NHTSA is investigating 17,198 Rivian vans for potential seat belt failures.
Fraying braided cables may leave drivers without restraints in a crash.
Rivian’s EDV was built for Amazon but now sold as the ECV to others.
More than 17,000 of Rivian’s all-electric delivery vans are under the watchful eye of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration due to potential failures of the driver’s seat belt anchorage system. According to the agency, drivers could be left without any kind of functional restraint in the event of a crash, which obviously poses a significant safety risk.
The NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation has received six Vehicle Owner Questionnaires that state the seat belt anchorage system can fail. These questionnaires “describe multiple instances in which the seat belt steel braided cable frays, breaks and/or unravels, leaving the occupants unrestrained in the event of a collision.”
It’s also noted that a frayed cable can weaken the seat belt load capacity. In the event of a collision, the NHTSA says a faulty seat belt system “presents an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety.”
A total of 17,198 examples of 2022 and 2023 model year Rivian EDVs will be investigated. The ODI says it will “focus on the integrity of the seat belt assembly, installation method, and potential design/manufacturing changes and deficiencies.” The investigation will also allow it to understand the frequency and severity of the alleged fault.
So far, the NHTSA is not aware of any injuries or fatalities caused by a failure of Rivian’s seat belt anchorage system.
The Rivian EDV is sold in three different wheelbase options and load capacities. It was initially built exclusively for Amazon after the retail giant placed an order for 100,000 vehicles, which will be delivered gradually until 2030. As of November 2023, the electric van has become available to other companies as well, where it is marketed as the ECV.
Some affected EVs may roll too far when parked, creating potential safety concerns.
The recall involves 26 Wagoneer S and 49 Charger Daytona EVs built since August.
A second recall targets 8 Wagoneer S units with an interior crash safety issue.
Automakers tend to dread recalls, but for FCA US, the latest round is a relatively small headache. Fewer than 100 vehicles are affected, though the fixes are important enough to warrant quick attention. The Jeep Wagoneer S was hit with two separate recalls on the same day, while the Dodge Charger Daytona was pulled into one of them as well.
In both cases, FCA says it has not received reports of crashes or injuries, but dealers have been instructed to carry out repairs at no cost to owners.
Rollaway Risk
The larger of the two recalls involves 26 Jeep Wagoneer S SUVs built between August 9, 2024, and March 18, 2025, along with 49 Dodge Charger Daytona models manufactured from August 2, 2024, through April 3, 2025.
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the issue lies with the Electric Drive Module, which may have been fitted with a Park Pawl Return Spring that wasn’t installed correctly. Federal safety rules require that a vehicle in Park should not roll more than 5.9 inches, or 150 millimeters, on a 10 percent grade with all brakes released. In this case, both the Wagoneer S and Charger Daytona can exceed that threshold, raising the possibility of an unintended rollaway.
Owners should be informed of the recall on September 25. FCA says that dealerships will replace the Electric Drive Module of all vehicles.
Interior structure concern
The second recall is limited to the 2025 Jeep Wagoneer S, impacting just eight units built on January 31, 2025. These electric SUVs may have been assembled with an incorrect cross car beam in the instrument panel. In the event of a crash, this could compromise the intended load distribution, increasing the risk of injury “in certain crashes.”
An investigation into the potential issue was opened on July 1, and by late August, the scope of vehicles impacted had been determined.
FCA will alert impacted owners to the recall from October 24, and dealerships have been instructed to replace the instrument panel cross car beam free of charge.
Editor’s note — This article has been updated from an original version that failed to detail the federal and state requirements for motorcoach inspections.
A motorcoach crash near Wawayanda, New York, that killed two adults and injured dozens of students two years ago underscores the critical importance of tire inspection and preventive maintenance.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released its final report this summer, concluding that a catastrophic failure of the left-front steer tire on a 2014 Prevost motorcoach caused the Sept. 21, 2023 crash. Investigators determined the failure resulted from prolonged tire under-inflation, prior impact damage, and eventual tread-and-belt separation. The bus veered sharply, breached a cable barrier and rolled into a ravine.
