19 Polestar 3 owners are subject to a new recall for their panoramic glass roofs.
In each case, the roof could detach due to a rework during the production process.
The automaker will replace the glass roof on all electric cars as part of the recall.
Before they even reached customers, a small batch of Polestar 3s had to go back to the shop — again. Nineteen vehicles that were already reworked during production are now being recalled due to an issue introduced during that very process. The problem at hand isn’t a tiny one either.
The panoramic glass roof on these SUVs could detach while driving, which would be an alarming sight for anyone on the road behind them.
According to Polestar, the 3s in question needed a paint rework during production. During that process, technicians used masking tape, and the automaker is worried that it wasn’t removed correctly. In cases where some is left behind, the glass and body structure might not adhere properly. Ironic in this case that additional tape might make two things not stick so well.
What to Watch For
That all said, Polestar does provide some insight for owners who might wonder if they own one of the affected cars. Beyond simply searching for their VIN through the NHTSA or their local dealer, owners can look for warning signs. These include water leaking into the cabin, an unsuspected increase in cabin noise, and errors with various electrical systems.
Oh, and there’s one more thing. Polestar points out that it’s possible that the roof could “separate from the vehicle.” Notably, it adds that this is an unlikely possibility and that it would probably include high speeds, a bumpy road, and somewhat dramatic acceleration or deceleration. All and all, it seems like this is a relatively small issue and one that very few owners will have to deal with.
Next Steps for Owners
Those affected can expect Polestar to remove any masking tape around the panoramic roof and replace the roof itself. Polestar 3 owners with a build date after December 3, 2024, don’t have to worry about this, as the manufacturer has mended the issue after that. The automaker will send out owner notification letters no later than August 18.
Certain Tesla models may have seat fasteners that are not correctly torqued.
The company became aware of the issue after a customer complaint in May.
Tesla is no stranger to recalls in the United States, but more often than not, its vehicles can be fixed with a simple over-the-air software update. However, that’s not the case with their latest recall, which will require owners to return their cars to a store or service center to be fixed. Making things worse for Tesla is the fact that the recall is for the brand-new 2026 Model Y and Model 3.
A safety report reveals that one or more fasteners joining the seat back to the seat base may not have been torqued correctly during assembly. Owners of vehicles with the defect may now have a loose or rattling seat. Unsurprisingly, the NHTSA and Tesla have determined this poses a safety risk in the event of a crash, prompting a recall.
Fortunately for Tesla, the recall only impacts 48 vehicles in the United States, of which just 2.1% are estimated to contain the defect. Cars being recalled include 30 Tesla Model Ys built between April 3, 2025, and May 7, 2025, as well as 18 Model 3s manufactured from Apr 3, 2025, to April 16, 2025.
The NHTSA recall reveals the fault could affect either the driver or front passenger seat, or both. Tesla became aware of an issue on May 12 after it received a customer complaint. It was quickly determined that 2 of the 4 fasteners used to secure the seat back to the seat bottom on the driver’s seat were completely missing.
Tesla claims to have pinpointed the root cause of the issue. It states that on April 2, 2025, a production change at the factory made it possible to manually advance the seat assembly from the backup manual assembly station without the system having to verify that the fasteners were present or torqued correctly.
Owners impacted by the recall will be notified on August 16. Dealers have been instructed to inspect the seat assemblies and, if necessary, replace any missing or incorrectly tightened fasteners.
Volvo just recalled over 11,500 cars because their braking software might not be right.
The automaker has advised owners to stop using one-pedal driving until further notice.
Thankfully, an over-the-air software update will resolve the issue for affected vehicles.
Update: While Volvo hasn’t specified the exact number of cars affected, they did send us a statement confirming that “the software remedy has been rolled out to compatible cars via over-the-air update and is also available through retailer workshops.” The spokesperson further added, “We are asking customers who have not yet had the corrective software installed in their cars to avoid selecting ‘B’ mode or One Pedal Drive while driving.”
Regenerative braking is a vital technology for EVs and PHEVs. Without it, they’d have a significantly lower range. The entire driving experience would be different since it enables B-mode and one-pedal driving. Now, 11,469 Volvo owners are finding out what that’s like to live with. The automaker just issued a warning to stop driving with either of those modes until it sorts out a braking issue.
The new recall, number 25V392000, includes several models from 2020-2026, including the S60, V60, S90, XC60, XC90, XC40, EX40, EC40, and C40. Those running software 3.5.14 might have issues with their brake control module. Specifically, they might experience a loss of braking functionality. While that sounds bad, there are two sides to this story.
