The report found the median wage for Wisconsin workers — $25.01 per hour — reached a record high for the second year in a row, though the report says this doesn’t represent the full story when it comes to workers’ wages. (Justin Sullivan | Getty Images)

The Trump administration’s policies are defining the current economic moment Wisconsin workers are facing — undercutting economic growth and undermining workers, according to the 2025 State of Working Wisconsin report. 

Every year since 1996, the High Road Strategy Center, a University of Wisconsin-Madison nonprofit think tank, produces the report to present information on the state of work and jobs, including who is “winning” and “being left out” of the economy, though future reports may be in trouble. 

Laura Dresser, a co-author of the report and High Road Strategy Center associate director, said in a statement that the 2025 data shows “some real strengths for working Wisconsin owing to the strong recovery from pandemic shutdowns.” 

“Long-standing inequalities are still with us, and federal policy puts substantial clouds on the horizon,” Dresser said. “I’m especially concerned about the administration’s attacks on the integrity of federal economic data.”

Joel Rogers, director of the center and a UW-Madison professor, and Leslie Vasquez, outreach specialist and communications director, are also authors of the report that was released the Friday before Labor Day. 

Dresser’s concern about federal jobs data stems from President Donald Trump’s decision last month to remove Erika McEntarfer, the director of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, from her position after a dismal jobs report that showed hiring slowed in July and was weaker in May and June than previously reported. He falsely claimed the reports were rigged as his justification. 

The report warns that the approach being taken by Trump is a “disaster for economic decision making and for public trust.” 

“Good economic decisions require reliable data,” the authors stated in the report. “Without reliable independent data, we cannot understand the economy nor, more narrowly, can the High Road Strategy Center continue confidently producing reports that draw on it. With hopes for continued national commitment to reliable data, and fears about the quality of what politically motivated ‘revisions’ will do, we will anxiously monitor changes in leadership and data at the BLS.”

Wage median reaches high, gaps ongoing 

The report found the median wage for Wisconsin workers — $25.01 per hour — reached a record high for the second year in a row, though the report says this doesn’t represent the full story when it comes to workers’ wages. 

While Wisconsin’s median wage reached a new high, a difference in wages exists among workers based on gender, race and ethnicity. Men’s median wage — $27.05 — in 2024 was more than $4 per hour higher than women’s median of $22.97, a 15% difference. 

When race is considered, the differences become more stark. White men have the highest wages at a median of $28.54 per hour. The median for white women was about 17% less at $23.66 per hour. 

The median wages for workers of color fell considerably below that of white men and women. Black men and women had about the same hourly median wage at $19.93 and $20.29 — 29% less than white men. Hispanic men had a median wage of $18.56 and Hispanic women a median of $17.57.

The report also found that over 800,000 workers — nearly a third of Wisconsin’s workforce — make less than $20 per hour. 

The report says raising the minimum wage would be one way to help close these gaps. Wisconsin’s minimum wage is currently $7.25, a number in line with the federal minimum wage and that has been unchanged since 2009. 

“Raising the minimum wage to $15 per hour would not only be politically popular but would directly or indirectly raise the wages of 231,800 (or 18%) of women workers, 36,200 (or 25.6%) Black workers, and 50,200 (or 26.6%) Hispanic workers in the state,” the report states. 

In response to the report, Peter Rickman, president and business manager of the Milwaukee Area Service & Hospitality Workers (MASH) Union, also urged Wisconsin lawmakers to make increasing the state’s wages a priority this fall.

“The service and hospitality working class needs comprehensive living wage legislation with a $20 per hour floor, yearly adjustment for inflation, reduction of the tip penalty, and restoration of local control,” Rickman said. “Democrats and Republicans alike tell us that they want to represent the working class. Now is their time to show us by introducing and passing comprehensive living wage legislation.”

Meanwhile, Wisconsin reached a record of 3,058,500 jobs in July, but the state’s overall jobs growth has been weak. 

Wisconsin has added about 1,400 jobs per month in 2025 — growing about half as fast as the national rate. According to the report, the state has 2% more jobs than before the pandemic, while the U.S. overall has seen 5% more jobs. 

Unemployment remains low in Wisconsin with a 3.1% rate in July 2025. Wisconsin also has a 66.4% labor force participation rate, higher than the national average of 62.6%. 

“The jobs and unemployment data are strong, but the economy is cooling off after the rapid recovery from pandemic shutdowns,” the report states. 

It also finds the economic softening mirrors the national environment where analysts have warned of a slow down or even a recession.

Federal policies undermine growth 

Federal policy changes under the Trump administration are contributing to these outlooks, according to the report.

“For workers, the warning signs and the brewing economic storm of tariffs, immigration crackdowns and federal disinvestment are especially concerning,” the report states. “While the current labor market is solid, these substantial disruptions may not only slow our overall economic growth, but also reduce the power of working people, as opportunities become more scarce.”

The report predicts that tariffs, which are taxes on imports to the U.S., will raise the price of goods for American consumers, the Trump administration’s deportation agenda will undermine the country’s economic strength by hobbling jobs growth and federal cuts to social safety nets will hit the state’s low-wage workers hardest.

“Economists and investors have observed that immigration changes may constrain economic growth even more than the high cost of tariffs. Employers are already complaining about the impact of the raids on their workforce and customers,” the report states. 

According to the report, 320,000 immigrants reside in Wisconsin and generate $23 billion in economic output annually. In 2023, federal data found that immigrants constituted 7% of Wisconsin’s workforce. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrests in Wisconsin have doubled under the Trump administration, and of late, the administration, which promised to focus on “criminals,” has been shifting towards deporting people with no criminal convictions and no pending criminal charges. 

“Despite considerable economic and cultural contributions, immigrants face persistent barriers to fully participating in the workforce and community life,” the report states. “The current administration’s anti-immigrant policies have increased fear and dampened new immigration, constricting the Wisconsin economy where labor markets are already tight.”

The Trump administration has also approved cuts to federal Medicaid and food assistance programs, which Gov. Tony Evers’ administration estimates could cost Wisconsin over $284 million and puts thousands at risk of losing support.

“The federal budget, enacted this summer, contains hundreds of provisions with disturbing implications for working people. It holds enormous tax breaks for the rich,” the report states, noting that an analysis by the Institute Taxation and Economic Policy Wisconsin found the “annual tax break to Wisconsin’s richest 1% will be $67,000. And the tax break for the bottom fifth of households in the state? Just $70.” 

“All of this, and more, is coming and will hit lower wage working families across the state especially hard,” the report states. 

The upheaval in federal policies also comes as participation in unions in Wisconsin, which the report says helps with improving conditions for workers, are down as a result of state policies. 

From 2011 to 2024, unionization in Wisconsin fell from 14% to 7%. Over the same time period, union coverage nationally only fell two percentage points from 13% to 11%. 

That drop in Wisconsin, the report notes, comes after over a decade of public sector unions being disempowered in Wisconsin by Act 10, the state law signed by former Gov. Scott Walker in 2011 that significantly reduced collective bargaining powers of public sector employees. 

In addition, the Trump administration has targeted unions, ending collective bargaining for a million federal employees — four out of five federal workers represented by unions at over a dozen federal agencies. He has also fired members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency tasked with protecting labor rights, for “unduly disfavoring the interests of employers.” 

“Despite federal and state policies that have impeded unionization over the last half century,” the report states, “unions continue to provide workers with the means to improve wages and working conditions in their jobs.”

GET THE MORNING HEADLINES.

SUBSCRIBE

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, pictured July 31, 2025. (Photo by Ashley Murray/States Newsroom)

The economy-wide tariffs President Donald Trump placed on nearly every U.S. trading partner are illegal, a federal appeals court said Friday.

The International Economic Emergency Powers Act does not give the president the power to impose tariffs, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled in a 7-4 decision upholding a May decision from the U.S. Court of International Trade and dealing a blow to Trump’s signature trade policy.

The unsigned majority opinion said the tariffs “exceed the authority delegated to the President by IEEPA’s text.”

However, the judges delayed their ruling from going into effect until October, providing the Trump administration an opportunity to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The ruling also does not affect other tariffs Trump issued under different authorities, including industry- or material-specific tariffs on automobiles, steel and aluminum.

