In recent days, the Taiwan Straits has been busy with allied warships.

Hobart Class destroyer HMAS Brisbane (DDG-41) and Halifax Class frigate HMCS Ville de Québec (FFH-332) transited the Straits on September 6.  A People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command spokesman objected to the transit in the normal manner, and said that the naval movements had been monitored.

While the transit was occurring, the Royal Navy carrier HMS Prince of Wales (R09), having completed a five-day port visit to Tokyo, sailed northwards along Japan’s eastern seaboard with HMS Dauntless (D33) and into the Sea of Japan, then southwards to commence a series of exercises with South Korean Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin Class destroyer ROKS Gang Gam-chan (DDH-979), minelayer ROKS Nampo (MLS-570) and Soyang Class fast combat support ship ROKS Soyang (AOE-51). 

As this activity was winding up in the Sea of Japan on September 8, two ships from Russia’s Pacific Fleet based in Vladivostok, the flagship Slava Class cruiser RFS Varyag (D001 and the Steregushchiy Class corvette RFS Gromkiy (F335) were heading in the opposite direction, leaving the area through the Soya Strait off northern Hokkaido, and then cruising through the Sea of Okhotsk into the northern Pacific.

The Australian and Canadian innocent passage was followed up by Arleigh Burke Class destroyer USS Higgins (DDG-76) and Type 23 frigate HMS Richmond (F239) also transiting the Taiwan Straits on September 12. There had been some speculation in the British press that Foreign Minister David Lammy, to avoid upsetting the Chinese, had vetoed the passage of HMS Richmond, to the consternation of the Ministry of Defence - but Lammy was replaced as foreign minister a week before the transit took place.

The carrier strike group led by HMS Prince of Wales is now on its long return journey to Portsmouth. On its outward deployment, the CSG passed through the Middle East region during a short-lived lull. On its return, the CSG is likely to have to contend with a more complex security situation. But the CSG commander can feel reassured that his command is operationally at peak efficiency, after continuous training at sea with allies since it left Portsmouth in April.

 

A brand new Russian fishing vessel broke down near the strategic southern entrance of the Oresund over the weekend, drifting in the sea lanes and attracting the attention of NATO member security forces.  

The crab vessel Mechanic Stepanov was built at Otradnoye Shipyard on the Neva River, and it received its RS class certification on September 4. No problems were identified in inspections and sea trials, and the vessel was cleared to depart for the long voyage to its home port in the Kuril Islands.  

The Stepanov got under way from St. Petersburg last Wednesday, but did not make it very far before running into trouble. The crab boat transited westbound through the Baltic and then suffered a blackout on Saturday night, reportedly due to a mechanical casualty. AIS data shows that the Stepanov was adrift in a busy shipping lane at the entrance to the Oresund for an extended period before going to anchor. 

Given heightened tensions between Russia and NATO - and previous incidents in the Baltic and the Danish Straits - a security response from NATO members was inevitable. Photos captured by observer Christian Panton show the Latvian Navy minesweeper LNVS Virsaitis (A53) responding to the scene, along with the Danish patrol boat Bopa (MHV 911). 

Swedish outlet Aftonbladet received an unconfirmed report that the crew of the fishing vessel requested a port of refuge in Sweden and were turned down, though this narrative was disputed by the authorities. After regaining power, Mechanic Stepanov transited north with a security escort and returned to its commercial voyage. 

 

The Philippines' western allies are lining up to voice opposition to China's plan to declare an "environmental zone" around Scarborough Shoal, a land feature in the Philippine EEZ that China has occupied since 2012. Manila views the declaration as a pretext, designed to extend Chinese sovereignty over Philippine territory, and a new excuse to allow the China Coast Guard to refuse access for Philippine artisanal fishermen. The news may be especially concerning for the Philippines given a reported buildup of up-armed Chinese patrol boats around Scarborough in recent weeks. 

On Sept. 10, China's State Council declared a new "National Nature Reserve" covering waters in and around Scarborough Shoal. While a compelling policy choice in its own right, China's ability to declare any special maritime zone in the area is in question. The Chinese mainland is more than 450 nautical miles away from Scarborough Shoal, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague rejected China's claim to waters within the Philippine EEZ nine years ago. Among many other findings, the court specifically ruled against China's attempts to close off access to Scarborough Shoal for Philippine fishermen. China has ignored the ruling and maintains that it has sovereign ownership over most of the South China Sea, citing the history of Chinese commerce in the area and a much-contested interpretation of UNCLOS' "straight baseline" clause. 

"The irony is clear: since 2016, evidence has shown large-scale harvesting of endangered species and reef destruction by Chinese fishermen," Philippine National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano said in a statement. "To now claim stewardship over an ecosystem that they themselves has damaged is both contradictory and misleading."

Beijing's "nature reserve" plans drew immediate opposition from the Philippine government. On Friday, Manila filed a diplomatic protest - the latest of many - to voice its objections to new infringements on Philippine sovereignty. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio joined the Philippines' objections, calling the Chinese declaration "another coercive attempt to advance sweeping territorial and maritime claims." The U.S. is a treaty ally of the Philippines, and has basing arrangements on Luzon and Palawan. 
 

