defence Force. But more is needed.

Regional partners – including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the United States – have a chance to lead. This means investing in environmental cleanup, supporting affected communities and acknowledging historical responsibility.

It also means listening to Pacific voices, who have long called for greater attention to the war’s toxic legacy. Their knowledge, resilience and lived experience must be central to any response.

Stacey Pizzino is a Lecturer at the School of Public Health, The University of Queensland.

Bryan G. Fry is a Professor of Toxicology, School of the Environment, The University of Queensland.

This article appears courtesy of The Conversation and can be found in its original form here. 

 

Last week, South Africa announced postponing a key naval exercise with China and Russia slated for November. This has been interpreted as a move to avoid the exercise coinciding with the G20 summit, scheduled in South Africa in the same month. U.S. Vice President JD Vance is expected to attend the summit. In the past few months, South Africa has been in the crosshairs of U.S. President Trump, stemming from policy differences. Last month, South African exports to the U.S. were slapped with a 30% tariff rate.

South Africa's Department of Defense explained that the decision to postpone the exercise was in view of the activities related to South Africa’s G20 Presidency. “The postponement is to ensure that the exercises do not impact on the logistical, security and other arrangements associated with South Africa’s G20 Presidency,” said Siphiwe Dlamini, DoD Head of Communication. South Africa took over G20 leadership in December last year and will be handing over to U.S. in November.

According to some defense analysts, it would have been baffling for South Africa to host a trilateral naval exercise with China and Russia alongside the G20 summit. The exercise (EX MOSI) is in third iteration and takes place every two years between the BRICS partners. South Africa said new dates for the postponed exercise will be announced, without mentioning specific timelines.

This year, the exercise was planned off South African waters in the Western Cape. While BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) alliance has focused on economic cooperation, the scope appears to be expanding to include defense. Last week, a briefing meeting for a proposed BRICS combined maritime exercise was held in Cape Town, South Africa.

The meeting brought together military leaders from BRICS partner countries, including Iran. Speaking to the press after the meeting, Captain Hassan Maghsoodloo, Commander of the First Naval District of Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, confirmed his combat naval units are likely to participate in the drill.

South Africa maintains that military exercises are an opportunity to strengthen its multilateral and bilateral relations. In the past few years, South Africa has participated in joint military exercises with countries such as Brazil, Germany, China and France. However, South Africa and the U.S. last month agreed to cancel the Shared Accord military exercise, which was planned in Free State province. “Unfortunately, South Africa’s Ministry of Defense and Veterans presented requirements deemed inconsistent with the agreements between our governments that U.S. DoD could not support,” said a diplomatic note from the U.S. Embassy in South Africa.

 

[By Sam Roggeveen]

Australia’s former prime minister Tony Abbott wrote in the Wall Street Journal recently that “a world dominated by Beijing would resemble China, with the silencing of dissent, the confiscation of wealth, and the brutal exercise of power.” It’s a dark but plausible vision, given Beijing’s treatment of its minorities, its sometimes-violent repression of dissent, the constant surveillance of its people, and its suppression of free speech. If China ever achieved world domination, it could certainly exercise its power the way Abbott describes.

However, what’s left out is a credible account of how China can achieve world domination in the first place. To believe in Abbott’s vision and muster the energy to resist Beijing, we first need to be convinced that there is a realistic path from the world we are in today to the prospect he is warning about.

Three other great powers – India, Russia and Japan – live in the same neighborhood as China and have a vital interest in ensuring that Beijing’s ambitions are permanently frustrated.

This remains a weak point in the more hawkish assessments about China’s ambitions, a lack of detail about how Beijing gets to world domination. One example (you can find others here) is a warning by Hal Brands from Johns Hopkins University, who argues that China threatens America’s way of government and could encourage its slide into autocracy:

If China were someday able to dominate East Asia after American retrenchment, it might gain the power to coerce the United States economically and diplomatically, even if it could never invade militarily. The proliferation of Chinese influence in regions around the world could gradually give Beijing powerful geopolitical and geo-economic advantages, rendering the United States insecure even within its hemispheric fortress. In the meantime, the international economic friction created by protectionism and chaos would drag down American growth, which could exacerbate social and political conflicts at home. And if democracy receded overseas and powerful autocracies advanced, autocratic voices within the United States might be empowered – as indeed happened in the 1930s.

Note the “ifs”, “coulds” and “mights” sprinkled throughout this passage – it takes a series of leaps to imagine a world in which China is so powerful that it can undermine American democracy. But note also that Brands acknowledges the unlikelihood of China ever being able to threaten the continental United States with overwhelming military force. The United States is too big, too powerful, and too far away to ever be vulnerable to Chinese invasion.

Expansive accounts of Chinese capabilities and intentions are not only light on detail, they also draw attention from more plausible and near-term concerns. As I have written in Foreign Policy this week, the military parade staged in Beijing unveiled new weapons systems that appear mostly to be dedicated to tasks in China’s near abroad rather than for a global military posture.

True, the People’s Liberation Army has developed a host of new capabilities to project military power far from home, as Australia discovered in February when a naval flotilla circumnavigated the continent. But the Beijing parade suggests that building a military to rival the United States as a global expeditionary force is far from Beijing’s top priority. Its real focus is to be powerful in the near neighborhood.

That’s bad news for Taiwan, and it is compounded by new assessments such as this one, featured in the latest issue of the journal International Security, arguing that the military balance between the United States and China has shifted so markedly in Beijing’s favor that it is becoming difficult to see how Washington could defend Taiwan.

It will also make life much more difficult for Southeast Asian countries on China’s periphery. China’s military weight, alongside the attraction of its huge economy, will incentivize the weaker countries of mainland Southeast Asia to preemptively bow to Beijing’s preferences. Indeed, we can already see the makings of a Chinese sphere of influence in Cambodia and Laos. Recent Lowy Institute research shows that China is now the leading partner for both countries in joint military exercises and other kinds of defense diplomacy.