According to Volvo, the issue seems to only pop up after “coasting downhill for at least 1 minute and 40 seconds.” It would be rare to do that on the vast majority of roads. One would likely be descending a mountain or dropping into a valley on a long highway.
But the big issue is what happens if it does occur. The automaker warns, “If the situation occurs, pressing the brake pedal may remove braking functionality entirely.” Clearly, that’s about the worst possible scenario.
Notably, Volvo didn’t provide a chronology report to explain how it heard about this situation, what it did in the aftermath, and how it decided to conduct a recall. Because of that, we’re missing a lot of vital information about how this all came about.
The NHTSA does require Volvo to produce that report, but it simply isn’t available yet. We do know that Volvo plans to fix all of these cars via a software update over the air. It’ll notify owners by August 6, and dealers already know about the situation.
Interestingly, this recall might actually be a bit bigger than 11,469 units. In a different piece of paperwork filed with the NHTSA, Volvo says that the recall includes 14,014 cars. We’ve reached out to the NHTSA to see why the figures are different. We’ll report back here if we learn the cause of that difference.
Rivian recalled 28,000 R1T and R1S EVs due to faulty front turn signals.
The faulty turn signals fail to illuminate, creating a potential safety risk.
The company isn’t aware of any accidents or injuries caused by the issue.
The owners of 2025 Rivian R1T and R1S models in the US may start being confused with BMW drivers after it was revealed that some of the brand’s EVs may have faulty turn signals. This problem has forced the automaker to issue a recall in the United States for almost 28,000 vehicles.
According to Rivian, the issue lies in one or both of the front turn signals failing to light up or flash as they should, which, unsurprisingly, isn’t exactly up to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. The culprit? Turn signals sourced from Myotek in Farmington Hills, Michigan, which may have been improperly manufactured.
It’s unclear what may have been done wrong during the manufacturing of the turn signals, but they could suffer some kind of “internal failure.” If one or both of the turn signals stop working, a message will be displayed on the instrument cluster. The remaining turn signals will also start blinking twice as fast as they should, and the turn signal sound will accelerate.
A total of 27,882 vehicles are involved in the recall. These consist of R1S models manufactured between April 29, 2024, and May 13, 2025, as well as R1Ts that were built from July 10, 2024, to May 13, 2025. Rivian says it stopped using the suspect front turn signals on May 13.
An investigation into the problem was initiated in February before Rivian decided a recall was necessary at the start of June. It isn’t aware of any accident or injuries caused by the fault, but it could prove to be a nuisance for both owners and other motorists.
Owners will be notified of the recall starting July 25, and dealerships will inspect the affected vehicles, replacing the turn signals if needed.
It’s the sort of issue that’s unlikely to cause major headaches, but one that’s definitely irritating enough to warrant a fix. Let’s just hope it doesn’t turn into a flash of trouble.
New legislation affecting future school bus safety across Illinois could add pressure to already constrained school transportation budgets.
Senate Bill 191, passed by the Illinois General Assembly last month, requires all new school buses manufactured after July 1, 2031, be equipped with three-point seat belts. The bill does not require school bus drivers or aides to ensure students wear the occupant restraint systems or to provide training on their usage.
The legislation now sits on Gov. J.B. Pritzker’s desk. Under Illinois law, he has 60 calendar days to act. If no action is taken within that time frame, the bill automatically becomes law. This process is outlined in the Illinois Constitution and ensures that a passed bill cannot be blocked through executive inaction—a notable contrast to the federal system.
It is doubtful Pritzker veto the bill and force a three-fifths vote in both chambers to override. It passed unanimously in the House and secure three-times more yes votes than no votes in the Senate.
That is due in part to pushing back the original compliance date three years from Jan. 1, 2028.
Supporters say the measure improves student safety and aligns school buses with modern standards. Critics warn that installing seatbelts will increase costs for school districts already struggling to meet current demand, potentially reducing the number of students they can transport.
Child passenger safety providers are urging the industry to voice support of proposed rulemaking by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that addresses an oversight in updates made to FMVSS 213 that could impact the new manufacturing of child safety restraint systems for school buses.
It also delays the side-impact protection compliance date for all other child restraint systems from June 30, 2025, to Dec. 5, 2026, and provides that the Child Restraint Air Bag Interaction 12-month-old (CRABI)-12MO test dummy will not be used to test forward-facing CRSs.