In a post to social media, Trump said he would appeal to the Supreme Court, where he predicted victory, and repeated his claim that tariffs were an essential economic tool.

“If these Tariffs ever went away, it would be a total disaster for the Country,” he wrote shortly after the decision was published. “It would make us financially weak, and we have to be strong.… If allowed to stand, this Decision would literally destroy the United States of America. At the start of this Labor Day weekend, we should all remember that TARIFFS are the best tool to help our Workers, and support Companies that produce great MADE IN AMERICA products.”

Several Democratic states challenged the IEEPA tariffs. Oregon Solicitor General Benjamin Gutman argued on their behalf on July 31. The 11 judges on the appeals court expressed skepticism of both sides during those arguments.

In a statement Friday, Oregon Attorney General Dan Rayfield called the ruling “a huge win for Americans.”

“Every court that has reviewed these tariffs has agreed that they are unconstitutional,” he said. “This ruling couldn’t come at a better time as people are walking into their local stores and seeing price increases for school supplies, clothes, and groceries.”

A new study projects that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC)—the system of currents that includes the Gulf Stream—could shut down after 2100 under high-emission scenarios. This shutdown would drastically reduce heat transport northward, leaving Europe vulnerable to extreme winters, summers of drying, and shifts in tropical rainfall. Climate models show the tipping point is linked to collapsing winter convection in the North Atlantic, which weakens vertical mixing and creates a feedback loop that accelerates decline.

Sargassum has escaped the Sargasso Sea and exploded across the Atlantic, forming the massive Great Atlantic Sargassum Belt. Fueled by nutrient runoff, Amazon outflows, and climate events, these blooms now reshape ecosystems, economies, and coastlines on a staggering scale.

Young orangutans master the art of building intricate treetop nests not by instinct alone, but by closely watching their mothers and peers. Researchers tracking wild Sumatran orangutans over 17 years discovered that “peering”—the deliberate act of observing nest construction—is the key to learning.

A new player is about to join Europe’s compact EV hatchback scene, and it comes from a brand gaining momentum. Leapmotor, backed by Stellantis, has offered a first glimpse of its upcoming Lafa 5 before the official unveiling at the IAA Mobility Show in Munich on September 9. Positioned directly against Volkswagen’s ID.3, it marks the company’s first step into the competitive hatchback segment.

More: I Drove Stellantis’ Chinese Electric SUV That Rivals Tesla For Just $30K

The shadowy teasers reveal a five-door silhouette with clean proportions and a sporty edge. Up front, the headlights carry Leapmotor’s recognizable LED design language, tying the car visually to the rest of its lineup.

Design Cues with a Twist

The front end with the short hood is slightly reminiscent of the pre-facelifted Kia EV6, the pronounced rear shoulders send Renault Megane vibes, while the full-width LED taillights at the back have a hint of Porsche (if you squint…). We can also see a roof-mounted LiDar sensor that hints at advanced driver assistance tech.

The hatchback is expected to sit on the same LEAP 3.5 architecture as the B10 crossover. That platform currently supports a rear-mounted motor with up to 215 hp (160 kW / 218 PS) and a battery pack offering as much as 67.1 kWh, so the Lafa 5 will likely share similar numbers.

A Record Month for Leapmotor

Leapmotor shared the Lafa 5 teasers on its social media accounts, celebrating a new record month in terms of sales. The brand delivered 57,066 units in August, which is an all-time high and represents an 88% increase compared to the same month last year.

More: Stellantis’ Chinese Brand Unveils Its First Sedan

The company’s vice president Cao Li described the Lafa 5 as a car designed for “young people who refuse to settle, conform, or be ordinary.” That ambition will put it directly in competition not only with the VW ID.3 but also with the Cupra Born, Peugeot E-308, Opel Astra Electric, MG 4, BYD Dolphin, and Renault Megane E-Tech.

More details are set to be revealed when the Lafa 5 takes the stage at the Munich Motor Show next week, so stay tuned for mow.

The battle in the battery-electric vehicle segment has never been fiercer. A growing number of brands from China have turned the EV industry on its head, forcing legacy automakers to up their game and invest heavily in the sector.

One of Audi’s first entrants into the electric SUV space was the Q4 e-tron, first launched in early 2021 as a rival to the likes of the Tesla Model Y, Volvo XC40 Recharge, and the BMW iX1 and, in Sportback guise, the BMW iX2. Barely two years after being unveiled, in late 2023, the Q4 e-tron was updated, bringing with it new electric motors, improved range, and more equipment.

Despite being on sale in Europe and the US for quite some time, the Q4 e-tron only recently landed in Australia, providing us with our first opportunity to put it to the test. It’s sold locally in SUV and Sportback guises and in 45 e-tron and 55 e-tron quattro forms. We tested the former in its entry-level trim.

QUICK FACTS

Photo Credits: Brad Anderson/Carscoops

What Makes Up The Q4 e-tron?

Underpinning the Q4 e-tron is VW’s familiar MEB platform and an 82 kWh gross, or 77 kWh usable, lithium-ion battery pack. As part of the 2023 update, power for the 45 e-tron was upped from 270 hp (201 kW) to 282 hp (210 kW). It also produces a solid 402 lb-ft (545 Nm) of torque through the rear wheels.

Prices kick off from AU$84,900 (~$55,000) for the base 45 e-tron and top out at AU$107,500 (~$69,600) for the 55 e-tron quattro Sportback. Our tester was optioned with the AU$1,350 (~$870) metallic paint, which brought up its price up to AU$86,250 (~$55,800).

With the exception of the massive faux Singleframe grille, which can be divisive, the Q4 e-tron is quite a good-looking SUV. Similarly, the interior has its pros and (of course) its cons.

Photos Brad Anderson/Carscoops

A Quirky Cabin

One thing I immediately appreciated about the cabin was the dashboard. Having spent plenty of time behind the wheel of new cars coming out of China, it was nice to step inside an SUV that has some personality, rather than a bland dash, a big screen, and not much more.

A 10.25-inch digital gauge cluster comes standard across the range, as does an 11.4-inch infotainment system supporting wireless Apple CarPlay and Android Auto. The screen is nice and responsive, and the menus are easy to understand, as with other Audi models. The software feels a little dated, but it’s usable, and the screen is handily tilted towards the driver.

Positioned below the screen are buttons for the climate control system. While plastic and rather cheap, they’re much nicer than HVAC controls in the infotainment screens of some competitors. Some flashy silver trim on the dash adds to the striking looks, as does the four-spoke steering wheel. However, there are some rather odd features.

Interior Oddities

The most notable feature is the floating console. Finished in piano black, it houses the electronic shifter and drive mode buttons, and while functional, it’s suspended over a weird array of storage cubbies. There’s a small shelf big enough for a pair of sunglasses, two vertical slots where you can put a phone, and then a separate wireless charging pad. But the charger is vertical, so you have to rest your phone on its side to charge it and secure it in position with a plastic clip that, unfortunately, may scratch a phone’s screen. A single, large storage area would have been a more elegant solution.

The haptic buttons on the steering wheel can also be infuriating. You can press the buttons individually, or swipe across them for various functions, but it’s easy to mess up. On several occasions, I accidentally hit the telephone icon while trying to skip tracks, making inadvertent phone calls. I’m also not a fan of the piano black around the door handles, which are prone to scratching.

Photos Brad Anderson/Carscoops

Additionally, for an AU$86,250 (~$55,800) SUV, there are a few too many cheap black plastics spread throughout.

Space at the front is good. The seats are appointed in lovely leather trim and include heating and 4-way lumbar support. Sadly, the front passenger seat is not electrically adjustable, which is a shame at this price point. Our tester also had some worrying signs of wear on the driver’s seat, despite only being driven a few thousand kilometers.

Review: The 2024 Audi RS e-tron GT Will Warp Your Sense Of Reality

Included among the (welcome) features is an ambient lighting system and an eight-speaker audio system with a subwoofer.

The second row is just big enough for tall adults, but headroom is lacking, as is toe room. It would have also been nice if Audi added a panoramic glass roof, as you’ll find in many other electric SUVs, some of which are significantly cheaper than this. Cargo space sits at 520 liters (18 cubic feet), or 1,490 liters (52.6 cubic feet) with the rear seats folded down.