Beyond its immediate neighbors, it is difficult to see how China could exercise dominance regionally, let alone globally. And that’s not just because of the United States; indeed, even in a post-American Asia, Chinese dominance seems a long shot. For one thing, China is surrounded by countries with which it has territorial disputes. Furthermore, much of modern Asia is founded on the struggle against colonialism and foreign domination. And finally, three other great powers – India, Russia and Japan – live in the same neighborhood as China and have a vital interest in ensuring that Beijing’s ambitions are permanently frustrated. For all these reasons, it is difficult to see the region meekly acquiescing to Chinese dominance.

In an era of receding US primacy in Asia, it is tempting to assume that the pendulum will swing to the other extreme. Real life is likely to be more complicated – and competitive – than that.

Sam Roggeveen is Program Director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program. He is the author of The Echidna Strategy: Australia’s Search for Power and Peace, published by La Trobe University Press in 2023.

This article appears courtesy of The Lowy Interpreter and may be found in its original form here. 

 

On Sunday, a migrant vessel collided with a Turkish coast guard vessel at high speed off the coast of Turkey, killing five people and wounding one more. 

The collision occurred off Ayvalik on Turkey's Aegean coast, near the island of Lesvos. According to the governorate of the Balikesir region, there were 34 people aboard the boat, including the operator, and all aboard went into the water. Five bodies were recovered during the ensuing search and rescue mission, and one injured individual was taken to a hospital for treatment.

The Turkish Coast Guard periodically rescues or interdicts migrants off the coast of Ayvalik, which is just eight nautical miles (at the narrowest point) from Greek soil, where migrants have access to EU asylum claim opportunities. In December, the Turkish Coast Guard rescued 57 irregular migrants in four inflatable boats in the area; in that instance, the survivors alleged that they had been pushed across the boundary line by the Hellenic Coast Guard, a sensitive contention often raised by human rights NGOs and hotly disputed by Greece.  

Migration on the Aegean route is less intensive than it once was, but it remains risky for those who take it. According to the Daily Sabah, two migrants were found dead last week on the beaches of Rhodes, opposite the Turkish port of Marmaris and another popular destination for migrants seeking a better life. 

 

A freighter has gone aground in the remote reaches of Canada's Northwest Passage, at a location in the southern half of the Central Canadian Archipelago.

According to local outlet Cabin Radio, the freighter Thamesborg was en route from China to Quebec when it grounded in Franklin Strait, just southeast of Prince of Wales Island. The central section of the Northwest Passage has two options - a northern route, often blocked by ice, and a southern route, which passes between Victoria Island and the mainland. Franklin Strait is one of the options for accessing this route. 

At 800 miles northeast of Yellowknife, Franklin Passage is exceptionally remote. A grounding in the distant waters of the Northwest Passage has been among the top concerns of Canadian SAR planners for years. Luckily, the operator of the Thamesborg reports that there has been no pollution due to the grounding, and the crew are all safe, according to Cabin Radio. 

AIS data provided by Pole Star Global shows that Thamesborg is aground on a shallow pinnacle on the southwest side of the strait. She is accompanied by two Canadian Coast Guard vessels, an unnamed CCG patrol vessel and the icebreaking buoy tender Sir Wilfred Laurier. Though intermittent cloud cover makes analysis difficult, satellite data from JPSS / RAMBB appears to show no ice in the area of the grounding. 

The Northwest Passage is known for the twin risks of shallow water and ice, and is prone to clogging with drifting floes even during the short shipping season. Many transits (including modern cruises) are done in smaller, shallower-draft vessels.

The largest vessel ever to transit the passage was the 1969 voyage of the 115,000 dwt tanker SS Manhattan, with extensive icebreaker support. The vessel made the transit in ballast both ways, at less than her full laden draft of 52 feet. The effort was not successfully repeated due to ice. 

 

In response to a concentration in the southern Caribbean of a substantial US Navy force, the Venezuelan Navy has reportedly deployed some of the Peykaap III Fast Attack Craft that Iran supplied it with several years ago.

The Venezuela Navy deployed Iranian-built Peykaap-III (Zolfaghar-class) fast attack craft equipped with CM-90 Anti-Ship Missiles (ASCM) supplied by Iran. pic.twitter.com/vc2aiSIKxI

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) September 6, 2025

One of three Venezuelan Peykaap Fast Attack Craft seen on the dockside at the Agustín Armario Naval Base in Puerto Cabello (https://x.com/i/status/1964133901049221184)

In April 2021, the Iranian Navy (Nedaja) logistics vessel IRINS Makran (K441) left Bandar Abbas, escorted by the Moudge Class frigate IRINS Sarhand (F74). Iranian official sources suggested that the flotilla was heading for Venezuela. Clearly visible on the deck of IRINS Makran as she left port were seven Peykaap fast patrol craft, a North Korean-derived type with a crew of three normally operated by the IRGC Navy where it is known sometimes as the Zolfaghar.

The flotilla rounded the Cape of Good Hope but was then spotted by the Danish Navy with the Peykaap fast patrol craft still on deck, en route to the Russian Navy 325th anniversary in St. Petersburg. It was not clear whether the Makran returned to Bandar Abbas with the Peykaaps still on board. But at some point, the boats were delivered to Venezuela, because the boats were on show during a naval parade in Venezuela in July 2023.