NHTSA proposes to amend FMVSS No. 213, “Child Restraint Systems” and FMVSS No. 213b, child restraint systems: Mandatory applicability beginning Dec. 5, 2026,” to exclude school bus CRSs from the requirements and to provide attachments for connection to the vehicle’s LATCH child restraint anchorage system. These anchorages are only required in school buses that are 10,000 pounds GVWR and less.
Charlie Vits, a child passenger safety technician and a consultant to school bus seating manufacturer IMMI, said NHTSA has always been supportive of school bus child restraint systems since the 2003 introduction of IMMI’s SafeGuard STAR as well as the Besi Pro Tech and HSM PCR.
As currently designed for school transportation, NHTSA wants to assure their continued future availability and use, Vits said, adding the purpose of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published on the Federal Register last week is to remove three important but non-applicable regulatory details impacting their design and function.
“Unless these detailed requirements are removed from FMVSS 213, 213a and 213b as currently written, the production of these school bus child restraints will most likely cease on June 30, 2025, when the three requirements are to become effective,” he said.
These child restraint systems will no longer be compliant with the federal child restraint standards unless they are redesigned and constructed as a more costly and less usable product, Vits added.
Denise Donaldson, a certified passenger safety instructor and editor and publisher of Safe Ride News, noted the recent proposals are essentially housekeeping in nature.
“The more exciting development occurred in 2023, when NHTSA issued a final rule to create a product category specifically for school bus child restraint systems,” she explained. “Although these products were previously considered compliant with FMVSS 213 under the category harness, the new category’s description gives manufacturers greater freedom to innovate when designing products made exclusively for school bus use.”
From left: Denise Donaldson, the editor and publisher of Safe Ride News Publications, and Sue Shutrump, at the time the supervisor of OT/PT services for Trumbull County Educational Service Center in Ohio, discuss the importance of CSRS during STN EXPO Reno on July 14, 2024. (Photo courtesy of Vincent Rios Creative.)
When that rule was issued, Donaldson said incongruities with school bus CRSs remained in the regulatory text.
“Since these products install using a seatback mount, they needed to be made exempt from the standard’s requirement that car seats have a LATCH system for installation,” she added. “They should be exempt from the upcoming side-impact standard since the test in that standard replicates a passenger vehicle environment, substantially different from a school bus. These are loose ends, so the proposals are important for addressing these issues and satisfying the requests of petitioners, including manufacturers.”
Vits noted the NPRM cleans up regulatory language from current rulings that school bus child restraint systems could not meet due to the nature of their design.
Meeting the requirements would require costly redesigns resulting in a less usable school bus child restraint, he said, adding, “The intent of NHTSA is not to change anything that impacts the concept of the current school bus child restraint.”
In 2014, NHTSA first published proposed rulemaking to add side-impact crash protection to all types of child seats except harnesses, otherwise known as school bus vests, Vits said.
“IMMI commented on the NPRM that although it supported side-impact protection requirements in child restraints, school bus child restraints were similar to the excluded harnesses and not capable of meeting those requirements,” he added. “The nature of the web-based, no-shell design for these child restraints does not provide the necessary structure to meet these requirements. Therefore, school bus child restraint systems should also be excluded from meeting the side- impact protection requirements.”
NHTSA published the final ruling on side impact requirements as FMVSS 213a on June 30, 2022. But, Vits noted, NHTSA had yet to formally define school bus child restraints as a type of child restraint, so they could not exclude it from side impact requirements.
With FMVSS 213b in December 2023, NHTSA formally defined it as a type of child restraint but omitted excluding it from the requirements of FMVSS 213a. He said the oversight was to have been corrected in a to-be-published ruling last Oct. 9 but again was missed.
IMMI submitted a Petition for Rulemaking on Jan. 19 that formally requested NHTSA change the regulations to exclude school bus child restraints from the FMVSS 213a requirements, resulting in last week’s NPRM. IMMI also found the requirement to include LATCH and tether connectors and their associated labeling remained as a requirement for school bus child restraints, Vits said.
“IMMI submitted another Petition for Rulemaking on May 19, 2025, formally requesting NHTSA to change the regulations to exclude school bus child restraints from the LATCH connector and associated labeling requirements of FMVSS 213 and 213b,” he said, adding the change was also included in the NPRM.
Several other regulatory product developments impacted passenger vehicle child seat manufacturers and caused concern they would not be able to meet the FMVSS 213a effective date of June 30, 2025. In response to the petitions of these manufacturers,Vits said NHTSA published the NPRM to propose delaying the effective date of FMVSS 213a to Dec. 5, 2026, the same effective date of FMVSS 213b.