 

[By Sam Goldsmith]

Autonomous submarines that Australia has launched into production are likely to relieve operational pressure on the country’s crewed submarines, undertake the most dangerous undersea missions, and present an enemy with greater risk of detection and attack.

While the government and builder Anduril are saying little about specific technology built into the submarines, called Ghost Sharks, some features are clearly probable or even certain, at least when the design is fully developed. Likely missions include communications and radar intelligence, detecting ships and other submarines, and laying mines.

The AUD$1.7 billion, five-year contract announced on September 10 would cover production of a first batch of dozens of Ghost Sharks, with entry into service early in 2026, the government said. The money would also pay for maintaining the submarines in service and for further development of the design.

‘This is the leading capability in the world in terms of a long-range autonomous underwater capability,’ Defence Minister Richard Marles told reporters. Specifications are undisclosed, but the all-electric Ghost Sharks are evidently less than 12 meters long, in at least one configuration, and displace less than 100 tonnes. The six crewed submarines of Australia’s Collins class are 78 meters long and displace 3,100 tonnes.

Launch of full-rate production follows a development program in which Anduril, working with the Royal Australian Navy and Defence agencies, built three prototypes ahead of schedule and within budget. ‘Ghost Shark will continue to evolve, as it must, with new payloads, new weapons, smarter autonomy and adapting to the emerging threats,’ said David Goodrich, chief executive of Anduril Asia-Pacific.

An obvious role for Ghost Sharks is the traditional submarine function of collecting communications and radar intelligence, in which a boat loiters in a place suitable for receiving signals and sticks an antenna above the water to do so. Submarines are valuable for this role because they can covertly carry their receivers close to a foreign transmitter to pick up weak signals or those made when the presence of a listener is unsuspected.

To the extent that Ghost Sharks can relieve the Collins boats of that mission, those crewed submarines, 22 to 29 years old, will be under less operational pressure. The Ghost Sharks, being numerous, should be able to simultaneously undertake such intelligence-collection in many more places than the crewed submarines can. Being so much smaller and not needing to expose a snorkel pipe for running diesel generators (which they don’t have), they should be able to loiter in places where the navy would dare not send a Collins.

Anduril has said the Dive-XL autonomous-submarine design, which the Ghost Shark is based on, has a ‘multi-thousand mile range’, meaning at least 3,200 km. The voyage doesn’t have to start from a harbor: a Ghost Shark could be carried partway to its destination on a ship. On the other hand, it’s likely to cruise at only around 3 or 4 knots (6 or 7 km/h) to conserve battery energy.

Ghost Sharks will surely carry sonars for detecting sound from other vessels, quite likely including rope-like towed array sonars, which may have to be clipped on by divers as the sub leaves on missions. Ghost Sharks should be able to identify targets from sound signatures and decide whether they should rise to near the surface to make a radio report of what they’ve found. The information might then cue attacks by other forces, such as Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime aircraft.

Again, in performing these missions, Ghost Sharks can to some extent substitute for crewed submarines, and they can do the work in more and riskier places—especially since high danger of destruction of an uncrewed vessel may be acceptable. Maritime choke points, such as straits, are likely locations, but it’s conceivable that a line of Ghost Sharks might assemble off, say, the northwest coast of Australia and listen for enemy submarines in the open ocean.

Ghost Sharks must be much too slow to maneuver to make their own torpedo attacks.

They can surely lay mines, however, which is presumably the strike capability that Marles said the Ghost Shark would bring. Minelaying is another task that Ghost Sharks could do in more and riskier places than a Collins might enter, possibly even in ports.

Whether for minelaying or other tasks, Ghost Sharks could be dispatched before a war broke out, under instructions to lie on the sea bottom and await instructions, which might be sent by various means. Unlike crewed submarines, they couldn’t run out of food.

The dozens of Ghost Sharks in the initial batch, plus those that will follow, should enormously expand Australia’s ability to exploit the advantages of undersea warfare—to observe an enemy and disrupt its actions.

Sam Goldsmith is the director of consultancy Red Team Research.

This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here. 

 

Earlier this month, the U.S. Air Force and Royal Norwegian Air Force tried out the USAF's new antiship bomb against a maritime target in the Norwegian Sea, achieving the desired effect.

Quicksink is designed to follow a ship's movements while in mid-flight, with enough precision that it can drop into the water right alongside. When it sinks to a certain preset depth below the keel, it detonates, forcing the hull to hog upwards with the blast. The ship then falls back down, sags, and (in at least one prior test) breaks in two. In prior testing on a small merchant ship, complete sinking was achieved in under 20 seconds. This is the method of destruction delivered by heavyweight torpedoes, generally considered the gold standard of maritime lethality - but at a small fraction of a torpedo's cost. 

A Quicksink test in 2022 (Air Force Research Laboratory)

“A Navy submarine has the ability to launch and destroy a ship with a single torpedo at any time, but the Quicksink aims to develop a low-cost method of achieving torpedo-like kills from the air at a much higher rate and over a much larger area,” explained AFRL program manager Kirk Herzog in 2022.