Iranian Warship Thought to be Headed to Venezuela Left Port with 7 High-Speed Missile Boats Aboard - USNI News

Image from @Maxarhttps://t.co/qt56vQXVda pic.twitter.com/MoGxhW6LFO

— U.S. Naval Institute (@NavalInstitute) June 1, 2021

IRINS Makran seen in Bandar Abbas Naval Harbor before its departure, with Peykaap Fast Attack Craft on deck

The Peykaaps in both Iranian and Venezuelan service are fitted with two launching tubes for Nasr anti-ship missiles, an Iranian-manufactured copy of the Chinese C-704 missile which has autonomous terminal guidance combining a TV-homing seeker and millimeter-wave radar. The export version of the Nasr-1 is known as the CM-90. The system has a range of 90 kilometers. Hezbollah used Nasr-1 to attack the Beit Lid military base in northern Israel on October 17, 2024. The Khowsar shorter-range missile from the same Eagle Strike missile family, known in Chinese service as the C-701, was used by Hezbollah to attack INS Hanit (503) off Lebanon in July 2006. Both Khowsar and Nasr-1s can be fired from the same missile boxes. Surprisingly, neither of these two types of missiles have yet been identified in use by the Houthis.

The Nasr-1/CM-90 is unlikely to pose a significant threat to US Navy warships, which will nonetheless need to be at general quarters when in zone. The Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Jason Dunham (DDG-109) and its sister ships have overlapping anti-missile systems, such as Sea Sparrow and Phalanx, to deal with both medium and close-range anti-missile systems.

However, the US naval force commander will have other options for neutralizing the threat well before the Peykaaps could get within Nasr-1 range. The Venezuelans have more potent weaponry available in the form of 100-kilometer range Kh-31A (AS-17 Krypton) anti-ship missiles; these can be fired from Venezuela’s remaining Su-30MK2V Flanker fighters, from a batch of 24 delivered by Russia in 2008.

 

[By Jim Halsell]

The Taiwan Strait remains one of the most volatile flashpoints in the world. With the People’s Republic of China (PRC) accelerating its coercive behavior aimed at “reunifying” Taiwan with the mainland, the United States must adopt a clearer, more deliberate strategy to bolster deterrence and reassure regional partners. One measure that should be taken is to include Taiwan in the world’s largest multinational maritime exercise – the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). Doing so would be consistent with U.S. policy under the Taiwan Relations Act, align with the values of collective defense and democratic solidarity, and signal to Beijing that any use of military force against Taiwan will result in a unified, multinational response.

Taiwan’s Strategic Significance

Taiwan occupies a central position in the First Island Chain and plays a crucial role in the balance of power in East Asia. It is a thriving democratic society of 23.4 million people and a key node in global semiconductor supply chains. Beijing’s claim to the island is tenuous, supported by a campaign of intimidation and “gray zone” tactics that aim to coerce Taiwan into capitulation without war.

Though lacking official recognition as an independent country by the United States and many of its allies, Taiwan is not isolated. U.S. policy, as codified in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), commits the United States to make available “defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,” and to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security” of the people of Taiwan. Inclusion in RIMPAC would help operationalize this policy while remaining consistent with the U.S. One China policy.

Why Include Taiwan?

Deterrence requires both capability and credibility. While Taiwan continues to acquire U.S. military hardware and reform its defense posture, the question of whether the United States and its allies would support Taiwan in a contingency remains deliberately ambiguous. Strategic ambiguity may help manage escalation risk, but it risks failing to deter if Beijing concludes that the costs of aggression are tolerable.

Involving Taiwan in RIMPAC would signal a broader multinational investment in regional peace. Beijing is pursuing two parallel lines of effort to pressure Taiwan: coercion without violence and the looming threat of military force. Both avenues can be countered through stronger integration with partners, transparent signaling, and public commitments to Taiwan’s survival as a free society.

The inclusion of Taiwan in RIMPAC would not require diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. RIMPAC has previously included diverse participants with some participating only as observers. Taiwan could be invited under a similar framework—e.g., “Taipei Navy—Observer”—that would align with RIMPAC precedent, and would not constitute formal U.S. recognition. It would, however, reinforce the deterrent message that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would not remain a bilateral issue between Washington and Beijing.

Reinforcing the Taiwan Relations Act

The TRA provides a clear legislative foundation for actions that enhance Taiwan’s defense and deter coercion. The Act affirms that “the United States will consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means…a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Participation in exercises like RIMPAC would help Taiwan prepare for defense without crossing the line into formal alliance, thereby avoiding a breach of the One China policy.

Congress continues to reaffirm bipartisan support for Taiwan’s self-defense. The FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes provisions to strengthen military cooperation and enhance deterrence through initiatives like the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative. Including Taiwan in exercises alongside Japan, Australia, and other regional partners would be a natural extension of these legislative efforts.

Operational and Symbolic Value

Beyond signaling, there are tangible military benefits. Taiwan’s military operates U.S.-made systems and is transitioning toward an asymmetric defense model, emphasizing survivability and denial. Interoperability with U.S. and allied forces, especially in joint maritime operations, will be essential in any scenario short of or including conflict.

As the Council on Foreign Relations notes, “Taiwan likely doesn’t have the capabilities to defend against a Chinese attack without external support,” despite pledging nearly $20 billion in defense spending for 2025. Enhancing operational coordination before a crisis emerges is not only prudent, but operationally essential.

Symbolically, inclusion in RIMPAC would acknowledge the democratic values that Taiwan shares with other regional partners. This is particularly important as Taiwan remains diplomatically isolated, with only eleven countries maintaining official relations. Participation in multinational military activities would help offset this isolation without provoking conflict, provided it is managed diplomatically and clearly communicated.

Would Other Nations Support Taiwan’s Inclusion in RIMPAC?

One of the central concerns surrounding Taiwan’s potential inclusion in RIMPAC is whether key U.S. allies and regional partners would support such a move or whether they would balk at the political risk of antagonizing the People’s Republic of China. However, recent geopolitical trends suggest that support for Taiwan’s participation in multinational defense activities is quietly growing, particularly among Indo-Pacific democracies that share an interest in preserving regional stability and resisting Chinese coercion.

Japan is perhaps the most likely partner to welcome Taiwan’s inclusion. Tokyo has become increasingly vocal about the importance of Taiwan to Japan’s national security, with senior officials, including former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, stating that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency.” Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have increased coordination with the U.S. military and have participated in bilateral and trilateral exercises that implicitly prepare for scenarios involving Taiwan. Given Japan’s growing anxiety over China’s assertiveness and its own constitutional reinterpretation on collective self-defense, Tokyo would likely support Taiwan’s inclusion in a multilateral setting like RIMPAC, especially if coordinated in advance with careful diplomatic messaging.