The proposals “are what is needed to set the standard’s school bus CRS category on the correct footing, allowing current CSRs models to be compliant and opening the door for future innovation,” Donaldson, who favors the proposals, pointed out.
“School bus child restraints have served the industry well for the past 22 years,” she added. “They have provided critical protection to pre-K children in numerous school bus crashes over the years. They need to continue to be available to school transportation for years to come.”
While Donaldson expressed confidence that NHTSA will make the necessary changes to FMVSS 213a and 213b, Vits commented that unless NHTSA acts immediately according to the proposed ruling, manufacturers will need to cease production.
“Although the comment period closes on June 30, NHTSA wants to hear from those in the industry as soon as possible due to the urgency to turn this NPRM into a final ruling,” he added. “They want to know that transporters of pre-K children want these school bus child restraints now and in the future.”
In providing input by June 30, Vits noted “comments should be short and simple, beginning with a statement in support of the May 30, 2025 NPRM, FR Doc. 2025-09750. Then, briefly share your positive experiences with these type of child restraints, especially if they have provided protection to any of your children in crashes.
“Express your need to have them continue in production without adding requirements to provide side impact protection and LATCH anchorage connectors.”
Donaldson noted in creating the school bus CRS category in 2023, NHTSA clearly signaled its support of this type of child safety restraint system.
“I feel confident that a rule that finalizes these important proposals, which are necessary to make that category viable, will be forthcoming,” she added.
Ronna Weber, executive director for the National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services, said the National Congress on School Transportation’s Resolution No. 6, Request for Clarification on FMVSS 213a and 213b Final Rules, approved by state delegates last month underscores the industry’s commitment to safely transporting preschool and special needs children, a sizeable industry component.
The resolution noted that any regulations should continue to ensure children requiring securement based on age and weight are carried safely and securely, CRSs are attached to the seat back to ensure a secure fit for the child. It is believed approximately 310,000 to 335,000 CRSs designed for school buses are on the road today.
NHTSA also published a total of 16 NPRMs on May 30, most of which are considered deregulatory by cleaning up obsolete ruling text related to requirements for vehicles produced more than 10 years ago. Rules pertaining to school buses include: FMVSS 207: Seating Systems, FMVSS 210: Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, and FMVSS 222: School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection
As no new requirements are being added, there is little merit in commenting on them, commented Charlie Vits, a certified passenger safety technician and consultant to IMMI.
Donaldson said those in the school transportation sector should be assured that their school-bus-only CSRS and any that they purchase while the NPRM is going through the rulemaking process continue to be safe and legal.
“These regulatory changes will not necessitate though would allow future redesign of these products,” she said. “However, another aspect of the 2023 final rule that applies to any forward-facing child restraint, including school-bus-only CSRS, requires labels and instructions to state a minimum child weight for riding forward facing of 26.5 pounds.
“The compliance deadline for this requirement is June 30, 2025. For school-bus-only CSRS, this means that a rider must be at least 26.5 pounds, which is slightly higher than the pre-rule-change minimum weight of 25 pounds for most models.”
A 2023 fatal crash in Arizona is linked to Tesla’s Full Self-Driving software system.
The incident raises questions about Tesla’s vision-only autonomous driving strategy.
It coincides with Tesla’s Robotaxi push and sparks concerns over autonomous readiness.
When tech collides with the real world, the consequences are rarely theoretical. In late 2023, a tragic accident happened in Arizona. Of 40,901 traffic fatalities that year, it was unique. It was the only one that involved a pedestrian and a Tesla reportedly running on Full Self-Driving (Supervised) mode. Now, as Tesla begins its Robotaxi launch in Austin, it’s raising questions about safety now and in the future.
The accident happened in November of that year when Johna Story, a 71-year-old grandmother, was pulled over on the interstate. She was stopped in an effort to help others who had already been in an earlier accident. Video from the Tesla shows that the roadway leading up to the crash was obscured by direct sunlight on the horizon.
That said, the video obtained by Bloomberg of the crash does show warning signs that something was wrong. While the roadway is impossible to see, the car in the right lane slows down. Other vehicles are parked on the right shoulder. A bystander was waving their hands for traffic to slow down.
Before he knew it, Tesla driver Karl Stock was veering left, then back toward the road before hitting a parked Toyota 4Runner and Story head-on. She passed away at the scene. “Sorry everything happened so fast,” Stock wrote in a witness statement for police. “There were cars stopped in front of me and by the time I saw them, I had no place to go to avoid them.”