Photos Brad Anderson/Carscoops

The Drive

Jump into the Q4 e-tron and you can set off in one of two ways. The simplest one is to press the brake pedal, select Drive or Reverse, and set off, just like a Tesla. Perhaps to cater to more traditional buyers, Audi has also added a physical Start/Stop button.

At low speeds, produces a more noticeable hum for pedestrian safety than some other EVs, but it goes away once you build speed. Speaking of speed, I was pleasantly surprised by how rapid the 45 e-tron felt. It’ll run to 100 km/h (62 mph) in 6.7 seconds, which isn’t far off some proper hot hatches, and pulls strongly to highway speeds.

Much like a Hyundai or Kia EV, Audi has positioned paddle shifters on the steering wheel to adjust the level of brake regeneration on the fly. However, there’s no full one-pedal driving mode.

The ride quality is exceptional. The Q4 e-tron suits Australian roads perfectly, providing the right amount of support while ironing out any significant imperfections in the road. And yet, it still manages to retain a slightly sporty edge, so it is quite enjoyable to drive.

Read: New Entry-Level Audi Q4 E-Tron Promises To Go The Distance

A handful of different drive modes are available, including a configurable Individual mode where you can adjust the powertrain and steering. You can also up the brake regen by driving in ‘B’ rather than Drive, which is what I did most of the time during my week with the SUV.

The Q4 e-tron is reasonably efficient. I averaged 17.4 kWh/100 km while I had it, matching the Polestar 4 and Leapmotor C10 I recently tested. This brings the real-world range closer to 450 km (280 miles). The Audi supports both 11 kW AC charging and 175 kW DC fast charging, meaning the battery can be charged from 10-80 percent in 28 minutes. That’s not class-leading, but it should be adequate for most buyers.

All Q4 e-tron models sold in Australia include adaptive cruise control with active lane-centering. Like most other EVs on the market, the Q4 45 e-tron excels on the daily commute. It’s whisper quiet, the steering is light yet direct, and it’s well insulated from outside intrusions.

Photos Brad Anderson/Carscoops

Verdict

The entry-level Q4 e-tron is a solid option for those in the market for an all-electric SUV of this size. But it comes with a premium price tag and doesn’t feel up to scratch in some areas, mainly due to some shortcomings with the interior and the fit and finish.

While not a traditionally shaped SUV, the Polestar 4 we recently drove feels a fair bit more premium, and yet is slightly cheaper. Then there’s the matter of the army of EVs emerging from China that are becoming increasingly compelling for new car buyers across Australia.

Photos Brad Anderson/Carscoops

New Zealand’s biggest port, Tauranga, has slammed further delays in the long-delayed review of large-scale improvements to its harbor, which it says would pump millions of dollars into the country’s economy.

The project has been in the consenting system for more than six years. Tauranga’s application for its greenlighting under the Fast-track Approvals Act was halted by a judicial review due to a "legislative drafting error" that left the words “Mount Maunganui wharves” out of the project description.

A fast-track panel, which was intended to commence sittings on September 1 to review the project and potentially approve it, has indefinitely been put on hold by the High Court.

Port of Tauranga has described the decision as both “ludicrous” and “frustrating”, and it says the delays in approving the project are reaching crisis point. The port is being forced to turn away shipping services due to a lack of berth capacity, and New Zealand is facing the risk of being bypassed by international services, the port warns. 

Last month, for instance, the port was forced to decline a proposed new service to the Americas that would have saved New Zealand importers and exporters millions per year in freight costs. A report by the NZ Institute of Economic Research has also estimated that, without the container berth extension, the country will miss out on NZ$485 million to NZ$749 million of annual gross domestic product by 2032.

“It is very frustrating that in the midst of significant interest from international container lines, we are unable to support new trade opportunities because we don’t have the berth space,” said Julia Hoare, Port of Tauranga Chair. “We have also lost the flexibility to readily manage congestion when ships turn up off-schedule. When arrivals bunch up, we’re forced to further delay ships at anchor and productivity decreases."

Currently, the port has a dedicated container terminal at Sulphur Point, with bulk cargo wharves at Mount Maunganui, both of which are connected by the Tauranga Harbor Bridge. The Sulphur Point container berths are operating at almost full capacity due to demand and the growing global trend that is seeing the building of larger ships.

The new project aims to convert existing cargo storage land into usable berths on both sides of the harbor, growing the port's capacity. The first stage of Sulphur Point extension will add 285 meters of berth to the south of the existing wharves and will allow the port to expand capacity from the current 1.2 million TEU to 2 million TEU annually. This will enable the terminal to accommodate three or four ships at once, instead of the current two.

The Mount Maunganui expansion involves a berth extension of 315 meters (plus mooring dolphins), a development that is aimed at relieving capacity pressure and allowing for the future replacement of the oldest, original part of the port, midway along the Mount wharves.

Despite the controversies facing the Stella Passage project, Tauranga has had stellar performance over the past financial year. New Zealand’s busiest port posted a seven percent increase in total trade to 25.3 million tonnes with container volumes increasing by 5.3 percent to 1.2 million TEUs. During the year, the port saw its profits hit NZ$126 million, a 23% increase year over year. 

 

A merchant vessel may have narrowly avoided an attack off the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia, an area that has previously had comparatively few security issues for passing traffic. The reported incident follows just days after an Israeli strike eliminated top Houthi leaders.

At about 1730 hours UTC on Sunday, the master of an unnamed vessel informed UKMTO that they had seen a splash in the water near the ship, followed by a loud bang. The crew is safe, and no damage was reported. The vessel remains under way. Investigations are in process and UKMTO has asked for passing traffic to report any suspicious activity. 

A Houthi spokesman later identified the vessel in question as the tanker Scarlet Ray, and said that it had been "hit" by a ballistic missile - contrary to the ship's own reports. AIS data suggests that Scarlet Ray had been loitering off Yanbu, and that her GPS signal was disrupted by spoofing in the weeks prior to the incident; the signal has not been received since midday Sunday. 

The area of the incident is more than 600 nautical miles north of the highest-risk Red Sea region, the waters just off Houthi-controlled parts of western Yemen. Waters off Yanbu are within the Saudi exclusive economic zone, and rarely see disturbances of the kind that plagued the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden last year.

Observers have been quick to note that the claimed attack followed three days after a major Israeli airstrike on Houthi leaders. The Israeli attack killed the group's prime minister, Ahmed al-Rahawi, and several associates, Houthi official Mohammed al-Bukhaiti told the New York Times. Others believed dead include foreign minister Jamal Amer and information minister Hashem Sharaf el-Din. The Houthis have vowed to take revenge: the group's militia council chief Mahdi al-Mashat said Sunday that "our vengeance does not sleep, and dark days await you." 

Multiple analysts have assessed that the strikes on the Houthis' political leadership - including moderates - are likely to drive the group to take more kinetic action, potentially including more actions against shipping. For more than a month, the group has focused its aim on striking Israeli territory rather than disrupting merchant traffic; after Houthi forces hit and then sank the Greek bulker Eternity C, no further reported attacks followed off the coast of Yemen for about six weeks.  

 

A small freighter encountered an explosive device and suffered a blast in waters off the coast of Odesa, according to Ukrainian media. 

Ukraine's Black Sea shipping corridor is known for the risk of drifting explosive devices and occasional Russian attacks. Sea mines linked to the Ukraine conflict have been found as far away as Georgia, on the other side of the Black Sea. The navies of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey have removed countless mines from the water, but despite countermeasures, chance encounters still happen. 

In this case, the Belize-flagged freighter NS Pride was operating off Chornomorsk - just south of Odesa's harbor - when it struck an unidentified floating explosive device. The vessel was in ballast at the time of the casualty, and there were no injuries reported. 

"The ship sustained minor damage and is currently being inspected. It is likely to continue its journey under its own power," Ukrainian Navy spokesman Dmitry Pletenchuck told local outlet Dumskaya. "Unfortunately, due to the actions of the Russian invaders, a large number of explosive objects remain at sea. And in a constantly moving maritime environment, it is, of course, impossible to predict such incidents with 100% certainty."

Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reports that it is possible that the object was the remains of a Russian-Iranian Shahed drone that had been shot down by Ukrainian forces. The other strong possibility is a drifting sea mine. 