This month, the U.S. Air Force conducted a new round of testing - this time, far from home. After a week of preparation for the bomb load, a U.S. Air Force B-2 bomber out of Whiteman AFB, Missouri flew all the way to the Norwegian Sea, where it met up with four F-35 fighters of the Royal Norwegian Air Force and one P-8A Poseidon maritime search aircraft. Escorted by the Norwegian fighters, the B-2 crew dropped more than one bomb on an unspecified maritime target, sinking it. 

Courtesy RNoAF

Courtesy USAF

“This test is a clear example of how we work with trusted allies to bring new capabilities into play faster and smarter,” said U.S. Air Force Col. Scott Gunn, 53rd Wing commander. “We’re not just preparing for tomorrow; we’re shaping it together.”

The test comes amidst rising tensions between Russia and NATO, including suspicions about the movements of Russia's fishing, research and tanker vessels. In the Baltic, Russia-linked tankers have been accused of attempted or actual damage of subsea cables. Across Northern Europe, defense planners are concerned at the amount of time that Russian research ships have spent near critical subsea infrastructure. And Russia's fishing fleet is universally suspected of spying on NATO interests, so much so that Norway has sharply restricted their access (and will even seize them if they stay too long). 

In the event of conflict, an inexpensive, proven weapon like Quicksink would be a cost-effective way to resolve these small-vessel threats if they posed a threat to strategic subsea pipelines - critical for delivering Norwegian gas to Europe. A new, 500-pound version of the bomb would be sized and priced appropriately for small vessel threats. Paired with a stealth delivery vehicle like the B-2, it would also be an efficient deterrent to bottle up the surface combatants of Russia's Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea, away from the likely conflict zone of the North Atlantic. 

 

As the UK plans to hand over Chagos Islands to Mauritius, India is eyeing to exert its influence on the archipelago. Last week, Mauritian Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam made a state visit to India, where together with Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed on several bilateral pacts spanning power sector, port development and maritime security. A major highlight of the discussion between the two leaders is India offering to assist Mauritius as it moves to assert its sovereignty over Chagos Islands.

Modi congratulated his Mauritian counterpart on the return of Chagos Islands, terming the measure as a historic milestone. “India has always supported decolonization and stood firmly with Mauritius in this journey,” added Modi.

However, the Chagos Islands takeover means Mauritius will have an expanded maritime zone to monitor. Currently, the size of Mauritius EEZ is estimated at 2.3 million square kilometers for a country with a modest coast guard, operating less than a dozen patrol vessels. Commenting on the new obligations for Mauritius, India’s Foreign secretary Vikram Misri said that India remains ready to provide the needed assistance.

“Mauritius has many more responsibilities now. It needs maritime resources, and in order to be able to fully develop and exploit those resources, it will need assistance. India is a preferred partner in providing that assistance. In addition, maritime security cooperation would help counter illegal fishing, arms and drug trafficking through support with equipment, platforms and trained personnel,” noted Misri.

Part of this support also includes surveillance of Chagos Marine Protected Area (MPA). The U.K government designated the MPA back in 2010, and it remains one of the world’s largest MPAs at a size of 640,000 square kilometers. Notably, Mauritian PM Ramgoolan requested Modi to provide an Indian ship for a planned mission to the Chagos Islands.

“We want to visit Chagos to put our flag there. The British offered us a vessel, but we said we preferred one from India because symbolically it would be better,” said Ramgoolan.  

Early this year, when Modi visited Mauritius, the two countries upgraded their ties to an enhanced strategic partnership. This has seen Mauritius become one of the largest recipients of Indian aid, with deals worth $680 million signed last week. Part of this funding will go into the upgrade of Mauritius’ Port Louis. With the re-routing of global merchant shipping via the Cape of Good Hope, Port Louis has strategic significance on the busy east-west shipping routes. Mauritius is also important to India’s ambition of projecting naval influence in the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, the British House of Commons last week voted in favor of a bill supporting handover of Chagos archipelago to Mauritius. A delegation from the UK’s Foreign Office is expected in Mauritius later this month to finalize the handover process. However, Chagos’s largest island, Diego Garcia, remains under the Anglo- American military lease for 99 years.

 

[From our correspondent at DSEI]

Shooting down Houthi drones in the Red Sea has been an expensive business.

Royal Navy Type 45 guided missile destroyer HMS Diamond (D34) was deployed in zone in the Red Sea for several months in early 2024, and on one night in January shot down seven drones aimed at merchant vessels, using its Sea Viper missiles. On its last night in the danger area, it shot down a Houthi ballistic missile. US Navy vessels, and other allies participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian, accounted for many more drones and missiles.

Whilst some drones were brought down by relatively inexpensively machine and chain gun fire from Phalanx and similar such systems, most takedowns were performed using missiles. A single Sea Viper missile probably costs more than $1m. The total cost of missiles fired by HMS Diamond during its Red Sea deployment has been estimated to be $25m, whereas the cost per unit of the Houthi drones shot down is probably in the region of $50,000.