Notably, Bloomberg claims that FSD was engaged at the time of the accident. “He [Stock] had engaged what the carmaker calls Full Self-Driving, or FSD,” the report claims. This isn’t substantiated by the police report. Neither the reporting officers nor Stock mentions FSD, Autopilot, or any sort of cruise control or autonomous system. That said, it’s possible that the publication gained access to the non-public NHTSA crash report and that more data is available there.
Vision Vs. Lidar & Radar
Ultimately, crashes like this highlight what seems like the most obvious concern for Tesla’s FSD. Vision-based systems aren’t wildly dissimilar from the way that humans perceive the road. That means that when humans struggle to see the roadway ahead, as is the case with bright sunlight on the horizon, or in smoke-filled or foggy conditions, vision-based systems can struggle too.
As mentioned, it seems unclear when exactly FSD was engaged and when it wasn’t. That said, even if the system disengaged in time for Stock to avoid the crash, it’s unclear how he would’ve seen what was coming to do so. In fact, this crash and others like it, albeit without additional fatalities, led the NHTSA to kick off an investigation into FSD that is still ongoing.
“A Tesla vehicle experienced a crash after entering an area of reduced roadway visibility conditions with FSD -Beta or FSD -Supervised (collectively, FSD) engaged. In these crashes, the reduced roadway visibility arose from conditions such as sun glare, fog, or airborne dust,” the investigation called out.
On the flip side, systems that rely on radar or lidar can ‘see’ beyond fog, light glare, and smoke. They can pick up on obstacles that vision-based systems sometimes have real trouble with. In this case, a lidar-equipped system could’ve potentially alerted Stock to the stopped obstacles. That doesn’t make them perfect.
Cruise famously shut down after billions worth of investment because of crashes. Those cars all used radar and lidar and still failed. All of that said, it’s still a bit of a wonder as to why Tesla and its CEO, Elon Musk, are so staunch in their use of vision-only systems. Only time will tell if that changes.
The Robot Elephant In The Room
We might learn sooner rather than later whether or not Tesla sticks with its vision-only system. The automaker is already testing robotaxis and driverless cars and is set to expand that this month in Austin, Texas. Musk has promised that the program will expand throughout the year and that Level 5 autonomous driving is coming soon.
Of course, Tesla has continually improved FSD over the years. It’s a dramatically more capable system than it was in 2023 but it still has some major issues. Just a few weeks ago, a Tesla, reportedly with FSD engaged, crashed on an open road with no obstacles, no visual queues, or any other explicable reasoning. We’ve yet to confirm the details, but in the video, the car literally drove off of the road and into a tree at around 55 mph. These two crashes are things that Tesla’s Robotaxis cannot do if the automaker ever wants them to be mainstream. For now, there’s little more to do than to wait and see what happens.
— Jaan of the EVwire.com ⚡ (@TheEVuniverse) June 4, 2025
The automaker is famous for its lack of a PR department [until it really wants to get a message out]. That said, it does sometimes speak about why it continues to push for Autopilot and FSD usage among its customers.
Two years ago, when it recalled over a million cars, it said, “We at Tesla believe that we have a moral obligation to continue improving our already best-in-class safety systems. At the same time, we also believe it is morally indefensible not to make these systems available to a wider set of consumers, given the incontrovertible data that shows it is saving lives and preventing injury.”
While Tesla is notoriously opaque about the safety data it gathers, it does claim that its cars are safer on average than human drivers. Since third parties don’t have full access to that data to validate it, it’s hard to simply accept those claims. Nevertheless, if they’re accurate, Tesla has a point. At the end of the day, nobody in this equation wants to risk lives. The question is, which route is the safest, not just in the future, but right now?
Besides thanking the various individuals involved in putting together the 17th National Congress on School Transportation last month in Des Moines, Iowa, and providing copies of the proceedings to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and other organizations, resolutions focused on increased safety and data keeping.
The most time-sensitive resolution is No. 6, which requests clarification on FMVSS 213a and 213b final rules related to the performance and use of child safety restraint systems (CSRS). NCST submitted the resolution to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration immediately. It notes that the school transportation industry takes great pride in providing the safest form of transportation available and that preschool and special needs transportation are a sizable component of the industry.
The resolution states the importance of further engaging NHTSA “to ensure children requiring securement based on age and weight are carried safely and securely, child safety restraint systems are attached to the seatback to ensure a secure fit for the child. It is believed that there are approximately 310,000 to 335,000 [child safety restraint systems] specifically designed for school buses on the road.”