NS Pride is an Albanian-owned, Belize-flagged coastal freighter of about 3,400 dwt. Built in 1988 and approaching her 40th year in service, the vessel has changed names eight times since 2001 and has a questionable inspection record. Her typical trading pattern alternates between Greece, Sicily and Tunisia; on this voyage, she departed from that pattern and made multiple stops in Turkey before heading further north to Odesa, hugging the coast to stay closer to Bulgaria and Romania, AIS data provided by Pole Star shows. 

 

In the past few years, there has been a growing body of research looking into the potential weakening of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation(AMOC). It is the Atlantic branch of the global ocean current system, responsible for transporting warm ocean water to the north, where it sinks and returns as cold, deep water to the South Atlantic. This circulation helps control the Northwestern European climate. In fact, AMOC is part of the reason Northern Hemisphere is on average 1.40C warmer than the Southern Hemisphere.

However, researchers have revealed rising risks for AMOC to reach a tipping point, especially as the global climate system changes. A key destabilizing factor for AMOC is changes in ocean salinity. Back in 1961, the U.S oceanographer Henry Stommel was among the first researchers to recognize how the Atlantic’s water salinity leads to AMOC tipping point. But as this research has progressed with time, there has been speculation about the role played by climate change.

Last week, researchers from Utrecht University in Netherlands released a groundbreaking study on the nexus between climate change and AMOC collapse. While the researchers published an almost similar study last year, the new paper uses data from the latest climate models contained under the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6). The recent IPCC report is based on data from CMIP6, which consists of climate models from various institutes around the world. Under CMIP6, some of the models have global warming projections beyond year 2100. This has provided a more granular approach in analyzing systems such as AMOC. Unfortunately, the findings are concerning.

Although previous studies indicated that AMOC collapse before 2100 was unlikely, the new paper shows that the tipping point could begin as early as 2060. “The risk of a tipping point by 2100 is over 90% under a high-emission scenario and over 50% under an intermediate climate change scenario,” said René van Westen, co-author of the study.

In this case, a tipping point is when deep convection in the northern Atlantic stops. One approach to the AMOC shut down is the ongoing loss of ice in the Arctic, which adds freshwater in the Atlantic, affecting the ocean salinity levels.

“The study provides rough estimates but main point is - this is a risk I used to consider less than 10%, and given the devastating impacts lasting many centuries we really want this to be less than 1%,” said Stefan Rahmstorf, Professor at Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany, who was also part of the study team.

A full shut down of AMOC would cause severe climate disruptions. Some studies have showed that if AMOC weakens, sea levels on the American northeast coastline would rise sharply. On the other side, cold air temperatures would expand to cover Iceland, Britain and Scandinavia, with unprecedented storms.

 

There are times when “the way things are” are no longer acceptable. Radical change, with incremental and careful execution, is urgently needed within the US Navy’s Surface Ship Repair Maintenance enterprise to rectify the shortcomings of two decades of well-intentioned initiatives that rendered a majority of Surface ships neglected and ill-equipped for combat.

The problem is not wholly maintenance related – the contributing issues came about as an aggregate result of the Navy’s increased operational tempo since the start of the Global War on Terror, changes in Surface Force manning models, and disputes with Congress over the decommissioning of certain classes of ships, among other things. Recent operations in the Red Sea today are eerily reminiscent of the world in 2002 when we stretched the Navy thin to answer the nation’s call – and paid a price for decades. A recent GAO report highlighted the impact of manning shortages to ship crew’s ability to perform corrective maintenance; over 75 percent of Executive Officers stated that it was “difficult or very difficult” to complete required corrective maintenance. To address the lack of sustained success, and avoid the missteps of the past, the Surface Force and NAVSEA should employ a multi-tiered approach primarily centered on retaking control of shipboard maintenance to get us fair in the channel again.

2002-2010: MSMO and Management Failure 

The story begins with the war in the Middle East in 2003. For the first time in decades, the Navy’s answer to the nation’s call to action, pushed the fleet forward, and kept it there, using its Tomahawks and Marines to enable an immensely successful land campaign. It was not by coincidence that the president chose an aircraft carrier as a platform to announce “Mission Accomplished.” The cost of that prolonged surge, however, was the deferral of a mountain of maintenance that had been scheduled for the ships and then canceled. The Navy needed to invent a way to get those ships back in service quickly and efficiently. Working with industry, the Navy developed a plan that would leverage the strengths of certain shipyards for certain types of maintenance and provide stability for the workforce by bundling multiple ships of the same class together with the idea that this would result in money savings and efficiencies in the process. This plan, called MSMO (Multi-Ship-Multi-Option) plan was implemented in the early 2000’s.

As envisioned, this plan was a good idea, however naval officers know very little about the business world. There was an implicit assumption in the execution of the MSMO plan that the Navy would save money by encouraging the industry to voluntarily decrease their bottom line. Read that again. It was never going to happen, and it didn’t happen. As a contractor following my retirement, I learned that ship repair business is just that – a business. Right or wrong, income is predicated on the Navy spending money to fix ships – any significant efficiencies in that process result in less money spent, and thus less profit. Less profit makes stockholders unhappy and drives businesses out of business. 

At the same time, the Navy decided to save manpower dollars for other programs such as the Optimal Manning and Top Six Rolldown initiatives, which reduced shipboard manning and mandated the dissolution of the Ships Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs), which had been around since the early 1980s. In fact, the GAO reports that the backlog of incomplete maintenance exceeded any savings from manpower cuts that were instituted as part of Optimal Manning and other reductions in shipboard manning.

The SIMA dissolution was especially problematic since SIMAs were primarily designed to be focused on two things: leveraging Sailors on shore duty to conduct relatively minor and mid-level repairs using the expertise gained at sea and training shipboard Sailors in their technical rating. The elimination of SIMAs had a second impact: it meant all work had to go to contractors at a much higher price. While it may be true that the cost of SIMA was higher than the projected cost of giving the work to private industry – SIMA was cheaper only if you did not consider the actual cost of SIMA, e.g. salaries, facilities, etc., the Sailor cost was already spent, and the training and experience of working on equipment in-rate on shore duty is difficult to put a price tag on. 

An additional phenomenon I observed was that the cadre of government planners who performed availability and maintenance planning and preparations were released and hired by contractors as this process moved to industry under the Multi Ship Multi Option (MSMO) strategy. This did not change the net number of personnel in this area, but it made the cost and scope of those with this skill set a bit more difficult to track and quantify, and may have added a cost to the process as well. In parallel, the Navy drastically reduced the footprint of an organization called Supervisor of Shipbuilding, who was basically the “overseer” designed to hold the ship builders and ship maintainers honest and uphold standards.

Around this timeframe (roughly 2007-2010), another dynamic came and went: Ship Class Squadrons, or CLASSRONs. Modeled after the Naval Aviation Enterprise, these groups were formed around each ship class and were given control of maintenance funding, acquisition processes, and current readiness. Led by sequential major commanders with experience in a specific ship class, they consolidated processes, lessons learned, assessments, and maintenance under one individual – wearing a command pin. They also tracked Class Advisories and major modifications across a focused subset of ships. As a cruiser commanding officer, I (Cordle) was overwhelmingly satisfied with the support received by the class advocate. In my specific case, the Cruiser CLASSRON Commander had held my job before, and therefore understood it.

The CLASSRON Commander had the time and bandwidth to deal with roughly 20 ships compared with the current model where one Engineering Duty Officer Captain has to process all of the maintenance information associated with over 100 ships on each coast. The CLASSRON initiative was not given enough “bake time” and would have likely produced significant dividends if left in place. This occurred in 2012 with the justification that it created a parallel C2 process and muddied the waters with respect to funding.

In an effort to improve oversight, Commander Navy Regional Maintenance Center, (CNRMC), was established in 2010 to standardize and oversee the Regional Maintenance Centers, whose processes were perceived to have drifted over the years. The goal was to place a flag officer on the waterfront with the supporting staff to police the maintenance process. While initially successful, the center of gravity of that organization has shifted to Washington and away from the waterfront. And in another manning decision, the Navy combined two flag positions, one for ship maintenance and one for modernization, placing arguably the two most complex functions in the Navy enterprise on the shoulders of one junior Flag officer. From this author’s experience, this task is too great for one individual, no matter how Herculean his or her efforts could be – they will always be pulled in two directions – one toward, and one away from the waterfront.