The imbalance in the cost of attacking with drones, as opposed to defending against drones, makes the contest more than just a test of rival technologies. It also becomes a matter of attrition and economics, with defenders using systems designed for far more sophisticated targets running down stocks that are necessarily limited because of the cost of procurement.

The disparity has been clearly demonstrated once again by the recent air incursion into Poland on September 10 by at least 17 Russian drones. At least 15 were Gerbera decoy drones, unsophisticated dummies designed to draw fire, making the Russian effort either a test run or a political stunt. But this did not prevent an expensive array of air-to-air missiles being expended by NATO jets to bring them down. Economically, the contest was won by the Russians. In open war, a similar such attack would reduce NATO stocks of air defense missiles before the Russians deployed the real drones with explosive payloads.

Hence one of the most interesting stands at the biennial Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) exhibition held in London this week was that of Frankenburg Technologies. This Estonian firm has developed a short-range, speed-of-sound anti-drone missile for a unit cost of about $65,000. The company describe the missile as the smallest guided missile in the world. The Frankenburg Mk 1 can be fired from ships, but also from aircraft, drones, from fixed ground sites and armored vehicles. The low cost of the system effectively means that it could be deployed on many more platforms than is currently the case in naval applications, where the target demands a more sophisticated and integrated defensive approach. Frankenburg Technologies contends that the simplicity of its design will enable hundreds of missiles to be manufactured every week. The system appears to undergoing field trials in Ukraine.

Commander Dan Hallett, a director of the firm and a former Royal Navy officer, told TME "I’ve seen how fast maritime threats evolve. Today, Russian drones strike Ukrainian ports and Houthi drones target Red Sea shipping — proof that drones are now weapons of strategic disruption at sea. Frankenburg Technologies pairs frontline experience with advanced counter-drone missile systems for crewed and uncrewed vessels, giving navies, ports, and energy operators the tools to detect and defeat these threats before they endanger lives and maritime trade.”

It remains to be seen if prolonged Western procurement processes can transition from peacetime to more agile contracting in the face of an intensified and accelerating threat. Faced with the realities of a national struggle for survival, the Ukrainian government has an imperative to make that transition. But whether other governments still in peacetime mode can follow that lead remains to be seen.

 

[By Angela van der Berg]

The International Court of Justice’s landmark advisory opinion on climate change has come in handy for South African communities that are trying to stop global oil company Shell from drilling for oil and gas off the coast.

The opinion, handed down by the world’s highest court in July 2025, sets out what all governments are legally required to do to tackle climate change. It confirmed that:

• All states have a duty to prevent activities within their jurisdiction from causing significant climate harm.
• States must phase out fossil fuels to keep global temperatures below 1.5°C above pre-industrial times. This includes regulating private companies, such as fossil fuel corporations, to drive their pollution levels down.
• Human rights to life, health, food, water and a healthy environment are directly affected by climate change. Therefore, states must protect these rights.
• Cumulative effects matter. One mining or drilling project may seem small but governments must consider its contribution to global emissions and climate harm.
• Governments are also legally obliged to adapt towns, cities and rural areas so that they can withstand climate disasters, especially for those most at risk.

The advisory opinion is already being used in South Africa by a community and environmental law organization, Natural Justice, and a sustainable development advocacy group, The Green Connection, in their appeal against a government decision to allow Shell to drill up to five exploration and appraisal wells off the coast of the Northern Cape province.

Their appeal says the South African government has not considered how Shell’s oil exploration will contribute to climate change.

I am an environmental law specialist who researches how international and domestic law can be used to advance climate justice in South Africa and across Africa. In my view, the advisory opinion could shift the balance in courtrooms across Africa in favor of environmental justice and human rights groups. It confirms that governments must align fossil fuel decisions with their duty to prevent harm. This gives communities a stronger legal basis to argue that fossil fuel expansion undermines both their rights and their country’s climate obligations.

South Africa is already experiencing worsening floods, droughts and storms. Every bit of warming increases these risks.

The country’s 2024 Climate Change Act sets out a pathway to cut emissions and build resilience. Yet fossil fuel projects are still being approved by the government.

What the Shell appeal is all about

In June 2025, South Africa’s Department of Mineral Resources granted Shell an environmental authorization to drill for oil and gas in the ocean on the country’s west coast. This area is ecologically sensitive, supporting whales, fish stocks and small-scale fishing communities.

Natural Justice and The Green Connection argue in their appeal that the authorization is unlawful and defective. They give the following reasons.

The environmental impact assessment assumed an oil spill could be stopped far more quickly than is realistic, and downplayed the risks of ultra-deepwater drilling, where equipment failure or a blowout on the scale of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster is possible. These risks threaten marine ecosystems and small-scale fishers’ livelihoods.

Some of Shell’s safety and emergency response plans were not included in the assessment. This meant the public and decision-makers could not evaluate whether Shell is able to manage a major disaster. Their absence doesn’t mean Shell has no plans at all, but it does mean the decision was taken without a transparent review of those plans.