The motorcoach was carrying 40 high school students, three adult chaperones, and a 59-year-old driver en route to a band camp. Two chaperones were ejected and killed, the driver was seriously injured, 14 passengers sustained serious injuries, and 27 others were treated for minor injuries.
The Farmingdale Union Free School District, which chartered the motorcoach for its marching band trip, said the loss continues to reverberate across the community. Superintendent Paul Defendini described the tragedy as “unimaginable” for students, families and faculty, noting the emotional scars remain long after the wreckage was cleared.
While the crash involved a commercial motorcoach, the findings carry urgent lessons for school transportation.
Comparing School Buses & Motoroaches
School buses meet strict construction standards for crashworthiness regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and undergo stringent inspections required by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and each state Department of Transportation — daily driver walk-arounds, preventive maintenance cycles, and recurring school district, bus company and state inspections.
School buses are largely exempted from most other FMCSA regulations though school bus drivers are held to the same drug and alcohol testing and medical review requirements.
But FMCSA requires motorcoaches not only have annual inspections but also that companies perform pre- and post-trip inspections and state and federal law enforcement officials performing en-route, destination and random inspections. Many states also include motorcoaches in commercial vehicle inspections, and school districts may subject contracted motorcoach companies to their own vehicle and driver inspection, noted Ken Presley, vice president of legislative affairs, industry relations, and the chief operating officer for the United Motorcoach Association.
While federal and varying state rules also focus on motorcoach driver hours-of-service and electronic data logging requirements, the vehicles don’t have to meet the same federal construction and crashworthiness standards as school buses, though they do meet federal roof-crush standards, have advanced glazing to remain intact and prevent intrusion in a crash, and must be equipped emergency exits and with lap/shoulder seatbelts. And motorcoach drivers don’t need the school bus “S” endorsement.
“This case underscores why school administrators and contractors should be paying attention to motorcoach inspection protocols, not just their yellow bus fleets,” said Bob Pudlewski, a longtime maintenance consultant and STN’s technical editor. “When a district hires a motorcoach for a trip, it’s still their students on board. Tire safety, driver checks and maintenance records all matter.”
NTSB has repeatedly flagged tire safety risks over the past decade, issuing recommendations to strengthen preventive maintenance across the passenger carrier industry. In past cases, under-inflation, aging tires and improper load ratings have contributed to deadly crashes.
In the case of Wawayanda, New York, investigators stressed that under-inflated and damaged tires are at high risk of sudden failure. The agency urged operators to adopt Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS) or at minimum establish rigorous manual gauge checks to supplement visual inspections. It also reiterated the lifesaving value of lap/shoulder belts, noting that ejection remains a leading cause of death in rollovers.
“Tires that are inadequate or damaged pose an immediate risk to passengers and everyone else on the road,” Pudlewski said.
A Patchwork of State Requirements
Motorcoach oversight varies widely across states. Some jurisdictions mandate annual safety inspections, while others require semiannual checks or rely heavily on operator self-reporting. Federal regulations compel motor carriers to maintain preventive maintenance logs, but enforcement depends on state and local agencies, which may not always keep pace with operating cycles.
“Periodic regulatory agency inspections are not frequent enough to keep up with real-world operating cycles,” Pudlewski explained. “That’s why agencies require preventive maintenance checks conducted by owners, along with condition reports from drivers. Tires that are inadequate or damaged pose an immediate risk to passengers and everyone else on the road.”
Tires remain the single point of contact between a heavy vehicle and the road. A failure — whether from under-inflation, aging, or improper installation — can instantly compromise steering and stability. Pudlewski emphasized that operators must take ownership of this responsibility, outlining the following best practices for both school buses and motorcoaches:
Check air pressure: Over- or under-inflated tires affect performance and safety. Consider TPMS or implement a scheduled tire inspection program using calibrated gauges.
Measure tread depth: Document during every preventive maintenance cycle. Minimum: 4/32 inch on steer tires and 2/32 inch on rear tires.