2011-2014: The Trends Worsen 

In the early 2010s, the VADM Balisle report and subsequent GAO findings were released, indicating a dangerous trend of neglect within the Surface Force. As a result, the Navy looked to reverse course in Sailor maintenance, manpower/manning models, and Officer training – albeit this was a slow change. As an outcrop of these reports and the associated action items, the Navy implemented the Surface Engineering Maintenance Planning Project, SURFMEPP, designed to focus on life cycle maintenance, act as the “conscience of the Navy” to get ships to expected service life, which has been extended several times from 35 to 45 years over the same period. 

With 2013 entered sequestration, government shutdowns, and funding shortfalls across the enterprise. During my time (Cordle) on active duty, I sat at the front table of Naval Surface Forces Atlantic time and again and signed documents that cut significant lifecycle maintenance from Surface ship availabilities because the money was not available.

To be sure, the confluence of these factors did make the MSMO more efficient, more flexible, and able to maximize the work completed, but it did not save money. The other unfortunate side effect was that a lack of rigor and uniformed oversight on the Navy side allowed companies to take advantage of the situation thereby increasing profits, although they arguably used much of the extra income to reinvest and try to grow, train, and pay their workforce in a standard capitalist model (that we laud in most other applications) – but with the Navy as their only paying customer. In the end, industry conducted themselves like any capitalist business that has to make money to stay viable. It is worth noting as background perhaps, but even before sequestration the lack of stability in the funding lines created considerable volatility in the repair community even under MSMO – the long-standing practice of underfunding surface ship maintenance and then using mid-year plus ups to close the gap to meet requirements generates its own uncertainty every fiscal year, as I experienced in my short tenure as a Type Commander Maintenance Officer in 2011 (Cordle). 

Thus, the MSMO financing vehicle coupled with the elimination of SIMAs, which was initially hailed as a process designed to get the most work done (albeit at a premium price), fell victim to economics, in that the expected savings never materialized. As a result, in the decade that was the 2005 to 2015, the Surface Navy gave away its ability to fix itself and took out title loans on its ships in the form of a maintenance backlog to the tune of billions of dollars. Add to this the compounding “interest” of fewer Sailors with less training conducting shipboard self-evaluation, and you get the expected result: a rather large volume of unaddressed maintenance discrepancies aboard ships.

2015-2020:Replacing MSMO with MACMO

About halfway through this journey, in the 2010s after one or two complete change outs of the key leaders who brought MSMO to the table, a new narrative developed: civilian contractors are making too much money and keeping the ships longer to increase their bottom line. Unfortunately, rather than conduct a holistic self-analysis of the system, the Navy abruptly scrapped the MSMO concept in favor of a firm-fixed price, restrictive process that allowed a relatively small set of contractors to bid on large availabilities individually and called it another name bathed in obfuscation: the Multi Award Contract Multi Option, or MACMO, process.

Designed to cure the ills of the MSMO process by driving competition and accountability into the system, this was another good idea, but as Admiral (ret) Jesse Wilson once said, “whenever you create a new process you create new problems”. Since this was a fairly classic “top down” initiative, there was not much of an appetite for pushback or critique and not much time to shift the processes to support it. Several established and complex processes were taken on by the government, including the purchasing of long lead time materials and the complex and detailed planning process, without a robust experience base or training program in place to support it. The learning curve for this change was a steep one, and the Navy paid a price in planning and material delays during the transition to this new process.

A 2017 GAO report captured the precise cost of these manning decisions, in terms of unexecuted maintenance, in billions of dollars and millions of man-days. The graphs are eye-popping and relevant even today.

Manpower Savings were more than offset by increased maintenance costs (Source: GAO)

Now came some interesting system dynamics that while predicted, created a new set of issues when juxtaposed against the changes previously mentioned. First, the Arleigh Burke-class Destroyers (DDGs) and the Harpers Ferry-class Landing Ship, Dock ships (LSDs) entered their midlife periods, forcing maintenance availabilities to extend beyond the previous 3 to 5-month durations into durations of 12-18 months. This length change required more planning, more parts, and a larger, better trained workforce in industry, all of which were sub-optimized by the transition to MACMO.

Secondly, the Navy also revived the Coast Wide Bid process that surprised many when it actually happened to USS RAMAGE and again to USS SHOUP a few years later. Navy Manpower and manning management processes in both the active duty and civilian side are not aligned to support such endeavors.

Thirdly, Congress and the Navy treated the Cruisers and LSDs as chips in a game of poker, alternately placing them on decommissioning lists, cutting their funding to near zero, laying them up, and then trying to bring them back after a bluff has been called. This resulted in huge sunk costs, delays in critical repairs, not to mention the impact on manning and morale of crews that were “strung along” for years in a decommissioning mindset. Like trying to restore the old Ford truck that one would find in their grandfather’s pasture, this effort has grown in cost and magnitude far beyond original estimates, sucking money away from other endeavors. Delays in designing a replacement for these capital ships, which are pretty awesome warfighters, have resulted in their being kept around, with the quandary that no capital ship is as capable, nor as expensive to maintain, as our aged cruisers.

2020-Present: The Consequences 

A 2020 GAO report found that “since shifting to the Multiple Award Contract-Multi Order (MACMO) contracting approach for ship maintenance work in 2015, the Navy has increased competition opportunities, gained flexibility to ensure quality of work, and limited cost growth, but schedule delays persist. During this period, 21 of 41 ship maintenance periods, called availabilities, for major repair work cost less than initially estimated, and average cost growth across the 41 availabilities was 5 percent. Schedule outcomes were less positive, and Navy regional maintenance centers varied in their performance.2 This is shown in the graph below:

Schedule delays under MAC-MO Contracting (Source: GAO)

Admiral Galinis, who later commanded NAVSEA as a 3-star, when asked at a 2015 Fleet Maintenance Seminar what changes the MACMO would bring around, he said “two things we will lose are flexibility and teamwork.” In retrospect, he was correct. Unfortunately, they were lost at a time when they were much needed. Another ingredient added to this complex system of setbacks was the ramp up of operational employment based on growing threats in the Pacific and in the Arabian Gulf. This resulted in policies of maintenance deferral and reduced certification requirements, all well documented in the Comprehensive Review of 2017.

Righting the Ship

In a 2019 article, David Larter described Navy Maintenance as a “dumpster fire.” While we do not fully agree with this dark assessment, it is definitely in need of a good overhaul. Surface Navy leaders have taken some action to help put us in a good place, including:

1. Surface Type Commanders have established a Post-Major Command Surface Warfare O-6 billet to oversee all aspects of the maintenance domain. This brings experience, oversight, and seniority to the process and is starting to pay dividends. 

2. Establishment of Surface Readiness Groups – this initiative (which is not new) theoretically restores the positive attributes found in CLASSRONs. Under the Surface Readiness Group model, all ships in the Maintenance Phase are aligned under one Commodore per homeport, allowing a singular focus on maintenance and freeing up the deployed Commodores to focus on warfighting.

These are great steps to remedy the problems. Imagine if a Ford F-150 production line had to deal with a change to baseline of about 30 percent – this would be a flawed business model. Yet, this is what we ask the maintenance community to deal with every time a ship enters a yard period. To address this dilemma, the Surface Force needs to improve its scope of work planning for upcoming surface availabilities. Additionally, there should be more margin built into the schedule and price of each availability. Availabilities should start with a measure of float built in, and the Surface Force should resist the urge to plan against this float. Further, the Surface Force should acknowledge that there will be increases to scope and new work, instead of ignoring it or pretending it will not manifest. By leveraging options, frontloads, class maintenance plans, and flexible contracting, it must be possible to fund and plan for both long-term maintenance and current repairs. Things on a ship break all the time, and the process needs to be proactive vice reactive. 

Additionally, the Navy should consider the following measures: 

1. Treat this like the crisis that it is. Assemble a team of the most experienced people and challenge them to come up with a plan but force them to take off their functional “armor” (acquisition, modernization, maintenance, contracting, etc.) to collaborate on a new plan that is innovative, integrated, and responsible. This team should be challenged to openly discuss the best and worst parts of each model from MSMO to MACMO, Firm Fixed Price and Cost-Plus contracts. The narrative that “the utterance of the word MSMO will result in career suicide” is not helpful here.