NHTSA is currently accepting comments for a notice of proposed rulemaking initiated as a result of the final rules for FMVSS 213a and 213b that would exempt CSRS from side-impact protection requirements and lower anchorage attachment requirements (due to being designed for school buses specifically). The NPRM also states that the CRABI-12MO test dummy is no longer being used to test forward-facing CSRS for side impact, and that labels on school bus CRSs will also be updated to reflect their installation method, versus referencing vehicle belts or child restraint anchorage systems.
The NPRM also seeks to delay the implementation of FMVSS 213a and 213b to Dec. 5, 2026 from June 30, 2025, giving more time to manufacturers to test and certify their products.
Resolution 1 expressed appreciation to Patrick McManamon for serving as NCST Chair from 2015 to 2024. He stepped down as chair earlier this year citing professional and personal reasons.
Resolution 3 recognized the following individuals for serving as on-site officials and for their dedication and service to NCST.
– Mike LaRocco, conference chair
– Charlie Hood, on-site chair
– Susan Miller, on-site coordinator
– Lori Wille, editor
– Laura Meade, parliamentarian
– Rene Dawson & Reginald White, timekeepers
– Samantha Kobussen, National School Transportation Specifications and Procedures artwork
– Zander Press, printer
– Ronna Weber and NASDPTS leadership for “making the Congress a success in the manner it was organized and concluded.”
However, the NCST resolution asks NHTSA if CSRS specifically designed for school buses — such as the IMMI Star, BESI ProTech, and HSM Portable Child Restraint — are exempt from the side-impact requirements under FMVSS 213a, as of the effective date of June 30. If they are not exempt, NCST questioned if devices manufactured prior to June 30 will remain permissible for continued use beyond the implementation deadline. The resolution also asks, in the event the specified CSRS are not exempt and in consideration of maintaining a high standard of safety, what alternative CSRS models or types would be deemed acceptable for continued use on school buses.
The resolution seeks clarification from NHTSA if it will be issuing any additional guidance or initiating rulemaking specifically addressing the use and approval of CSRSs for school bus applications prior to the June 30 effective date. It also asks NHTSA if it will be updating the curriculum for the Child Passenger Safety on School Buses training courses to reflect the forthcoming changes, particularly those involving add-on school bus securement systems.
“The NCST respectfully urges NHTSA to provide a formal response and guidance at the earliest possible opportunity, mindful of the June, 30, 2025 implementation date to support informed decision-making, training readiness, and procurement planning by school transportation providers nationwide,” the resolution states.
NHTSA mandates transportation equipment design and safety performance requirements but does not regulate use. States establish requirements for each type of CSRS based on a child’s age and weight as well as the vehicle. NHTSA did publish Guideline for the Safe Transportation of Pre-school Age Children in School Buses, which essentially recommends using CSRS for the appropriate weight and height of children and following CSRS manufacturer installation instructions. That guideline, which is not binding for states, came out in February 1999 and no updates have been made since.
Additionally, the NHTSA-sponsored Child Passenger Safety on School Buses, taught at TSD Conference, is also best-practice guidance and not a regulation. It was already updated in 2023 by the National Safety Council. The organization develops and maintains the curriculum. The NHTSA website also includes a School Bus Safety page that links to more information on the eight-hour, hands-on securement training.
Meanwhile, Resolution 2 referenced a March 2024 School Transportation News article that identified a student passenger reporting challenge that indicates school bus ridership is disappearing. The Editor’s Take column by Ryan Gray noted that the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration indicates the number of students transported nationwide by the yellow school bus is about one-third less than the figure used by the industry.
The resolution recognizes the need to develop a standardized reporting system for collecting school bus ridership data and “requests the interim steering committee of the 18th NCST to appoint a focus group to research and develop recommendations for standardization of data collection relative to ridership on school bus and make periodic reports to the Interim Committee.”
Data collection for the 2024 survey is expected to be completed this fall.
Resolution 5 “encourages transportation professionals to plan bus stops that are not in proximity to known registered sexual offenders when made aware, when possible. Training programs should be provided to all transportation personnel on recognizing and reporting suspected or known human trafficking.”
The resolution states that the NCST is aware of the safety concerns associated with sexual predators and offenders as well as human trafficking, noting an increase these crimes occurring across the U.S.
All NCST resolution proposals presented to the state delegations passed.
Edmunds recently experienced unintended acceleration in its Charger Daytona test vehicle.
Similar issues have been reported online, prompting a response from automaker Stellantis.
It says this is a ‘drive-by-brake’ safety feature that has been on combustion cars for years.
For most folks, a car that accelerates on its own is a dangerous proposition. Just ask Toyota — those unintended acceleration headlines weren’t exactly a PR dream. According to Stellantis, though, that’s a meticulously engineered safety feature. It just happens to be one that we haven’t really heard about before today.