Australia has also strengthened its strategic alignment with the United States and Japan, particularly through the AUKUS agreement. Canberra has voiced concerns about China’s regional behavior and recently joined Washington in emphasizing the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. While Australia might be more cautious about formal diplomatic gestures, it is unlikely to oppose Taiwan’s participation in a non-sovereign capacity, especially if framed as a security-enhancing measure rather than a political endorsement.

Other Indo-Pacific states, such as India, Philippines, and Vietnam, have growing interests in counterbalancing Chinese maritime assertiveness. India has long advocated for a multipolar Asia and may view Taiwan’s inclusion as consistent with its own efforts to build regional coalitions. The Philippines, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has deepened security ties with the United States and allowed expanded access to military bases in response to PRC aggression in the South China Sea. Vietnam, while traditionally wary of foreign alignments, has clashed with China over maritime claims and may be open to Taiwan’s inclusion in an observer or limited functional role.

European states that have participated in recent RIMPAC iterations such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have also increasingly signaled concern over Taiwan’s security. They conducted transits of the Taiwan Strait, and their defense white papers mention the Indo-Pacific as a zone of strategic interest. While these countries may not be vocal advocates for Taiwan’s inclusion, they would be unlikely to withdraw or protest if the decision were led by the United States with appropriate multilateral coordination.

Ultimately, the determining factor may be how the invitation is framed. If Taiwan’s participation is defined not as a sovereign equal to other states but rather as a security partner or “participant entity,” other nations could find it diplomatically palatable. This would mirror Taiwan’s existing participation in multilateral forums such as the Olympics, the World Trade Organization and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, where it joins under the name “Chinese Taipei.”

RIMPAC’s Flexible Participation Model

RIMPAC’s long history as a multinational exercise underscores its diplomatic flexibility. Since its inception in 1971, RIMPAC has included a diverse array of participants, including states with varying degrees of political alignment with the United States, non-ally partners, and even, at times, strategic competitors. This precedent offers a viable pathway for Taiwan’s inclusion without triggering a fundamental break in U.S. policy or alienating key participants.

A notable example is the People’s Republic of China, which was invited to participate in RIMPAC in both 2014 and 2016. Despite growing tensions in the South China Sea and concerns about Chinese military transparency, the Obama administration included the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in an effort to promote professional military dialogue and reduce the risk of miscalculation. China sent surface combatants, auxiliary vessels, and observers to participate in non-combat aspects of the exercise. This inclusion was reversed in 2018 following the continued militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea, but the precedent remains: even states that do not share U.S. values or alliance structures have participated in RIMPAC under constrained formats.

Similarly, RIMPAC has welcomed non-allied or non-aligned states such as Vietnam, India, and Brunei, each of which participated in observer or limited operational capacities. These arrangements allowed for diplomatic inclusivity without compromising the exercise’s core focus on interoperability and security cooperation. India was first invited as an observer in the early 2000s before gradually expanding its participation, culminating in the deployment of naval assets by the 2010s. This incremental approach demonstrates RIMPAC’s capacity to accommodate partners with unique diplomatic statuses or sensitivities.

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), established under the Taiwan Relations Act as the vehicle for unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations, could serve as the conduit for managing Taiwan’s RIMPAC participation. AIT-coordinated representation would allow the United States to maintain consistency with its One China policy while exercising its commitment to Taiwan’s self-defense.

Managing PRC Backlash

Inevitably, Beijing would likely respond harshly to Taiwan’s inclusion in RIMPAC, as it has to other perceived infringements on its sovereignty claims. Large-scale military drills, economic sanctions, diplomatic condemnation, and cyber operations are all part of the PRC’s well-established retaliation playbook. Yet the United States and its partners must resist the temptation to let their Taiwan policy be dictated by fears of PRC outrage. This reactive posture grants Beijing a de facto veto over democratic decision-making and emboldens further coercion.

China has escalated its pressure campaign on Taiwan even in the absence of provocations. Since the election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, Beijing has employed what Richard Bush calls “coercion without violence,” a deliberate campaign to wear down Taiwan psychologically, politically, and economically without firing a shot.3 This has included near-daily air and naval incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), cyberattacks on government agencies, diplomatic isolation, and targeted disinformation campaigns.

These actions have continued even as Taiwan’s leadership has treaded cautiously. President Tsai’s tenure was marked by efforts to maintain the cross-Strait status quo and avoid unilateral declarations of independence. Her successor, President Lai Ching-te, has pledged to do the same, calling for “dialogue instead of confrontation” in his 2024 inauguration address. Nevertheless, Beijing has continued to characterize Lai as a “separatist” and launched punitive military exercises following both his inauguration and Taiwan’s National Day celebrations.

This pattern reveals a key truth: Beijing’s escalatory behavior is not a response to specific actions by Taipei or Washington, but part of a long-term strategy to bring Taiwan under PRC control. As such, restraint has not yielded peace; resolve may. Integrating Taiwan into multinational military exercises like RIMPAC would impose reputational and strategic costs on Beijing’s aggression by signaling that Taiwan’s security is a shared interest among responsible stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

Ultimately, deterrence fails when adversaries perceive inaction as weakness. Taiwan’s participation in multinational exercises is not merely symbolic. It is a necessary step to ensure that coercion is met with collective resolve. The message to Beijing must be unmistakable: the democratic world will not stand by while one of its own is bullied into submission.