2. Restore SIMA as a separate command. SIMAs are currently resident within Code 900 at the Regional Maintenance Centers. This construct sub optimizes SIMA’s visibility, employment, and effectiveness. Command is command; and putting a Shore Command Pin on the Commander of Ship Intermediate Maintenance would open additional command opportunities to the Engineering Duty Officer community – and consequently be good for the ships and Sailors.

3. Empower the local shipyard. Currently a Shipyard Commander has relatively no tools or levers to punish or incentivize a lead maintenance activity during a Shipyard availability. For instance, if an LMA neglects to conduct a repair within a prescribed timeline, or the work is not completed to the level of quality that it should, the shipyard has to spend exorbitant amounts of time, resources, and money to present an iron-clad case to fiscally punish the LMA. In many cases, it is more cost effective to not pursue punishment. Conversely, the Shipyard Commander has little to no way of rewarding a LMA who does a job well (on time and/or under budget). Consideration should be given to allowing the Shipyard Commander, with delegation to pertinent Project Managers, to fiscally reward or withhold a relatively small percentage of money at their level. The shipyard represents the “tactical ground commander” and observes many violations in Shipboard maintenance, and has very little ability to affect immediate change.

4. Fix the planning phase of major availabilities. On average, the amount of work during a major availability changes by roughly 30 percent after it begins. This corresponds to a range of 2,000 and 20,000 Requests for Contract Changes (RCCs) depending on the length of the maintenance period. One solution is a “Business Model Cost and Schedule” approach that was published in the Naval Engineer’s Journal in 2021.

5. Revive the good parts of the MSMO strategy to include focusing certain repair yards on certain classes of ships and providing bundled ship contracts over a period of years to allow consistency, gain some efficiencies, and train a workforce for the nation’s future. This approach does not have to be unitary in its contracting strategy but could include a more flexible pricing process described in #1 above. The contracting officers will have issues with this, but we cannot continue to build the maintenance process around the contracting process instead of around the Fleet. Many in the commercial industry have shared that a predictable and dependable income stream are critical to allowing industry to train the workforce and invest in infrastructure.  

6. Leverage the goodness of processes like the Continuous Intermediate Availability (CIA) model conducted in Rota, Spain, which is similar to the old 13-week availabilities, where TYCOM-level maintenance is accomplished in short, focused maintenance periods. This could be folded into the OFRP, perhaps at the beginning of the Sustainment Phase right after deployment, and the ship return to service for a while before starting maintenance. To be sure, this initiative will have to be balanced against the need of the Operational Commander.

7. Split the Flag Officer billets for maintenance and modernization. There isn’t a single root cause for many of the current issues, nor is the problem with any particular individual. However, the move to put too many decisions on a single individual’s plate was a singularly bad move and needs to be fixed quickly.

8. Move the commander of CNRMC to Norfolk, and place a deputy in San Diego. The vision of CNRMC that was put in place by USFF in 2010 was to place a Flag Officer on the waterfront overseeing ship’s maintenance. That fundamental tenet has been lost but could be regained relatively simply. The new modernization Flag Officer can satiate the appetite in Washington for information, while their maintenance counterpart can get “boots on the ground” and start extracting ships from the yards with a crowbar instead of a 300-mile towing hawser. Of note, a similar move was just implemented with the creation of a Flag Officer billet to supervise the nuclear shipyards in Norfolk, Virginia.

9. Replicate the Supervisor of Shipbuilding model from the nuclear side at the regional maintenance centers. Empower them to provide oversight, accountability, and rigor to the ship repair process. Put teeth back into the process. Rewrite the NAVSEA Standard Item 009-060 to require contractors to provide a detailed, integrated plan that can be graphed, tracked and used to hold them to account. If there is one thing I hear over and over from Commanding Officers in the yards, it is “who is holding anyone accountable?” You can figure out the answer. No one.

10. Bring back a deployable ship repair capability to replace the Yellowstone Class Destroyer Tenders by installing a full machine repair capability (including Additive Manufacturing) into one Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) class ship in each theater. These multi-purpose platforms have lots of space and could probably support a modular solution as well. Manning could be surged from the Regional Maintenance Centers in time of need.

This is not an argument to completely revert to the old way of doing things. This article is formulated from not just our own experiences, but multiple peers who (at least to some extent) feel the same way. One shared, “Firm Fixed Price is a great model for the commercial industry or Maritime Sealift Command, for basic maintenance on ships that are not all that complex; it is exactly the wrong model for complex warships that require expertise, flexibility, and integration – like Navy ships.”

There were many sins (including some in which at least one of us was complicit), all well intentioned, and many unavoidable over the years. But by scrapping programs that used to work, and failing to look for another solution, we will all simply admire the problem as more and more of the Fleet is tied to the pier when it is needed most. Instead, the Surface Warfare Community needs to take control of its own destiny, help the Engineering Duty Officer community do its core job, assume responsibility for the maintenance of its ships, increase command opportunity, and inject rigor, decisiveness, and accountability into a system where these words have gone out of style.

One key component of any strategy is to “take a fix.” The 2022 GAO report on maintenance backlog provides a stunning insight into the lack of accuracy and estimating the value of deferred maintenance. The amount provided to the GAO was literally off by a factor of 10 ($1.8 billion vs $180 million). This gap was then addressed by accelerating decommissioning of multiple ships which collectively represented about 80% of the gap. Unfortunately this approach addresses the immediate problem without addressing the root cause; its effect will be temporary and cannot be repeated. As today’s Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Readiness Groups engage in global combat operations unparalleled in modern history, with even less ships than we had during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the same forces at work in 2002 are starting to become evident, with deployments stretching to an average of over 220 days and no end in sight. Unless something changes, we are likely to find ourselves in the same position 10 years from now.

Captain John Cordle, USN, retired from the Navy in 2013 after 30 years of service. He commanded the USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79) and USS San Jacinto (CG-56), earning a Bronze Star in 2003 and the U.S. Navy League’s Captain John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership in 2010. He is a Plankowner on CVN 75 and CVN 77, where he served as Reactor Officer. He received the SNA Literary Award in 2014 and 2019, as well as the 2019 ASNE Solberg Award and U. S. Naval Institute Author of the Year Award for his contributions to fatigue management in the United States Navy. In addition to serving as Chief of Staff for Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic (SURFLANT), he also served as a Program Manager for Maintenance University at Hunnington Ingalls Industries and as a GS 14 Human Factors Engineer at SURFLANT, where he was recognized with the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Award. Now retired, he is focused on leveraging his life experience to help develop future leaders.

Captain Holman Agard, USN, has a combined 27 years of service between the Enlisted and Officer ranks. He currently is serving as the Commanding Officer of USS SHOUP (DDG 86) and the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Commander for the GEORGE WASHINGTON Carrier Strike Group (CSG-5) based in Yokosuka, Japan. Previously, he served in OPNAV N96 as the Destroyers Branch Head and Ships Deputy. He also was the Executive Officer and Commanding Officer in USS HOPPER (DDG 70). He has experienced extensive maintenance availabilities in all six ships he has been stationed on.

This article appears courtesy of CIMSEC, and may be found (with footnotes) here. 

 

As Europe ramps up funding for its defense, German ports want to see some of the new resources used to strengthen transport infrastructure against potential military attacks. In a recent letter to the German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, the Central Association of German Seaport Operators (ZDS) emphasized that ports form the first line of attack in a war scenario. In addition, ports are critical in military deployment. In an emergency, materials and soldiers of the German military and NATO partners would have to be moved through seaports.

ZDS estimates that an initial $3.5 billion is needed to ready German ports for wartime emergencies. “We must prepare for this, even if we hope that it never comes to a real emergency. History has taught us this,” said ZDS. The funding should be part of the defense budget and utilized to secure vulnerable port areas and associated infrastructure. These include quay walls, cyber systems and railway facilities. ZDS recommended a dual-use approach for the funding, catering for both civilian and military needs.