In fact, it only entered the spotlight after Edmunds experienced the issue firsthand with its Dodge Charger Daytona long-term tester, which began picking up speed without the driver’s input.
To put things lightly, the launch of the Charger Daytona hasn’t gone as well as Stellantis might have hoped. That said, it’s still a vehicle worthy of testing and reviewing, and that’s why Edmunds has one. What they likely never expected was that it would speed up on its own one day.
An Unexpected Moment
According to the tester who was behind the wheel at the time, things went sideways almost immediately:
“I was pulling out onto a thoroughfare street from a strip mall parking lot when warning lights appeared on the Charger’s instrument panel for the stability control, frontal collision warning system, regenerative braking, and more. There was also a short-lived message — it might have been something about the forward collision warning system — and that the car would be in low power mode. This wasn’t good. I could tell something was wrong because the car accelerated sluggishly.
Once up to speed, the Charger did the thing we’re all here to talk about. It kept accelerating even after the driver lifted their foot off of the pedal. That’s weird in any car, but even stranger in an EV, where regenerative braking usually slows the car down faster than in a combustion car.
According to the driver, this wasn’t rapid acceleration, but more akin to the speed one typically gains in an automatic car when letting off of the brakes from a dead stop. Except, rather than only being capable of picking up a little speed, it managed to add around one mile per hour each second that the brakes weren’t applied. That said, the brakes did work, albeit with more force necessary (according to the driver) than normal.
“I let the car accelerate by itself as a test. It reached about 45 mph before I had to apply the brakes again for another stop sign. That was enough. Using the time-tested fix for all things tech. I pulled off onto a side street from the stop sign and parked. Fortunately, the acceleration stopped when I put the transmission in Park.”
For its part, Stellantis says that this is the way it’s designed, but we’ll circle back to that. First, it’s important to point out that Edmunds isn’t alone. Thomas Hundal over at The Autopian compiled a list of similar instances documented online.
That included one complaint directly to the NHTSA, where a driver claimed that the car sped up even after they were off the accelerator. They finished their complaint with an important detail. “I regained control using the brake alone.” When confronted with this evidence, Stellantis responded, and the statement it gave was a whopper.
All Of This Is Intentional, Says Stellantis
Here’s the statement in full before we break it down a little.
“In the rare event of an accelerator pedal fault, Stellantis has implemented a ‘drive-by-brake’ safety feature, which allows the driver to control speed through the brake pedal. In this instance, the feature worked as intended, and the driver was able to safely maneuver the vehicle off the road. This feature has been in Stellaris internal combustion engine vehicles for many years and has been carried over to battery electric vehicles.”
That’s right, folks, nothing to see here. “The feature worked as intended.” This is especially gobsmacking because the car doesn’t tell the driver what is happening. It doesn’t alert drivers to, you know, drive via the brake pedal. Of course, many electric cars now feature one pedal driving, but those ones use active regenerative braking to slow down when no input is provided.
It seems that the Charger Daytona is fitted with technology that does the exact opposite. It’s worth noting that while Stellantis says this is a feature carried over from combustion cars, we can’t find any examples of it. There’s no mention of it in past press releases, owner’s manuals, or any other documentation we’ve checked up until now, though we’re still digging, and if anything turns up, we’ll update the story.
For now, at least, several outlets are trying to get the word out to Charger Daytona owners that if their cars accelerate when they don’t expect it, it’s totally normal. Honestly, this doesn’t sound like a totally terrible feature so long as owners know what to expect and when to expect it. We’ve reached out to Stellantis in hopes of learning more about the situation. If we hear back, we’ll update you here.
Waymo is recalling 1,212 cars due to a risk of hitting fences, gates, and obstacles.
The autonomous car company states it has no reports of injuries linked to the recall.
In fact, it actually fixed the affected vehicles before the recall was issued last year.
Waymo handles recalls in a unique way, standing apart from most other brands. Instead of relying on dealerships to manage the process, Waymo can implement fixes directly. And, rather than notifying customers individually, the company can resolve the issue internally. This approach is on display again with the latest recall, which addresses an issue Waymo identified and corrected last year. Interestingly, this recall isn’t tied to any particular vehicle model.
In an NHTSA filing dated May 12, 2025, Waymo declared a recall of its “5th Generation Automated Driving System (ADS) software prior to the 11/7/2024 driverless software release.” It affected 1,212 vehicles that could have ended up in collisions with “chains, gates, and other gate-like roadway barriers.” Notably, Waymo says that it doesn’t know of any injuries related to the recall.