Rotate tires: Every 5,000 miles to even out wear.
Torque wheel lugs: Follow OEM torque guidelines and sequences.
Maintain alignment: Improper alignment accelerates wear and stresses tires as though under constant cornering.
Liability for School Districts
The Farmingdale tragedy also raises questions of liability for school districts when contracting with outside carriers. While federal law requires motorcoach operators to meet safety and insurance standards, parents may still hold districts accountable if oversight is perceived as lacking.
Legal experts warn that failure to vet an operator’s maintenance records or safety ratings could expose districts to criticism or even liability. Transparency, safety audits and clear documentation may help build trust with parents and mitigate risk.
“The school bus industry has long led the way in preventive safety,” Pudlewski said. “Extending that same culture of vigilance to motorcoach trips is essential. At the end of the day, parents don’t distinguish between bus types—they just expect their children to get home safely.”
In the wake of the crash, New York lawmakers passed Assembly Bill A8557, requiring seatbelts on all charter buses and mandating their use. The law, which took effect in April, also increases penalties for noncompliance. State leaders say the measure is aimed at reducing fatalities and serious injuries in future crashes. Meanwhile, New York has required “seat safety belts” on school buses since 1987. The law does not specify if those seatbelts should be the two-point lap belt or three-point lap/shoulder belt variety.
The NTSB’s report shows how a single under-inflated tire can cascade into tragedy. For school leaders, maintenance directors, and contractors alike, diligence is not optional, concluded Pudlewski.
“Tires are the sole point of contact between a vehicle and the road,” Pudlewski added. “Their proper care isn’t optional—it’s essential for student safety.”
Technology to prohibit speeding is nothing new to school buses. While a federal proposal to require speed limiting devices on heavy-duty vehicles was recently scuttled, states and local governments continue to push for their use.
Where does the school bus industry stand with theses devices? Do they really increase safety?
Several manufacturers think so. Speed limiters, also known as intelligent speed assistance (ISA) technology, gained traction about three years ago in New York City. The devices were first placed on a variety of 50 government fleet vehicles but not school buses. However, the project has since been expanded three times, and currently speed limiters are now installed on 700 vehicles operating across the five boroughs, 50 of which are school buses powered by both diesel and electric.
Magtec Products provides advanced the ISA, which company names SafeSpeed, on vehicles in New York City. Gary Catapano, Magtec’s chief strategy and safety advisor, has extensive firsthand school bus safety experience. He oversaw transportation companies operating in the New York area as the senior vice president of safety for First Student as well as First Transit and Greyhound from October 2004 through October 2017.
“I’m really passionate about school bus safety and what school busses do every single day in North America. It’s a pretty incredible mission, moving all those children safely and securely, and by and large, they do a great job making that happen,” he said. “But speeding is one of those problems that affects not only the school bus industry, but every type of transport out there. … [I]t’s the leading cause of fatal injuries and crashes. Typically, from year to year, anywhere from 29 to 33 percent of all fatal crashes have speeding as a causal factor.”
He said when he left First Student, he started to work with Magtec because he had piloted the technology and saw how it could make fleets safer.
“Speed is at the center of our roadway safety problems in North America, and when you slow people down, you end up being able to avoid collisions,” Catapano said, adding that slowing down allows for more follow distance between vehicles and more time to conduct defensive driving maneuvers. School bus drivers have more time to react to other hazards on the roadway as well as actions of other motorists.
“So, not only does that eliminate speed related crashes but allows you to drive more defensively and help avoid non speeding related crashes,” Catapano added.
He noted that having ISA on school buses, especially those traveling in neighborhoods with children and bicyclists present, is critical to safety. Even traveling a few miles over the speed limit increases both crash risk and severity.
New York City vehicles have traveled over 5 million miles using Magtec’s SafeSpeed across a variety of vehicles and departments. Catapano noted that NYC is a challenging environment to operate vehicles due to its urban landscape, high skyscrapers and roadways with various speed limits.