Germany’s defense budget is poised to more than double until 2029, from about $72 billion in 2025 to more than $177 billion in the next four years. Part of the funds are earmarked for expanding transport infrastructure, especially roads and railways that are already considered as militarily relevant. With the ZDS proposal, the funding would also be extended to ports. Some of Germany’s most important seaports by cargo throughput include Hamburg, Bremerhaven, Wilhelmshaven and Rostock.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Germany has responded by strengthening the capabilities of its military. This has meant defense preparations for potential Russian aggression. This week, German media carried reports that the federal government is finalizing a military railway system to support NATO’s eastern flank. The exercise includes mapping critical infrastructure sites that would be prioritized in case of an attack.

Separately, ZDS has also been highlighting the aging port infrastructure in Germany. New climate regulations and shifts in global trade are putting pressure on the shipping industry to transform. Unfortunately, the financing availed to ports in Germany has been criticized as insufficient for any meaningful development, and ZDS says that the needs come to about $17 billion. Currently, the federal government pays the states around $45 million annually for seaports. However, there have been some milestones, with the federal government last month announcing $467 million in funding to ports. The investment will go into modernization and building infrastructure for green shipping.

Top image: Carsten Steger / CC BY SA 4.0

 

A federal appeals court has affirmed the lower court ruling that invalidated the Trump administration's sweeping nation-by-nation "retaliatory" tariffs. The court found that the levies do not have a legal basis under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the law that the administration has used to undergird most of its rapidly-shifting tariff announcements. 

IEEPA was enacted in 1977 to limit the president's power to impose punitive trade measures without Congress' involvement. The act allows the president to take certain trade actions during a declared emergency to respond to an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to America's economy or national security. Powers enumerated under the act include blocking tranactions, freezing assets, and (in the event of an actual attack) confiscating property belonging to the threat. The statute limits each "emergency" to one year at a time, an attempt to curtail open-ended presidential decrees. It has been used by previous presidents on rare occasions, like sanctioning Al Qaeda, targeting the ayatollahs' regime in Iran, or limiting the finances of Colombian drug gangs.  

Trump used IEEPA extensively during his first term, and has begun to apply it in earnest since January 2025. Most of his administration's tariffs - including all of his "reciprocal" tariffs on U.S. trading partners - rest on claims of authorities under IEEPA, but the administration has had difficulty defending these applications of the statute in court. 

In May, the Court of International Trade in New York found that Trump's retaliatory tariffs were not legally justified by IEEPA, but it stayed its decision pending appeal. The administration then took the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; on Friday, the court determined that IEEPA does not give the president any tariff powers (the word tariff does not appear in the text of the statute). Since Congress did not say that it would hand over its constitutional authority to levy tariffs when it wrote IEEPA, the court ruled, Congress did not delegate those powers to the president; though the White House does have other tariff authority under other statutes, the court found that it does not have tariff authority stemming from IEEPA. 

IEEPA "neither mentions tariffs (or any of its synonyms) nor has procedural safeguards that contain clear limits on the president's power to impose tariffs," the appeals court ruled. "Whenever Congress intends to delegate to the president the authority to impose tariffs, it does so explicitly, either by using unequivocal terms like tariff and duty, or via an overall structure which makes clear that Congress is referring to tariffs."

The appeals court stayed its ruling to give time for an appeal to the Supreme Court, which is highly likely. The court has responded favorably on most the administration's requests for emergency stays, and Trump held out hope that it would pause or overrule this court decision as well.  

"Tariffs were allowed to be used against us by our uncaring and unwise Politicians," President Trump wrote Friday in a social media post. "Now, with the help of the United States Supreme Court, we will use them to the benefit of our Nation, and Make America Rich, Strong, and Powerful Again!"
 

 

[By Kolaia Raisele and Aidan Craney]

In recent years, Pacific island nations have earned global credibility as champions of climate action. Pacific leaders view sea level rise as an existential threat.

But this united front is now under strain as some Pacific nations pursue a controversial new industry – deep-sea mining. Nauru, the Cook Islands, Kiribati and Tonga have gone the furthest to make it a reality, attracted by new income streams. But nations such as Fiji, Palau and Vanuatu have called for a moratorium on deep-sea mining in international waters.

Public opinion across the Pacific is often divided, pitting possible economic gains against the potential risks of an industry whose environmental impact remain uncertain but potentially significant. As this tension intensifies, it may split the Pacific and risk the region’s moral authority on climate.

What are the concerns over deep-sea mining?

Deep-sea mining targets three types of mineral deposits – polymetallic nodules strewn across deep underwater plains, cobalt-rich crusts on seamounts, and the ore deposits around hydrothermal vents.

To extract them, mining companies can use unmanned collectors to pump ore to the surface and return the wastewater. This creates plumes of sediment which can smother marine life. Methods of minimizing damage to species from mining on land are largely unworkable at depth.

Deep-sea ecosystems are poorly understood, but we know they are slow to recover. Researchers have found areas mined as a test more than 40 years ago still show physical damage and immobile corals and sponges remain scarce.

Many species live on the seabeds, seamounts and hydrothermal vents which would be targeted for mining. Pictured: a crab crawling across a field of polymetallic nodules near Gosnold Seamount. NOAA, CC BY-NC-ND

Why is there so much interest in deep-sea mining?

Deep-sea mining hasn’t begun anywhere in earnest, because the International Seabed Authority has yet to finalize rules governing extraction. This authority oversees the 54% of the world’s oceans beyond territorial waters.

But plans for deep-sea mining operations can still be submitted and considered without these rules in place.

Analysts have estimated seabed minerals could be worth a staggering A$30 trillion. Some of the richest deposits lie in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone in international waters between Hawaii and Mexico, thousands of kilometers away from Pacific nations. Under international law, companies cannot mine in international waters on their own. They need to be officially sponsored by a national government, which has to keep effective control over its operations.

One reason deep-sea mining companies see Pacific states as such useful partners is that these countries can access reserved areas of international seabed set aside for developing countries, as well as potential resources in the very large territorial waters around many island states.

Backers in Nauru, Tonga, the Cook Islands and Kiribati argue rising demand for manganese, cobalt, copper and nickel could deliver significant economic returns and diversify economies.

Nauru

Nauru’s enormous deposits of guano – compressed seabird excrement long sought as fertilizer – once made the country wealthy. But the guano is largely gone and the small nation has limited other resources.

Nauru sponsors Nauru Ocean Resources, a wholly owned subsidiary of seabed mining company The Metals Company. In 2011, the company received an International Seabed Authority contract permitting exploration of polymetallic nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, more than 8,000km from Nauru.

Nauru has since “proudly taken a leading role” in developing international legal frameworks in mining nodules in the international seabed. In June, Nauru signalled Nauru Ocean Resources would apply for an exploitation license.

Tonga

Tonga’s government is similarly backing deep-sea mining by partnering with The Metals Company to explore mining in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone.

In August 2025, Tonga signed an updated agreement with Tonga Offshore Mining, a subsidiary of The Metals Company. The agreement was originally signed in 2021 amid large-scale criticism over the lack of public consultation.

The mining company has promised new benefits, ranging from financial benefits, scholarships and community programs. Even so, the revised deal has encountered opposition from civil society, young people and legal experts. Prominent Tongans remain unconvinced, citing environmental, legal and transparency risks.

Economic pressure is part of the picture. Tonga owes an estimated $120 million to China’s Exim Bank – roughly a quarter of its annual GDP.

Cook Islands

The 15 Cook Islands are widely scattered, giving the government exclusive rights to almost two million square kilometers of ocean. The government has issued exploration licenses inside its Exclusive Economic Zone to three companies – Cook Islands Consortium, CIIC Seabed Resources Limited, and Moana Minerals. The Cook Islands government has established a domestic regulatory framework and is building research capacity.

Kiribati

Kiribati’s atolls and island are even more dispersed. The nation’s exclusive economic zone covers about 3.4 million km². The state-owned Marawa Research and Exploration company holds a 15-year exploration contract with the seabed authority. Kiribati has opened talks with China to explore potential collaboration.

The Pacific split

While revenues could potentially be sizeable for the Pacific, costs, technologies and environmental liabilities are highly uncertain.

The experience of Papua New Guinea is a cautionary tale. In 2019, the PNG deep-sea mining venture Solwara-1 went into administration following intense community pushback. The fallout cost the government an estimated $184 million. The PNG government now opposes deep-sea mining in its territorial waters.