So why the recall if the problem has already been addressed? Well, the answer is simple: Waymo is obligated to publish it on NHTSA.
The filing clarifies that “Waymo’s internal safety processes had previously identified collisions with chains strung across the path of travel, gates, and similar roadway barriers as an area for improvement, and software updates were in progress at the time NHTSA’s examination began.”
That examination is related to over 22 incident reports involving the same fifth-gen software at the heart of this recall. In that case, the NHTSA says that it involves “collisions with clearly visible objects that a competent driver would be expected to avoid.” Waymo says that during its ongoing discussions with the NHTSA, it was busy working on this issue in the background.
Ultimately, on May 1, 2025, Waymo chose to initiate the recall to meet “relevant regulatory reporting obligations.” Since Waymo owns all of the vehicles involved, there was no need to notify individual vehicle owners or dealers.
The latest recall affects 3,665 Polestar 3 models in the United States due to a camera glitch.
Polestar said it’ll resolve the issue with an over-the-air software update for affected vehicles.
Volvo recently recalled over 400,000 vehicles in the U.S. for a similar rearview camera fault.
Just days after news broke that nearly 28,000 Polestar 2 EVs are being recalled in the United States for a faulty rearview camera, the 2025 Polestar 3 is now facing similar issues. Things could get particularly bad for the majority-owned Geely brand if the Polestar 4 is the next model to be recalled, as it famously doesn’t even have a rear window, meaning it solely relies on a camera.
Polestar says that the vehicle’s infotainment display does not show the rearview camera image by default when the SUV is placed in reverse. In addition, if the vehicle is traveling forward at less than 10 mph since it was last placed in reverse, a 3D/360 view is incorrectly displayed, as opposed to the rearview image.
Curiously, whereas Polestar recently specified the 2’s issue was due to a synchronization error between the Parking Assist Camera and the infotainment system, it hasn’t specified what the cause of the issue in the 3 is. What we do know is that it can be remedied with a simple over-the-air software update that is being readied.
In total, 3,665 Polestar 3 models are impacted by the recall. All of them were built between March 7, 2024, and April 23, 2025. Polestar says the software will be updated either by a dealer or through an over-the-air (OTA) update, free of charge. Owner notification letters are expected to be mailed on July 1, 2025.
Volvo is also dealing with some rearview camera issues of its own. It is recalling a total of 413,151 vehicles in the United States over a software issue that may prevent the image from being shown on the infotainment screen. Impacted models include the likes of the S60, V6, V60 Cross Country, S90, V90, V90 Cross Country, XC60, XC40, XC90, and C40.
Ford recalled three trucks over what it suspects could be some missing battery nuts.
All three are Lightning EVs with nuts located on the high-voltage battery junction box.
If they’re indeed loose or missing, they could cause arcing and potentially lead to fire.
Whether some realize it or not, automotive safety has never been as advanced as it is currently. That safety doesn’t just relate to how cars handle on-road incidents either. It starts at the production facility, and a new recall from Ford is a great example.
The Blue Oval just recalled three, yes three, individual F-150 Lightnings due to one or more potentially missing or loose retention nuts. In a new recall filing with the NHTSA, Ford says that these nuts hold the high-voltage battery junction box bus bars down. If they’re missing or loose, it could lead to electrical arcing or even a fire.
According to Ford, the nuts in question could’ve been removed in error during a reworking operation. It seems that there was no record of the nuts being re-torqued to appropriate specs after that rework. As such, Ford wants to check to be sure they’re not just there, but that they’re tight too.
While it says it doesn’t know of any accidents or injuries related to the issue, it does say that it knows of one field report and one warranty report related to the same incident. It’s already alerted dealers to the issue and will notify all three owners by May 23 at the latest. Dealers will check the nuts, install them if necessary, and of course, torque them properly. That should solve the issue altogether.
Until then, owners should pay attention to signs like a “loud noise while driving”, a “Stop Safely Now” message, and a check engine or malfunction indicator light on the dashboard. If the problem occurs, the truck will lose motive power, but the 12-volt battery should continue supplying power to steering and braking systems.
Decades ago, it’s unlikely that a problem as isolated as this one would’ve even been found. Even if a worker on the production line had caught it, they might not have had procedures in place to track other similarly affected vehicles.
No doubt, recalls are on the rise across the industry, but cases like this explain why that’s not as bleak a headline as it may seem. Essentially, the safety net that catches defects has a much finer mesh size than ever before, and we’re all safer for it.
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