It is time for the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies to move from passive deterrence to active deterrence. The inclusion of Taiwan in RIMPAC would send an unmistakable message to Beijing: any aggression against Taiwan risks triggering a multilateral response from a network of regional powers united by shared values and interests. Including Taiwan in RIMPAC would fulfill the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act, enhance deterrence, and stand as a visible affirmation of America’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Lieutenant Commander James Halsell is a submarine warfare officer. His most recent assignment at sea was engineer officer on board the USS Topeka (SSN-754). He is the Federal Executive Fellow at the U.S. Naval Institute, and a doctoral student at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, researching the potential impact of deep-seabed mining on maritime sovereignty assertions.

[By: ABB]

ABB and shipping company Wallenius Marine have formally established a new joint venture based in Stockholm, Sweden, to expand their OVERSEA™ collaboration and ensure customers will fully benefit from future-proof vessel performance management capabilities. 

Launched in September 2022 as a collaboration between ABB and Wallenius Marine, OVERSEA™ is a combined digital solution and ‘fleet-support-center-as-a-service’ offering designed to help ship owners, operators, and managers enhance the efficiency and sustainability of maritime operations. OVERSEA™ leverages ABB’s significant expertise in ship technologies and the extensive fleet management knowledge from Wallenius Marine to enable measurable performance improvements. The solution leverages ABB Genix™ Industrial IoT and AI Suite, which integrates the power of industrial analytics and artificial intelligence into an enterprise-grade digital suite.

The solution collects and analyzes data on board of several vessels worldwide, with shore-based experts providing advanced decision-making support and tailored recommendations from the OVERSEA™ Fleet Support Center in Stockholm. As a result, operators are able to propose operational changes that can reduce fuel consumption and emissions while optimizing safety and reliability across their fleets.

“Our long-standing tradition of innovation and pioneering spirit is built on many years of experience in ship operations and advanced technical expertise. This makes us well equipped to quickly identify and respond to industry needs. Through our partnership and close collaboration with ABB, we can now bring our innovative fleet support service to a global market, and we look forward to continuing to drive maritime development together," says Johan Mattsson, CEO of Wallenius Marine.

“The establishment of the OVERSEA™ joint venture marks a significant milestone for us, solidifying the successful collaboration between ABB and Wallenius Marine over the past few years,” said Tomas Arhippainen, Business Line Manager, Marine Service & Digital, ABB Marine & Ports. “With OVERSEA™, customers can transform data into actionable insights, enabling them to not only improve their performance but also sustain it over time. Consequently, both vessels and customer offices can adopt sustainable improvements, enhancing energy efficiency, safety, and reliability.”

Austal Limited announces that the United States Coast Guard has exercised options worth US$314 million (A$480 million) with Austal USA for the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program.

The contract options approve Austal to order long lead time materials (LLTM) for another three OPCs, Austal USA’s 4th, 5th, and 6th cutters. Funds have also been provided for logistic supply items for two OPCs.

The original OPC contract was awarded to Austal USA in June 2022 for detail design and construction of up to 11 OPCs, with a potential value of US$3.3 billion. To date, two of 11 OPCs in the contract have been awarded to Austal USA, as well as LLTM for a third (see ASX announcement 6 August 2025).

“These early awards reflect the strong partnership that has quickly developed between the Coast Guard and Austal USA teams, and provide an important sign of intent for OPCs 3-6,” said Austal CEO Paddy Gregg.

Work on Austal USA’s first OPC, Pickering (WMSMS 919), is well underway with the keel laying planned for December. Construction began on Icarus (WMSMS 920) in early August.

The 110 metre OPCs will support US national security strategy by maintaining the nation’s economic, social, environmental and military security mission areas. The OPC will typically conduct its primary missions beyond 12 nautical miles from shore and will be employed anywhere US national interests require the Coast Guard’s unique blend of authorities and capabilities. OPC will provide the majority of the Coast Guard’s offshore presence conducting a variety of missions including law enforcement, drug and migrant interdiction, and search and rescue.

With a range of 10,200 nautical miles at 14 knots and a 60-day endurance period, each OPC will be capable of deploying independently or as part of task groups, serving as a mobile command and control platform for surge operations such as hurricane response, mass migration incidents and other events. The cutters will also support Arctic objectives by helping regulate and protect emerging commerce and energy exploration in Alaska.
 

[By: Metal Shark]

The Dominican Navy has received its second 85’ x 19.5’ welded aluminum Near Coastal Patrol Vessel (NCPV), built by Louisiana, USA-based boat builder Metal Shark.

Christened ARCTURUS CG-114 in keeping with the Dominican tradition of naming military vessels after constellations and celestial bodies, the new patrol craft was built at Metal Shark’s Franklin, Louisiana shipyard and officially incorporated into the Dominican Navy during a ceremony at the Port of Sans Soucí on August 31st. The delivery of ARCTURUS CG-114 follows the delivery of the Dominican Navy’s BETELGEUSE CG-102 in 2020.

The vessel was acquired by the Dominican Republic under a $54 million U.S. Navy Foreign Military Sales contract awarded to Metal Shark to produce up to thirteen 85-foot Defiant-class patrol craft for U.S. partner nations in support of regional defense initiatives. ARCTURUS CG-114 is the seventh NCPV to be delivered.

The NCPV is a monohull vessel utilizing the parent-craft hull form of Damen Shipyards’ 2606 Standardized Patrol vessel, which has been significantly optimized by Metal Shark to suit the requirements of the NCPV mission.

The ARCTURUS CG-114 will strengthen maritime surveillance and control of the Dominican Republic’s jurisdictional waters, expanding its response capacity to combat drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal fishing, and transnational organized crime, while also conducting search and rescue operations at sea.

Powered by twin 1,600-horsepower Caterpillar C-32 marine diesel engines turning fixed-pitch Michigan Wheel propellers through Twin Disc MGX-6599 transmissions, the NCPV achieves speeds in excess of 25 knots. The vessel has been designed for missions of up to six days at sea, supporting an operating crew of ten.

To maximize versatility, the NCPV carries a 5.6-meter Metal Shark-built aluminum RIB, powered by twin 50-horsepower Mercury four-stroke outboards. The RIB may be quickly deployed and recovered via an integrated stern slipway in support of missions.