Nautilus Mineral’s Solwara-1 deep-sea mining project in Papua New Guinea wound up in 2019. Pictured: the company’s three seabed mining vehicles. Credit Nautilus Minerals / handout image

While deep-sea mining now has clear backers, other nations are far more wary.

In 2022, Palau launched an alliance calling for a moratorium on mining in international waters. Early signatories included Fiji, American Samoa and the Federated States of Micronesia. Since then, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and the Marshall Islands have joined, as well as dozens of other countries. PNG has not yet joined.

Opposition from these Pacific states is based on the precautionary principle, which favors caution when knowledge is limited and damage is possible.

Pacific youth are among the most prominent opponents of deep-sea mining. The regional Pacific Blue Line coalition uniting civil society, faith groups, women’s organizations and youth networks has consistently called for a complete ban in the region. Young people have spoke out publicly in nations such as Tonga, where youth advocates criticized limited consultation and rallied against the plans, as well as the Cook Islands, where young people have demanded transparency.

Reputation under a cloud?

Pacific leaders have built a worldwide reputation for their principled climate diplomacy, from championing the 1.5°C goal to the major new advisory opinion on climate change issued by the world’s top court in response to a case instigated by students from the University of the South Pacific.

If some Pacific leaders open the door fully to deep-sea mining, it risks undermining the region’s united front on environmental issues and threatens its credibility.

The way this plays out will shape how the world hears the Pacific on climate and the oceans in the years ahead.

Kolaia Raisele is a PhD Candidate in Anthropology, La Trobe University.

Aidan Craney is a Research Fellow in Anthropology and Development Studies, La Trobe University.

This article appears courtesy of The Conversation and may be found in its original form here. 

 

Norway has selected the British Type 26 frigate built by BAE to meet a requirement for ‘at least’ five anti-submarine vessels.

The announcement was made jointly by Prime Ministers Sir Keir Starmer and Jonas Store on August 31, and is valued for the UK at $13.5 billion.

Ships for the Royal Navy and the Royal Norwegian Navy are to be built to identical specifications, so that in future logistic chains can be unified, joint crew training conducted and crews exchanged between ships. The decision comes ahead of the announcement of a new UK-Norway defense agreement, and builds on a particularly close naval relationship dating from the Second World War and continued through the Cold War. Royal Marines train annually in Norway to defend the far northern region, which borders Russia, and the HMS Prince of Wales (R09) carrier strike group on its deployment to the Pacific has been supported by the Norwegian Nansen Class frigate HNoMS Roald Amundsen (F311) and the logistic vessel HNoMS Maud (A530).

The primary task for the Norwegian Type 26s will be anti-submarine warfare. The weapons fits remain to be fixed, and will no doubt be adjusted for the ships destined for both navies to take into account the strength of Norwegian missile manufacturers such as Kongsberg. The frigates will have hangars to integrate an anti-submarine warfare helicopter into the ship’s surveillance and attack capability.

BAE’s Type 26 won out against stiff competition from Naval Group’s FDI, Germany’s F-127 and the American Constellation Class. The Type 26 has also been ordered for domestic manufacture by Australia (six Hunter Class ships) and Canada (fifteen River Class ships).

 

Information from multiple sources suggests that the Royal Navy is now unable to meet commitments in several important areas, contrary to UK Ministry of Defence insistence that it is continuing to meet its operational tasking. A pattern of over-reliance on allies for support in order to maintain basic operational capabilities is apparent in a number of areas. For political reasons the Ministry appears unwilling to acknowledge the difficulties. But the problems are now so widespread that the collapse in capability has become glaringly obvious, and all too embarrassing for friends and allies to mention.

The state of affairs is primarily a responsibility of British governments over many years who have shrunk the defense budget and delayed shipbuilding decisions, such that vessels are going out of service before new ships are delivered. At the same time, insufficient numbers of ships are being built to meet operational tasking, and the situation is compounded by a crisis in recruitment and retention. The issues are affecting operational capability across the whole fleet, and are not restricted to discreet capability areas.

In the Indo-Pacific, HMS Prince of Wales (R09) continues its long-range deployment. But the Royal Navy is only fielding two of its protective escorts, Type 45 destroyer HMS Dauntless (D33) and Type 23 frigate HMS Richmond (F239), the others being provided by a changing cast of ships from Norway, Spain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. For half of its deployment, the Carrier Strike Group has relied on a Norwegian replenishment ship, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary being unable to field RFA Tidespring (A136) for the entire cruise. Meanwhile on deck, the carrier is only supporting two squadrons of F-35s, half the number it was designed to carry.  Much smaller flattops, for example in the Italian Navy, carry similar numbers of aircraft.

Of six Type 45 destroyers, only two are operational, with HMS Daring (D32) about to return to service after a refit lasting over 3,000 days. The eight remaining Type 23 frigates are 30 years old, kept operational only with great difficulty, amongst them HMS Lancaster (F229), rumored likely to be withdrawn from Bahrain this year without replacement. The Type 23s are being replaced by Type 26s, with HMS Glasgow due in service in 2028, and Type 31s, with HMS Venturer due in service by 2027. 

Even if there are no shipbuilding delays, in 2026 and 2027 the Royal Navy risks being down to less than five frigates, all of dubious serviceability. It is also possible that the Norwegian order for five Type 26 frigates announced on August 31 could delay delivery of some of the eight Type 26 frigates for the Royal Navy through the reallocation of production slots.

Underwater, delays in ordering new nuclear ballistic missile submarines mean that the Vanguard Class boats are suffering prolonged unserviceability. The need to always have one ‘bomber’ at sea has meant that three-month deployments are frequently extended, in one case in 2023 to six months. Prolonged deployments generate a whole series of problems, such as crew mental health and retention issues, and inevitably systems on board either fail or scheduled maintenance is missed, risky events in nuclear submarines. The consequences of running the Vanguard boats well beyond their design life will persist until at least the early 2030s, when new Dreadnought Class submarines currently being built start coming into service. 

The situation with attack submarines is equally dire. The last Trafalgar Class submarine HMS Triumph (S93) was decommissioned in July. Of seven Astute Class submarines to be built, five are commissioned, but only one is believed to be operational, probably committed to protecting the on-station nuclear ballistic submarine at sea. None is available to counter the still-powerful Russian submarine force elsewhere, which probably explains why a recent Russian submarine alarm in the northern Norwegian Sea had to be covered at huge cost by P8 Poseidon aircraft instead.

In support of the fleet at sea, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary is suffering a manning crisis, and can probably only put four ships to sea.

The only healthy component of the fleet appears to be the offshore patrol vessels of the River Class, five of which are deployed to maintain the historic Royal Navy global presence, albeit with their limited firepower. The vessels cover for the shortage of destroyers and frigates - but without any anti-aircraft or anti-submarine capability. Royal Thai Navy versions of the same River Class design have a 76mm gun and Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Omani versions have a 76mm gun and Exocet missiles, but the Royal Navy ships for cost reasons only have a 30mm Bushmaster cannon.

For the next few years, until ships under construction come into service, Royal Navy planners will be praying that no operational emergencies arise - because so few ships are available to meet contingencies. It will be a struggle to maintain the underwater nuclear deterrent; there will be a single minesweeper in the Gulf to handle inevitable crises; issues generated by the wars in Gaza and Ukraine continue. But all the while, threats multiply and the seriousness of the lack of capability goes unrecognized.

Pesticide poisoning is a common method of suicide in many low- to middle-income countries. Substituting highly toxic pesticides for less fatal ones can save lives.<br><br><a href="https://ourworldindata.org/pesticide-bans-suicide-prevention" target="_blank"><img src="https://ourworldindata.org/cdn-cgi/imagedelivery/qLq-8BTgXU8yG0N6HnOy8g/d8cbf8af-42ff-4bb4-7704-444383efb400/w=1350"/></a>

State fairs are a big draw this time of year for millions of visitors. Whether it's getting a chance to pet a newborn calf, take a ride in a giant plastic ball or eat any number of fried foods, going to the fair is always an experience.

The post Let’s go to the state fair! We’re taking a tour of America’s favorite summer tradition appeared first on WPR.

A new Gallup poll shows the share of adults in the United States who say they drink alcohol has fallen to its lowest point in the nearly 90 years.

The post Alcohol use for Americans hit a record low. What does that mean for Wisconsin? appeared first on WPR.