The technology became a part of the city’s Transition to Safety plan. The report “NYC School Bus Fleet: Improving Road Safety Through Technologies and Training” published in January 2024 stated that the ISA system provides a warning (visual, haptic or a combination) to a driver that the target speed is exceeded.
After installing the technology on school buses, the report states “preliminary results on the first nine-bus pilot indicate that installing ISA on school buses decreased excessive speeding (11-plus mph above the speed limit) from 4.21 percent to 0.03 percent of overall driving time, representing a 99.29 percent decrease in excessive speeding time. These initial findings suggest that ISA is a feasible intervention to decrease speeding behaviors in school bus drivers.”
Catapano explained that NYC chose to enforce a speed limit that was above the posted limit by 11 miles per hour and matched the settings of the 2,000 speed cameras that are in placed around the city. Many NYC streets have a speed limit of 25 mph, putting the maximum speed a vehicle could travel at 36 mph. He noted the SafeSpeed device keeps track of the posted speed limits wherever the vehicle is traveling, regardless of if it’s on a highway or residential street.
Meanwhile, the 2025 NYC Safe Fleet Transition Plan, prepared by the Volpe National Transportation Center for the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), said ISA resulted in a 64 percent relative decrease in the amount of time that drivers exceeded the speed limit by at least 11 mph.
“With sufficient evidence that ISA is effective at reducing severe speeding, the technology has been recategorized from “exploratory” to a Tier 2 “best practice” technology,” the report states. It adds that the city plans to install ISA in an additional 1,600 fleet vehicles, which would be the largest single deployment of active ISA in the U.S.
In addition to safety, Catapano said the speed limiters are also saving fleets anywhere from 3 to 5 percent on fuel consumption. Plus, he said speeding results in tailgating, which leads to having to use the brakes more often, resulting in higher maintenance costs for parts replacement.
He added the technology is relatively affordable and easy to install—typically taking around one hour per bus.
Beyond speed regulation, the Magtec SafeSpeed system also offers remote vehicle shutdown capabilities, which can be used in emergency situations, such as when a bus driver is impaired or a vehicle is hijacked. Originally developed for military and high-value cargo protection, this security feature allows school districts to safely immobilize a vehicle from their dispatch office.
“Whether it’s an impairment issue, a medical emergency, or even a security threat, this technology gives districts a way to take control and protect both passengers and the public,” Catapano added, noting that no additional device is required.
Another Success Story
New York City’s adoption of ISA systems is already inspiring interest from other school districts, some with as many as 1,200 buses already equipped with the technology, Catapano noted. Yet adoption remains slow nationwide.
“Truthfully, the technology is very inexpensive and it’s readily available now,” Catapano said. “The real question is, why aren’t more districts using it?”
At least one more big city is. A new pilot program in Washington, D.C., featuring speed-limiting technology developed by LifeSafer, is making waves in the effort to reduce crashes, injuries and fatalities on the road. The program also centers around ISA technology that automatically prevents vehicles from exceeding the speed limit.
LifeSafer has a three-decades-long mission of preventing road deaths, starting with ignition interlock systems. But four years ago, the company pivoted toward broader applications of safety tech.
“I started asking, how else can we save lives?” said Michael Travars, president and general manager of LifeSafer.
That question led to the development of an ISA technology, a system already proven in large commercial fleets but largely untapped in the public sector—especially in school transportation.
The turning point came when Travars connected with Rick Burke, D.C.’s traffic safety officer, during a conversation about the city’s Vision Zero goal for eliminating traffic crash fatalities. That led to a pilot installation of ISA devices in 10 school vehicles used for the city’s School Connect program, which provides equitable transportation for students transferring between schools.
The pilot program launched in January and was designed to run for three months, focusing on school buses operating throughout the city at varying times and locations. After just 30 days, feedback from school bus drivers was overwhelmingly positive.
“The drivers loved it,” Travars relayed. “One of them told me, ‘I know my vehicle will go the speed limit, so I can pay attention to the kids.’ That’s the whole point.”