No baseline studies (basic surveys of the marine life and ecosystems in the exact area) were done before approval. Without this information, the risks from spills, and pollution to whales, fish and corals, were likely underestimated.

The appeal also says that there was no consideration about how future production might affect South Africa’s ability to meet its Paris Agreement commitments, and that drilling for oil and gas is outdated as these are not renewable energies.

Any oil spills could pollute beyond South African borders, potentially reaching neighboring Namibian waters. However, the environmental impact assessment ignored effects on Namibian fisheries, tourism and coastal communities.

Finally, the approval failed to comply with the Integrated Coastal Management Act, which says the South African government must protect sensitive ecosystems for the long-term benefit of communities and future generations.

How the International Court of Justice opinion has been used in the appeal

The advisory opinion is not legally binding. However, the obligations it has confirmed, in international climate and customary law, are. It is the most authoritative interpretation yet of what governments must do to prevent further climate change.

Under South Africa’s constitution, courts must take international law into account when interpreting rights.

This gives organizations like Natural Justice and The Green Connection (and others across Africa) a powerful new tool. They can:

• challenge new fossil fuel projects in court by arguing they breach international obligations to prevent climate harm
• hold governments accountable for weak climate policies or failure to meet Paris targets
• strengthen community voices, showing that demands for clean energy and protection of livelihoods are backed by international law.
• build regional solidarity, with African groups drawing on the same opinion to resist fossil fuel expansion and demand climate justice.

A turning point

Across Africa, where 45 countries are exploring for oil, gas or coal, the court’s opinion raises the stakes by suggesting that continued fossil fuel expansion could breach international obligations.

The Shell appeal is a test for whether South African courts will accept that fossil fuel expansion in the era of the climate crisis is inconsistent with the constitution and international law.

Win or lose, the case marks a shift. For the first time, African activists are wielding the United Nations’ highest court as part of their legal strategy. As climate impacts intensify, that strategy may prove decisive in shaping Africa’s energy future.

Angela van der Berg is Director of the Global Environmental Law Centre and Associate Professor, Department of Public Law & Jurisprudence at University of the Western Cape.

This article appears courtesy of The Conversation and may be found in its original form here. 

 

As part of the ongoing economic reforms, Libya has reported progress on the development of Sirte Port and its connecting infrastructure. During the peak of hostilities between forces of west and east Libya in 2016, Sirte was one of the fiercest battlegrounds. With tensions between the two Libyan governments tapering down, development initiatives appear to be resuming.

Recently, the two governments closed ranks in a move to allow Turkey to proceed with exploration of oil and gas off Libya’s Mediterranean waters. Ports development is another area that has gained national consensus in Libya, viewed as an importunity to revitalize trade relations for the country.

Sirte Port in central Libya is seen as one of the most strategic infrastructure initiatives. The port has potential to rekindle Libya’s trade with its landlocked neighbors including Chad, Mali and Niger. Sirte port resumed commercial operations in February after nearly 14 years of closure due to war in the region. The arrival of the general cargo ship Sea Horizon marked the reopening of the port. The vessel carrying construction materials and equipment for projects in Sirte Free Zone, arrived from Alexandria port in Egypt.

Last month, Sirte Free Zone Authority (SFZA) announced notable progress in the construction of the “SSS” highway project. The $2 billion road project is expected to link Sirte port with key southern cities including Sabha and Sokna. The project is part of Libya’s Vision 2030 aimed at enhancing transportation between northern and southern Libya. In addition, it is envisioned that it will form a road corridor to the country’s landlocked neighbors. Notably, the project involves companies from Egypt and the UAE, signaling regional backing.

The SSS project involves plans to install smart port system in Sirte, reportedly with Huawei’s support. There has also been significant progress in construction of specialized terminals. Early this month, Sirte port announced completion of its first dedicated bitumen unloading platform, which will support in the reconstruction efforts.

Further, the port is celebrating increased commercial activity with docking of more vessels. Last week, the Turkish general cargo vessel Lutuf docked at the port. The vessel arrived from Turkey’s port of Gemlik and was carrying about 1,000 tons of goods.

 

[By Jason Lancaster]

Guadalcanal, the Coral Sea, Tarawa, New Guinea, and Iron Bottom Sound highlight the strategic location of the South Pacific during the Second World War. Today, U.S. and allied preeminence in this vital region is under threat. The People’s Republic of China (PRC,) through a sophisticated blend of economic inducements, political influence, and maritime coercion, is executing a campaign to erode U.S. and allied presence and reshape the Indo-Pacific order. Such activities mirror the tactics of insurgency, where control is gained not just through force, but by blurring legal boundaries, exploiting economic vulnerability, and using civilian fronts to advance strategic ends.

The PRC’s maritime insurgency is not limited to the South China Sea. It is a global phenomenon. This maritime insurgency is not fought with gunfire but with corruption, development loans and aid, and the PRC’s deep-water fishing fleet. More than 17,000 vessels fishing throughout the world routinely engage in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), often acting as a civilian vanguard for PRC state objectives. The situation is particularly acute in the South Pacific, where Chinese fishing fleets exploit the limited enforcement capacity of Pacific Island Countries (PICs), deplete sovereign marine resources, and undermine local economies, eroding governance, and sovereignty in the process. 