“Metal Shark is honored to deliver the second Near Coastal Patrol Vessel (NCPV) to the Dominican Republic,” said Henry Irizarry, Senior Vice President of International Business Development at Metal Shark. “This delivery represents a strategic milestone in strengthening the Dominican Navy’s ability to protect its maritime domain, counter illicit trafficking, and ensure regional security. The NCPV reflects Metal Shark’s enduring partnership and commitment to advancing shared defense and security interests, reinforcing the strong ties between our nations as we work together to safeguard critical coastal and economic resources.”

“The NCPV program is a testament to Metal Shark’s ability to consistently produce rugged and reliable offshore military platforms designed to meet a complex set of mission requirements and built to rigorous NAVSEA standards,” said Metal Shark CEO Chris Allard. “With multiple NCPVs now patrolling the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Central America and additional units under construction, Metal Shark is proudly supporting those who serve and protect across the entire region.” Metal Shark specializes in the design and construction of welded aluminum vessels from 16’ to over 200’ for military, law enforcement, and commercial operators. Key customers include US and foreign militaries, law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and other clients worldwide. With two fully self- contained production facilities and an unmanned systems development facility in Louisiana, USA; a research, design, and testing facility in Alabama, USA; and a dedicated engineering facility in Croatia, Metal Shark’s 400+ employees produce over 200 vessels per year with a proud and proven track record of high quality, on-time deliveries.

[By: National Association of Waterfront Employers]

The National Association of Waterfront Employers (NAWE) is calling on Congress to include the bipartisan “Strengthening American Maritime Dominance Act” (H.R. 3842) in the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This critical measure would expand the Capital Construction Fund (CCF) to allow U.S. marine terminal operators (MTOs) to upgrade critical cargo handling equipment—modernizing port infrastructure at no cost to taxpayers.

With operations at 16 of the 17 U.S. defense strategic seaports, NAWE member companies are vital to the nation’s strategic sealift. Including this proposal in the NDAA will not only modernize critical port infrastructure but also allow the industry to safely and securely transition away from cargo handling equipment produced in China.

“Ports and the marine terminal companies that operate at our ports are the backbone of our supply chain and economy. Expanding the CCF will ensure that private marine terminal operators can reinvest in safer, cleaner, and more efficient equipment—strengthening America’s ports, boosting domestic manufacturing, and enhancing national security,” said NAWE President Carl Bentzel.

Under the proposed expansion, private MTOs could defer taxes and reinvest those funds into new or replacement cargo handling equipment. The legislation includes strong Buy America provisions and bans the purchase of equipment manufactured in China using CCF funds, ensuring investments support U.S. jobs, industry, and workforce safety.

Modernizing port infrastructure is critical to preventing future supply chain disruptions–like those seen during the COVID-19 crisis—and to ensuring a responsive delivery system that sustains U.S. military operations abroad. Allowing private reinvestment through the CCF will stimulate economic growth, create jobs, and support resilient trade operations without additional taxpayer burden.

NAWE recently outlined its support for the legislation in a letter to House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee leaders. That letter can be found here.

Germany’s Ernst Russ is moving forward with its first newbuild orders in years, an innovative pair of feeder containerships specially designed for Iceland’s Eimskip and the challenges of the North Atlantic. The companies report that the design incorporates future technology while also being specifically designed with customer service needs in mind.

The project builds on a partnership between the companies and provides a financial structure to support the newbuild effort. The joint-venture company ElbFeeder, majority owned by Ernst Russ, has signed the contract to build the two vessels with China Merchants Jin Ling Shipyard (Nanjing), while the board of Eimskip approved a 10-year time-charter. 

“This investment will be a milestone for Ernst Russ, marking our first newbuild investment in decades,” said Joseph Schuchmann, Co-CEO and Chief Commercial Officer of Ernst Russ. “We are delighted to be able to implement it together with our long-standing partner Eimskip, who will also function as the initial long-term charterer and thus contributes significantly to the financial viability of the project.”

Due for delivery in the second half of 2028, the vessels will be 185 meters (607 feet) in length with a capacity of 2,280 TEU. They will be the largest vessels in Eimskip’s operation and will be used on the company’s Blue Line sailing between Reykjavik and Rotterdam as well as Teesport in the UK.

“We see great opportunities with the delivery of these new vessels, especially considering the ambitious plans to increase exports of fresh seafood and salmon,” said Vilhelm Mar Thorsteinsson, CEO of Eimskip. He notes that the time-charter in combination with the newbuilding contract enables Eimskip to future-proof its Iceland-Europe trade, while ElbFeer secures long-term revenues.

 

The new ships use advanced designs suited to the North Atlantic (Eimskip)

 

The vessels were designed for the demanding conditions of North Atlantic routes in collaboration with the Shanghai Merchant Ship Design and Research Institute (SDARI). Their optimized hull structure has been engineered to enhance hydrodynamic performance, enabling higher service speeds and maneuverability while maintaining fuel efficiency and operational reliability, ideal for the conditions in the North Atlantic. 

In addition to the design supporting service speed in an efficient way, they report that the focus is also on optimal energy utilization, including hull design, silicone coating, shore power connection, and other equipment selection. The vessels will also feature a dual-fuel propulsion system, methanol- and LNG-ready.

ElbFeeder currently operates a fleet of seven container vessels. The newbuilds will increase the fleet to nine, and options for two additional vessels were negotiated. Eimskip operates a total fleet of 14 vessels, while Ernst Russ manages a fleet of 26 vessels with a focus on smaller containerships, as well as bulkers and multipurpose vessels.

[By: Höegh Autoliners]

Höegh Autoliners today celebrated the naming of its sixth Aurora-Class vessel in commercial operation at Sweden’s leading port and the largest in the Nordic region. The vessel was sponsored by Jenny Westermark, Senior Vice President, GTO Production Logistics at Volvo Group, who performed the traditional bottle-breaking. An array of sustainable Volvo Group cargo provided a spectacular showpiece for the proceedings.