He said the technology is purposefully non-distracting and once installed—typically a 30-minute process—the system silently enforces preset speed thresholds. Using real-time data from mapping sources like HERE, Google and Waze, the system automatically calibrates to local speed limits. It never hits the brakes for the drivers but simply prevents further acceleration.
The goal, Travars said, is safe, seamless compliance. And if drivers need to override the limiter in an emergency, a manual override button provides temporary acceleration for a fixed time, after which the limiter resumes.
With the D.C. pilot now past its initial phase, LifeSafer is working closely with city officials to expand ISA technology across more school vehicles. At the same time, the company is actively speaking with other cities and districts interested in launching their own programs. And while cost is always a concern for school systems, LifeSafer is committed to flexibility.
“We’re being adaptive during this early adoption period,” added Travars. “We want to see proof of safety, and we’re happy to work with districts to make that happen.”
Feds Have a Different Opinion?
Meanwhile, despite positive feedback from NYC, D.C. and others, the National Traffic Highway Safety Administration and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration withdrew a proposal to require ISA on heavy-duty vehicles.
The proposal would have required heavy vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating over 26,000 pounds to be equipped with speed-limiting devices, initially set to a speed—likely between 60 and 68 miles per hour—that was to be determined in the final rule.
It dates back to the Obama administration’s original proposal that trucks with a gross weight of more than 26,000 pounds be equipped with a speed-limiting device to keep them under 65 mph. The proposed rule was withdrawn during the first Trump administration, only to be revived and advanced in 2022 by the Biden administration.
However, FMCSA and NHTSA withdrew the rule once again earlier this year. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said the device is not only an inconvenience but a hazard for drivers who are forced to go slower than the flow of traffic. Reasons for the withdrawal include policy and safety concerns as well as continued data gaps that create considerable uncertainty about the estimated costs, benefits and other impacts.
Bus & Motorcoach News reported that the American Trucking Associations, United Motorcoach Association other industry advocates embraced the proposed rule, including large trucking firms, Coach USA and many four-wheel truck drivers.
The opposition centered on the hazards of speed differentials, increased crashes, traffic backups, driver fatigue and increased pressure on a dwindling driver pool for relief drivers, as many routes were previously accomplished without exceeding the driving hours of service.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued a letter of non-enforcement for school bus child safety restraint systems tied to updates made to FMVSS 213.
NHTSA proposed on May 30 amendments to Child Restraint System Standards FMVSS 213, FMVSS 213a and FMVSS 213b to exempt school bus child safety restraint systems from the requirement to comply with side-impact protection requirements defined in FMVSS 213a. Charlie Vits, a child passenger safety technician and consultant to school bus seating manufacturer IMMI, said during STN EXPO West in Reno, Nevada, that NHTSA issued a letter of non-enforcement for school bus CSRS, allowing for the continued use of the safety restraints designed for school buses.
On July 2, NHTSA stated that it “recognizes that because the date on which the comment period closes is the same as the compliance date for FMVSS No. 213a, it will not be possible to publish a final rule prior to the current compliance date. NHTSA is concerned that the regulatory uncertainty likely to arise for the period of time in between the June 30 compliance date and any published final rule will lead to a decrease in overall levels of CRS safety as fewer CRS options are available for the public,” it stated.
It noted that in the public interest, NHTSA is exercising its discretion to temporarily pause enforcement of the applicability of FMVSS No. 213a for CRSs produced on or after June 30, 2025, and until the date of publication of any rule finalizing the May 30 proposal.
“NHTSA emphasizes, however, that under 49 U.S.C. 30115(a), a manufacturer may not certify to a standard if, in exercising reasonable care, the manufacturer has reason to know that the certification is false or misleading in a material respect. As such, even while the enforcement of the applicability of FMVSS No. 213a is paused, if a manufacturer continues to certify to the standard, the manufacturer must have a good faith basis that the CRS meets the standard,” NHTSA added.