The South Pacific is by no means a strategic backwater. It lies astride the sea lines of communication connecting U.S. treaty allies in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia.  It is home to key U.S. territories such as Guam and American Samoa. It includes the Compact of Free Association (COFA) states Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. At its heart are the fourteen Pacific Island Countries. possess rich marine resources, and command strategic real estate that could either anchor regional stability or serve as launchpads for malign influence.

Historically, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand have been the region’s primary security and development partners. However, since 2018, the PRC has dramatically expanded its presence building dual-use infrastructure, embedding security arrangements, and offering opaque development assistance. Despite sustained Western aid to these nations, Beijing’s influence has surged. The construction of Chinese-funded ports and runways in the Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Long range missiles stationed in the Kiribati or the Solomons could threaten Hawaii, Australia, and the continental U.S., compromising freedom of navigation, eroding regional deterrence, and challenging the U.S. ability to defend treaty partners Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

IUUF is a major threat to PIC economies. Fishing is a major contributor to many PIC economies and IUUF challenges the ability of states to create revenue, further condemning them to a future of dependency on international development aid. The United States can enhance its hard power in the Indo-Pacific by utilizing soft power to counter IUUF and provide humanitarian assistance, thereby denying PRC regional influence.

Countering IUUF

The United States does not need to develop a new engagement strategy with South Pacific nations from whole cloth. The Pacific Island Forum produces its own strategic documents. Composed of 18 members and associate member states, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) serves as a unifying voice for the small states of the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand are full members while U.S. territories Guam and American Samoa are associate members. The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security articulate shared South Pacific security concerns and development goals. The United States and its allies are already adopting PIF strategic documents for engagement with Pacific Island Countries to achieve mutual successes. 

Countering IUUF and other forms of transnational crime is a top PIF priority, second only to climate change and rising sea levels. While the United States pays signatory nations US$60 million a year over ten years for the privilege of fishing within PIC Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, the PRC flagrantly disregards the sovereignty of Pacific Island states while plundering their maritime bounty. Pacific Island nations do not have the capacity to police their expansive EEZs against massive fishing fleets without assistance. 

Pacific Fusion Center

The PIF’s 2018 Boe Declaration recommended various security proposals to defend PIF interests. One was the development of a Pacific Fusion Center to support the collation, sharing, and analysis of intelligence. The Pacific Island Forum stood up a Pacific Fusion Center in Vanuatu in 2021. The fusion center “enhances information sharing, cooperation, analysis and assessment, and expands situational awareness and capacity across the Pacific.” The fusion center provides an opportunity to expand multinational cooperation in the region and expand defense and security force capacity. To successfully counter transnational crime, the U.S. should support and increase the capacity of the Pacific Fusion Center with the mid-term goal of turning it into a maritime headquarters, increase the capacity to enforce PIC EEZs and laws, and increase regional maritime domain awareness fed into the Pacific Fusion Center.

Through US associate PIF members Guam and American Samoa, the U.S should offer USCG support for the center to immediately increase its effectiveness. With a mid-term goal of creating a PIC-led multilateral maritime headquarters like the Combined Maritime Forces headquarters in Bahrain, this multinational maritime headquarters would be rotationally led by PICs with Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. support, and would have tactical control of forces regionally assigned to countering transnational crime.

The Pacific Fusion Center will not be effective without forces at sea enabling maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA supports two vital interests: enabling US, Australian, New Zealand, and local PIC forces to intercept and eliminate IUUF, and monitoring the PLAN in the region. IUUF fleets are vast. This was illustrated off South America, in February 2025, when the Argentine Navy tracked over 380 PRC flagged fishing vessels near the Argentine economic exclusion zone, requiring Argentina to send two warships and two aircraft—a sizable portion of its deployable blue water forces—to monitor these fishing vessels. The United States can support MDA through multiple asset types to identify potential threats within the maritime domain, supporting both the Pacific Fusion Center and a PIF response at sea.

Improving Capacity

Most PICs have little capability to enforce their own EEZs. Australia’s mitigation for the PIC’s lack of resources is the Pacific Maritime Security Program. This security assistance program provides Guardian-Class patrol boats, an equivalent of the USCG’s fast response cutter (FRC), along with crew training and maintenance for every PIC. The program has provided a total of 22 patrol boats over 30-year program. This effort has been a mixed success, as the region is full of marked and unmarked reefs and multiple ships have met with accidents. In December 2024 the new Fijian patrol boat RFNS Timo was damaged while docking. Timo is a replacement vessel for RFNS Puamau, which hit a reef and sank in June 2024. Timo completed her first patrol in April 2025. Despite this program many of these countries still do not have the capacity to patrol the entirety of their EEZs. The geography is a demanding one—the EEZ of Kiribati is roughly the size of the continental United States. The RAN and RNZN also have capacity issues. The RAN and RNZN serve dual functions, conducting both war at sea and law enforcement missions. The RNZN’s new force design will reduce the availability of RNZN vessels to conduct regional constabulary duties.