With a capacity of 9,100 car equivalent units (CEU), the Höegh Moonlight joins Höegh Autoliners’ flagship series of 12 next-generation pure car and truck carriers (PCTCs).  The Aurora Class plays a central role in the company's ambition to reach zero emissions by 2040. All are classed by DNV and fly the Norwegian flag. The fifth sister vessel, the Höegh Sunrise, was named at Omaezaki Port in Japan in June this year.

CEO of Höegh Autoliners, Andreas Enger, commented: “The naming of Höegh Moonlight demonstrates our strong commitment to decarbonising deep-sea shipping – not in the future, but right now, today. These vessels are not concepts; they are working, sailing answers to one of the most urgent challenges in our industry. I would like to thank Jenny Westermark for graciously sponsoring the vessel.”

“The partnership between Höegh Autoliners and Volvo Group is not just a business alliance. It’s a shared commitment – a joint force – to drive real, lasting change in our industries,” Westermark added.

SETTING INDUSTRY STANDARD
Built for a low-carbon future, the Aurora Class is the most technically advanced and environmentally friendly series of car carriers ever constructed. All 12 vessels are designed from the keel up to transition to clean fuels, with the first eight powered by LNG via dual-fuel engines. They are also “ammonia-ready” with reinforced decks and an integrated tank developed by TGE Marine at the heart of the design, allowing for straightforward conversion to be able to run on clean ammonia in the future. The final four units in the Aurora newbuilding programme, scheduled for delivery from 2027, are dual-fuel vessels able to operate on ammonia from day one. The eight first dual-fuel LNG powered vessels are estimated to deliver 58% lower emissions per transported car compared to the industry average.

Höegh Autoliners COO Sebjørn Dahl said: “The Höegh Moonlight reflects the transformation we are leading across the maritime sector. From the speed of delivery to the scale of innovation onboard, these vessels demonstrate what can be achieved when ambition meets action. We are grateful to our partners, crew and global team for making this possible – together, we're building more than vessels, we're helping to shape a cleaner, smarter future for global trade.”

Oskar Orstadius, CSO at Höegh Autoliners, added: “The naming of the Höegh Moonlight marks more than the arrival of a vessel; it's a celebration of our close collaboration with key customers and our shared commitment to sustainable, high-quality transport solutions. We are proud to strengthen these partnerships in a port that plays an important role in our global network, and we would also like to express our sincere appreciation to our agent in Sweden, Scandinavian Shipping and Logistics, who has represented Höegh Autoliners with dedication for more than 20 years.”

GREEN PORT STRATEGY
Port of Gothenburg CEO Göran Eriksson notes that Höegh Autoliners' traffic at the port plays a vital role in enabling Swedish industry to access global markets. "With the introduction of these new Höegh vessels, that connection can now be made in an even more efficient and climate-smart way than before. The Port of Gothenburg is committed to becoming a leading bunkering hub for alternative fuels in Northern Europe, and Höegh stands as a strong example of a frontrunner showing that our initiatives as a port are moves in the right direction.”

By 2030, the port aims to reduce carbon emissions by 70%, at sea, in the terminal areas and on land. The transition is being carried out in close collaboration with industry, policymakers and academia, with a strong focus on creating sustainable value chains for a thriving society and strengthening business access to global markets. Key components of this effort include investments in shoreside power, green shipping corridors, electrification and the fuels of the future, all driven by close cooperation with stakeholders across the entire transport chain.

Höegh Moonlight key facts
YEAR BUILT: 2025
DWT: 25,200
GT: 83,687
CARGO CAPACITY: 9,100 CEU
FLAG: NORWEGIAN
MAX DECK HEIGHT: 6.5 M
MAX DOOR WIDTH: 19 M
MAX RAMP: 375 MT
LENGTH OVER ALL: 199.90 M
BREADTH (MLD): 37.8 M

[By: Med Marine]

Turkey’s leading shipbuilder and tug operator, MED MARINE, proudly announces the successful launch of the MED-A2800SD tug on August 23, marking the third vessel in the six-unit RAmparts 2800 series ASD (Azimuth Stern Drive) fleet being built for Tunisia’s renowned port authority, OMMP. The launch, held at MED MARINE’s EREGLI SHIPYARD, underscores the steady progress of this fleet project and further strengthens the partnership established under the prestigious contract signed between OMMP and MED MARINE.

Measuring 28.20 meters in length and delivering a forward bollard pull of 60 tonnes, the MED-A2800SD tug has been engineered by the internationally renowned naval architecture firm Robert Allan Ltd. to meet the rigorous demands of modern port operations. Powered by twin medium-speed diesel engines and fully compliant with Class FIFI-E standards, the tug ensures both operational excellence and safety.

Thanks to its optimized hull design, the MED-A2800SD tug delivers exceptional manoeuvrability, stability, and fuel efficiency, even under the most demanding harbour conditions. Capable of performing a wide range of operations—including towing, mooring, escorting, firefighting, pollution control, and coastal support—this vessel exemplifies MED MARINE’s commitment to providing reliable and versatile assets for international operators.

This milestone represents a key advancement in the six-vessel fleet program, reaffirming MED MARINE’s ability to deliver world-class tugboats on schedule while maintaining the highest standards of quality. The launch of the RAmparts 2800 series tug highlights the ongoing progress of the project and OMMP’s strategic vision to strengthen its towing capabilities with future-ready assets.

Technical specifications of the tugboat:
Length: 28.20 m
Beam: 11.50 m
Depth: 5.49 m
Draft: 5.40 m
Gross Tonnage: 428
Bollard Pull: 60 tons
Speed: 12 knots @ 80% MCR
Crew: 8

[By: Panama Maritime Authority]

President José Raúl Mulino met with more than 40 representatives of shipping companies from Japan’s Kanto region, where he presented Panama’s new ship registry strategy aimed at safeguarding its global leadership through enhanced safety standards and fully digitalized processes.