Meanwhile, in addition to delaying the side-impact protection compliance date for all other child restraint systems from June 30, 2025, to Dec. 5, 2026, the proposal provides that the Child Restraint Air Bag Interaction 12-month-old (CRABI)-12MO test dummy will not be used to test forward-facing CRSs.
NHTSA proposes to amend FMVSS No. 213, “Child Restraint Systems” and FMVSS No. 213b, child restraint systems: Mandatory applicability beginning Dec. 5, 2026,” to exclude school bus CRSs from the requirements and to provide attachments for connection to the vehicle’s LATCH child restraint anchorage system. These anchorages are only required in school buses that are 10,000 pounds GVWR and less.
Vits, a child passenger safety technician and a consultant to school bus seating manufacturer IMMI, said NHTSA has always been supportive of school bus child restraint systems since the 2003 introduction of IMMI’s SafeGuard STAR as well as the Besi Pro Tech and HSM PCR.
As currently designed for school transportation, NHTSA wants to assure their continued future availability and use, Vits said, adding the purpose of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published on the Federal Register last week is to remove three important but non-applicable regulatory details impacting their design and function.
“Unless these detailed requirements are removed from FMVSS 213, 213a and 213b as currently written, the production of these school bus child restraints will most likely cease on June 30, 2025, when the three requirements are to become effective,” he said.
These child restraint systems will no longer be compliant with the federal child restraint standards unless they are redesigned and constructed as a more costly and less usable product, Vits added.
Denise Donaldson, a certified passenger safety instructor and editor and publisher of Safe Ride News, noted the recent proposals are essentially housekeeping in nature.
“The more exciting development occurred in 2023, when NHTSA issued a final rule to create a product category specifically for school bus child restraint systems,” she explained. “Although these products were previously considered compliant with FMVSS 213 under the category harness, the new category’s description gives manufacturers greater freedom to innovate when designing products made exclusively for school bus use.”
From left: Denise Donaldson, the editor and publisher of Safe Ride News Publications, and Sue Shutrump, at the time the supervisor of OT/PT services for Trumbull County Educational Service Center in Ohio, discuss the importance of CSRS during STN EXPO Reno on July 14, 2024. (Photo courtesy of Vincent Rios Creative.)
When that rule was issued, Donaldson said incongruities with school bus CRSs remained in the regulatory text.
“Since these products install using a seatback mount, they needed to be made exempt from the standard’s requirement that car seats have a LATCH system for installation,” she added. “They should be exempt from the upcoming side-impact standard since the test in that standard replicates a passenger vehicle environment, substantially different from a school bus. These are loose ends, so the proposals are important for addressing these issues and satisfying the requests of petitioners, including manufacturers.”
Vits noted the NPRM cleans up regulatory language from current rulings that school bus child restraint systems could not meet due to the nature of their design.
Meeting the requirements would require costly redesigns resulting in a less usable school bus child restraint, he said, adding, “The intent of NHTSA is not to change anything that impacts the concept of the current school bus child restraint.”
In 2014, NHTSA first published proposed rulemaking to add side-impact crash protection to all types of child seats except harnesses, otherwise known as school bus vests, Vits said.
“IMMI commented on the NPRM that although it supported side-impact protection requirements in child restraints, school bus child restraints were similar to the excluded harnesses and not capable of meeting those requirements,” he added. “The nature of the web-based, no-shell design for these child restraints does not provide the necessary structure to meet these requirements. Therefore, school bus child restraint systems should also be excluded from meeting the side- impact protection requirements.”
NHTSA published the final ruling on side impact requirements as FMVSS 213a on June 30, 2022. But, Vits noted, NHTSA had yet to formally define school bus child restraints as a type of child restraint, so they could not exclude it from side impact requirements.
With FMVSS 213b in December 2023, NHTSA formally defined it as a type of child restraint but omitted excluding it from the requirements of FMVSS 213a. He said the oversight was to have been corrected in a to-be-published ruling last Oct. 9 but again was missed.