The US Coast Guard (USCG) faces budgetary and ship number restrictions, but they are the regions preferred US service for cooperation. With local agreements, the USCG can help increase regional capacity. USCG District Oceania, formerly District 14’s area of responsibility is the Pacific with ships based in Honolulu and Guam. The USCG has two national security cutters, one medium endurance cutter, three Fast Response Cutters (FRCs), and three buoy tenders stationed in Honolulu, as well as three FRCs and a buoy tender based in Guam. The U.S. Navy supports USCG missions as able. These efforts are primarily focused on the U.S. and COFA state EEZs. USCG ships are responsible for patrolling thousands of miles of both U.S. and COFA EEZs. The distances involved are vast: it is 850 miles from Guam to Palau and over 5,000 miles from Honolulu to American Samoa. In addition to fisheries protection, these cutters are also responsible for counter-narcotics, smuggling, other law enforcement requirements, and search and rescue.

The United States must increase its regional naval presence to reassure citizens, partners, and potential partners. Utilizing USCG assets reassures regional allies and partners while minimizing the threat of escalation with the PRC, reducing fears and potential misgivings of U.S. intent. The United States should increase USCG District Oceania’s assets by relocating four Fast Response Cutters currently homeported in Bahrain to the South Pacific. The increased presence of Littoral Combat Ships in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility would mitigate the reallocation of the four FRCs. 

Eradicating IUUF

Increased and improved provision of command and control and MDA and increased capacity to intercept IUUF fishermen is required for the eradication of IUUF. Officials at the New Zealand embassy stated that there were not sufficient naval forces in the region to enforce EEZs across the multitude of countries. Legal action offers an essential tool to deter further incursions despite limited forces at sea.

PICs should be provided legal, domestic, and security assistance to prosecute transnational crime. Most PRC fishing captains work for state owned enterprises tied to important CCP bosses. Linking senior CCP party members to illegal behavior that costs PIC citizens jobs, money, and resources for the future could be a method to end IUUF as well as deter future PRC illegal activities. Convictions in absentia after fair public trials are a method to deter PRC activity and highlight PRC malign influence. 

Healthcare and Pacific Partnership

Medical support is one of the most frequently requested forms of aid from PICs. The U.S. Navy’s Pacific Partnership is hugely popular in the region and provides life-changing care. The popularity of the mission should drive the U.S. and allies to increase the frequency of visits with increased allied support. USNS Mercy does not participate every year, but there has been an attempt at her participation every two years.

The Department of Defense should discuss RAN, RNZN, and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force support for increasing the number of Pacific Partnership missions. Although none of these navies have a dedicated hospital ship like USNS Mercy, each nation has a ship suitable for these missions and the capacity to send a single vessel for a 3–4-month humanitarian deployment to the South Pacific. A planned rotation of USN, RAN, USN, RNZN, USN, JMSDF provides a six-year cycle that enables maintenance, training, and other operational requirements to be scheduled. The U.S. off-years would still see U.S. mission support with a ship as well as medical personnel. U.S. years would have USNS Mercy support.

The Navy should hub a medical expeditionary ship (T-EMS) in Yap, Federated States of Micronesia to support smaller scale but persistent humanitarian medical support in the region. These vessels contain one or two operating rooms and are extremely suitable for this mission because of their shallow draft and hospital level facilities and ability to embark helicopters. The T-EMS’s sister ships, the fast expeditionary transports (T-EPFs) have been frequently used for Pacific Partnership stations, demonstrating the utility of this class for use in the South Pacific.

Conclusion

The South Pacific region holds immense strategic value for the United States and its allies. Located at the heart of key U.S. alliances and territories, the region has drawn increasing attention from the PRC, whose maritime gray zone insurgent activities threaten to undermine regional security, economic stability, and political alignment.

The PRC’s deepening engagement with PICs, particularly through dual-use infrastructure, strategic partnerships, and coercive economic practices has shifted the balance of influence away from traditional allies like the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. The potential for Chinese military assets in Kiribati or the Solomon Islands should be viewed as a severe threat to U.S. territories and Indo-Pacific allies. Coupled with increased PLAN presence and aggressive operations, this trend signals a challenge to U.S. freedom of movement and regional dominance.

To effectively counter this encroachment, the U.S. must commit to a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy that integrates regional security support, humanitarian assistance, and institutional cooperation. Expanding the Pacific Fusion Center will strengthen intelligence sharing and regional coordination and MDA. Increased USCG presence would deter illegal activities like unregulated fishing and support local law enforcement capabilities. These efforts should be pursued in partnership with Australia, New Zealand, and other like-minded nations to promote regional ownership and reduce perceptions of neocolonial influence.