Mulino emphasized that Panama’s registry is positioning itself as the flag of the future, driven by new policies aligned with international benchmarks for safety, efficiency, and environmental protection.

The stakes are high for Japan: 7 out of 10 Japanese shipowners already fly the Panamanian flag, and 41% of Japan’s total tonnage is registered under Panama. For Panama, consolidating its role as Japan’s preferred registry is vital, as 66% of new shipbuilding comes from the Japanese market.

Reflecting on the registry’s long history dating back to the 1920s, Mulino stressed that unlike other registries, Panama’s flag is not a maritime franchise but a national emblem backed by the full weight of the state. He also revealed that his administration is pushing forward a comprehensive modernization plan for the registry, framed within a broader maritime and logistics strategy that integrates the Canal and Panama’s port system. “This plan will bring together our entire maritime cluster under what we now call the National Maritime Strategy—the future of our country,” Mulino declared, pledging to see this project through during his presidency. He underscored his vision of a more flexible Maritime Authority and registry that provides streamlined, user-friendly services. “You can count on Panama’s registry to continue working in favor of the global maritime community, especially Japan,” Mulino told the gathered shipowners.

Joining him were Panama Maritime Authority (PMA) Administrator Luis Roquebert and Merchant Marine Director Ramón Franco, both of whom reinforced the president’s message.

“Panama has been the world’s natural bridge since ancient times. The creation of our Ship Registry in the early 20th century, alongside the construction of the Canal, positioned the Isthmus as a global benchmark in ship registration—changing the course of maritime history,” Roquebert noted.

He highlighted that the PMA has successfully diversified its services, now offering integrated solutions in over 50 countries. “Thanks to our broad network of partners and our expertise, we provide unmatched technical, legal, and diplomatic support,” Roquebert said.

For his part, Merchant Marine Director Ramon Franco presented “The Panamanian Ship Registry: Renewing Our Strategy for a New Era,” outlining Panama’s new direction and the competitive advantages it offers.

He explained that the Mulino administration’s guiding principle is quality over quantity,
focusing on:

• A safer fleet and significant accident reduction.
• 100% digital, streamlined processes.
• A younger fleet, with active policies to phase out high-risk vessels.
• Rigorous inspections and enhanced pre-checks to ensure only compliant ships fly Panama’s flag.
• Trust from industry leaders—Japanese shipowners choose Panama because its security and reputation protect both investments and cargo.

Franco also underlined Panama’s pioneering role as the first registry to enforce mandatory traceability for ship-to-ship (STS) transfers, part of a strategy to modernize the fleet by gradually phasing out older tonnage and aligning with the IMO’s decarbonization goals for 2050.

As of August 25, 2025, Panama’s ship registry includes 8,812 vessels totaling 241.5 million gross tons (GT), according to IHS Markit—representing 14% of the global fleet, based on Clarksons Research’s World Fleet Monitor.

Franco reported that the new strategy is already delivering results: fewer accidents and a 13% increase in newbuilding registrations compared to the previous year. He closed by reminding Japanese shipowners that Panama’s registry offers more than just a flag—it comes with the full backing of a country that provides political and economic stability, a robust banking system, special economic zones, investment incentives, world-class logistics hubs, and, of course, the Panama Canal.

Nearly two years after the project was unveiled, construction started today in China for what is likely to become the world’s first ammonia-fueled containership. The project, which is being led by CMB.TECH, as part of its efforts to accelerate the transition in the shipping industry, will launch a vessel that they report will transform short-sea shipping and demonstrate the potential of ammonia as a low-emission fuel.

The vessel, which is named Yara Eyde, is being built in China the Qingdao Yangfang Shipbuilding and will be a 1,400 TEU ice-class containership optimized for operations between Norway and Germany. The vessel will be owned by Delphis, the container division of CMB.TECH and operated by NCL Oslofjord, a joint venture between North Sea Container Line and Yara Clean Ammonia. The Norwegian Government, through its Enova Investment Fund, provided approximately $3.6 million in grants to the project.

Today, September 5, marked the first day of steel cutting for the vessel. The companies previously said delivery is scheduled for mid-2026.

“This is more than the start of a ship – it is the start of a new chapter in maritime decarbonization,” said Hans Olav Raen, CEO of Yara Clean Ammonia. “Yara Eyde embodies our ambition to make low-emission ammonia a reality for shipping and to inspire the industry toward solutions that reduce emissions.”

So far, ammonia-fueled shipping has mostly been a few pilot projects as the leading engine manufacturers work to perfect their first offerings and complete certification. The industry is also awaiting the finalization of regulations and is still working to develop the fueling infrastructure and safety protocols for ammonia, which is highly toxic.

The potential for ammonia as one of the fuels to address decarbonization, however, has created strong anticipation in the shipping industry. While there are only three vessels currently in service with ammonia as their primary fuel, an offshore supply vessel and two tugboats, there are now 39 ammonia-fueled vessels on order for delivery over the next four years, according to data from DNV.

Yara Eyde is set to operate on a route between Oslo, Porsgrunn, Bremerhaven, and Rotterdam. NCL will manage the commercial operations. Yara Clean Ammonia will deliver ammonia fuel to the vessel, while Yara International has entered into a contract for shipping containers between Yara’s fertilizer plant in Porsgrunn, Norway, and Hamburg and Bremerhaven in Germany.

In addition to being a demonstration of the potential for ammonia-fueled operations, the goal is to use the ship to drive investment and build industry support for the infrastructure and adoption of ammonia technology.

“Yara, NCL, and CMB.TECH are walking the talk to decarbonise shipping by combining our know-how on clean ammonia, operational excellence in the North Sea, and state-of-the-art low-carbon ships,” said Alexander Saverys, CEO of CMB.TECH in 2023, announcing the project. “We want to prove to the world that we can decarbonise today to navigate tomorrow.”