IMMI submitted a Petition for Rulemaking on Jan. 19 that formally requested NHTSA change the regulations to exclude school bus child restraints from the FMVSS 213a requirements, resulting in last week’s NPRM. IMMI also found the requirement to include LATCH and tether connectors and their associated labeling remained as a requirement for school bus child restraints, Vits said.
“IMMI submitted another Petition for Rulemaking on May 19, 2025, formally requesting NHTSA to change the regulations to exclude school bus child restraints from the LATCH connector and associated labeling requirements of FMVSS 213 and 213b,” he said, adding the change was also included in the NPRM.
Several other regulatory product developments impacted passenger vehicle child seat manufacturers and caused concern they would not be able to meet the FMVSS 213a effective date of June 30, 2025. In response to the petitions of these manufacturers,Vits said NHTSA published the NPRM to propose delaying the effective date of FMVSS 213a to Dec. 5, 2026, the same effective date of FMVSS 213b.
The proposals “are what is needed to set the standard’s school bus CRS category on the correct footing, allowing current CSRs models to be compliant and opening the door for future innovation,” Donaldson, who favors the proposals, pointed out.
“School bus child restraints have served the industry well for the past 22 years,” she added. “They have provided critical protection to pre-K children in numerous school bus crashes over the years. They need to continue to be available to school transportation for years to come.”
While Donaldson expressed confidence that NHTSA will make the necessary changes to FMVSS 213a and 213b, Vits commented that unless NHTSA acts immediately according to the proposed ruling, manufacturers will need to cease production.
“Although the comment period closes on June 30, NHTSA wants to hear from those in the industry as soon as possible due to the urgency to turn this NPRM into a final ruling,” he added. “They want to know that transporters of pre-K children want these school bus child restraints now and in the future.”
In providing input by June 30, Vits noted “comments should be short and simple, beginning with a statement in support of the May 30, 2025 NPRM, FR Doc. 2025-09750. Then, briefly share your positive experiences with these type of child restraints, especially if they have provided protection to any of your children in crashes.
“Express your need to have them continue in production without adding requirements to provide side impact protection and LATCH anchorage connectors.”
Donaldson noted in creating the school bus CRS category in 2023, NHTSA clearly signaled its support of this type of child safety restraint system.
“I feel confident that a rule that finalizes these important proposals, which are necessary to make that category viable, will be forthcoming,” she added.
Ronna Weber, executive director for the National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services, said the National Congress on School Transportation’s Resolution No. 6, Request for Clarification on FMVSS 213a and 213b Final Rules, approved by state delegates last month underscores the industry’s commitment to safely transporting preschool and special needs children, a sizeable industry component.
The resolution noted that any regulations should continue to ensure children requiring securement based on age and weight are carried safely and securely, CRSs are attached to the seat back to ensure a secure fit for the child. It is believed approximately 310,000 to 335,000 CRSs designed for school buses are on the road today.
NHTSA also published a total of 16 NPRMs on May 30, most of which are considered deregulatory by cleaning up obsolete ruling text related to requirements for vehicles produced more than 10 years ago. Rules pertaining to school buses include: FMVSS 207: Seating Systems, FMVSS 210: Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, and FMVSS 222: School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection
As no new requirements are being added, there is little merit in commenting on them, commented Charlie Vits, a certified passenger safety technician and consultant to IMMI.
Donaldson said those in the school transportation sector should be assured that their school-bus-only CSRS and any that they purchase while the NPRM is going through the rulemaking process continue to be safe and legal.
“These regulatory changes will not necessitate though would allow future redesign of these products,” she said. “However, another aspect of the 2023 final rule that applies to any forward-facing child restraint, including school-bus-only CSRS, requires labels and instructions to state a minimum child weight for riding forward facing of 26.5 pounds.
“The compliance deadline for this requirement is June 30, 2025. For school-bus-only CSRS, this means that a rider must be at least 26.5 pounds, which is slightly higher than the pre-rule-change minimum weight of 25 pounds for most models.”
Editor’s Note: This article has been updated to include the letter of non-compliance. Taylor Ekbatani contributed to this report.