Combating transnational crime, particularly illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing requires not only physical presence but also legal and political resolve. Holding senior PRC officials accountable through international legal mechanisms can deter further violations and reinforce the rule of law. In parallel, bolstering regional healthcare through expanded Pacific Partnership missions and sustained medical presence such as stationing a T-EMS in Micronesia will address urgent humanitarian needs and enhance U.S. soft power. Ultimately, securing the South Pacific is not solely about countering PRC influence. It involves empowering Pacific Island Countries, reaffirming the United States’ commitment to its allies, and ensuring that the region remains free, open, and resilient.

Commander Jason Lancaster is a Surface Warfare Officer. He has served at sea in amphibious ships , destroyers, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5, and is the Operations Officer for the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Deployment Training Center. He holds Masters’ degrees from the National War College and the University of Tulsa and completed his undergraduate work at Mary Washington College.

This article appears courtesy of CIMSEC and may be found in its original form here. 

For one week at Belong Wisconsin’s summer camp, foster children experience what it is like to be close to their biological sibling. And as funding becomes uncertain, all involved with the camp are determined to keep it going.

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American flags hang alongside the official agency flag at the U.S. Department of Justice building in Washington, D.C., in August. The Justice Department is sharing state voter roll data with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (Photo by Jonathan Shorman/Stateline)

The U.S. Department of Justice is sharing state voter roll information with the Department of Homeland Security in a search for noncitizens, the Trump administration confirmed.

The data sharing comes after Justice Department attorneys this summer demanded that election officials in nearly two dozen states turn over their voter lists, alarming some Democratic state secretaries of state and election experts. They have voiced fears about how the Trump administration planned to use the data. Even some Republican secretaries of state have declined to provide their full voter lists.

Homeland Security in an unsigned statement to Stateline called information sharing essential to “scrub aliens from voter rolls” and said the federal government was “finally doing what it should have all along — sharing information to solve problems.”

“This collaboration with the DOJ will lawfully and critically enable DHS to prevent illegal aliens from corrupting our republic’s democratic process and further ensure the integrity of our elections nationwide. Elections exist for the American people to choose their leaders, not illegal aliens,” the statement reads.

The Justice Department said in its own statement that state voter roll data provided in response to requests from the department’s Civil Rights Division is “being screened for ineligible voter entries.”

Noncitizen voting is extremely rare. One study of the 2016 election placed the prevalence of noncitizen voting at 0.0001% of votes cast.

The data sharing marks a next step in President Donald Trump’s efforts to exert more federal influence over state-administered elections. Trump signed an executive order earlier this year that sought to require individuals to provide proof-of-citizenship documents to register to vote, a rule quickly blocked in federal court. He has also threatened to sign another executive order attempting to restrict mail ballots.

At least 10 states have either provided publicly available data or given the department directions on how to request public data. On Friday, Indiana Secretary of State Diego Morales, a Republican, confirmed to reporters that he had provided the Justice Department with all voter information requested, including driver’s license and partial Social Security numbers — making Indiana the first known state to have supplied personally sensitive data.

While the administration didn’t describe how Homeland Security will use the voter rolls to search for noncitizens, the agency operates a powerful program, Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements, or SAVE, that can identify the immigration or citizenship status of an individual.

SAVE was originally intended to help state and local officials verify the immigration status of individual noncitizens seeking government benefits. But U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which is part of Homeland Security, this spring refashioned it into a platform that can scan states’ voter rolls if officials upload the data.

In the past, SAVE could only search one name at a time. Now it can conduct bulk searches, allowing officials to potentially feed into it information on millions of registered voters. SAVE checks that information against a series of federal databases and reports back whether it can verify someone’s immigration status.

Since May, it also can draw upon Social Security data, transforming the program into a tool that can confirm U.S. citizenship because Social Security records for many, but not all, Americans include the information.

As the Justice Department has sought state voter rolls this summer, letters from the department’s attorneys to state officials in many instances have demanded full lists of registered voters that include sensitive personal information such as driver’s license numbers and partial Social Security numbers. At least 22 states were asked for some data, according to the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University, which is tracking the requests.

Some states have turned over publicly available voter files or offered directions on how to request them. Others have flat-out refused the requests.

“The Department of Justice hasn’t shown any good reason for its fishing expedition for sensitive voter information on every American,” Maine Secretary of State Shenna Bellows, a Democrat, said in a news release Monday announcing that her office had rejected the Justice Department’s second request for her state’s voter data.

Justin Levitt, who served as senior policy adviser for democracy and voting rights in the Biden White House and is now a law professor at Loyola Marymount University, said that he has no confidence that Homeland Security would act carefully with any data received.

Levitt, speaking with Stateline on Wednesday before the data sharing was confirmed, voiced concern that the Justice Department was “serving as a stalking horse” for other entities within the government.

“The fact that they’re having to sneak through the back door rather than knocking on the front door tells you that there’s improper procedures going on,” Levitt said.

This story was updated to add information from Indiana Secretary of State Diego Morales confirming his state shared voter roll information with the U.S. Department of Justice.

Indiana Capital Chronicle’s Whitney Downard contributed reporting. Stateline reporter Jonathan Shorman can be reached at jshorman@stateline.org.

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